







Submitted by Lewis David Coyne to the University of Exeter   
as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
in the Department of Sociology, Philosophy, and Anthropology,  
in January 2018. 
  
  
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright 




I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been 
identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for 














The present thesis is an original interpretation and qualified defence of Hans 
Jonas’ philosophy. Jonas’ thought constitutes a system, the purpose of which, I 
argue, is to rectify modernity’s most critical ills: nihilism, the ecological crisis, 
and the threats to human dignity posed by certain biotechnologies. While these 
might at first appear disparate, Jonas shows that they are in fact 
interconnected: all originated in the anti-Aristotelian turn taken by Western 
thought in the sixteenth century – a theoretical event Jonas seeks to overcome 
by synthesising Heidegger’s existentialism, Kant’s ethics, and Aristotle’s 
ontology. Previous commentators have tended to downplay Aristotle’s influence 
on Jonas’ system, and so I emphasise this aspect of his work. 
I argue that Jonas’ project is largely successful but fails in two key 
respects. Whilst he is able to develop a neo-Aristotelian ontology and a 
‘biogenic’ axiology, his Kantian moral philosophy does not attain the sought-
after objective status, while his political theory – as presented in The Imperative 
of Responsibility – is largely unpalatable. Jonas is, therefore, both unable to 
defeat nihilism and give his ethic a satisfactory political expression. As such, I 
uphold Jonas’ theory of responsibility on relativistic virtue ethical grounds, and 
argue that its implications for bioethics and environmental ethics remain of great 
significance. Finally, I attempt to bolster Jonas’ reputation as a political theorist 
by highlighting moments in his post-Imperative work which indicate that he was 
moving towards a republican conception of citizenship and the state, thus far 
overlooked by commentators. 
With his system so corrected, Jonas stands out as one of the most 
profound philosophers of the post-War period, and a valuable guide for 
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Introduction: Nihilism and Modernity 
I. The Nature of Jonas’ Philosophical Project 
Hans Jonas (1903-1993) is little known in the English-speaking world, despite 
having had a significant influence on continental European environmentalism in 
the 1980s and 1990s.1 His philosophy is here interpreted as a unified 
metaphysics, ethics, and politics, following in the German tradition of system-
builders. The purpose of this philosophical project is practical, intended to 
confront the following ills of modernity: nihilism, the ecological crisis, and the 
biotechnological revolution. At first glance these might appear to be disparate 
issues. Jonas shows us, however, that they are in fact very much connected, 
following from the materialist, anti-Aristotelian turn taken by Western thought in 
the sixteenth century. Overcoming these crises – so I will argue – requires a 
retrieval, where possible, of the Aristotelian heritage. Although Jonas did not 
conceive of his work in this way, I believe it is this effort which fundamentally 
motivates it.2 We shall see that for both its depth and foresight Jonas’ thought is 
more relevant today than ever. 
This thesis interprets, analyses, and ultimately offers a qualified defence 
of Jonas’ project. My case rests not only on his individual arguments, but also 
on the power of his thought to synthesise the above concerns into a powerful, 
targeted critique of modernity. Since Jonas wrote relatively little the unity of his 
thought primarily emerges by taking together his classic texts, The 
Phenomenon of Life and The Imperative of Responsibility. The latter, in 
particular, bears favourable comparison to the great texts produced by Jonas’ 
peers: Arendt, Gadamer, and Marcuse. However, I also make extensive use of 
Jonas’ Philosophical Essays, Mortality and Morality, and the recently published 
Organism and Freedom, as well as a range of other articles and lectures, some 
of which are yet to be translated into English.3 In so doing we can address what 
                                                          
1 For accounts of this influence, both philosophical and political, see Schmidt (2013) and 
Schütze (1995). 
2 Jonas claims that “Aristotle didn’t play much of a role” in his thinking, and appears bemused 
that so many people should feel that he did: “there was little I could do to keep myself from 
being classified as a neo-Aristotelian. I wouldn’t have classified myself that way, but it’s hard to 
defend yourself against others’ views. At any rate, I wasn’t in bad company” (M: 204). 
3 Organism and Freedom (OF) is not to be confused with Organismus und Freiheit (OFA), the 
1973 German-language translation of The Phenomenon of Life (PL). 
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would otherwise be gaps in Jonas’ thought, as well as providing crucial detail to 
his claims.  
Before turning to our first topic – Jonas’ analysis of modern nihilism – I 
will say a little about the character of his thought and where it fits in the history 
of twentieth-century German philosophy. As stated, his philosophy is a partial 
critique of modernity. The significance of that epochal transformation, beginning 
in sixteenth-century Europe, is its emphasis on empirical investigation and 
inductive reasoning over tradition and theoretical enquiry. The benefits accrued 
by modernity are readily apparent, above all the advances in healthcare, 
material security, and freedom from servitude secured for most of us in the 
West. This Jonas does not doubt: his critique of modernity is not social or 
cultural, although he does at times mourn the loss of custom in public life (TME: 
57-59). His objections are to the consequences of modernity’s materialist 
tendency: a worldview which brings ever-greater swathes of existence into its 
purview for technological manipulation, and – precisely because it does this – 
undermines any foundation for normative instruction as to whether it ought to. In 
Jonas’ words:  
The crisis of modern man – at least one aspect of it – can be put in these 
terms. Reason triumphant through science has destroyed the faith in 
revelation, without, however, replacing revelation in the office of guiding 
our ultimate choices. Reason disqualified itself from that office, in which 
once it vied with religion, precisely when it installed itself, in the form of 
science, as sole authority in matters of truth. […] This situation is 
reflected in the failure of contemporary philosophy to offer an ethical 
theory, i.e., to validate ethical norms as part of our universe of 
knowledge. (PE: 170) 
The challenge, according to Jonas, is to develop such an ethical theory, one 
grounded in a non-reductive ontology and which – when transposed to the 
political domain – could act as a bulwark against the relentless assault of 
instrumental rationality. 
With this aim, and its implicit defense of reason proper, there is some 
commonality with the Frankfurt School’s first generation, in particular 
Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse. Of course, the project of these figures was 
[11] 
 
to defend the dialectical and emancipatory rationality of Hegel and Marx. Jonas 
certainly had socialist sympathies, and later in life was even loosely associated 
with the German Social Democrats, but he was no philosophical Marxist (IR: 
175; IHJ: 363).4 Jonas’ philosophy emerges from a different tradition: that of 
phenomenology, the method devised by Husserl and taken up most notably by 
Scheler and Heidegger. Jonas studied at Freiburg and Marburg under both 
Husserl and Heidegger, but his thought owes considerably more to the latter.5 
Heidegger’s fusion of phenomenology, existentialism, and hermeneutics, his 
critical reflections on modernity, and his radical interpretation of Western 
metaphysics, all exerted a profound and lasting influence on Jonas, as we shall 
see.  
However, Heidegger’s political alignment with the Nazis in 1933 came as 
an immense blow to Jonas, both philosophical and personal.6 He came to 
believe that Heidegger’s predisposition to Nazism could be attributed to a 
combination of philosophical nihilism and a personal affinity for blood and soil 
nationalism (HRR).7 Put simply, while Heidegger’s thought was unparalleled in 
its depth and profundity, it had at its heart an ethical void. It is for this reason 
that Jonas uses his tutelage in Heideggerian existentialism against Heidegger’s 
own thought. For Heidegger had himself opened up the Western tradition to 
radical reinterpretation, and so Jonas reaches back to Kant and Aristotle for 
additional inspiration, retrieving key aspects of their thinking rather than – as 
Heidegger had – idiosyncratically distorting them. As a result Jonas’ moral 
philosophy, much of which is captured in a new categorical imperative, is tied to 
                                                          
4 Jonas’ overriding political adherence – as distinct from his political philosophy – was to 
Zionism. He even fought in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, although later in life admitted to having 
regrets about the way in which Israel was established to the detriment of the Palestinians (M: 
36-37). 
5 To my knowledge Jonas attended the following courses of Heidegger’s: the ‘proseminar’ on 
Aristotle’s De Anima in Freiburg, Summer 1921, which according to Kisiel (1993: 230-232) 
actually focused on Book 7 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics; the Marburg Summer 1924 course 
published as Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy (2009); the Winter 1924-5 course 
published as Plato’s Sophist (1997); the Summer 1925 course published as History of the 
Concept of Time: Prologomena (1985); and the Winter 1925-6 course published as Logic: The 
Question of Truth (2010c). 
6 Just as Jonas never renounced his intellectual debt to Heidegger, it seems that even after 
breaking off contact he had conflicting personal feelings toward Heidegger. The 1982 interview 
with Ingo Hermann for Zeugen des Jahrhunderts on ZDF television shows that Jonas kept a 
sketch of Heidegger above his desk. He also contributed an essay to a Festschrift for 
Heidegger’s 80th birthday after his public denunciation of Heidegger (Klostermann, 1970). 
7 One of the strongest expressions of the latter tendency in Heidegger’s writings is his almost 
self-parodic 1934 article ‘Why Do I Stay in the Provinces?’ (1981: 27-29). 
[12] 
 
an ontology which gives full recognition to life and corporeality: notions which 
were largely absent from Heidegger’s thought.  
One might reasonably ask whether we would be better off spurning 
Heidegger altogether, particularly now that his anti-Semitism has been 
incontrovertibly proven with the publication of the Schwarze Hefte. 
Unfortunately a remark made by Leo Strauss six decades ago still holds true 
today: “[o]nly a great thinker could help us in our intellectual plight. But here is 
the great trouble, the only great thinker in our time is Heidegger” (1995: 305). 
For all his criticisms of Heidegger Jonas ultimately thought the same, hence 
why, as David Levy says, Jonas’ system offers an “answer” to Heidegger’s 
thought, which is “at once more rational and more humanly inclusive” (2002: 
79). 
As indicated, Jonas’ accompanying appeal to Kant and Aristotle is of 
paramount importance for his philosophical project. Whereas Heidegger’s 
criticisms of the modern epoch extended to not just instrumental rationality, but 
reason as such – another factor in his embrace of Nazism – Jonas retains faith 
in the power of theoretical and practical reason. It is this which leads Jonas to 
seek a new metaphysics and an objective ethics. He is aware, of course, that 
this philosophically goes against the grain of the times, metaphysics having 
been “so often declared dead” (MM: 101). But in “entering this now abandoned 
arena with a certain good cheer” (ibid.), Jonas takes a step beyond the strictly 
negative critique of modernity offered by Adorno and Horkheimer, as well as 
ensuring that his alternative does not collapse into a reactionary irrationalism 
like Heidegger’s. So although Jonas suggests that we should not “be too 
modern” (SE: 20), this entails only a rejection of “certain developments which 
are ominous, which are dangerous, or which are undesirable”, not that 
“modernity as such was somehow a mistake” (OR: 3). In short, the ills of 
modernity are to be rectified through an appeal to alternative aspects of the 
Western tradition, not an abandonment of that tradition entirely.8 
                                                          
8 One might argue that in this respect Jonas stands to Heidegger as Jürgen Habermas stands 
to Adorno and Horkheimer. The difference is that Habermas seeks to save modernity from itself 
by appealing to its current of communicative rationality, whereas Jonas reaches further back, to 
Kant and Aristotle, for a corrective. Incidentally, Habermas allegedly overruled Jonas’ 
nomination for the Theodor-W.-Adorno-Preis on the grounds that his “conservative spirit” sat at 
odds with that of the award (M: 204). 
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II. Ancient Gnosticism, Modern Nihilism 
Our first topic is Jonas’ treatment of modern nihilism. But what exactly is 
nihilism, and what is particular to its modern form? Nietzsche, its greatest 
diagnostician, claimed at the end of the nineteenth century that nihilism “stands 
at the door”, asking “whence comes this most uncanny of all guests?” (2017: 
11). Some decades later Jonas notes in response that “the guest has [since] 
entered and […], as far as philosophy is concerned, existentialism is trying to 
live with him” (PL: 213). Both agree that modernity is plagued by this 
phenomenon, but they differ on exactitudes.  
Nietzsche defines nihilism as the widespread sense that “there is no 
goal” to existence, “no answer to the question: why?” (2017: 15). He claims this 
is the result of the slow unravelling of the West’s transcendent grounds for value 
and meaning, a process which was inevitable precisely because those grounds 
were transcendent. The pillars of Western thought which have now been found 
untenable were Platonic metaphysics, according to which the physical world is a 
mere copy of the real, and the Judeo-Christian version of this notion, wherein 
the corporeal world is positively debased.9 We can no longer sustain belief in 
either, a development famously encapsulated in Nietzsche’s proclamation that 
“God is dead” (1974: 181). For this reason Nietzsche claims that we are no 
longer entitled to a Christian ethics of benevolence, mercy, and equality, even 
one which seeks to ground itself in reason, as in Kant’s philosophy – an attempt 
which failed on its own terms by eventually appealing to God (2015:101).  
The only honest solution, according to Nietzsche, is to “become gods” 
ourselves (1974: 181). This means giving full and open expression to the life-
force which lies hidden at the bottom of all creative endeavours (even those, 
such as Judeo-Christian theology, apparently opposed to it): the will to power. 
Overcoming our moral inheritance and affirming a new set of values explicitly 
based on the will to power would be a godly achievement, heralding the arrival 
of the Übermensch. For Nietzsche, this task justifies all means, even – or 
rather, especially – those running counter to our most deeply held moral beliefs. 
The following sums this up most vividly: “[t]o attain that tremendously energetic 
quality possessed by great men, the quality most needed in moulding the men 
                                                          




of the future, requires not only the cultivation of these men but also the 
annihilation of millions of the ill-constituted” (2017: 540).  
 Jonas accepts only part of Nietzsche’s account of the origin of nihilism, 
and in a way which allows him to eschew the latter’s quasi-fascistic conclusion. 
His analysis emerges from a critical engagement with Heidegger’s 
existentialism, which he reveals to be the philosophical peak of modern 
nihilism.10 This discovery is the result of a curiously dialectical process. Jonas’ 
early tutelage in Heideggerian existentialism, with its emphasis on alienation, 
angst, and our ‘thrownness’ into being, acted as the theoretical framework for 
his doctoral thesis on Gnosticism, a 2nd century Christian sect. Jonas argues 
that Gnosticism was the most “radical and uncompromising” expression of the 
zeitgeist of late antiquity (GR: 26), testifying to a “troubled existence” following 
the turmoil into which imperial Rome had then fallen (WPE: 31).11 It is 
summarised as follows: 
The cardinal feature of gnostic thought is the radical dualism that 
governs the relation of God and world, and correspondingly that of man 
and world. The deity is absolutely transmundane, its nature alien to that 
of the universe, which it neither created nor governs and to which it is the 
complete antithesis: to the divine realm of light, self-contained and 
remote, the cosmos is opposed as the realm of darkness. (GR: 42) 
Using Heidegger’s existentialism as an interpretative framework, Jonas vividly 
reconstructs the Gnostic experience of being, wherein humanity’s divine spirit is 
locked in the mind, which is in turn incarcerated in the body, and stranded on a 
hostile world created by the unholy demiurge (44). It is, as he says, the pinnacle 
of nihilism in late antiquity, and although “not the key to understanding the 
whole epoch” (26) – which is generally less apocalyptic – nevertheless 
illuminates the troubled spirit of its time. 
                                                          
10 Of course, Heidegger famously insisted he was not an existentialist (1977: 151) – a label that 
was attributed to him by Sartre (1948: 26), among others – and it is indeed true that the former’s 
early work differs greatly from the latter’s. But with this distinction in mind, and some leniency, 
we can grant Jonas the usage of the phrase ‘Heidegger’s existentialism’, which he 
acknowledges was not Heidegger’s own term (MM: 46) and only applies to Heidegger’s early 
work (PL: 231). 
11 Jonas’ thesis was later published in two German-language volumes, and in the single 




The question then is why Heideggerian existentialism is so appropriate a 
lens for understanding Gnosticism: quite a remarkable coincidence given the 
millennia which separates them. To this end Jonas switches focus, using 
Gnosticism as a way of interpreting existentialism. “In other words, the 
hermeneutic functions become reversed and reciprocal – lock turns into key, 
and key into lock: the ‘existentialist’ reading of Gnosticism […] invites as its 
natural complement the trial of a ‘gnostic’ reading of Existentialism” (PL: 213). 
The result of this effort is the discovery that their underlying commonality is 
nihilism. This they share because both late antiquity and late modernity – of 
which Gnosticism and existentialism are the quintessential representatives – 
are historical periods of profound spiritual disruption and transformation. The 
only difference is that existentialism surpasses Gnosticism in its commitment to 
nihilism, signifying the relative depths of crisis defining the two epochs.  
According to the Gnostics, the darkness in which we are situated may be 
overcome in death provided one prepares in life by studying the religion’s 
tenets, supposedly handed down by the “messenger from the world of light” 
(GR: 45). According to Heidegger, however, “authentic” existence is only 
reclaimed in moments of angst which reveal our individual being-toward-death 
(2010a: 328). The consequence is this: although in Gnosticism the physical 
world is characterised by entirely negative value, the inverse of which belongs 
only to the human spirit and alien God, its vision is still one of objective good 
and evil, thus preventing a slide into absolute nihilism. For the existentialist, 
however, there are no such values. The world is devoid of any given meaning 
and there is no redeeming afterlife or even fixed norms by which to orient 
behaviour. Rather – according to Heidegger – we are helplessly thrown into 
being, and liable to fall prey to the inauthentic existence of anonymous mass 
humanity: ‘the They’. All one can do is face this fate with “resoluteness” (323) 
and so reclaim authenticity. This, as Jonas notes, constitutes “the true abyss. 
That only man cares, in his finitude facing nothing but death, […] is a truly 
unprecedented situation” (PL: 233). 
What, then, allowed for this absolute nihilism marking out existentialism 
as more radical even than Gnosticism? Here it is useful to recall Nietzsche’s 
analysis. Jonas agrees with Nietzsche that attempts to justify existence through 
a transcendent principle risk succumbing to nihilism by devaluing the physical 
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world. Likewise, he holds that devaluation of nature, the “gnostic principle”, is a 
recurring feature in Western history and so nihilism is in some form an ever-
present threat (GR: xxxv).12 But modern nihilism is unique in its depth because 
modernity alone rejects natural teleology and purpose in its entirety. This is the 
crucial blow struck against Nietzsche’s analysis: it is not the case, as Nietzsche 
claimed, that “the general character of existence does not admit of interpretation 
in terms of the notions ‘purpose’, ‘unity’ or ‘truth’”, and that it “achieves nothing” 
(2017: 19, emphasis removed). This is a thoroughly modern view, prematurely 
aiming at not only those religious and philosophical systems which seek 
justification for existence in transcendence, but also those which locate 
teleological principles in the natural world. But why should we reject the latter as 
well as the former, as Nietzsche would have us do? For it was precisely 
Aristotle’s achievement to demonstrate that purpose and unity are immanent 
principles of existence, inherent to the natural world and reflected in the social 
world of the polis where the good of each citizen informs the common good of 
the whole (PL: 222).  
It is modernity’s undue rejection of this heritage, an error from which 
neither Nietzsche nor Heidegger were exempt, which paves the way to absolute 
nihilism. As Jonas puts it: “a change in the vision of nature, […] of the cosmic 
environment of man, is at the bottom of that metaphysical situation which has 
given rise to modern existentialism and to its nihilistic implications” (216).13 
Heidegger’s existentialism is, therefore, a description of contemporary Western 
humanity alone, and the nihilism it represents can be traced to the materialist 
anti-Aristotelian turn of the sixteenth century (213-214). The destruction of the 
scala naturae and the stripping of teleology from plant, animal, and eventually 
                                                          
12 On this basis Elad Lapidot (2017) argues that the purpose of Jonas’ philosophical project is to 
confront and overcome the Gnostic principle per se, but this reading is too broad. For Jonas, 
“[t]he disenchanted world is a purposeless world” (PE: 171), and Platonism, Christianity, and 
Gnosticism, for all their devaluation of the physical world, did not construe it as completely 
purposeless. His underlying aim is rather to confront the Gnostic principle in its modern 
manifestation. 
13 Jonas’ use of the word ‘nature’ (with or without the capitalised ‘n’) seems to be coextensive 
with his use of ‘biosphere’, ‘biosystem’, ‘the kingdom of life’, etc., rather than referring to non-
living nature as well. Similarly, his references to ‘Being’ (with or without the capitalised ‘b’) 
occasionally seem coextensive with his references to ‘Life’, and ‘life as a whole’. As a result, in 
Jonas’ philosophy, life, Being, and nature often coincide – but whether this is philosophically 
coherent, or simply demonstrates a lack of clarity, is hard to say. It should also be noted that 
Jonas’ use of the word ‘Being’ is, in Heidegger’s sense, metaphysical since referring to the 
totality of beings (Seiendes), rather than drawing the ontological difference between being 
(Sein) and beings (Seiendes). For this reason I capitalise Jonas’ ‘Being’ except when he uses it 
in a sense closer to Heidegger’s ‘being’ (e.g. ‘organismic being’), which is always uncapitalised. 
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human life, emptied Being of purpose, dignity, and intrinsic value, rendering 
plausible the notion “[t]hat nature does not care, one way or the other” (233). 
While Gnosticism originally arose from the demise of the res publica which had 
reflected Aristotelian cosmology (222), the plausibility of existentialism rests on 
the lack of any metaphysics which does justice to the purposeful and value-rich 
living world.  
As discussed, Gnosticism is nevertheless saved from absolute nihilism 
through its appeal to an objective good, identified with the world of light. But 
now, after the total victory of materialism and subsequent death of God, there is 
no such bulwark left: hence the all-encompassing nature of modern nihilism. To 
overcome it requires not a return to faith and revelation – which cannot hope to 
compete with secular developments – but rather a return to an Aristotelian, 
teleological philosophy of nature. 
III. The Technological Threats 
This account of modern nihilism might only be of spiritual or cultural interest 
were it not for other, more immediate threats: the ecological crisis and the 
biotechnological revolution. As we shall see in the next chapter, these follow 
from the very same modern materialism to which we owe our nihilistic 
predicament. But firstly a little more needs to be said about these 
developments.  
The industrialisation of the West, and later the wider world, has brought 
about climate change, mass species extinction, the desertification of 
landscapes, pollution, overpopulation, and finally genetic engineering, which 
promises to intervene in nature in quite another way. Both the ecological crisis 
and biotechnological revolution represent the dramatic increase in power – 
temporal and spatial – which humanity has acquired through modern science 
and technology, and for which, as discussed, we now lack credible normative 
guidance. Worse, the nature of these threats is unique. Unlike the “insanity of a 
sudden, suicidal nuclear holocaust”, which may be avoided with relative ease by 
“sane fear”, these existential threats are “slow, long-term, [and] cumulative”, 
therefore easily overlooked (IR: ix). This is all the more so since both arise from 
the higher standards of living to which modern humanity actively strives.  
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Although a variety of ecological problems had become apparent by the 
time Jonas was writing his key works in the 1960s and 1970s, climate change 
was still then only a hypothesis. One of his essays concludes with the following 
conjecture: 
[S]uppose that a proposed rate of industrial growth, perfectly feasible and 
desirable in itself, involves a rate of fuel-burning that brings into play the 
so-called greenhouse effect – i.e., the trapping of thermal radiation under 
a carbon dioxide layer that forms in the upper atmosphere. Suppose that 
calculations show that this in time will raise terrestrial temperatures to a 
point where the polar ice caps begin to melt; and that once started, this is 
an irreversible and self-accelerating process with the end-result (ignoring 
all other consequences of the climatic change) of raising the ocean level 
enough to submerge vast continental areas on this globe, thus leading to 
incalculable catastrophe [...]. Surely then, with such a prospect 
demonstrated as certain or highly probable, the simple imperative that no 
economic policy is right whose eventual outcome defeats the prime 
purpose of all economy will bid the economist to place a normative 
interdiction on the policy in question[,] whatever its immediate benefits 
may be. (PE: 99-100) 
Needless to say, the abovementioned consequences of anthropogenic climate 
change are now crossing over from a possibility to an actuality. In terms of 
global consequences, the latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) found that:  
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, 
many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to 
millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of 
snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and the 
concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased. (2013: 4) 
Of all the ecological disruption wrought by modern humanity, climate change 
best exemplifies the global nature of the threat; indeed, to such an extent that a 




Regarding the second dimension of our technological powers – our 
temporal reach into the distant future – the IPCC claim that “[a] large fraction of 
anthropogenic climate change resulting from CO2 emissions is irreversible on a 
multi-century to millennial time scale” (28). Even if carbon dioxide emissions 
were immediately and dramatically reduced, thus limiting the global mean 
temperature increase to 2°C above preindustrial levels, “[m]ost aspects of 
climate change will persist for many centuries” (27) accompanied by 
“considerable” risks (IPCC, 2014: 14). If our present rate of emissions continue 
unabated, however, leading to a global mean temperature increase of 4°C or 
more above preindustrial levels, the likely effects include “severe and 
widespread impacts on unique and threatened systems, substantial species 
extinction, [and] large risks to global and regional food security” (ibid.). Taking 
these two dimensions together, Stephen Gardiner (2011) has argued that 
climate change presents us with the ‘perfect moral storm’, since we lack a pre-
existing global and intergenerational ethic and the theoretical political tools 
through which to effectively act upon it. In later chapters we shall see that 
Jonas, too, diagnosed this problem, and moreover attempts to devise the 
objective ethic and political structures which could rise to the challenge.   
The other manifestation of our new powers which concerns Jonas is the 
biotechnological manipulation of living things: above all, ourselves. From the 
first cloning of non-human life in the 1950s, followed by genetic engineering in 
the 1970s, through to the synthetic biology and prospect of ‘designer babies’ 
today, the genome has become the direct object of our control. The precision 
with which genes can now be targeted, particularly since the development of the 
CRISPR/Cas9 editing tool, dwarfs that of traditional methods such as cross-
pollination and animal husbandry (although this does not, to be clear, mean that 
traditional methods are always commendable and newer methods necessarily 
unethical). At first glance this seems to be only a temporal power over the 
development of individual organisms, but modifications passed on through 
offspring can in principle be disseminated throughout a species and have a 
global impact. Indeed, in some cases of genetic engineering this is precisely the 
intention, such as ‘gene drive’ technology which promotes the spread of genetic 
alterations through populations (Akbari, et al., 2015).  
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Beyond the dangers which arise on a case-by-case basis lies an 
overarching problem: that the nihilism characterising contemporary civilisation 
undercuts any recourse to moral boundaries on biotechnological intervention, 
particularly where the distant future of humanity is at stake. As Jonas puts it: 
“the ruling pragmatism of our time […] will let no ancient fear and trembling 
interfere with the relentless expanding of the realm of sheer thinghood and 
unrestricted utility. The ‘splendor and misery’ of our age dwells in that irresistible 
tide” (PE: 142). The latest developments are genetic modification of unviable 
human embryos by researchers in China (Liang, et al., 2015), followed a year 
later by regulatory approval for a similar experiment on healthy embryos in the 
UK (Callaway, 2016). In Europe it remains illegal to carry a genetically-modified 
embryo to term, but there is no reason to suppose that the international 
consensus against eugenics – which arose specifically in response to Nazi 
atrocities – will withstand the apparently benevolent promise of human 
enhancement. Should we pursue this path? If not, why not? Jonas’ seminal 
essays on bioethics, which we shall look at in detail in the final chapter, are in 
part an attempt to answer these questions and establish new moral limitations 
on the possible application of such technologies. 
IV. Against the Stream: Jonas’ Philosophical System 
Such, in brief, are the three crises which Jonas’ philosophical project 
addresses. It now falls to describe the structure of his system, which has only 
been gestured at so far. We said above that the root of modern nihilism is the 
undue expulsion of teleology and the scala naturae from explanation of the 
natural world in the scientific revolution. We also saw that the root of nihilism 
more broadly – the ‘Gnostic principle’ – was the denial of positive value and 
purpose in the physical world. Jonas’ solution is to develop a non-reductive 
metaphysics allowing for an ethics and politics that together account for our 
responsibilities for the future in the face of ecological and biotechnological 
threats. As stated, this does not amount to a theological solution. In The 
Imperative of Responsibility, which not by coincidence concludes with a 
reference to Aristotle, Jonas claims that “[a]bandoned to ‘sovereign becoming’ 
[…] after abrogating transcendent being, we must seek the essential in 
transience itself” (IR: 125). 
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Chapter One will reconstruct Jonas’ critique of modern technology and 
the scientific revolution, which in one stroke paved the way for modern nihilism 
and the two technological crises discussed. Jonas’ analysis begins by showing 
that the nature of modern technology is of a qualitatively different sort than the 
pre-modern. Originating in a mathematically calculable vision of nature, modern 
technology has intertwined with our socio-economic activity and become a force 
in its own right: both exercising and feeding from an ideological power in the 
form of progress. I argue that his sociological account of how this occurs is 
insufficient, but once corrected informs a compelling philosophy of technology 
which avoids both the dystopianism of Heidegger’s and the utopianism of 
‘posthumanist’ approaches. For Jonas, the practical problem is as follows: 
having become an end in itself, technological progress has broadened the 
scope of collective action – both temporally and spatially – to an extent which 
lies beyond the domain governed by traditional norms. This diagnosis is 
ultimately motivated by the Aristotelian concern that the distinction between the 
domain of means, to which technē properly belongs, and that of ends, which 
was previously determined by the virtues of sophia and phronēsis has been 
corrupted. What is required, then, is a new ethic which can resolve this issue 
and address the three crises discussed. 
Jonas begins this attempt with an appeal to a reformulated Aristotelian 
philosophy of nature, recounted in Chapter Two, as only this can allow us to 
counter the Gnosticism of modernity which denies value and purpose in the 
physical world. The principal means by which Jonas proceeds is modifying 
Heidegger’s existential phenomenology. Although the nihilistic component of 
Heidegger’s existentialism was historically contingent, the broader analytic of 
our existence as ‘care’ was a timeless insight. However, whereas Heidegger 
had taken humans to be alone caring for their being in a purposeless universe, 
Jonas argues, on the basis of a monistic metaphysics, that all life demonstrates 
concern for its existence. From the lowliest unicellular organism, through plant 
and animal life to human beings, Jonas shows that teleological capacities and 
self-organisation are inherent to each. Seeking continued existence through the 
satisfaction of metabolic needs is the organismic condition, marking out life from 
mere matter. Moreover, since qualitatively different teleological capacities 
emerge in evolution we may speak meaningfully of a scala naturae in terms of 
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the freedom of ‘world-openness’ attained. Plants have only a rudimentary world 
compared to animals, which in turn possess a more restricted world than human 
beings, with our apparently unique openness to metaphysical and moral. The 
ethical import of this philosophical anthropology will only become fully apparent 
in Chapter Four and Six. Finally, Jonas argues that since life arose from matter 
and on to ever-greater degrees of complexity – which serves no mechanistic 
evolutionary purpose – we may suppose that this development is a “potentiality, 
hidden in matter’s womb”, manifesting itself given time enough and favourable 
circumstances (MM: 51). This notion I call the nisus of Being, which Jonas uses 
to argue, against the nihilists, that nature is purposeful and does care. When 
reconstructing this ontology we shall see that certain revisions are required to 
make Jonas’ philosophical biology and anthropology tenable, but that this can 
be done consistently with his wider theory. 
In Chapter Three we move from ontology to axiology: the question of 
what kinds of value exist. The conception of life and Being as immanently 
teleological allows Jonas to argue that value is necessarily imbued in both, as 
achievement of a goal – even a non-conscious one – is better for its possessor 
than the opposite. This amounts to a subjective value-preference, a good-for-
something. Given their possession of such subjective goods, Jonas is then able 
to argue that each organism, and even Being as such, are of intrinsic and not 
merely instrumental value: a major advance in the confrontation with modern 
nihilism. However, nihilism remains undefeated as long as nothing is shown to 
matter objectively, and the extension of intrinsic value to even Being itself does 
not count as such. Hence Jonas claims that the mere capacity for valuing is 
itself objectively valuable, and infinitely superior to a universe that lacked it. This 
particular argumentative move is the weakest point of Jonas’ philosophical 
system, and one of two major reasons why his project is open to criticism. I 
argue that there is no binding way to defend Jonas here and concede that his 
challenge to nihilism is unsuccessful at the last. However, I suggest an 
alternative to Jonas’ attempt in the form of Alasdair MacIntyre’s neo-
Aristotelianism. MacIntyre argues that the fundamental error of modern 
philosophy is the attempt to rationally demonstrate the existence of an objective 
good. He argues that we should instead recognise that the good is relative to 
forms of life, which goes some way to dissolving the problem. It also means that 
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the greatest flaw in Jonas’ philosophical system is precisely where he does not 
appeal to Aristotle.  
Chapter Four introduces the core of Jonas’ moral philosophy: his theory 
of responsibility, perhaps the area of his system which stands up best to 
scrutiny. Jonas argues that responsibility for others has historically been 
marginal in ethical thought. The reason why is that we are responsible only for a 
vulnerable good which is within our power to protect, and the reach of our 
power has previously been limited. The factor which changes this state of affairs 
is modern technology, as described above. Jonas’ ethic of responsibility is 
intended to provide the normative boundary by which to guide our technological 
and socio-economic activity. Taking the Kantian form of a new categorical 
imperative, Jonas’ theory of responsibility has for its ultimate object the ‘idea of 
Man’: humanity’s continued existence as a moral being, recalling his 
philosophical anthropology. As such, his ethics accounts for our duties to future 
generations and non-human life, providing us with something like a task of 
guardianship for Being. 
Since our new responsibilities follow from the power afforded by modern 
technology when integrated into our collective socio-economic life, Jonas 
moves from moral to political concerns. The question guiding Jonas’ 
investigation, here treated in Chapter Five, is which political institutions are best 
able to act upon the imperative of responsibility for future generations and non-
human life. His theoretical efforts in that domain have been subjected to 
considerable, and largely justified, criticism, as Jonas’ argument unfortunately 
collapses into one for ecological authoritarianism. However, in reconstructing 
his argument I show that this conclusion does not, in truth, follow from his ethic 
of responsibility, and the parts of genuine value in his political philosophy – the 
‘heuristic of fear’ and precautionary principle – are separable from his troubling 
vision of the state. Moreover, I argue that Jonas actually began to move away 
from his earlier acquiescence to authoritarianism with the essay ‘Auf der 
Schwelle der Zukunft’ (TME: 53-75). In this and other publications following The 
Imperative of Responsibility, Jonas draws on civic republican themes – once 
more demonstrating his debt to antiquity – albeit in a fragmentary and 
provisional way. Nevertheless, when these remarks are synthesised we are 
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able to point toward superior conceptions of citizenship and the state in his body 
of work, and redeem him as a political theorist. 
The final component of Jonas’ philosophical system is his bioethics, 
recounted in Chapter Six. Since his moral philosophy makes the case for the 
continued existence and essence of humanity – the idea of Man – Jonas took 
an interest in the development of medical science and biotechnology due to its 
potential to change the human condition. Although Jonas’ instincts place him at 
odds with the utilitarianism of mainstream Anglo-Saxon bioethics, it is perhaps 
in this domain that he exercised most influence in the United States, as a 
founding fellow of the Hastings Center and twice giving evidence to the US 
Senate (TH; THSR). His contributions to bioethics are more relevant today than 
ever, as Jonas was an early critic of what is today known as transhumanism. 
Objecting to both its ends and its methods, Jonas raised compelling objections 
to genetic engineering (since rebranded ‘genome editing’) for its potential to 
undermine our freedom and, in some circumstances, violate human dignity. As 
to the final goal of enhancement, Jonas asks in what sort of image humanity is 
supposed to be remade. The answer usually given is one which transcends the 
limitations, vulnerabilities, and dependencies characteristic of organic being. 
Transhumanism is, therefore, only the most recent manifestation of the Gnostic 
principle, denying the value of our corporeal existence. Against this troubling 
vision, Jonas persuasively argues that the human condition – that we are born 
rather than made, that we must die, and that we must live in the knowledge of 
these facts – is worth preserving. 
I conclude by considering some overarching criticisms of Jonas’ system, 
above all his appeal to an objective ethics as a remedy for the ills of modernity. 
It is true that the ‘untimely’ nature of Jonas’ thought means it is not beyond 
reproach, and that a post-metaphysical philosophical system of the sort 
advocated by Habermas might have exposed him to fewer foundational 
problems. But the attempt to develop a theory of Being shorn of the 
reductionism of modern materialism, and an objective ethic of responsibility 
which seeks its ground in that ontology, is a noble one nonetheless. The effort 
even speaks to something inseparable from the human condition, as alone 
among living beings we must question our own existence. In recognising this 
Heidegger was correct. But the question also demands a proper response, 
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including ethical and metaphysical claims which are, as Jonas notes, “never-
completed attempts to confront this question […] and to find an answer to it” 
(MM: 84). In rising to this challenge, as well as confronting the defining crises of 



























Chapter One: The Technological Age 
I. Heidegger’s Spectre 
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. Firstly I shall reconstruct Jonas’ critique 
of modern technology, in part by showing where his theory is influenced by, and 
departs from, that of Heidegger. Secondly, I will attempt to defend Jonas 
against the charges most commonly levelled at him: indulgence in “cynicism” 
(Crocker, 2012: 34) and “dismal depictions of modern technology” (Sharon, 
2014: 36), which amount to “technological dystopianism” (Ihde, 1999: 28). While 
there is no denying that Jonas adopted what Ihde calls a “rhetoric of alarm” (29) 
around modern technology, I will show that the substance of Jonas’ thought on 
the matter is more nuanced than his critics take it to be. Ihde, for example, 
attributes to Jonas the opinion that technology “intrudes between humanity and 
its essence and as something like a Frankenstein […] outruns and threatens its 
creator” (1979: 132). On a superficial reading Jonas’ philosophy of technology 
may appear to fit this description, but the charge is in fact wide of the mark. 
As stated, I will partly proceed by showing how Jonas’ work on 
technology is a response to that of Heidegger. Heidegger’s philosophy of 
technology was indeed dystopian. Famously, he claimed in his obfuscatory 
interview with Der Spiegel that “philosophy will not be able to bring about a 
direct change of the present state of the world. This is true not only of 
philosophy but of all merely human meditations and endeavors. Only a god can 
still save us” (1990: 56-7). The present state of the world Heidegger lamented 
was what Günther Anders once called “[t]he ‘technification’ of our being” 
(Anders & Eatherly, 1989: 1). That is: the increasing dominance of technology 
and instrumental rationality over ourselves, our world, and the Earth. 
Heidegger’s canonical reflections on technology constitute one aspect of his 
huge influence on Jonas, who shared these concerns and himself became a 
prominent figure in the philosophy of technology. However, Jonas’ humanism 
ultimately sets him apart from Heidegger, in this area as in so many others. To 
take as an example what can only be a rebuke of Heidegger, Jonas tells us: 
“the human mind alone, the great creator of the danger, can be the potential 
rescuer from it. No rescuer god will relieve it of this duty” (MM: 54). 
Curiously, however, Jonas’ engagement with Heidegger’s philosophy of 
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technology remains almost entirely implicit. As Richard Bernstein notes:  
Although Jonas discusses many thinkers in the Imperative of 
Responsibility, there is one exclusion that is notable by his absence. 
Heidegger is barely mentioned; his name doesn’t even appear in the 
index. Yet there is a sense in which Heidegger’s presence is manifest on 
almost every page of the book. (1995: 16-17) 
To my knowledge, Jonas’ only explicit comment on his teacher’s philosophy of 
technology appears in his Memoirs, where he states: “[w]e need a new ethics 
for the age of technology, one that confronts the challenges of our era. 
Heidegger, for one, recognised this need, and attempted to take it on, though 
what he has to say on the subject […] seems to miss the point completely” (M: 
203). In addition to the question of ethics there are other key dividing lines 
between their analyses which make Jonas’ superior. Our starting point, 
however, is examining the place technology occupies in his philosophical 
anthropology. 
II. From Homo Sapiens to Homo Faber 
Of the two charges levelled at Jonas which supposedly comprise his 
dystopianism – that technology endangers the essence of humanity, and that it 
necessarily does so – the first is the easiest to address.  
Far from conceiving of technology as external to human nature and 
antithetical to it, his philosophical anthropology – which we shall encounter in 
greater detail in the following chapter – actually accords technology a central 
place. Indeed, Jonas straightforwardly claims that technology is “integral to the 
human condition” (IR: 203), since the creation of certain artefacts – tools, 
images and graves – “reveal various decisive human qualities” (MM: 78). It is 
this move which undercuts Ihde’s first criticism. Jonas holds that tool-making 
indicates a basic capacity for abstraction, allowing for image-making which 
brings with it a primordial experience of truth as correspondence (81). 
Furthermore, the creation of the grave – accommodating both of the above 
techniques – reveals a being which is aware of its own mortality, and “raises his 
thinking to the realm of the invisible” (85). For this reason Jonas says that 
“metaphysics arises from graves” (84). By this last point Jonas does not mean 
that all grave-making beings have a systematic metaphysics. What he means is 
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that the one is presaged by the other: the grave-making being has an existence 
which broaches metaphysical notions – in particular, comprehension of our 
finitude – and a metaphysics proper becomes a possibility. As we shall see in 
the next chapter, humans are set apart from all other lifeforms by having arrived 
at the latter point.  
 What relevance has this to Jonas’ philosophy of technology? The key 
point is that a grave-making being – which must first of all be a tool-making 
being – has the capacity for metaphysics, and Jonas claims that “[w]hen man 
first began to interpret the nature of things […] he began to be man” (PL: 7). It 
follows that for Jonas Homo faber necessarily plays a part in the constitution of 
Homo sapiens, the being whose world transcends its immediate environment 
(MM: 79). On this basis we can conclude that Ihde was wrong to interpret Jonas 
as thinking that technology intrudes between humanity and its essence.14 
What concerns Jonas, and explains what Ihde called his rhetoric of 
alarm, is “the triumph of homo faber […] in the internal constitution of homo 
sapiens, of whom he used to be a subsidiary part” (TPT: 38). Although not 
explicitly set out as such, Jonas’ worry can be understood in Aristotelian terms. 
In the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle distinguishes between five different 
intellectual virtues: technē (craftsmanship), epistēmē (knowledge), phronēsis 
(practical judgement), sophia (wisdom), and nous (intellect) (1984d: 1140a-
1144a). Of these he regards technē as the ‘lowest’ since it is principally 
concerned with means to ends, rather than the ends themselves, and it is only 
by reflecting on the relative importance of ends than we can flourish.15 In other 
words, technē is no end in itself – an insight which could not be further from the 
spirit of modernity, which has elevated technological development “to the 
position of [its] dominant and interminable goal” (Jonas, TPT: 38). How has this 
radical inversion occurred – whereby what is really a means has become for us 
an end in itself? Jonas’ answer is that the difference lies in modern technology 
itself, which has, as a result of its all-encompassing successes, come to occupy 
a pre-eminent role in our collective life. The question now is whether Jonas is 
                                                          
14 At times it seems that Jonas regards technology and tools as different things – for instance 
when he claims that technology was “foreshadowed in the tool” (MM: 86). The majority of his 
writings on the topic do not make that distinction, however. The decisive break for him, as I say, 
is between pre-modern and modern technology. 
15 Certainly, technē cannot be understood as identical to the contemporary idea of technology, 
since technē also encompassed what we would today call the fine arts, which we rightly regard 
as valuable beyond any instrumentality. But this point is peripheral to the issue at hand. 
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right to say that modern technology is, in this respect, qualitatively different from 
‘traditional’ (i.e., pre-modern and non-Western) technology. To answer this we 
must turn, once again, to the scientific revolution. 
III. The Scientific Revolution 
(α) The Origin of Modern Technology  
For Jonas the origins of today’s technological crises lie in the epochal 
transformation which Europe underwent firstly in the Renaissance, and then, 
more explicitly, in the Enlightenment. He first argued this in the 1959 essay ‘The 
Practical Uses of Theory’ (PL: 190), but his thoughts on the matter are 
developed in greater detail in ‘The Seventeenth Century and After: The 
Meaning of the Scientific and Technological Revolutions’.  
Jonas opens the latter essay by stating, in characteristically dramatic 
fashion, that “[w]e live in a revolution – we of the West – and have been living in 
one for several centuries” (PE: 46). This revolution is no short-term political 
event, like the French or Russian revolutions, but rather a “revolution of thought” 
(48) which has unfolded over the last five centuries up to the present day. We 
may, however, point to a single year as illustrative of this “change in theory, in 
world-view, in metaphysical outlook” (ibid.). 1543 saw the publication of 
Vesalius’ On the Fabric of the Human Body and Copernicus’ On the 
Revolutions of the Celestial Orbs. Jonas contends that together they represent 
a novel reconfiguration of nature as uniform matter: the former at the 
“microcosmic” level of the human being, and the latter at the “macrocosmic” 
level of the solar system (52). The materialist interpretation of the human body 
would eventually result in the loss of a normative conception of human nature, 
with immense consequences, as we shall see when turning to medicine and 
biotechnology in Chapter Six. But as will be fully discussed in the next chapter, 
it was not until the Darwinian revolution of the 19th century that the scala 
naturae was fully toppled, resulting in the loss of humanity’s belief in its own 
uniqueness and privileged position in the universe. This was only made 
possible by the Copernican mathematical proof of heliocentrism, and so the 
latter is the decisive event.  
The reason Jonas takes Copernicus’ proof to be pivotal is that it allowed 
for a plausible materialist understanding of nature to take hold. Of course, the 
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concept of matter had been around since antiquity in various guises, and as 
‘substance’ was at the core of Aristotle’s understanding of Being. The difference 
is that prior to the scientific revolution matter was also taken to be teleologically 
ordered in a way that attributed to beings varying degrees of significance: this 
was the scala naturae, or ‘great chain of Being’, as Arthur O. Lovejoy (1936) 
had it. But with the discovery that the Sun did not orbit the Earth, toppling the 
old geocentric perspective, the notion of a hierarchical structure to the cosmos 
took a first, crippling blow. This issue is not that the Sun became the centre of 
the universe instead. It is rather, as Collingwood notes, that there is no longer 
any centre to Being, just a grid populated by bodies at various points (1945: 97). 
Thus began the gradual development of a new understanding of nature as 
“homogenous” by virtue of the fact that “the earth had become a ‘star’ itself [...] 
and by the same token the planets had become ‘earths’” (PE: 53). Needless to 
say, this is not literally true: every schoolchild learns the differences between 
types of celestial body. Jonas’ point is that the customary notion of cosmic order 
was scientifically disproven. This was no mere cosmological fact, but one which 
entailed the loss of the Earth’s exceptional status in the universe, where what 
was of greatest significance was also perceived to be at its physical centre. 
 Jonas argues that hidden behind the cosmological implications of the 
new Copernican worldview is a yet more subtle development. He claims that 
“the technological turn later given to the speculative revolution was somehow in 
the cards from the beginning” (48). At first glance this appears to be either an 
error, since the industrial revolution only followed the scientific after some two 
hundred years of relative technological stability, or crudely fatalistic, since 
random and unforeseen events might have changed the course of historical 
development. Underpinning such skepticism is the widely-held belief that, as 
Ullrich Melle states, “[m]odern science in its beginnings is the self-conscious 
renewal of the purely theoretical intention [...] of the ancient Greek will” (1998: 
332). In other words, the scientific enquiry emerging from the Renaissance is – 
at least to begin with – the same as its Greek forebear in generating theoria: 
disinterested knowledge of the world. But Jonas argues that in fact praxis lay at 
the heart of the new conception of nature initiated by Copernicus. I will attempt 
to make sense of this claim. 
 From Aristotle to Aquinas the speculative or theoretical sciences were 
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distinguished from the practical. The former treated “things unchangeable and 
eternal [...] which, being unchangeable, can be contemplated only” – biology, for 
example – whereas the latter dealt with “the planned changing of the 
changeable” (PL: 189), such as agriculture. This distinction corresponds to two 
of the intellectual virtues mentioned above: epistēmē (knowledge) and technē 
(craft). Whilst there was of course interaction between the two – biology 
informing how to best manage livestock, for example – theoretical enquiry 
remained logically separate from practical affairs.  
The decisive change occurred with the conceptualisation of nature as 
matter, explicable according to purely efficient causation. This vision contained 
“manipulability at its theoretical core and, in the form of experiment, involved 
actual manipulation in the investigative process” (PE: 48). Although Galileo 
famously claimed that nature was an “all-encompassing book […] written in a 
mathematical language” (2008: 183), this claim in isolation would have also 
been familiar to the Greeks, since mathematics characterised Pythagorean and 
Platonic ontology. The key difference, according to Jonas, is that modern 
science relies on algebraic version of a mathematised nature which is crucially 
different to the geometric model of antiquity (PL: 67). The difference between 
the two is that the latter was best equipped to map passive bodies in space, the 
movement of which remains explicable according to a final cause: teleology. But 
the former could also account for movement, and thus reduced it to efficient 
causation. Once movement was adequately calculable it allowed for the 
measurable manipulation of those same objects, in turn allowing 
experimentation – for which the Greeks had little regard – to take its preeminent 
place in modern science. With this last development, technology increasingly 
became the means by which scientific advances were made, from telescope, to 
microscope, to Large Hadron Collider. It is for this reason that Jonas boldly 
claims that from its inception modern “‘science’ is technological by nature” 
(198). 
This distinction may well be too fine to bear the weight Jonas would like it 
to. Nevertheless, his account is strengthened by a degree of historical 
verifiability. Taking Copernicus as the rough starting point for his enquiry is an 
uncontroversial move (e.g. McGrew et al., 2009: 95), as is pointing to an 
emphasis on algebraic calculation and experimentation as the defining features 
[32] 
 
of the scientific revolution. Jonas goes further, however, in claiming that these 
developments made possible the technological revolution of two centuries 
hence. According to Albert Musson and Eric Robinson, the notion that the 
scientific revolution might have directly led to the industrial was “generally 
regarded as tenuous” (1969: 11) up until the inter-war period. Since then, 
however, it has gradually become more widely accepted by scholars. What 
makes Jonas’ account notable is that it carries this observation over to the 
plane of metaphysics. This means, of course, that the significance he attributes 
to the changing philosophical conception of nature cannot be categorically 
proven in and of itself, but that it is informed by a now widely-accepted historical 
thesis lends credence, I would argue, to his claim that the Renaissance was the 
pivotal moment in the development of modern technology.  
(β) Heidegger’s Seinsgeschichte 
 So far, my account of Jonas’ philosophy of technology can be 
summarised as follows: in the Renaissance, a new worldview was made 
possible when rational investigation switched emphasis from theoretical 
contemplation to experimentation underpinned by algebraic mathematical 
calculation. It is at this point that the first connection with Heidegger’s 
philosophy of technology should be made. For Heidegger, too, the particular 
character of mathematics is key to understanding modern technology. He held, 
however, that manipulation is not just particular to the role mathematics plays in 
modern science, but is its essence as such. For Heidegger, mathematics 
consists only of “a kind of grasping and appropriating” of beings (1977: 251), 
which allows for the “metaphysical projection of the thingness of the things” in 
physical science (249). This “new experience” of nature (272) has its purest 
expression in “the realm of [...] uniform space-time” envisioned by physics 
(268). Having diagnosed the essence of mathematics as grasping, and science 
as its reflection, it is but a short step for Heidegger to show how mathematics as 
such allows for the technological “enframing” as a resource in modernity (301). 
Heidegger, therefore, goes much further than Jonas in terms of the radicalism 
of his critique. To be clear, he does not reject technology, science, or 
mathematics; on the contrary, he holds that they are all ways of engaging with 
the world. The problem, according to Heidegger – paralleling Jonas’ concerns 
about the predominance of Homo faber – is the ubiquity of this mode of 
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engagement with the world in modernity. 
 In emphasising the connection between mathematics, science, and 
technology there is clearly a commonality between Jonas and Heidegger’s 
philosophies. However, because Jonas distinguished between sorts of 
mathematics, and Heidegger did not, their theories differ regarding the pivotal 
historical moment in the genesis of modern technology. As we have seen, for 
Jonas this moment is the scientific revolution of the Renaissance. For 
Heidegger, however, the emergence of modern technology is in fact the 
culmination of the trajectory of Western metaphysics from its inception in 
ancient Greece. This striking claim was at the core of Heidegger’s 
Seinsgeschichte: that technology is, put bluntly, “the destiny of [b]eing” in the 
West (2001b: 183). The reason is that Western tradition has, since its inception, 
construed being as something which is produced according to fundamental 
principles, whether this be the God of Abrahamic religion, the Forms of Plato, or 
even the elements of the pre-Socratics. Regardless of specificities, all conform 
to a producer-product explanation of being, one which continues today in the 
scientific search for fundamental physical principles. For Heidegger, this 
‘productionist’ orientation, running like a thread through Western thinking, meant 
that Western thought was pre-disposed to interpret being as something 
graspable, as in Pythagoras and Plato’s mathematical ontologies, and 
eventually the natural sciences. According to this account, modern technology 
is, therefore, the ultimate expression of a productionist understanding of being 
inherent to Western thought. 
It is – to say the least – an audacious argument. And unfortunately for 
Heidegger, his Seinsgeschichte does not entirely stand up to scrutiny, above all 
regarding his somewhat creative interpretation of the pre-Socratics.16 Even 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heidegger’s most devoted disciple, had to admit that 
“the beginnings of Greek thought are shrouded in darkness, and what 
Heidegger recognized in Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides was 
certainly himself” (1994: 143). Whether it is truly possible to trace the origin of 
contemporary technology beyond modernity, all the way back to the birth of the 
Western mind, is highly debatable. It may simply be, as Gadamer suggests, that 
Heidegger read this history into his sources, posing a problem for his analysis of 
                                                          




 Jonas, for his part, scorns what he calls Heidegger’s “fate-laden” 
philosophy of history (PL: 242). Beyond its unverifiability – which Heidegger 
actually seemed to regard as an advantage (2002a: 243) – Jonas identifies a 
profound danger in Heidegger’s neglect of ethics. There is clearly an implicit 
value-judgment present in Heidegger’s depiction of modernity, insofar as he 
takes ‘mass Man’ to be increasingly under the sway of technological enframing. 
But Jonas rightly holds that Heidegger’s philosophy, since “devoid of objective 
norms” (PL: 248), cannot offer an adequate guide for acting in this context. For 
those seeking practical wisdom nothing can be gleaned from the “terrible 
anonymity” (258) of Heidegger’s thought beyond two inadequate solutions. The 
early, existentialist Heidegger had advocated acting authentically and resolutely 
in response to a “call of conscience” (2010a: 262), but, as stated, without any 
normative guidance by which to judge these calls. Heidegger heard such a call 
around 1933, coming to think of himself as a sort of prophet heralding the 
salvation of the West – at one point even wildly claiming to channel “the voice of 
the beginning” (1992: 167). Evidently he saw it as falling to himself to alert 
humanity to the spiritual void defining modernity which had forgotten the 
question of being. And yet, having nothing but a purely formal decisionism with 
which to respond, Heidegger notoriously endorsed Nazism as the vehicle of our 
salvation, identifying an “inner truth and greatness” in its “encounter between 
global technology and modern humanity” (2000: 213). In stark contrast, Jonas 
experienced the Second World War as a moral call of conscience to take up 
arms against the Nazi regime, enlisting in the Jewish Brigade of the British 
Army and fighting on the frontline of the Italian Campaign. Jonas then publicly 
entreated his fellow Jews to heed the call of their unique responsibility for 
defeating Nazism (OFL; OPW). 
After his monumental error – never truly acknowledged – the later 
Heidegger withdrew into political quietism, exemplified by his belief that ‘only a 
god can save us now’. He came to think that “technological advance will move 
faster and faster and cannot be stopped”, as “[t]hese forces […] have moved 
long since beyond [man’s] will and have outgrown his capacity for decision” 
(1966: 51). To a large extent this was driven by Nazism’s failure to politically 
manage technology, as Heidegger thought it could under his guidance – but the 
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very attempt, he subsequently decided, only amounted to another kind of 
enframing. The alternative he came to endorse was seeking “releasement” from 
enframing through thinking and poetry (2010b: 79). Then one must simply await 
the arrival – or fully-understood absence – of the gods. Once again, however, 
Heidegger’s ‘solution’ to the problems of modernity lacks any ethical dimension. 
For Jonas this normative deficit was crystallised in the later Heidegger’s 
proclamation that “Man is the shepherd of Being” (1977: 210). He retorts: “Man: 
the shepherd of being – not, mind you, of beings! […] [I]t is hard to hear man 
hailed as the shepherd of being when he has just so dismally failed to be his 
brother’s keeper” (PL: 258). For Jonas, then, Heidegger’s failures were one; 
indeed, the personal, political, and philosophical lesson to be drawn from 
Heidegger could not be clearer: only a reasoned moral response can truly rise 
to the challenge of contemporary technology. 
IV. The Forward March of Technology 
Ihde accused Jonas, we recall, of belonging to a strand of technological fatalists 
including Heidegger and Jacques Ellul.17 Interpreting Jonas in this way is, I 
believe, an error, albeit a forgivable one given that in his best-known essay on 
the topic he states: “[i]f Napoleon once said, ‘Politics is destiny’, we may as well 
say today, ‘Technology is destiny’” (TPT: 35). As will become clear, Jonas did 
not mean this literally, a point he made explicit by correcting himself in a later 
essay. Referring back to the earlier claim he says he was “speaking figuratively 
and exaggerating somewhat” (EBA: 491).  
The purpose of Jonas’ rhetoric is to highlight the “intoxication” (IR: 203) 
of humanity by the siren voices of technological progress and utopianism. He 
argues that our often uncritical pursuit of technological development has blinded 
us to the precarious situation over which we preside. So although Jonas thinks 
we are unthinkingly heading into a technologically-delivered dystopia – and 
given our ecological predicament this is not, I would suggest, a mistaken claim 
– he does not think we must necessarily do so. The subtle but crucial difference 
is between Heidegger’s technological fatalism and Jonas’ theory of 
technological autonomy. I will explain what I mean by this and why it is so 
                                                          
17 Ellul tells us: “[e]nclosed within his artificial creation, man finds that there is ‘no exit’; that he 
cannot pierce the shell of technology” (1964: 428). Crucially, ‘[i]t is vanity to pretend it can be 
checked or guided’ (ibid.). 
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important to both his ethics and an adequate philosophy of technology. 
(α) Technological Autonomy 
 As discussed above, Jonas was deeply critical of Heidegger’s fatalistic 
philosophy according to which the trajectory of history is determined by the 
unfolding of being, and from which no ethical guidance can be obtained. Jonas, 
by contrast, holds that “moral reason” is “our only hope”, though he admits that 
this is “a very weak and frail hope” (IHJ: 368). Nevertheless, he says, “I forbid 
myself to give in to despair and say ‘Nothing can stop the hold of this rush of 
things toward the abyss’” (ibid.). Moral reason has to overcome the “inherent 
dynamism” (TSE: 892) of technological development, which advances 
seemingly independently of any human deliberation. Jonas at various points 
refers to the “quasi-compulsive element” (897, emphasis removed), the 
“headlong rush” (IR: 203), even “the virtual infinitude of advance” (TPT: 37) 
characteristic of modern technology. However, his analysis of this tendency 
seeks to remain at the level of rational analysis: both Heidegger’s fateful history 
of Western metaphysics and Oswald Spengler’s notion of the Northern 
European ‘Faustian soul’ “strike a resonance in us” (36), but are incapable of 
concretely addressing the problem and adequately responding to it.18 
 Rather, there are two sorts of stimuli at the root of technological 
development. On the one hand lie motivations external to technology, but which 
nevertheless spur on its development, and on the other hand is the peculiar 
nature of modern technology itself, the origin of which lies in the aforementioned 
technological dimension of the scientific revolution. As stated, the modern 
sciences conceive of nature mathematically and quantifiably, thereby putting 
manipulability at the centre of their understanding of nature. The distinction 
between theory and practice is then partially dissolved in experimentation by 
actively doing things to nature in the pursuit of empirical knowledge, and this 
practical bent allows actual instruments to take centre stage. With this fusion of 
theory and practice Jonas claims a merging takes place in the means-end 
relationship between them. Rather than scientific theory merely acting as the 
bedrock upon which technological innovation occurs, as we commonly think, 
technological innovation is also at the heart of scientific discovery. Thus a 
                                                          




circularity emerges: new scientific discoveries allow for technological advances, 
which in turn propel scientific research, which in turn generates novel 
technologies, and so on, ad infinitum. Jonas calls this forward thrust the “formal 
automatics” of modern technology, resulting from its merging with modern 
science (ibid.). 
 External influences on technology then accelerate this process. Above 
all, capitalism plays a key role in technological development, and is therefore “in 
part the great danger that confronts us” (CR: 217). The industrial revolution of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw scientific-technology put to the use 
of capitalism on a grand scale. The fusion of research, innovation, and market-
economic activity further dissolved the distinction between technological means 
and social ends, and served to rapidly hasten development. Competition was 
driven by the profit-motive, embodied in the desire for greater efficiency from 
the new capital-intensive means of mass production. Finally, militaristic and 
political struggles between nations spurred on development. Initially this 
involved the market economies of Western Europe and North America, and 
later Japan, before the Cold War set these against the planned economies of 
the East. Market economies ultimately proved more efficient (in a narrow sense) 
than their adversaries, and following the collapse of the Soviet Union the 
capitalist mode of production spread worldwide. Although it has adapted to 
particular national traditions and circumstances, most countries – even those 
such as China, Cuba, and Vietnam, which remain nominally Communist – 
collectively form a global scientific-technological-capitalist civilisation.  
In market economies the dynamic of supply and demand informs both 
the sort of technology developed and its necessity. Partly this is a matter of 
advertising: “industry does not so much strive to fulfill human needs as to 
generate human needs”, as illustrated by the fact that “nobody ever dreamed of 
most of the things that progress keeps offering for our consumption” (216, 
emphasis added). But the pull of development is also down to the fact that 
technologies themselves “suggest, create, even impose new ends [...] simply by 
offering their feasibility” (TPT: 36). In other words, we are encouraged to 
consume novel technology because prior technology makes it desirable, on 
both an individual and societal level. Jonas continues:  
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Technology thus adds to the very objectives of human desires, including 
objectives for technology itself. The last point indicates the dialectics or 
circularity of the case: once incorporated into the socioeconomic demand 
diet, ends first [...] generated by technological invention become 
necessities of life and set technology the task of further perfecting the 
means of realising them. (Ibid., emphasis added) 
Take the automobile as an example. Cars and trucks were not isolated 
technological inventions, but brought about tarmacked roads, motorways, petrol 
stations, speed cameras, traffic lights, new laws, taxes, and insurance, the 
driving instruction and mechanic professions, new opportunities for trade, and 
so on. All become desirable when accommodating the new technology into our 
socio-economic life, and any of these technologies or practices may serve to 
facilitate others. This dialectic lies at the heart of Jonas’ theory of the autonomy 
of technology: that the positive feedback loop of technological innovation and 
industrial capitalism strengthens in line with our reliance upon ever more 
technology.19 As such, what was once merely a means has become for us an 
end. 
(β) Hegemony and Agency 
Since Jonas’ account of technological development operates at the level 
of socio-economics, he rejects the almost demonic aspect that Heidegger had 
attributed to it. One could argue, however, that Jonas’ theory of autonomous 
development is still essentially deterministic. Whilst he resists Heideggerian 
fatalism, Jonas may rather advance what Albert Borgmann calls a ‘substantive’ 
philosophy of technology:  
In the substantive view technology appears as a force in its own right, 
one that shapes today’s societies and values from the ground up and has 
no serious rivals. […] It seeks to give a comprehensive elucidation of our 
world by reducing its perplexing features and changes to one force or 
principle. That principle, technology, serves to explain everything. (1984: 
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on the one hand and industrial capitalism on the other, each containing ‘a variety of currents of 





Borgmann goes on to apply this label to Jonas’ account of modern science as 
the root of technological advance (29-30), and criticises it as too strong. 
However, one might note in response that Borgmann’s definition of 
technological substantivism is itself exaggerated. There is no doubt that Jonas 
is a technological substantivist, provided that we define this as the idea that 
technology is not just an instrument – a simple means to an end – but rather 
shapes our behaviour and so informs the ends to which it is put. But 
Borgmann’s definition stresses a deterministic angle which Jonas evades by 
explaining the force of technology as a result of its being embedded in our 
scientific and socio-economic activity. Unfortunately Jonas’ analysis of how 
technological imperatives concretely translate into human behaviour is not 
sketched out, and requires sociological support in order to be adequate to the 
task of informing his philosophy of technology. To build on Jonas’ above 
arguments I will thereby introduce Gramsci’s notion of cultural hegemony and 
Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration – and later, Ulrich Beck’s ‘risk society’ 
– which can, I believe, reinforce Jonas’ account of the autonomy of technology.  
 Extending Marx and Engels’ notion that “[t]he ideas of the ruling class are 
in every epoch the ruling ideas” (1970: 64), Gramsci argued that ideology 
exercises power semi-independently of economics. According to orthodox 
Marxism, economics is the driving force of history and ideology serves merely 
as a gloss in expressing the interests of the ruling class, capital. Gramsci 
rejected this determinism, offering an alternative critique wherein ideology has a 
power of its own over production in advanced capitalist societies such as our 
own. He argued instead that capital exercises power via institutional 
reproduction and entrenchment of ideas, a process he called “cultural 
hegemony” (1992: 179). For example, the media, education, and art all serve to 
reproduce ideas beneficial to capitalism. These structures, today widely 
available to all classes, shape common sense – “the most widespread 
conception of life and morals” – and so “modify the average opinion of a 
particular society” (173). Gramsci’s notion of cultural hegemony is able to show 
us how the ideology of technological progress, has, despite its fundamental 
unsustainability, become the dominant ideology of our time. Because of its 
comprehensiveness this conforms to what Karl Mannheim, Jonas’ postdoctoral 
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supervisor, called the “total conception of ideology […] the ideology of an age” 
(1991: 49).20  
 It should be noted, however, that cultural hegemony is not deterministic 
since the structures which entrench ideology as common sense can only do so 
via individual agency. Anthony Giddens explained how this process, which he 
called ‘structuration’, operates through agents: those who are able to “exercise 
some sort of power” (1984: 14). While Gramsci explained how ideology 
becomes common sense on an abstract level, Giddens showed that concrete 
social structures are reinforced and ideologically justified through individual 
agency. According to Giddens, social actors, though possessing little agency 
individually, are yet collectively responsible for the structural reproduction of 
ideology. He noted that structural conditions are dialectically “both constituted 
by human agency, and yet at the same time are the very medium of this 
constitution” (1993: 129). In other words, agents, who are to a great degree 
conditioned by social structures, nevertheless possess the capacity to inform 
those structures in their reproduction of them. This is how seemingly monolithic 
structures are changed or even toppled – if enough individuals redirect their 
agency against a particular structure, shifting collective opinion, both that 
structure and its apparently common sense ideological justification can be 
overturned. 
 How, then, can Gramsci and Giddens’ theories support Jonas’ critique of 
the autonomy of modern technology? Hegemony explains why in contemporary 
society we consider the desirability of limitless economic growth and 
technological development to be common sense. We rationalise this 
acquiescence with the drive of technological civilisation as a desire for progress. 
Technological progress is, Jonas claims – with the exception of medicine (IR: 4) 
– not a normative advance, but merely progress according to technology’s own 
criterion of efficiency (TPT: 35). Jonas argues that the ideology of progress is 
neither a “gloss” nor “a mere option” of technological development, but rather its 
“modus operandi as it interacts with society” (ibid.). This claim is compatible 
                                                          
20 Although Jonas studied under Mannheim as a postdoctoral student and wrote one of his 
earliest articles on Mannheim’s work (KM), the latter’s influence on Jonas is minimal, and 
certainly not comparable to that of Heidegger or Aristotle. Nevertheless, this connection is worth 
mentioning and – with the exception of Wennemann (2013: 114-122) – it has largely escaped 
the notice of commentators. It must be noted that whilst Mannheim’s conception of ideology is 
useful in elaborating upon Jonas’ social and political thought, their theories of utopianism are 
very much opposed. 
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with Gramsci’s theory of hegemony outlined above: the desire for technological 
development is not simply a reflection of the interests of the ruling class – as 
orthodox Marxists would have it – but is in fact a ‘common-sense’ hegemonic 
entrenchment of ideology. Furthermore, Jonas claims that this happens through 
a “complex, multifarious determinism” since we act as “the vehicle of those 
[technological] dynamics” in part through “our daily consumer existence” (42). 
Giddens, in turn, concretely explains how we exercise our agency so as to 
practically reinforce ideology through our engagement in structural practices 
such as consumption. 
 According to Jonas, whilst the subjective side of this pressure “can be 
resisted of course; there’s no compulsion” (CR: 216), the objective socio-
economic aspect is more pervasive. The problem, in short, is that “a style of life 
has been established which one somehow has to join […] or else one simply 
cannot exist in the society as it has come to be” (ibid.). As a banal example, 
consider the following: I wake up in the morning to the alarm on my mobile 
phone, a device made in China with materials including tantalum extracted in 
Africa. It is still dark so I turn on the light, running on electricity generated by 
nuclear power and burning coal, put on my dressing gown (made in 
Bangladesh), and go to the kitchen to make a coffee. The coffee beans were 
grown in Colombia and transported across the Atlantic before being packaged 
in an unrecyclable plastic wrapper somewhere in Europe. I turn on the stove, 
using gas extracted from the North Sea, to heat the Italian espresso pot, before 
fetching some milk from the fridge which has been running all night.21 And so 
on. On an individual level my actions are innocuous, but they are of course only 
possible as part of a destructive socio-economic whole. Each act presupposes 
a chain of events which, on a large enough scale and over a long enough time, 
entail serious ecological harms. Of course, each of us has the ability as 
individual consumers to opt out of some ecologically harmful practices, but 
changes to individual lifestyle only go so far, and here lies the crux of the 
matter: we have to live somewhere, work, travel, eat, drink, wash, clothe 
ourselves, and so on, and we can only do so in the society we inhabit.  
How, then, do we reform technology? Jonas notes that as individuals we 
might refuse to embrace the “inherent drive” of progress, “[w]e may resent the 
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fact and despise its fruits[,] and yet [we] must go along with it” (TPT: 35). This is 
because, as we learned from Giddens, the individual qua individual is virtually 
powerless to bring about structural change. For Jonas, our best hope of 
resisting the onward march of technological civilisation is at the level of 
governance, and judging by the insights gleaned from Gramsci and Giddens 
this can be achieved by a shifting of public opinion in favour of prudence and 
restraint. Although Jonas is not particularly confident that this will happen, as I 
will discuss in Chapter Five, Charles Taylor rightly notes that “it is still the case 
that there are many points of resistance, and that these are constantly being 
generated” (1991: 99). He continues:  
We need only think of the whole movement since the Romantic era […] 
and of the offshoot of that movement today, which is challenging our 
ecological mismanagement. That this movement has made some 
headway, has made some dent, however incipient and inadequate, in our 
practices stands as a partial refutation of any iron law of technological 
society. (Ibid.) 
Taylor is surely correct, giving us some reason to be optimistic about the 
potential for transformation made room for in Jonas’ analysis. Here is our final 
distinction to be drawn between Jonas and Heidegger. In light of Jonas’ critique, 
supplemented by Gramsci and Giddens, it is fair to say that Heidegger’s 
fatalistic Seinsgeschichte does not grasp the dynamic of technological advance 
in its concreteness. Jonas, however, tacks closer to social and historical 
analysis and is able to make conceptual room for the shaping, and perhaps 
even control, of the development of technology. 
V. The Risk of Utopianism 
As discussed at the end of the previous section, Jonas identifies the ideology of 
technological civilisation as one of progress. However, I have also referred 
throughout to ‘techno-utopianism’. It is this radical extension of the ideology of 
technological progress which Jonas identifies as the most cogent expression of 
modern humanity’s intoxication with technology. So far I have left techno-
utopianism undefined, but Jonas’ critique of technology is incomplete without a 
full account of this phenomenon, from its origins in the Enlightenment to its 
contemporary manifestations. I will then sketch out Jonas’ alternative diagnosis 
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by way of an encounter with Ulrich Beck’s analysis of ‘risk society’. But I will 
begin with Jonas’ bête noire: Francis Bacon. 
(α) The Baconian Ideal 
 As Mannheim notes, Bacon saw himself as a destroyer of the ‘idols’ of 
tradition and an advocate of objective, rational knowledge of the world (1992: 
55). In his zeal, however, Bacon essentially replaced the ideology of old with 
one of the new. The Baconian roots of techno-utopianism were identified by 
Jonas in his first essay on technology, ‘The Practical Uses of Theory’ (PL: 192-
194). As explained above, Jonas holds that modern science had from its 
inception a technological bent by virtue of its emphasis on the quantification and 
manipulation of nature. Furthermore, he claims that this character of modern 
science dissolves, or fuses, the ancient distinction between theory and practice, 
such that practice is presupposed in theory, and vice versa.  
Nowhere is this more self-consciously so than in Bacon’s philosophical 
works.22 Bacon begins the Novum Organum with the declaration that science 
must strike out in this new direction “so that the mind may exercise its right over 
nature” (2000: 6). The imperative of progress via the domination of nature is 
perhaps most famously formulated in the following: “[i]t is not merely success in 
speculation which is in question, but the human situation, human fortune and 
the whole potential of works. [...] Therefore those two goals of man, knowledge 
and power, a pair of twins, are really come to the same thing” (24). This 
declaration neatly encapsulates the project of the Novum Organum, the title of 
which suggests that this new scientific method must replace the reason which 
Aristotle regarded as the organ of rational enquiry. On this basis – with its 
explicitly practical agenda – Bacon elaborates on the notion that nature is to be 
technologically bent to humanity’s will and remade for our purposes. Bacon 
says: “in artificial things nature accepts the yoke from the empire of man [...]. A 
completely new face is given to bodies by human effort and agency” (224). If 
humanity is able to control nature through practical knowledge – so the 
argument goes – nature might be used against itself in order to alleviate 
scarcity, illness, exposure and other problems pertaining to humanity’s 
                                                          
22 In terms of comparable influence, the other major advocate of the new science as a guiding 
principle of knowledge was Descartes. In the Discourse on Method he claimed that “instead of 
the speculative philosophy taught in the Schools” (principally that of Aristotle and Aquinas), “a 
practical philosophy can be found” which would make us “masters and possessors of nature” 
(1968: 78). We shall confront Descartes’ legacy in the next chapter. 
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biological constitution.  
 The agenda becomes explicit in Valerius Terminus wherein Bacon states 
that the “true ends of knowledge” are the “command” of all creatures and the 
“restitution and reinvesting (in great part) of man to the sovereignty and power 
[...] which he had in his first state of creation” (1984: 42). In other words, a 
return to earthly paradise via scientific and technological progress awaits us. 
Elaborating on this theme, Bacon’s techno-utopianism stretches the 
imagination. In his unfinished novel The New Atlantis Bacon describes how the 
island people of Bensalem are able to use technology to meet their every need. 
In their applied-science research institute Salomon’s House, the “Interpreters of 
Nature” (1906: 297) modify and even create new organisms:  
By art [...] we make them greater or taller than their kind is, and 
contrariwise dwarf them and stay their growth; we make them more 
fruitful and bearing than their kind is, and contrariwise barren and not 
generative. […] We make a number of kinds, of serpents, worms, flies, 
fishes, of putrefaction, whereof some are advanced (in effect) to be 
perfect creatures, like beasts or birds, and have sexes, and do 
propagate. Neither do we do this by chance, but we know beforehand of 
what matter and commixture, what kind of those creatures will arise. 
(291) 
He even envisions turning our power over nature into power over human nature 
also, since the proper application of modern science ranges from “the meanest 
mechanical practice” to “immortality (if it were possible)” (1984: 42). Jonas 
refers to this as the “Baconian ideal” (IR: 140) – the dream of not merely 
technological progress, but rather wholesale power over nature, to use and 
redesign it according to our desires. 
 To present-day readers Bacon’s vision cannot but appear prescient: we 
are now able to make creatures ‘other than their kind is’ through genetic 
engineering, generate new lifeforms from ‘putrefaction’ in synthetic biology, and 
are pursuing immortality as part of the human enhancement agenda. On each 
of these points Bacon seems to have longed for the very technologies which 
have either emerged in recent decades, or at least now appear possible. 
Needless to say, he did not foresee the practical and ethical dilemmas which 
would arise in the realisation of his vision. In part this is because he believed 
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that mastery of creation was sanctioned by Christian scripture. Not only is his 
techno-utopia perceived as a restoration of paradise which preceded the Fall, 
but equally, the inhabitants of Bensalem are portrayed as devout Christians, 
and he even says in Valerius Terminus that “all knowledge is to be limited by 
religion” (1984: 34, emphasis removed). Of course, as we saw in the 
introduction, modern science has in fact demolished the power of religion. 
However, the main reason Bacon failed to envisage the problematic 
consequences of his ideal is precisely because utopianism precludes such 
considerations. By its very nature, techno-utopianism excludes the 
acknowledgment of fundamental flaws in its agenda, whilst smaller problematic 
side-effects are simply deemed rectifiable by better (i.e., more efficient) 
technology. As such, Baconian techno-utopianism is the strongest ideology of 
technological civilisation – the form of life which it helps entrench.  
 Although Jonas does not make the connection explicitly, there is a 
profound link to be drawn between the ideologies of progress and techno-
utopianism which characterise the contemporary West, and its deeper Gnostic 
tendency. This observation was made by Eric Voegelin, an associate of Jonas’ 
and who drew on the latter’s work to develop his critique of modernity as 
fundamentally Gnostic (1952: 124). In the ancient world, as we have seen, 
Gnostics held the divine to be fundamentally separate from the material world, 
the two realms being connected only by the messenger from the world of light 
who bade those who listened to prepare for salvation. Voegelin argues that the 
modern West is characterised by an “immanentization of the eschaton” (163). 
That is to say: it construes worldly history as teleological – a purpose 
discernable only to the select few – and oriented toward a “state of perfection” 
(120). The most conspicuous example is Marxist-Leninism, with its dream of 
world communism led by an elite vanguard, but Voegelin also points to the 
“progressivism, positivism, and scientism” of Comte as another key 
manifestation (164). The connection with Bacon’s thought should here be clear. 
Firstly he construed the world as explicable according to the principles of 
experimentation and inductive reasoning, which are available only to men of 
reason, rather than those beholden to the idols of the tribe. Secondly, and 
decisively, he quite literally held the historical telos of the scientific method to be 
a return to Earthly paradise, insofar as we would have power and sovereignty 
over Creation once more. 
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(β) The Reality of Baconianism 
Jonas called the fundamental instability of technological civilisation and 
the ecological and biological catastrophes that await us the “ominous side of the 
Baconian ideal” (IR: 140). He warns us of an “apocalyptic perspective calculably 
built into the structure of the present course of humanity” (141): however, rather 
like his all-too-brief account of ideology, Jonas did not discuss this precarity 
concretely, seemingly taking for granted that we share his diagnosis of the 
situation. In this instance it is tempting to give him the benefit of the doubt, since 
the audience for which he was writing lived under the perpetual threat of nuclear 
war. This was not Jonas’ chief concern, however, as he presciently identified 
the very crises we face today – climate change, pollution, overpopulation, and 
other such “slow, long-term, cumulative” problems (ix) – as greater threats. He 
observed, rightly, that the temporal and spatial distance of such issues places 
them at a remove from everyday concerns and political expediency, and so the 
movement toward them is considerably harder to avert in advance than nuclear 
war, “which sane fear can avoid with relative ease” (ibid.). A description of the 
inherent but subtle insecurity of technological civilisation which has caused 
these crises is necessary, therefore, to illuminate the reality of Baconian techno-
utopia. In order to flesh out this idea I will briefly turn to Ulrich Beck’s famous 
analysis of risk society. This move is justified, I would argue, by Jonas and 
Beck’s debate about the ecological crisis in which the latter stated: “I have 
described the new epoch, which Hans Jonas […] has identified, with the notion 
of ‘risk society’” (FWT: 70). 
 Beck diagnoses technological civilisation as fundamentally reliant on 
high-stakes risks which simultaneously imperil it. In line with Bacon’s vision, he 
notes that “the modernization process takes place with the claim of opening the 
gates to hidden sources of social wealth with the keys of techno-scientific 
development” (1992: 20). However, this process necessitates “a systematic way 
of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by 
modernization itself” (21). At face value risk society embodies the ideals of 
progress and techno-utopia, but it in fact rests on the “volcano” (76) of accepted 
and managed risks. Perhaps the best example of Beck’s diagnosis is nuclear 
power – presciently, the original German edition of Risikogesellschaft (1986) 
was published shortly before the Chernobyl disaster. Measures are of course 
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taken to minimise the risk of a nuclear incident: in the United States, for 
example, radioactive waste is disposed of “about 300m underground in a dry, 
geologically stable medium” (Penner et.al., 2008: 277). Here it is isolated from 
the biosphere for some 10,000 years to allow radiation to fall to what is deemed 
to be the minimally-safe level. Moreover, the power plants themselves are 
typically situated at a geographical remove from conurbations so as to minimise 
the risk to those segments of society most dependent on their fruits.  
Unfortunately the risk management process can and does occasionally 
fail. The Chernobyl disaster of 1986 was the result of lax procedures: engineers 
shut down multiple safety mechanisms as part of a live experiment with the 
reactors which caused the fatal power surge (Ramana, 2006: 1743). In 2011, 
the Fukushima disaster resulted from a combination of natural catastrophe – an 
earthquake followed by a tsunami which hit the plant – and insufficient 
preparation for such an eventuality (Pritchard, 2012: 220). To be clear, it is not 
that technologies such as nuclear power are any more likely to go wrong than 
simpler technologies – they may even be less likely – but that if they do the 
scale of harm is altogether greater (a distinction sometimes referred to as one 
of ‘risk’ and ‘hazard’). The collapse of a windmill might be likelier than that of a 
nuclear power station, but leads to negligible harm. A household fire can spread 
to catastrophic effect, to be sure, as the 1666 Great Fire of London proves, but 
its harmful effects nevertheless remain temporally bound to the present. In this 
respect neither are comparable to the nuclear power plant, where the major 
costs attached will affect future generations as well as our own. 
But above all, in risk society the danger is a byproduct of normal 
functioning. In addition to Fukushima-style catastrophes, Beck and Jonas’ 
concern is that the possibility of harm innocuously accumulates in the form of 
radioactive waste – as Jonas notes, while it continues to work perfectly “the 
peaceful reactor undramatically goes on depositing his poison for millennia to 
come” (TSE: 896). Analagously, booming population numbers, fossil fuel 
emissions, and depletion of biodiversity are inherent to our present model of 
development, which makes some concessions to the necessity of tackling these 
problems. In risk society the greatest threats are not always accidental but 
rather cumulative and otherwise-managed side-effects, which, as Beck says, is 
precisely why it is so troubling (1992: 29-30). Where Beck’s analysis helpfully 
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informs Jonas’, therefore, is firstly fleshing out the notion of risk intrinsic 
technological civilisation, and secondly in supplementing it with the notion of 
rational management. In Jonas’ critique deliberation only features insofar as he 
hopes it might rein in the technological drive (IR: 142). However, Beck shows us 
that rational planning in the form of bureaucratic governance is an integral part 
of risk society: part of technological civilisation’s autonomous thrust is that it 
involves governmental management of risks as a justification for perpetuating 
the whole.  
VI. Posthumanist Philosophies of Technology 
In reconstructing Jonas’ philosophy of technology I have attempted to show that 
the reasons most often given for disregarding it are unfounded, and that it offers 
an astute analysis of contemporary technological civilisation if bolstered with 
sociological analysis. However, the sense that his work is somewhat passé is 
tied to the changing trends in the philosophy of technology since Jonas’ 
intellectual peak in the 1970s. In particular, the ‘posthumanist’ turn taken in the 
1980s shifted the framework of technological analysis away from its traditional 
themes and figures. As Don Ihde notes, of the early philosophers of technology 
only Heidegger remains very much in vogue (2010: 1), although interpreted in a 
way that I suspect Heidegger himself would not recognise. Charting this 
movement to posthumanism, which remains the dominant paradigm, can help 
us better understand the reasons for Jonas’ current unpopularity and evaluate 
its strengths and weaknesses against the contemporary alternative. Tamar 
Sharon has divided the history of the philosophy of technology into four broad 
categories, which provides a useful entry point (although I shall refine them): 
they are the utopian, the dystopian, radical posthumanist, and the 
methodological posthumanist (2014: 5). We shall take them in turn.  
Courtesy of Jonas’ critique of it we are familiar already with techno-
utopianism, contemporary advocates of which include transhumanists such as 
Nick Bostrom, Max More, and Ray Kurzweil. Its defining features are that 
technology is an instrument put to use by humans who are in essence 
autonomous, productive beings: Homo faber. Technology is here conceived of 
as a neutral means to meet the end of material security against nature 
(including our own biological constitution), culminating in our meeting all 
conceivable needs and desires. I have argued that techno-utopianism is a 
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radical extension of the notion of technological progress, the everyday belief 
that technology continually improves and more or less delivers greater 
convenience and security. However, Sharon does not differentiate between the 
two.  
The same oversight also applies to her sweeping discussion of those she 
terms the ‘dystopian’ philosophers of technology. Broadly speaking, these 
thinkers sought to counter the naïveté of the above views by stressing what has 
been, or could be, lost in technological development. Amongst them we can 
name Lewis Mumford, Oswald Spengler, Heidegger, Arnold Gehlen, 
Horkheimer and Adorno, Günther Anders, Jacques Ellul, Hannah Arendt, and 
Herbert Marcuse.23 Jonas, of course, is also a key figure in this lineage which is 
united by the belief that technology – or at least its modern manifestation – is no 
mere instrument, and that Homo sapiens’ existence and/or essence may be 
imperilled by the success of Homo faber. As argued above, these insights are 
ultimately more profound than the caricature sometimes offered. Some, such as 
Heidegger, Ellul, and Spengler, arguably deserve the label ‘dystopian’ given the 
fatalistic dimension of their thinking, but the others, who do not subscribe to that 
notion, perhaps ought to be considered ‘critics’ instead. Unfortunately, once 
more Sharon overlooks this distinction: even those such as Horkheimer, 
Marcuse, and Jonas, all of whom offer reasoned and powerful critiques of 
modern technology, are grouped with fatalists such as Ellul and Heidegger, 
obscuring at least one fundamental point of difference (2014: 81). 
The third group Sharon identifies is radical posthumanism. This school 
has its roots in French post-structuralism, in particular the work of Michel 
Foucault, and finds contemporary advocates in Donna Haraway and Rosi 
Braidotti. The aim is to account for the way in which emerging technologies 
contribute to the deconstruction of dualisms foundational to Western thinking: 
self and world, mind and body, culture and nature, and so on. As such, it is 
fundamentally descriptive although its advocates often imbue their analysis with 
normative significance. This tendency is likewise a result of its Foucauldian 
inspiration, wherein “ethics involves the ability to reflect on the processes by 
which we are endlessly constituted as subjects and requires that we develop an 
                                                          
23 Incidentally, Jonas studied alongside Marcuse under Heidegger, with Horkheimer under 
Husserl, and with Arendt and Anders under both. 
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active relationship to the mediations that help shape the self” (Sharon, 2014: 
11). As such, the deconstruction of dualisms is deemed ethical in that it 
represents a challenge to power – but how we can distinguish good from bad 
according to only the descriptive category of power is unclear.  
In a different way the problem of normativity also affects the final group, 
methodological posthumanism, which is the more philosophically robust of the 
two posthumanist strands.24 The advantage of the methodological posthumanist 
approach is the detail added to a general theory of technology courtesy of fine-
grained examinations of particular technologies, which is why this shift has also 
been called the ‘empirical’ turn in the philosophy of technology (Achterhuis, 
2001). Key figures in this generation include Ihde, Albert Borgmann, Langdon 
Winner, Carl Mitcham, and Andrew Feenberg. Linked to this group is the 
sociological subdiscipline of science and technology studies, the foremost figure 
of which is Bruno Latour. All sought what they regarded as a more balanced 
examination of technology than was provided by the utopian and dystopian 
schools. 
Ihde and Borgmann are probably the most astute and insightful of this 
generation. Ihde provides phenomenological descriptions of the role played by 
technology in mediating between the self and the world, which he refers to as 
“the intentional arc [of] Human-instrument-World” (1979: 32). He claims that the 
medium of technology alters our experience of the world in two connected 
ways: through “embodiment relations”, and “hermeneutic relations” (36). The 
former refers to the way in which technology can amplify or diminish our 
experience of aspects of the world: for instance, a magnifying glass intensifies 
our visual perception of whatever we put before it, while shoes diminish our 
tactile perception of the ground beneath us. With an increase in technological 
complexity, however, Ihde argues that this reduction-amplification scale tips 
over into a novel hermeneutic capacity, as technology becomes a means of 
experiencing that which is not otherwise apparent to perception. He says:  
[I]n contemporary technologically embodied science, it is precisely what 
is thought to be unperceivable that is made present. The successful 
                                                          
24 I will bypass Sharon’s own contribution of ‘mediated’ posthumanism as it builds on aspects of 




search for atomic sub-particles, for DNA structures, for the various 
varieties of the micro-structure of the world appear through the mediation 
of the sophisticated instrument. (38, emphasis removed) 
As a consequence, Ihde claims, “[t]he ‘world’ for us is interpreted as one of a 
vast system of impersonal relations, often explicitly conceived of in terms of 
mechanical metaphors” (1983: 17). However, he holds that the intentional arc 
and this hermeneutic experience are also reflexive, changing our self-
perception: “technology supplies the dominant basis for an understanding both 
of the world and ourselves” (10). This even exerts an influence the science 
itself, which frequently conceives of the body in mechanistic terms: the heart is 
a pump, DNA is code, and the brain a computer, the latter accompanied by 
metaphors of ‘hardwiring’, ‘programming’, and ‘processing’. 
So far Ihde’s analysis is broadly in line with Heidegger’s theory of 
enframing and largely compatible with Jonas’ account of modern technology. 
Indeed, as with Ihde’s last point Jonas claims:  
There is a strong and, it seems, almost irresistible tendency in the human 
mind to interpret human functions in terms of the artifacts that take their 
place, and artifacts in terms of the replaced human functions. […] The 
use of an intentionally ambiguous and metaphorical terminology 
facilitates this transfer back and forth between the artifact and its maker. 
(PL: 110) 
The difference between Ihde and Jonas on this issue is that the latter regards it 
as a misconception and pursues a way out of modern mechanistic metaphysics, 
whereas the former does not. While Jonas attempts to tackle the reductive 
technological worldview on the plane of metaphysics, where it belongs, Ihde 
opts instead for “a ‘loose’ or maybe even ‘Zen’ relation to technology” (1983: 
23), modelled on the later Heidegger’s concept of releasement. The problem 
with Ihde’s approach is twofold, then: firstly, it surrenders the search for 
metaphysical accounts of the world which would allow for a stronger 
engagement with technologically-influenced conceptualisations of it. Secondly, 
and relatedly, it lacks the normative grounds required to judge how technology 
changes our self-conception. It is for this reason that Jonas regards the 
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elaboration of an “idea of Man” (IR: 43) as of utmost significance, particularly, 
as we shall see in Chapter Six, for bioethics. 
In this regard Borgmann’s thought represents an advance over Ihde, as 
his analysis of technology is explicitly anchored in a normative framework. 
Borgmann draws a distinction between two sorts of technological entities, the 
device and the thing. His account of a ‘thing’ follows that of Heidegger, as 
expounded in an essay of that name (2001b: 161-184). Borgmann explains it as 
follows:  
A thing, in the sense in which I want to use the word here, is inseparable 
from its context, namely, its world, and from our commerce with the thing 
and its world, namely, engagement. The experience of a thing is always 
and also a bodily and social engagement with the thing’s world. (1984: 
41) 
The crucial role played by a thing is as a focus, gathering both people and a 
world. Borgmann’s paradigmatic example of a focus is the household fireplace, 
or hearth, since it is, in fact, the etymological origin of the word. He notes that 
the hearth, as provider of warmth, physically and socially centred the 
household, provided its occupants with skilful tasks such as fire-lighting, and 
was intimately tied to the local source of timber. When describing the building 
and maintenance of a fire Borgmann arguably veers into Romanticism, but he 
does also recognise the degree of hardship such a way of life entailed (41-42). 
Indeed, for Borgmann it is precisely the promise of ease and affluence over toil 
and scarcity which explain the allure of technological development. This 
promise finds greatest expression in the device. A device “makes no demands 
on our skill, strength, or attention, and it is less demanding the less it makes its 
presence felt. In the progress of technology the machinery of a device has 
therefore a tendency to become concealed or to shrink” (42). A device 
equivalent of the hearth is a central heating system, which also provides warmth 
but with none of the focal aspects of the former. Its heat is dispersed throughout 
the house, it is less intimately connected to the environment powering it, and 
any more work involved in using it than clicking a button is considered 
laborious. Finally, its workings are largely hidden from the view of the user, 
again contributing to the device’s status as a background entity. 
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 Borgmann provides other detailed examples of the distinction between 
things and devices, in particular cookery versus microwave dinners (51-52) and 
hiking in the wilderness versus camping with all the latest mod cons (191-194). 
Although it is clear that Borgmann prefers “focal things and practices” (196) to 
devices, he stresses that this does not constitute a rejection of technology, even 
in its modern form. He tells us that “we have always and already accepted 
technology, be it in the middle of the wilderness or on a homestead where we 
pretend to live a self-sufficient life. […] [T]his acceptance is required of us. It is 
the sign […] of a new maturity” (194). The challenge is to identify those things 
and practices which, though just as technological as devices, act as focal 
points. Why? Borgmann’s answer is that these contribute to the good life, to 
flourishing – a connection worth briefly elaborating on.  
Borgmann argues that the consumption of devices principally offers 
convenience. As noted above, they encourage a less intimate relation to the 
world and other people, involve less skilful engagement, and so – despite their 
great utility – a life dominated by devices is in key respects a poorer one (124-
143). Moreover, he argues that the nature of the device as a background object, 
fulfilling a single function, means that we easily get bored and dissatisfied with 
them, and search for newer ‘improved’ versions. Because the device has little to 
no value beyond utility – though it might also have aesthetic value, or come to 
have sentimental value – it encourages a consumerist attitude to the world.25 
For Borgmann, if we seek to live well in an age of mass consumption then it is 
vital that we engage in focal things and practices which offer the chance to 
develop oneself, to maintain genuine relations with our friends, family, and 
wider civil society, and – if possible – pursue a line of work which involves such 
focuses. Cooking and preparing food, eating around a table instead of in front of 
the television, socialising at the pub rather than via the internet, walking the 
dog, learning a new skill or craft: all, in one way or another, embody 
characteristics of the focus.26 If we adopt technologies and practices both old 
                                                          
25 One wonders here as to the exact nature of a device which acquires sentimental value. Take 
the broken watch I value solely because it belonged to my late grandfather, and which has no 
utility for me (although it presumably did for him). Is this broken watch then no longer a device, 
but now a thing?  
26 The pub (my example, rather than Borgmann’s) shows that not all focal aspects of the thing 
need to be in play at the same time. The beer is generally not brewed on site and the fireplace, 
if there is one, is usually not maintained by the patrons. But even in its most superficial 
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and new which work in this way, Borgmann argues that there is no reason why 
we cannot recover “the promise of technology” (246). 
VII. From Technology to Ethics 
Borgmann’s philosophy of technology is undoubtedly one of the most insightful 
to emerge from the posthumanist turn, both for the richness of its analysis and 
its commitment to a normative dimension which broadly situates it within the 
framework of virtue ethics. In the latter it might work as a supplement to Jonas’ 
philosophy, which, as Nikulin points out, rarely explicitly draws on virtue (2001: 
101). Jonas’ theory shows us how the integration of science, technology, 
capitalism, and bureaucratic government form a mutually propelling juggernaut 
which leaves a diminished space for agency to fundamentally challenge it. 
Jonas’ solution, as we shall see in later chapters, is to utilise government and 
public policy against contemporary technological civilisation, as these can best 
respond to reason and thus enact the new responsibilities he identifies. But in 
doing so Jonas fails to flesh out the connection between technology and virtue, 
a possibility which Borgmann’s work alerts us to. 
Viewed from Jonas’ perspective, however, Borgmann’s philosophy of 
technology is not without its own limitations. Borgmann centres his analysis on 
the role technology might play in the good life, and asks that we engage with 
focal things and practices to that end, yet he overlooks the ambiguous role that 
technology plays in the formation of ends. Jonas noted, in a neo-Aristotelian 
vein, that part of modern technology’s peculiarity was that it is no longer a 
means to an end. To reiterate: “in addition to spawning new ends (worthy or 
frivolous) from the mere invention of means, technology as a grand venture 
tends to establish itself as the transcendent end” (TPT: 38). Borgmann 
somewhat evades the issue by arguing that “at least in our reflective moments 
we hold to the traditional understanding of means and ends” (1984: 247). In our 
reflective moments perhaps we do – indeed, faith in our ongoing ability to draw 
this distinction is one of the few remaining grounds for hope – but to just 
assume it is to neglect the very real influence technology has over our day-to-
day socio-economic activity, and which its accompanying ideology has over our 
                                                                                                                                                                          
manifestations the pub remains a social focus – the legacy of when it was quite literally a public 
house – gathering a community. 
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inner life. If Jonas is correct, then, Borgmann’s analysis is undermined by the 
changing nature of human ends in the technological age. 
A final problem is that despite his recognition that the reform of 
technology extends into politics and economics (226-246), Borgmann gives little 
sense of the urgency of the task. As Jonas, Anders, Beck and others in the 
‘critical’ or ‘dystopian’ schools have shown, risk is central to an adequate 
account of technological civilisation. And, although it might be a statement of 
the obvious, the fact that the future existence of human and non-human life is in 
doubt calls for a more urgent and collectively demanding response than 
Borgmann offers. The root of this oversight is, I suspect, his desire to break with 
those he considered substantivist philosophers of technology, and in doing so 
did an injustice to their insights. So let us summarise what we have learned 
from Jonas’ philosophy of technology, when reinforced with the necessary 
sociological theories: we have seen that technology, far from being a neutral 
instrument, is rooted in a particular approach to the world embedded in modern 
science. Its development acquired a momentum of its own when combined with 
industrial capitalism, which reinforces this automatic advance through the 
ideology of progress and its radical offspring, techno-utopianism. Both of these 
elevate technological advance to the status of an end-in-itself. This masks the 
great risks technological civilisation poses to life, and it is the latter development 
which makes unprecedented ethical demands of us. A new ethics will represent, 
then, the restitution of true ends and the relegation of technology to its proper 
place as a means. This ethics is our topic for the next three chapters, beginning 











Chapter Two: Philosophical Biology and Anthropology 
I. Ontology as a Ground for Ethics 
The previous chapter made the case that modern technology, developing 
autonomously, has its origin in the same scientific revolution from which modern 
nihilism arose. The root cause in both cases is a materialist interpretation of the 
natural world, interpreted mathematically and denied purpose, order, and value. 
It is this which Jonas’ ontology seeks to overcome.  
Jonas ambitiously argues that “Being, in the testimony it gives of itself, 
informs us not only about what it is but also what we owe to it” (MM: 101). 
Vittorio Hösle suggests that due to this unapologetic fusion of ontology and 
normativity “[i]t is no exaggeration to say that since Immanuel Kant, there has 
hardly been an ethicist in whose approach the metaphysics of ethics has played 
so decisive a role as in the case of Jonas” (2008: 22). While this may be an 
exaggeration – Hegel and Schopenhauer spring to mind – it is fair to say that in 
this respect Jonas’ philosophy is unusual for its time. Indeed, we shall see in the 
next chapter that Jonas’ attempt to bridge ethics and metaphysics leaves him 
open to criticism from those who uphold a post-metaphysical critical philosophy. 
Firstly, however, we must make sense of Jonas’ claim that Being implies 
obligation, and to do this we must first examine what ‘Being’, for Jonas, actually 
is. For this reason I will focus here on his middle-period work which seeks to 
demonstrate that life, in its manifold forms, is the pivotal domain of ontological 
interrogation: one which escapes and refutes materialism. 
There are two major works in Jonas’ œuvre which present his 
philosophical biology and anthropology, both having their origins in the Lehrbrief 
written by Jonas to his wife Lore during the Second World War (M: 220-245). 
The first is the only-recently published monograph Organism and Freedom. 
Jonas intended it to be a systematic and integrated presentation of ideas 
developed in a series of essays written in the 1950s, but abandoned the project 
after struggling to find a publisher (197). He opted instead to publish the 
individual essays in a single volume as The Phenomenon of Life: the other 
crucial text.  
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In both Jonas offers an “‘existential’ interpretation of biological facts” (PL: 
xxiii).27 Adopting Heidegger’s existential-phenomenological method, he sets out 
to show that the materialism of modern science is incompatible with a first-
person account of actually being alive. However, he also argues that 
Heidegger’s early approach is itself fatally limited as “existentialism, obsessed 
with man alone, is in the habit of claiming as his unique privilege and 
predicament much of what is rooted in organic existence as such” (ibid.). 
Integrating phenomenology with biological findings and concepts from 
philosophical anthropology, Jonas attempts to show how various organic 
capacities, in evolving, brought about differing degrees of freedom at the 
ascending levels of plants, animals, and humans. The transcendent properties 
of the last – our capacity for abstract thought and morality – thus constitute 
Being’s pinnacle. The end result is a partial rehabilitation of Aristotelian biology 
which, though plausible, is by no means uncontentious, as I will show by 
examining some broad criticisms Jonas’ philosophy of life has received.  
II. Dualism, Materialism, Integral Monism 
Jonas firstly sets about showing that materialism, as it is understood today, in 
fact rests on the untenable assumptions of substance dualism. He 
uncontroversially takes the exemplar of dualistic metaphysics to be 
Cartesianism, as Descartes infamously divided the world into res extensa and 
res cogitans or “extended” and “intelligent” substances (1968: 57). The former, 
res extensa, was the world of matter as described by the new physical 
sciences. As discussed in the previous chapter, this perspective jettisoned 
teleology and instead took material, formal, and efficient causation as sufficient 
to interpret non-human nature, living and non-living. The latter substance, res 
cogitans, was the human subject which accordingly became the central object 
of philosophical enquiry as sole terrestrial possessor of purpose and intrinsic 
value. As is well known, Cartesian substance dualism led to a conundrum in 
that the mind’s interaction with the material body could not be accounted for. To 
his credit, Descartes recognised that their relation was not simply like that of “a 
                                                          
27 I am grateful to Francesca Michelini for alerting me to the fact that in Organismus und Freiheit 
the word ‘existential’ is in this line replaced by “ontologische”, or ‘ontological’ (OFA: 3). 
However, I take The Phenomenon of Life to be the definitive edition, partly because it is the 
original, and partly because Jonas’ use of ‘existential’ seems more appropriate given his 
criticism of ‘contemporary existentialism’ in the following line. This latter usage is preserved in 
the translation as “[d]er zeitgenössische Existentialismus” (ibid.). 
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pilot in his ship”, but rather that the mind was “joined and united more closely 
with the body” (76). However, his notorious solution – indicated only in private 
correspondence (1998: 205) – that the point of connection was the pineal gland 
in the brain merely begged the question: how, then, was the mind joined to the 
pineal gland? No adequate answer conceived of on dualistic terms was 
forthcoming.  
The resolution of this fundamental flaw entailed a move to monism. Two 
competing positions arose, each emphasising one half of the substance duality 
over the other: the idealist path accommodated the physical into the mental; the 
second option, materialism, reduced the mental to the physical. Idealism was 
not so much philosophically defeated as culturally discredited: the success of 
the modern sciences, in particular Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural 
selection, proved decisive in resolving the stand-off in favour of materialism. 
Extending Darwin’s insights it was possible to argue that humanity, and 
consequently its faculties – previously taken to be apart from mechanistic 
nature, thereby deriving their dignity – were also mere products “thrown up in 
the mechanics of organic mutation” (PL: 127), as Jonas puts it. This explanatory 
advantage allowed materialism to emerge as the dominant ontology of the 
modern era. 
However, this still left the problem of accounting for the immediate 
evidence of the mind in a world purportedly composed of matter: how did the 
one belong to the other? Jonas critiques two philosophical attempts to account 
for this. The first, epiphenomenalism (which Jonas amalgamates with 
parallelism), had the virtue of taking materialism to its logical conclusion in that 
consciousness was conceived of as simply a shadow of neurological activity, 
with no power of its own. This was exemplified by B.F. Skinner’s description of 
mind as a “metaphor”, the efficacy of which is – he claimed – only plausible due 
to the “seeming relevance” of introspective observation (1974: 165). To this 
Jonas makes two objections. Firstly, he notes the “grandiose pointlessness” 
(PL: 129) of evolution giving rise, through natural selection, to a consciousness 
with no efficacy. However, this is not, in itself, a disproof. Secondly, therefore, 
he identifies a “logical absurdity” undercutting the epiphenomenalist claim “in 
that it denies itself the status of an argument”, since strictly physical processes 
are themselves “entirely foreign to ‘meaning’ and ‘truth’” (ibid.). For the 
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epiphenomenalist the mind has a reality, to be sure, but only as a correlation of 
neurological states. Creative, purposeful mental capacities such as meaning 
and judgement – conditions of possibility for even making the epiphenomenalist 
case – cannot be accounted for on such a model which permits only physical 
processes. Thus epiphenomenalism is, in essence, a performative 
contradiction: as a justification for materialism it circumvents the problem of 
mind-matter interaction “only at the price of destroying […] the very idea of 
mind”, which it at the same time presupposes in making the argument (IR: 
130).28  
The second solution analysed is emergence theory. The attraction of this 
approach was that it held on to the immediate evidence of the mind’s efficacy, 
but located its origin in particular configurations of matter, thereby retaining 
scientific compatibility. This position was advocated with force by Ernst Mayr, 
who held emergence theory to be “thoroughly materialistic” and “by definition, 
nonvitalist” (1982: 64).29 But, as Jonas points out, emergence is a “valiant 
attempt” to have it both ways by holding on to pure matter and the power of 
consciousness, yet refusing to confront the contradiction that the latter cannot 
have emerged ex nihilo, as it were, from a world of purely material and efficient 
causation (IR: 67). On the contrary, something of the causal power of mind 
would have to already reside in matter in order for particular configurations of 
the latter to give rise to the former – but this is precisely what the materialism 
underpinning emergentism denies. 
It is true that Jonas overlooks other philosophies of mind, the nuances of 
which might address certain problems with the above accounts. But the 
essential conundrum is that materialism can only make sense of mind by either 
defining it as an emergent property of a substance which precludes such 
qualities, or else reducing it to a mere phantom of the brain, in direct 
contradiction to the logical conditions of argumentation. Each is unappealing, 
                                                          
28 ‘Impotence or Power of Subjectivity’, the appendix to The Imperative of Responsibility, 
confronts the issue of epiphenomenalism in far greater detail. However, the essence of Jonas’ 
criticisms are summarised here.   
29 According to Strachan Donnelley, Mayr described Jonas as “one of the few thinkers who took 
organic life and organisms seriously” (2008: 261). However, he also accused Jonas of “fighting 
Darwin and […] endorsing biologically unsound theories” (1982: 75). In Mayr’s defence it has to 
be said that Jonas’ interpretation of the organism and metabolism is hardly in line with orthodox 




but their respective failures point toward a way out. The absurdity of the 
epiphenomenalist account reveals the fundamental inadequacy of the original 
Cartesian division between mind and matter. Descartes had conceived of this 
distinction under the influence of modern science, but arbitrarily so. There is no 
good reason, after all, to assume that the physical sciences provide us with a 
comprehensive ontology, and a very good reason to think that they do not: 
namely, the immediate evidence of our own minds. Although emergentism had 
valiantly tried to square this circle, the theory only makes sense if we admit that 
mind must already exist in matter as such, even if only in adumbrated form. 
With this latter observation we have essentially arrived at “integral” 
monism as the only plausible metaphysics of substance (PL: 19).30 In other 
words: a theory of Being which reunites the erroneously separated domains of 
mind and matter, synthesising the “partial monisms” of idealism and materialism 
(16). How, then, is this ontology to be constructed? Jonas’ answer is that we 
must take embodied consciousness as our methodological starting point. This 
derives its authority from being the most fundamental ground for enquiry 
available to us, since “my body […] is, in its immediacy of inwardness and 
outwardness in one, the only fully given concrete of experience in general” (24). 
If it is true, as we have argued, that “[r]eality, or nature, is one and testifies to 
itself in what it allows to come forth from it”, then “we must let ourselves be 
instructed by what is highest and richest concerning everything beneath it” (IR: 
69, emphasis removed). In this way Jonas proceeds to substantiate his 
ontology, which is consistent with, but transcends, the theory of evolution. In a 
dialectical twist he argues that the philosophical consequence of Darwinism is 
not, as is often claimed, the proof that humans belong to a mechanistic nature, 
but in fact the very opposite: “evolutionism undid Descartes’ work more 
effectively than any metaphysical critique […]. If man was the relative of 
animals, then animals were the relative of man and in degrees bearers of that 
inwardness of which man, the most advanced of their kin, is conscious in 
                                                          
30 What Jonas means by his call for an ‘integral’ monism can be clarified with reference to 
related ontologies. Despite referring to Spinoza as “the great rectifier” of Descartes, Jonas 
rejects Spinozistic “psycho physical parallelism” for veering “right to the other extreme” and 
locating psyche – and not just its latent possibility – in all living and non-living beings (MM: 185). 
He is similarly wary of “panpsychism” – perhaps to avoid the implication that mental activity, 
such as thoughts, occur even in lifeless beings – and uses the term only to refer to the 
theological metaphysics of Teilhard de Chardin (PL: 25). As such, Jonas’ integral monism ought 
to be considered an idiosyncratic attempt to bridge substance dualism. 
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himself” (PL: 57). Thus life and mind, both eluding the materialist, are shown to 
be one and the same. 
We shall briefly consider two possible criticisms of Jonas’ historical 
account. Firstly, we might argue the following: if it is true that to challenge an 
idea by reference to its origin is to commit a genetic fallacy then Jonas gains 
little from his narrative. One might say that although materialism arose from a 
flawed dualistic ontology this is not proof that it is itself defective. Jan Trnka has 
sought to defend Jonas from this charge by claiming that the latter’s history of 
modern metaphysics is a rhetorical move “to relativise the exclusive standing of 
materialistic ontology in modern science” (2008: 8). In other words, Jonas might 
be seen to be merely raising the question of materialism’s legitimacy by 
showing that it arose as a solution to the contradictions of substance dualism. 
Although this is by no means a disproof, exposing materialism’s historical 
genesis might then lay the ground for an alternative ontology by showing the 
other paths that might have been taken. But this is not, it seems to me, the 
entirety of Jonas’ intention. Rather, he offers a ‘deconstruction’ of materialism 
via a historical account – namely, that the Cartesian separation of mind and 
matter excluded the former from progressively greater swathes of the latter, 
leading to a conclusion which is incompatible with the very act of self-reflection. 
This is not simply a relativisation strategy, but an argument which draws power 
from a historical perspective.  
Secondly, there is the charge of vitalism, which is today regarded as an 
unscientific anachronism. Mayr, for instance, derided Jonas for invoking 
“nonmechanical forces that were not acceptable to most biologists” (2004: 25). 
Now, it is true that Jonas’ ontology transcends the materialist basis of modern 
biology, and that he shares this ambition with vitalist thinkers such as Bergson 
(1922) and Ludwig Klages (2013). But whether Jonas’ ontology is vitalist is 
really a matter of definition. If vitalism refers to a philosophy holding that living 
beings cannot be fully accounted for by the physical sciences, then the charge 
stands. However, this is not a troubling criticism since the materialist theories of 
the mind fail to satisfactorily account for it, as described above. On the other 
hand, we might think that vitalism entails, as Jonas himself claims, the view that 
“life involves forces other than those found in the interaction of inorganic bodies” 
(IR: 205, emphasis added). In that case, however, Jonas cannot be a vitalist 
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since his ontology is strictly monistic. To repeat, Jonas’ contention is that 
modern ontology’s march into the dead-end of materialism was not a necessary 
consequence of scientific discovery; on the contrary, science requires, as a 
condition of possibility, a philosophy that can account for the mind which 
practices it. To show how Jonas goes about developing this alternative we must 
first turn to phenomenology. 
III. Heidegger’s Existentialism 
Jonas originally studied under Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, and 
praised him highly in an obituary. Philosophically speaking, however, Jonas 
regards Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology as inferior to Heidegger’s 
existential version of the method. Jonas’ criticism of Husserl centres upon what 
he perceives as the Cartesian emphasis on cognitive consciousness: “Husserl 
invested all his efforts in attaining that realm of sources, the pure Ego, as a 
subject of philosophical reflection, and thereby to establish philosophy as the 
science of consciousness” (EH: 14-15). But philosophy “has to go beyond this, 
because what is given in consciousness, apart from itself, […] is the world, and 
Husserl did not offer, I would say, an approach to the world” (IHJ: 344). For 
Jonas, Husserl essentially overlooked “in what sense and to what extent we are 
enmeshed in the processes of nature” (345).  
Now, this characterisation of Husserl’s thought is somewhat unfair. In his 
later works Husserl both developed a concept of the lifeworld and emphasised 
the “completely unique ontic meaning of the body” for consciousness (1970: 
106-107), drawing a crucial distinction between its possible appearances as the 
lived body (Leib), and the objective body of scientific investigation (Körper).31 
However, we should note that Jonas’ discussions of Husserl’s phenomenology 
usually contrast it with that of Heidegger, in reference to the moment in time – 
the early- to mid-1920s – when Jonas studied under both (M: 41-42). It is true to 
say that at that point Heidegger, rather than Husserl, offered the most 
comprehensive account of the world in his existential phenomenology. 
As with Jonas’ philosophy of technology, the spectre of Heidegger looms 
large in his ontology. Vittorio Hösle (2008: 29), Susanna Lindberg (2005: 176), 
                                                          
31 One might add that Merleau-Ponty developed this dimension of Husserl’s thinking in his 
important phenomenological studies of the lived body (1962) and nature (2003). 
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and Lawrence Vogel have all argued that its core consists of Jonas “extending 
his teacher’s categories” to nature as a whole (Vogel, 1996: 170), an 
interpretation which is broadly correct. In so doing he did not embark on a 
radically new direction for phenomenology, but rather adapted and altered one 
Heidegger had gestured towards in his early studies of Dasein which 
culminated in Being and Time.  
In Heidegger’s usage Dasein referred to those beings for whom their 
being is an issue, and it is clear that Heidegger had human beings in mind. A 
rock, a painting, and a memory are all beings, but they are not beings which are 
concerned with themselves. Only Dasein is characterised in this way, by care 
for its own being (2010a: 175). Care entails that something has an existence 
(11-12). Heidegger played on the Greek and Latin etymology of ‘existence’, 
drawing on its original meaning of ‘standing-out’ or ‘standing-forth’. Dasein thus 
exists as it never simply resides in its present situation. On the contrary, it is 
both one step ahead of itself in its preoccupation with things – including its 
finitude, represented by death – and one step behind, as it were, in being 
constituted by a history. These characteristics of Dasein are the existential 
categories Vogel referred to above – historicity, being-toward-death, being-with-
others, and so on.32 Thus the fundamental being of Dasein is not transcendent 
consciousness, as in Husserl’s phenomenology, but rather care following from 
its being-in-the-world (53). Heidegger’s existentialism seemed, therefore, to 
reunite subject and world and overcome the Cartesian division of res cogitans 
and res extensa. 
The extent to which this is not the case, however, is clearest when we 
turn to Heidegger’s analyses of non-human life. From his 1921 lecture course 
Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle (2001a) through to the 1926 
course Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy (2008), Heidegger flirted with the 
possibility of Dasein’s extension to non-human life. In large part this 
investigation was guided by the twin concepts of world (Welt), in which Dasein 
is inextricably engaged, and mere environment (Umwelt), as made famous by 
the biologist Jakob von Uexküll (2010). Heidegger initially equivocated over 
their relative significance for existential phenomenology and the question of 
                                                          
32 Of the existential categories Jonas does not reject as historically contingent to Western 
Dasein, historicity is overlooked. I attempt to account for this in Chapter Three. 
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whether either could be attributed to non-human life. At his most generous, in a 
1925 essay, Heidegger states: 
Life is that kind of reality which is in a world and indeed in such a way 
that it has a world. Every living creature has its environing world not as 
something extant next to it but as something that is there for it as 
disclosed, uncovered. […] [W]e miss the essential thing here if we don’t 
see that the animal has a world. (2002b: 163) 
Here the two concepts seem to converge as a disclosing ‘environing world’, 
although this is apparently not available to plant life but only to animals. In any 
case, by the 1929-30 lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics Heidegger turned a corner and instead famously conceived of 
animals as “poor in world” (1995: 176). Heidegger there argued, in his most 
sustained and penetrating analysis of the issue, that animals are ‘captivated’ by 
entities in their Umwelten, rather than open to these entities as beings. Since 
ontological disclosure is denied to them we cannot, he says, attribute a world to 
animals. Finally, in 1935, with Heidegger’s famous ‘turn’ (die Kehre) away from 
existential phenomenology, he concluded that the “animal has no world, nor any 
environment” (2000: 47). 
Why could Heidegger not arrive at a satisfactory account of non-human 
life? Why did his early sympathies for animal existence collapse into a total 
dismissal of the idea? Jonas argues that it was because Heidegger had from 
the beginning overlooked the corporeality of Dasein, and could not, therefore, 
conceive of a common existential ground between living beings.33 This was 
most obviously the case for Being and Time, wherein “the body had been 
omitted and nature shunted aside as something merely present” (WPE: 31). 
Nature did later feature in Heidegger’s thought as ‘earth’ and phusis, but in 
neither case was this a living or corporeal nature. He only once, and belatedly, 
broached the phenomenon of the lived body (Leib), in the Zollikon Seminars of 
1959-69. There he stated that Dasein’s being-in-the-world is “determined by the 
bodying forth [Leiben] of the body” (2001c: 91). This was indeed a radical 
rethinking of the existential phenomenology of decades before, but the 
                                                          
33 See Aho (2009) for an analysis of Heidegger and the body; for a sample of the extensive 
literature on Heidegger and animals, see Buchanan (2008), Calarco (2008), Elden (2006), Krell 
(1992), and McNeill (2006). 
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connection Heidegger there drew between existence and embodiment was only 
provisional and tentative. In particular, Heidegger still had little to say about how 
Dasein and the Leib, if interlinked, related to the Körper. Jonas asks: “[i]s ‘care’ 
ever traced back to […] concern for nourishment, for instance – indeed to 
physical needs at all?” (MM: 47). It must be admitted that at no point, including 
in the Zollikon Seminars, did Heidegger undertake a full investigation of the 
body’s significance which could satisfy this demand. Hence the body remained 
for him “the most difficult problem” (Heidegger and Fink, 1993: 146). 
Had Heidegger from the start connected Dasein’s existential categories 
to the demands of organic being, as Jonas suggests, he might then have been 
able to recognise the presence of those structures in non-human life. Probably 
the closest Heidegger came to doing so is in The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics, when he briefly addressed “the motile character of the living being 
as such”, which “is intimately bound up with the question concerning the 
essence of life” (1995: 266). There Heidegger entertained the possibility that an 
animal’s motile behaviour, such as flight from danger or shrinking in pain, 
means that death, as opposed to a mere “coming to an end”, is in fact open to 
non-humans (267; emphasis removed). If so, animals would then have an 
existence of sorts in anticipation of their demise, their being-toward-death, 
which would have contradicted his well-known declaration in Being and Time 
that only Dasein can die whereas non-human life simply perishes (2010a: 237-
8). But the attribution of this existential structure to animals was not, however, 
carried out, due to Heidegger’s inadequate understanding of the body. 
Partly because of this oversight, Heidegger increasingly regarded 
language – logos, as distinct from phonē, the voice – to be of paramount 
ontological importance. As early as 1926 he claimed that Aristotle’s definition of 
the human being as ζῶον λόγον ἔχον was correct only insofar as it referred to 
our “being-as-speaking-with-one-another” (2009: 33, emphasis removed). This 
tendency intensified with the ‘turn’ of the 1930s, when language came to 
dominate Heidegger’s thinking. He suggested in the 1947 ‘Letter on Humanism’ 
that “language is not the utterance of an organism; nor is it the expression of a 
living thing” (1977: 206). Rather, “language is the house of [b]eing in which the 
human ek-sists by dwelling” (213). Since Heidegger by then took Dasein’s being 
to be overwhelmingly determined by access to language, he concluded that “the 
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essence of divinity is closer to us” than “our scarcely conceivable, abysmal 
bodily kinship with the beast” (206).  
Throughout his thought, then, the body was fundamentally overlooked. 
This was the case in Heidegger’s early existential phenomenology, but 
particularly from the 1930s as language increasingly held sway over his 
thought. Heidegger never, therefore, truly escaped Cartesian dualism: the 
division of res cogitans and res extensa ultimately reappeared under the guise 
of Dasein – whose embodied being was never adequately accounted for – and 
mere corporeal beings. 
IV. The Philosophy of Life 
Since this failure was peculiar to Heidegger rather than his method, Jonas sets 
about developing an alternative phenomenological ontology comprised of two 
key ideas. On the one hand is description of the “living, feeling, striving 
organism” (PL: 12), and on the other is an argument concerning the emergence 
of such beings within a universe apparently composed of inanimate matter. It is 
Jonas’ contention that the phenomenon of life – comprising of both of these 
ideas – can only be accounted for by a philosophy which integrates the findings 
of biology with an existential phenomenological perspective. In other words, one 
“must deal with the organic facts of life”, which pertain to the body as Körper, 
“and also with the self-interpretation of life in man”, understood as the Leib (6). 
Taking the two together reveals that existential categories are intrinsically 
connected to corporeal being, and, consequently, that there is not Dasein on 
the one hand and worldless beings on the other. Instead we find that degrees of 
world-openness are manifest in Being. Jonas characterises this organismic 
world-openness as a gradual realisation of freedom, in perception, action, and 
eventually thought, running “like Ariadne’s thread” through life (3).34 On this 
basis his ontology takes us far from the dualism of animating soul and lifeless 
matter, and instead to a unified, but gradated, natural world. 
In defence of existential phenomenology, Jonas notes that subjectivity is 
the most fundamental methodological starting point (to this extent, at least, 
Descartes was correct). More originally, however, he also claims that only on 
                                                          
34 Jonas’ debt to Romantische Naturphilosophie – in particular the work of Schelling (2006) – is 
here unmistakable. Aside from Goethe, however, the Romantics barely feature in his work. 
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the basis of embodied consciousness can we account for our experience of 
other living beings as living beings. The natural sciences presuppose, as a 
condition of possibility, exactly “that almost organic faculty of recognizing life, 
understanding life, [and] anticipating the encounter of life” (EDM: 4). Only on the 
basis of experiencing ourselves and other living beings as Leib can we 
subsequently interpret them as Körper and obtain objective knowledge: this “is 
the advantage – perennially disowned or slandered in the history of 
epistemology – of our ‘having’, that is, being, bodies” (PL: 82). Materialists and 
behaviourists, in their eagerness to avoid any and all anthropomorphism, rely 
on this pre-theoretical ability only to uphold a metaphysics which precludes it. 
To illustrate this Jonas uses a thought-experiment, asking what James Jeans’ 
God-as-Pure-Mathematician (a proxy for the physical sciences) would see when 
looking at an organism (75). The answer, Jonas claims, would be that which 
Newton discovered in the realm of physics: simply the movement of matter. But 
we, “happening to be living material things ourselves”, possess “peepholes into 
the inwardness of substance” (91), and for this reason perceive “a striving […] 
for existence and fulfilment” in all living beings (61). In essence this means that 
existential phenomenology is the key which unlocks Being’s door. To be sure, 
with this knowledge comes the danger of undue anthropomorphism, as in 
animist ontologies. But this, too, is only a possibility because we have the prior 
ability to recognise beings as alive.  
Our fundamental perception of living beings as ‘striving for existence and 
fulfilment’ leads Jonas to describe the Körper teleologically. In doing so he 
clearly reaches back for inspiration from Aristotelian biology, despite his claim 
that a philosophy of life “need not mean a return to Aristotle” (2). Jonas’ 
ambivalence is presumably due to the fact that natural teleology is widely 
regarded as a chief fatality of modern scientific progress. However, Jonas notes 
that the exclusion of teleology is only a presupposition of the natural sciences, 
which ought not to be confused with a finding. As discussed, precisely because 
our perception of life is as striving and purposeful, “‘teleology’ is not a 
metaphysical afterthought, […] but a descriptive, phenomenological concept […] 
indispensable in progressively organizing the [scientific] evidence” (KG: 163). 
Aristotle’s conceptualisation of it thereby remains a legitimate philosophical 
resource. As indicated in Chapter One, modern science operates according to 
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three of Aristotle’s four causes: the formal, material, and efficient. The final 
cause is the telos, or end, “for the sake of which a thing is done” (1984e: 194b). 
The telos of an artefact, for instance, is the purpose for which it is made. 
However, the telos of a living being does not transcendentally come from 
outside, as with the artefact, but rather from itself. According to Aristotle this 
pertains both to the “natural organized body” (1984a: 415b) and its being 
“moved by intellect, imagination, purpose, wish, and appetite” (1984c: 700b). 
Jonas takes up this notion of a two-fold “immanent teleology” (OF I: 36), like 
Aristotle locating it in the “structure and behaviour of the organism” (PL: 91). On 
this basis Jonas is able to give the rich account of life that Heidegger could not. 
(α) Self-Organisation 
As stated, the first type of immanent teleology is the organism’s self-
organisation. Jonas argues that in metabolism the organism achieves an 
“independence of form with respect to its own matter” (81), as the organism can 
absorb and excrete substance while maintaining a stable structure. This is what 
marks out the living being from a stone, river, or computer, which are at all 
times identical with their material composition, even when – as with the river – 
they are permanently in flux. Indeed, Jonas believes that we may go even 
further and say that material composition is in fact secondary to the organism, 
which principally exists in the continual metabolic activity of self-organisation:  
In the process of its being, the parts of which the organism consists at a 
given instant are only temporary, transient contents whose joint material 
identity does not coincide with the identity of the whole which they enter 
and leave and which sustains its own identity by the very act of passage 
of foreign matter through its spatial system, the organic form. This whole 
is never the same materially and yet it persists as its same self – by not 
remaining the same matter. (OF II: 15-16) 
Jonas stresses the novelty of organic being in the universe by characterising 
the living thing’s identity as a “performance”, “act”, and “process rather than 
structure” (48; 6, emphasis removed). Ontologically speaking the organism is 
what it does, which must not be confused with a being whose ‘is’ is distinct from 
the fact that it does things. The appearance of this mode of being allows us to 
speak of life as an “ontological revolution” (PL: 81). 
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As stated, self-organisation is systemic, which is to say that the identity 
of each part is derived from its place in the whole. This applies to individual cells 
– a neuron being very different from a spermatozoon – but most obviously to 
organs:  
[T]he parts in question cannot exist otherwise than as parts of their 
respective whole (a machine part can): […] there cannot be a heart, an 
eye, a nervous system, by itself. Outside the whole these structures lose 
not only the meaning of their function and the power to function, but the 
very possibility of existence. Furthermore, they have come into existence 
through acts of self-articulation of the whole and are thus creations of 
that which they subserve. […] [T]herefore, the whole is ontologically prior 
to this kind of part. (OF II: 39). 
If Jonas’ argument that ‘there cannot be an eye by itself’ strikes us as strange, 
this is likely because of a misunderstanding of the nature of organismic 
teleology. Clearly, an ‘organ’ is not, as its etymology implies, a tool or 
instrument: extraneous beings which can always be set down and picked up by 
their user. The organ is rather part of the organism, and if it ceases to be so 
(through an operation, for example) will wither and decay. Crucially, however, 
the organismic whole is not merely the sum total of its parts. A house, for 
example, is identical with the totality of bricks and mortar which constitute it, and 
which are teleologically arranged from without. By contrast, the organism, as a 
process or activity of self-organisation, is more than the sum of its parts.  
Joseph Farrell has argued that on Jonas’ account the organism’s self-
organisation should be explained with reference to the genome (2015: 191). For 
the most part Jonas pays little attention to genes, but at one point he does 
seem to invoke the genome as an explanation of the organism’s self-
organisation. He says that the organism grows “according to a predetermined 
‘plan’”, any deviation from which “during development is a failure to achieve 
itself” (OF II: 40). The recognition of possible deviation means he does not 
endorse a naïve genetic determinism, but the invocation of a ‘plan’ still implies a 
‘preformationist’ conception of the phenotype as essentially a product of the 
genotypic code. This is unfortunate, as such an understanding of organismic 
development has since been shown to be inaccurate:  
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The empirical fruits of several decades of research in molecular, cell, and 
developmental biology have revealed that what distinguishes one 
biological form from another is seldom, if ever, the presence or absence 
of a certain genetic template but rather when and where genes are 
expressed, how they are modified, and into what structural and dynamic 
relationships their ‘products’ become embedded. (Moss, 2003: xvii) 
The relation between a phenotype and genotype is therefore more complex 
than preformationism would suggest. For one thing, phenotypic development – 
including not only learned behaviour but even physiological functioning – can be 
informed by environmental factors (Barker, 2015: 53-62). This ‘adaptive 
plasticity’, as it is called, by itself indicates only a certain reactiveness on the 
part of the organism, which changes in response to environmental conditions. It 
is crucial to note, therefore, that the organism can also make changes to its 
environment – known as ‘niche construction’ – which then feed back into the 
process of adaptive plasticity (62-66). The result is a picture of phenotypic 
development as more active and malleable than was available to Jonas at the 
time he was writing. However, this does not really pose a problem for Jonas, 
whose theory is perfectly compatible with it. With recent biological evidence on 
our side, we can uphold the radical core of his account of organic being as 
freedom, and note that this includes phenotypic freedom from genetic 
determinism and preformationism.  
Organic being is, as Jonas suggests, fundamentally self-creation, or 
autopoiesis.35 Here an important contrast must be drawn between Heidegger’s 
existential analytic of Dasein and Jonas’ existential analytic of the organism. In 
Being and Time, Heidegger had attributed to Dasein “a potentiality-of-being 
which belongs to itself, and yet has not given itself to itself”, since “it exists as 
thrown, brought into its there not of its own accord” (2010a: 272). The ‘not’ 
emphasised by Heidegger does not denote a lack, as though a determinate 
essence is missing from Dasein. The very idea of a lack implies that something 
should be present, when, on the contrary, Dasein’s “character of being is 
                                                          
35 Indeed, Jonas’ philosophy has been highly influential on the concept of autopoiesis, arguably 
lending his thought greater contemporary relevance. For instance, Varela, Maturana, and Uribe 
similarly contend that “a physical unity […] remains as such only insofar as this organization is 
continuously realized under permanent turnover of matter” (1981: 7). For explicit references to 
Jonas in this context, see: Weber (2002), Weber and Varela (2002), di Paolo (2006), and 
Thomson (2004; 2007). 
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distinguished from any kind of objective presence” (ibid.). Jonas reveals this 
picture to be incomplete. It is true that Dasein’s mode of being is nowhere 
objectively present, but because Heidegger did not conceive of existence as 
essentially embodied he could not see that not only Dasein, but to an extent 
organic existence as such, is a potentiality-for-being. This is borne out by the 
analysis of metabolism – the defining characteristic of living beings – which 
reveals the organism to be at no point identical with its material composition, but 
rather a perpetual act of self-constitution extended through time. Crucially, this 
process cannot even be explained according to a preformed plan, present-at-
hand in the genome. Rather, the organism’s potentiality-for-being extends even 
into informing its own behavioural and corporeal development.  
This process of self-constitution also allows Jonas to account for one of 
Heidegger’s key concepts: the temporality of Dasein’s existence. As the title 
Being and Time would suggest, temporality was paramount for Heidegger’s 
existential analytic. For Heidegger, care fundamentally consisted of Dasein’s 
projections into the future, entailing that temporality was its ontological meaning 
(309). Thus for Heidegger one engages with beings insofar as they pertain to 
our projects, which are always ahead of us. Jonas agrees that temporality is 
essential to existence, but is able to argue that it follows from organismic being: 
“[i]nternally [the organism] is directed toward the next impending phase of its 
own being, i.e., the future as the continuation of the life-process to which it is 
committed; and this directedness constitutes biological time” (OF III: 2). In other 
words, the metabolic process, entailing that the organism is always in a state of 
becoming, is the corporeal foundation for that which we phenomenologically 
experience as the flow of time. We might say that there is a forward projection 
immanent in our very constitution. Heidegger would be correct to say that the 
experience of temporality comes first, of course, but he could not connect this to 
Dasein’s Körper or organismic being as such. 
(β) Behaviour 
Self-organisation coincides with the second form of immanent teleology 
exhibited by living beings: purposive behaviour. ‘Behaviour’ is here employed in 
a broad sense, to mean any purposive activity undertaken on the part of the 
organism in relation to its world. Obvious examples are the acquisition of food, 
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sexual reproduction, and the avoidance of predators. But Jonas also has in 
mind the basic capacity of an organism to move and orient itself in its world: the 
organism is engaged with beings as something-for nutrition, something-for 
traversing, something-for shelter, and so on. In each case this ‘something-for’, 
this openness to other beings, represents a purposive activity or behaviour 
which Jonas quite brilliantly ties to Heidegger’s notion of care. We recall that for 
Heidegger “[t]he being of Dasein is care” (2010a: 272), but he could neither 
show how this related to our corporeal existence nor characterise non-human 
life in the same way. For Jonas, by contrast, the organism as such is a being 
“whose being is committed to their own care” (OF II: 31, emphasis added). We 
shall see how he elaborates on this claim.  
Jonas argues that “having a ‘sake’, and awareness, i.e., being internally 
affected by the environment, emerge only and entirely with that organization 
which we call organic” (33). Why? Because in its self-constitution the organism 
wrests itself from the remainder of Being: with this process of individuation 
comes a boundary, and therefore an ‘inside’ and a corresponding ‘outside’ 
world. To quote Jonas: “to the living entity all the rest of reality is the ‘other’, the 
external: crowding in upon it from out of the environment and receding into its 
distance” (OF II: 46). This is the corporeal ground of the organism’s being-in-
the-world. And as with Dasein’s being-in-the-world, the organism’s existence is 
characterised by care, i.e., engagement with other beings. This follows from the 
demands of metabolic freedom of form: as the organism is not self-contained, 
but rather reliant on other beings for its continued existence, it relates to those 
beings accordingly: 
In the single encounters this otherness has the quality of foreign body or 
influence which is either useful or harmful; in its entirety and as an 
enveloping horizon it has the character of ‘the external world’ confronting 
the organism’s overwhelming concern in its own life-process which has 
to assert itself within it and, so committed, is of constitutive egoism. (46-
47, emphasis added) 
The reference here to harms illuminates another essential aspect of organismic 
being, namely, mortality. Although the organism has a freedom of form from 
matter, its dependence on other beings for continued existence means that it is 
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a “needful freedom” (PL: 80). Thus care is tied to the precarity of organismic 
being: it is an existence which is always oriented toward staving-off inexistence. 
This is the organismic ground of being-toward-death. 
In this way Jonas is able to explain how the basic structures of existence 
are not only connected to the lived body (Leib), but also the Körper, to which 
metabolism belongs. As we saw above, this is precisely what Heidegger failed 
to articulate courtesy of his neglect of the body. Jonas suggests that:  
The great contradictions which man discovers in himself – freedom and 
necessity, autonomy and dependence, self and world, relation and 
isolation, creativity and mortality – have their rudimentary traces in even 
the most primitive forms of life, each precariously balanced between 
being and not-being, and each already endowed with an internal horizon 
of ‘transcendence’. (xxiii) 
Of course, Jonas does not conceive of these structures as equally realised 
across the organismic realm in terms of intensity. To give an obvious example, 
he does not suppose that organismic care and being-toward-death are always 
conscious (let alone self-conscious). Rather, the internal horizon of worldhood 
opened up in the organism’s interaction with its environment constitutes “the 
fundamental condition from which ultimately all ‘later’ characteristics of life 
derive”, including sentience (OF II: 47). This is the connecting thread between 
the meagre world of the amoeba and Dasein’s immensely richer existence. 
Lastly, Jonas connects care to spatiality, which, in addition to temporality, 
is one of the two dimensions of the horizon mentioned above “into which life 
continually transcends itself” (OF III: 2). Heidegger had defined spatiality not as 
an objective point present-at-hand, but rather a as structure of Dasein’s being-
in-the-world such that care is always an act of “de-distancing” (2010a: 102). 
What he meant by this was that spatiality is first of all a dimension of our 
engagement with beings. A being is always somewhere in relation to Dasein 
before it is somewhere in mathematically-calculated space: the car keys are 
here (or over there) before they occupy a point in the spatial grid, the latter 
always being an abstraction from phenomenological reality. Jonas likewise 
claims that spatiality is a necessary dimension of care, but, true to his broader 
argument, that it belongs to the organism as such. In reaching outside of itself 
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to satisfy its metabolic requirements, the organism is “directed towards the co-
present not-itself, i.e., the ‘environment’ – that total ‘other’ […] which holds the 
stuff relevant to its own continuation; and this directedness constitutes biological 
space” (OF III: 2). For Jonas, then, the ‘here’ or ‘there’ that something has in an 
organism’s relation to it is first of all a relation of the lived body – of something 
being ‘out of reach’ or ‘within my grasp’ – and this on the basis of need (again, 
pertaining to the Körper). To take an animalistic example: for the fox in pursuit 
of the hare the latter is just there ahead, but this directed, phenomenological 
relation has its corporeal counterpart in the fox’s organismic constitution. 
(γ) The Nisus of Being 
On the basis of this description of the organism Jonas engages in a 
metaphysical speculation as to the emergence of life from Being as such. This 
idea first makes an appearance on the opening page of The Phenomenon of 
Life, where Jonas argues that “since matter gave such account of itself, namely, 
did in fact organize itself in this manner and with these results, it ought to be 
given its due” (PL: 1). His position can be clarified by comparison to two others 
which it might be mistaken for, which we shall take in turn.  
Firstly, and crucially, this is not a claim for a transcendent teleology 
determining the direction of evolution. On Jonas’ schema, the notion of 
transcendent natural teleology misapplies the logical relation of a designer to 
their product, where the former is the origin of the latter’s telos. On the contrary, 
Jonas holds that the emergence of life and its development into ever-more 
complex forms remains “entirely within the immanent” (MM: 173), without 
recourse to transcendent agency. He has in mind a weaker notion of a 
“potency” residing “in the very concept of physical ‘substance’” (PL: 2). Jonas is 
here careful to distinguish the two sorts of teleology: “although there should be 
no plan in [evolution] – this we have already rejected with good reason – we 
might ascribe to it a tendency, something like a yearning” (MM: 173). Michael 
Hauskeller has characterised this as a “nisus: an effort that is being made by 
nature […] to move in a certain direction” (2015: 45). Even if this is not a proper 
teleological claim, then, one might yet ask why the speculation is necessary. 
Jonas’ answer is that mechanistic evolution alone cannot explain the 
emergence of life: “the survival standard itself is inadequate for the evolution of 
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life. If mere assurance of permanence were the point that mattered, life should 
not have started out in the first place” (PL: 106). The fact that it did suggests 
that something else is also at play: an urge to develop. One might note that this 
also appears to be true of the evolution of animal life, which similarly defies the 
principles of natural selection: it is a far more precarious form of being than 
plant life, dramatically exposed to species-extinction in a way unknown to the 
latter – and yet life arose to these new heights nonetheless. This nisus of Being, 
as I will call it to distinguish it from Jonas’ teleological account of the organism, 
is therefore best understood as a tendency.36 
Secondly, the nisus of Being ought to be differentiated from Alfred North 
Whitehead’s panpsychist ontology. Whitehead’s ‘philosophy of organism’ was 
undoubtedly a significant influence on Jonas in the post-War period (M: 195); 
indeed, he credits Whitehead with an “intellectual force and philosophical 
importance […] unequalled in our time” (PL: 96). Nevertheless, Jonas rejected 
Whitehead’s ascription of inwardness to every entity: this, he claims, is “an 
overreaching of speculation […] uncalled for by the record of reality” (IHJ: 
357).37 The more parsimonious claim would be that sentience exists only as a 
potential in non-living Being. Jonas articulates this notion by suggesting that 
“right from the beginning matter is subjectivity in its latent form, even if aeons, 
plus exceptional luck are required for the actualizing of this potential” (MM: 
173). Incorporated into the notion of nisus, then, the argument is that in order 
for Being to have given rise to life and mind, the possibility – and at root nothing 
more than a possibility is identifiable – must have resided therein and 
expressed itself when chance delivered the necessary favourable conditions. 
Although this has a certain plausibility (much more so, one might note, than 
pure materialism) for some it will no doubt prove a speculation too far. If so, this 
arguably poses a problem for Jonas who requires the nisus of Being to make a 
key axiological claim, as we shall see in subsequent chapters.  
                                                          
36 Jonas does use “nisus” at one point, but rather inconveniently does so to refer to what I call 
the immanent teleology of the organism, rather than the tendency of Being (IHJ: 354). 
37 In his Memoirs Jonas refers to Whitehead as “a mighty figure” and concedes his debt to the 
latter (M: 195). We might note, for example, their similar conceptions of God as immanent in the 
world, or the parallel between Jonas’ rejection of modern ontologies and Whitehead’s critique of 
the Cartesian “bifurcation of nature” (1920: 32). However, Jonas takes issue with the fact that 
the “overbold” (MM: 211) attribution of sentience to all entities means that there is “no real place 
for death in [Whitehead’s] account of life”, nor for the “deep anxiety of biological existence” (PL: 
95-96). In this we have evidence that it was Heidegger’s Being and Time, not Whitehead’s 
Process and Reality (1978), that ultimately motivated Jonas’ philosophy of life.  
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V. The Scala Naturae: Plants and Animals 
Clearly, briefly reconstructing Jonas’ existential account of organic being leaves 
much unsaid. For now his position can be summarised in the following maxims: 
“there is no organism without teleology; there is no teleology without 
inwardness; and […] life can only be known by life” (PL: 91). The issue to which 
we now turn is the various forms to which the nisus of Being gives rise. To this 
end Jonas once again reaches back to Aristotle, this time rehabilitating the 
notion of a scala naturae: 
[T]he manifold of existing life presents itself as an ascending scale […]. 
Aristotle read this hierarchy in the given record of the organic realm with 
no resort to evolution, and his De anima is the first treatise in 
philosophical biology. The terms on which his august example may be 
resumed in our time will be different from his, but the idea of stratification, 
of the progressive superposition of levels, with the dependence of each 
higher on the lower, the retention of all the lower in the higher, will still be 
found indispensable. (2) 
Evidently the reason for Jonas’ qualified appropriation of the scala naturae is 
that Aristotle seemed to envisage the natural world as static and comprising of 
unchanging species. For instance, in the Generation of Animals Aristotle says 
that “it is impossible for [a living being] to be eternal as an individual – for the 
substance of the things that are is in the particular; and if it were such it would 
be eternal – but it is possible for it as a species” (1984b: 731b). However, after 
Darwin and the expansion of the fossil record we know that no such fixity exists: 
rather, the history of life on Earth is one of perpetual, if gradual, change and the 
“frustration and extinction” (IR: 81) of numerous evolutionary avenues. 
However, Jonas argues that the discrediting of one version of the scala 
naturae does not mean that the notion is nonsensical per se. On the contrary, 
he claims that Aristotle’s division, outlined in De Anima, of the soul into four 
accumulative types – “the nutritive, the appetitive, the sensory, the locomotive” 
(1984a: 414a) – glimpsed something fundamental. As indicated earlier, Jonas 
believes that this can be characterised as an ascending realisation of freedom 
in “world perception”, empirically identifiable by “greater sophistications of form, 
the lure of sense and the spur of desire, the command of limb and powers to 
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act, [and] the reflection of consciousness and the reach for truth” (PL: 2). On 
this scale we may identify ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ life-forms broadly corresponding 
to a hierarchy of plants, animals, and humans as evolutionary levels.38 If such 
clean-cut divisions seem at odds with Jonas’ avowed gradualism, it ought to be 
noted, firstly, that these are broad classes which themselves allow for huge 
variation – as indicated by distance between, say, bivalves and the great apes – 
and secondly, that what Jonas attempts to identify are the key manifestations of 
existential advance which do indeed roughly coincide with the demarcations of 
plant, animal, and human life.  
(α) Plant Life 
Jonas writes that plant life possesses a rudimentary subjectivity as the 
“germ of sensing unfolds to [a] distinct world-relationship, just as the cells grow 
into the differentiated, composite organism” (99). As an organism the plant is of 
course a metabolising being – in this case a photosynthesising one – and 
thereby self-constitutes through material exchange. Moreover, the plant exhibits 
care in the acquisition of water and sunlight, for which it only has to take root in 
any suitable location fortune happens to deliver to it. Jonas notes that this is the 
“most efficient means of exploiting the inherent advantages” of photosynthesis: 
through roots “we have immediacy guaranteed by constant contiguity between 
the organs of intake and the external supply” (103). However, this fixity of 
position and easy satisfaction of needs means that the plant’s relation to its 
environment “cannot take on the keen edge of want” (ibid.), which would 
constitute a sentient world-relation. 
(β) Animal Life 
Jonas suggests that with the evolutionary arrival of animals a huge 
existential gain was made. The defining characteristics of animal life are the 
“three modes” of “perception, emotion, and movement”, which “express the 
mediacy of animal being, or the split between self and world – a qualitative 
widening of the split which metabolism opened first” (PE: 206). Although part of 
the gradual advance of organic freedom, Jonas holds that these features 
                                                          
38 Jonas does not discuss archaea, bacteria, fungi, and algae, presumably because he saw 
them as existentially identical to plant life. For this reason, we might consider sub-section (α) 
Plant Life – and all references to plants – to refer instead to vegetative life. 
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nevertheless signify the realisation of a “real world-relation” (OF III: 1). He 
states:  
The differentiation of sentience […] furnishes the beginnings of a true 
world of objects; […] the exercise of motility (in turn implying 
centralization, viz., of control) subjects it to the self-assertion of freedom, 
which thus answers on a higher plane to the basic necessity of the 
organism. (PL: 100) 
Animals are distinguished by these co-arising modes, since their metabolic 
requirements – whether carnivorous or herbivorous – are such that movement 
is integral to their fulfilment. Unlike a plant’s virtually immediate attainment of 
sunlight, minerals, and water the object of an animal’s satisfaction lies at a 
spatial and temporal distance: in short, a meal must be sought out. The 
‘internal’ counterparts of this motility are sentience and emotion. As survival 
here “becomes a matter of conduct in single actions, instead of being assured 
by well-adapted organic functioning itself”, the animal’s “precarious and 
exposed mode of living commits to wakefulness and effort […] but it also knows 
the pang of hunger, the agony of fear, the anguished strain of flight” (105). As 
such, Jonas identifies in an animal’s sentient, emotional, and motile mode of 
existence the first conscious manifestation of care (although not, he believes, 
self-consciousness). 
While Jonas’ description of vegetative life closely tracks his account of 
organic being as such, the sceptic might ask whether his identification of 
sentience and emotion in animals amounts to mere anthropomorphism. 
However, Jonas pre-empts this criticism by offering a phenomenological 
account of intersubjectivity which deals with what has been called “the problem 
of animal minds” (James, 2009: 45). Jonas makes the argument that we 
understand the minds of others “not by analogical inference” with reference to 
our own, but rather because “[k]nowledge of inwardness as such, whether one’s 
own or that of others, is based on communication with a whole human 
environment which determines […] what will be found in eventual introspection” 
(PE: 246, emphasis added). This understanding between humans, Jonas goes 
on to claim, is in fact derivative of our pre-theoretical understanding of living 
beings as purposeful. Regardless of species, in the interaction of humans and 
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animals “something passes between us without which there could be no higher 
understanding, however far it surpasses this elemental substratum” (248). This 
understanding is indicative of our shared being:  
[Understanding] is part of the intuitive beholding of life by life and thus 
begins with the accomplishments of animal perception, which is attuned 
to the accomplishments of animal expression. […] Animal life is 
expressive, even eager for expression. It displays itself; it has its sign 
codes, its language; it communicates itself. Whole rituals of posture and 
gesture and expressive movement serve the role of signals. (Ibid.).  
The phenomenological perspective thereby refutes the absurd behaviourist 
interpretation of animal emotion and sentient behaviour as mechanistic, which 
in fact presupposes the recognition of emotion and sentience before attempting 
to explain them away. For the same reason the charge of undue 
anthropocentrism is here erroneous: it is an abstraction reliant upon the very 
human-animal intersubjectivity which it denies. 
In touching on the intersubjectivity fundamental to animal being we arrive 
at life’s inherent sociality, a topic which features strangely infrequently in Jonas’ 
published works.39 Some light can be shed on this oversight by looking to Leon 
Kass’ article ‘Appreciating The Phenomenon of Life’. Kass recounts a question 
put to him by a student, which he in turn addressed to Jonas: why, in the 
ascending scale of capacities constituting organic freedom described by Jonas, 
does sexual reproduction not feature? According to Kass, Jonas fell silent, then 
“commented that this was the most serious and powerful objection anyone had 
yet raised against his account” (1995: 11). Jonas’ justification for the omission 
was, firstly, that “reproduction and sociality are not indispensable functions of 
life for an individual animal qua living thing”, and secondly, that at the time 
Jonas “was still too much in the grip of the teachings of Heidegger and his view 
of life as (mainly) a lonely project over-against-death” (ibid.). The first defence is 
partly justified: an organism, though the product of reproduction, need not itself 
                                                          
39 At only one point in his published writing does Jonas point toward it (PE: 249-254), describing 
animals “who are able to play, namely animals with brood rearing, especially mammals with 
their sheltered childhood, who are still free from the grim pressure of animal needs but enjoy 
already the powers of movement” (249). In an unpublished manuscript Jonas mentions that this 
thought came to him whilst watching dolphins play from the deck of the ship on which he 
emigrated to America (FOS: 2-3). In it is a partial recognition of the social aspect of organic 
existence, yet the conceptual possibility is not there fully pursued. 
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engage in it. Clearly, however, this fails to account for the importance of 
reproduction and sociality for most animal life. Jonas’ second claim, that he was 
here under the undue influence of Heidegger, also fails to stand up to scrutiny, 
since Heidegger’s account of Dasein did in fact accommodate a social 
existence, via the category of being-with-others: “the world is always already the 
one that I share with others. The world of Dasein is a with-world” (2010a: 115-
6).  
Jonas’ neglect of life’s sociality would appear to uniquely hamper his 
project in a significant way – except that he did broach the issue in the 
unpublished Organism and Freedom. Jonas there acknowledges, if only fairly 
briefly and late in the book, that “the organic fact we have so far left 
unconsidered [is] sex” (OF IV: 67). Its recognition duly transforms his account of 
animal life:  
[W]ith the emergence of more direct co-operation in the sexual act, and 
again, much later, with the extension of the female role to tending either 
eggs or offspring, life within the species assumes entirely new features, 
profoundly affecting the very nature of animal existence. Whatever there 
is of non-self-seeking traits in the emotional economy of the animal 
kingdom has its root in this basis of sex and procreation. (67-68, 
emphasis added) 
As Jonas says, the world of animals is therefore not simply one oriented toward 
self-preservation and “acquisition”, but also one which finds fulfilment in 
“expenditure” with “no reference to the metabolic demands of the organism” 
(68). This recognition may have been influenced by one of Jonas’ 
correspondents, the biologist and philosophical anthropologist Adolf 
Portmann.40 In Animals as Social Beings, Portmann emphasised that a social 
existence is present from insects through to mammals on the basis of 
reproduction: “[t]he attraction of individuals to each other is the basic 
phenomenon of social life; and even in dragonflies, as we have seen, this social 
factor is primary for life itself” (1961: 55; emphasis added). Jonas even 
speculates that in the biological fact of reproduction we have the seed of “the 
whole scale of emotions which we comprise under the name of ‘love’ and which 
                                                          
40 See Portmann’s letter to Jonas (1956). 
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eventually reaches far beyond the physical realm”, including even amor Dei (OF 
IV: 68-69). In other words, sociality allows for one key form of transcendence to 
emerge, making love one of the highest forms of freedom.41 
Then there is the maternal (and occasionally paternal) animal practice of 
rearing young, which “suppl[ies] the foundation of all sociability” (OF IV: 69). 
Here ‘sociability’ does not mean a social existence per se, which is already 
necessitated by reproduction, but rather a ‘social life’ in the sense of living 
alongside others. This becomes clear when he states that “[w]ith the 
development of rearing habits intraspecies relations pass from the fleeting 
nature of the sexual encounter to more durable, either individual or collective, 
forms of association” (ibid.). Rearing allows not only for the animal’s parent-
child relation to blossom – contrast, for example, the life of a reared penguin 
with that of a turtle who hatches unaccompanied – but also for the social life of 
an entire brood, mentioned above, which establishes kinship amongst 
contemporaries. From broods the circle of sociability can obviously be 
expanded to packs, troops, and so on, each with complex structures and norms, 
and these eventually bearing comparison to human society. Therefore Jonas is, 
after all, able to accommodate Heidegger’s being-with-others in non-human life 
with reference to our corporeal natality.  
Jonas makes one last observation as to the significance of child-rearing, 
namely that it coincides with much of the technical skill evidenced in animal 
existence. Although there are exceptions to this – most obviously amongst 
primates – Jonas is right to note that rearing procedures account for much of 
the technical “measures which go from slight adaptations of existing features in 
the environment to elaborate artificial constructions” (70). Whether an 
excavated den or a constructed nest, the purpose is usually to account for 
vulnerability, either of the adult in hibernation or the child in infancy. This is 
evidenced by the fact that the majority of such habitations are constructed 
seasonally – exceptions including, as Jonas notes, the dam-building of beavers 
and the hives or nests of social insects such as bees and termites, all of which 
are remarkable in their complexity and social function. He concludes these 
critical supplementary reflections by noting that “we have in sexuality the root 
                                                          
41 Stephan Kampowski has argued that in Jonas’ philosophy love is the highest form of freedom 
(2013: 64), which I consider to be too strong a claim. It is one aspect of transcendence, to be 
sure, but not the whole. 
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for two extremely important classes of animal behaviour: social and technical” 
(71). 
VI. The Scala Naturae: Humans 
The final stage of Jonas’ scala naturae – indeed, the final stage of our 
reconstruction of Jonas’ philosophy of life – is the position of humanity in nature. 
In addressing this issue Jonas turns to philosophical anthropology. As with his 
debt to existentialism, the influence of philosophical anthropology on Jonas’ 
thought is likely due to its prominence in the 1920s Germany of his student 
days, though direct references in his work to the key figures are scant.  
The practitioners of that sadly out of favour sub-discipline pursued the 
question ‘What is the human being’s differentia specifica?’ in a way which 
sought to be consistent with, but transcended, the natural sciences. The 
methodological influence on Jonas’ approach here is obvious, and, like Jonas, 
some philosophical anthropologists broadly endorsed Aristotle’s dictum that the 
human is the ζῶον λόγον ἔχον. Ernst Cassirer and Max Scheler followed 
Aristotle in identifying the human as having something in addition to animal life: 
for Cassirer it was our symbolic cultural life, hence our status as the “animal 
symbolicum” (1944: 26), while for Scheler it was our possession of a “spiritual 
being” in addition to animal instincts (1961: 37). Other philosophical 
anthropologists offered more ambiguous definitions. Arnold Gehlen, for 
instance, argued that our unique world-openness originated in a deficiency of 
instinct as an “undetermined animal” (1988: 25). Similarly, Helmuth Plessner 
attributed humanity’s status as the “apostate of nature” (1975: 320) to the 
“eccentric” relation each human being has to their own body, in that we 
simultaneously have it and are it (1970: 36, emphasis removed). Of these 
definitions of human specificity Jonas approvingly cites Cassirer’s, stating 
simply “homo = animal symbolicum” (OF V: 37).  
The reason is as follows. Jonas holds that distinctively human freedom is 
epitomised by our transcendence, meaning an engagement with more than 
what is found in the physical world. Specifically, humans have a greatly 
increased freedom in the power of abstract thought. True to his integral 
monism, Jonas seeks to explain this achievement physiologically, initially via 
the human’s perceptual emphasis on vision. In the ability to behold an object by 
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sight we have a mode of perception which is both more durable than sound, 
and, in contrast to touch, smell, and taste, allows the perceiver to be situated at 
a remove from the perceived.42 Clearly this has an evolutionary benefit: a being 
which seeks sustenance, a mate, or to avoid predators has an advantage in 
surveying its field of vision and beholding at a distance an object therein. But, 
crucially, Jonas also argues that this freedom of perception leads to an increase 
in freedom of thought, as “[s]ight includes at any given instant an infinite 
manifold at once, and its own qualitative conditions open the way to what lies 
beyond” (PL: 151). What Jonas means is apparent in the study of a three-
dimensional object: it can never be perceived from all sides at once, but only 
from a single point of view which contains within it endless alternate perceptual 
possibilities through space and time. It is more apparent still in surveying the 
horizon or the night sky, which recede to a point and indicate that there is yet 
more: a ‘going-beyond’ which is never as explicit in the modes of perception 
reliant on proximity. Additionally, in perceiving at a distance the object is left 
untouched, and so one can disinterestedly observe change over time. From this 
Jonas draws a striking conclusion: the freedom of sight lays the ground “for 
some basic concept of philosophy” by making explicit “the contrast between 
change and the unchanging, between time and eternity. […] Thus the mind has 
gone where vision pointed” (152). 
One obvious criticism of Jonas’ thesis is that the explanatory gap 
between sight and a symbolic world is too great; our vision-centric perception is 
insufficient as the sole condition of possibility for the intellectual achievements 
which differentiate the human being. Gehlen noted that it is “impossible to 
declare any one distinguishing characteristic of man […] to be the ‘whole’. Such 
an approach never succeeds, for any one of these isolated characteristics can 
be found somewhere in the animal kingdom” (1988: 7-8). This, it seems to me, 
forcefully applies to Jonas’ claim that our symbolic being is grounded in vision: 
the latter is, after all, shared by many animals and truly excelled at by birds of 
prey. Additional and complementary physiological factors must have allowed 
humanity to rise to the level of freedom peculiar to it. Presumably this is why, in 
the much later essay ‘Tool, Image, and Grave’, Jonas supplemented his thesis 
by stressing a multitude of physiological characteristics: “the increase in man’s 
                                                          
42 See the third chapter of Organism and Freedom, and pp.135-187 of The Phenomenon of Life, 
for extensive discussions of this issue. 
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brain size, his hand, [and] his erect posture reveal their significance in what they 
allow us to accomplish” (MM: 77). It is this line of thought which allows him to 
better bridge the gap between our bodily constitution and symbolic being, 
demonstrated concretely with reference to three human artefacts: the tool, 
image, and grave. Such artefacts, brought into being with the help of the 
dextrous opposable thumb, are not simply objects: they embody ideas and 
drastically change humanity’s self-understanding. 
Firstly is the tool. “A tool is an artificially devised, inert object interpolated 
as a means between the acting bodily organ (usually the hand) and the 
extracorporeal object of the action. It is given permanent form for recurring use 
and can be set aside in readiness for this” (MM: 78). One objection to his 
definition, reminiscent of Heidegger’s discussion of the hammer in Being and 
Time (2010a: 69), might be that a tool need not be inert: think of an electric drill. 
However, Jonas means any object which is inert until it is picked up and put to 
use, in contrast to a machine which is left to work by itself, like a printing press. 
Jonas’ definition is also intended to preclude any comparison with a creative 
organic function, such as a caterpillar’s chrysalis or a spiderweb, as well as the 
utilisation of objects observable in mammal – and particularly primate – life. 
However, given the existence of the latter Jonas concedes that “here we can 
most readily speak of fluid boundaries between animal and human capabilities” 
(MM: 79).  
The definitively symbolic human capacity is image-making, which, he 
claims, “from its very beginnings in its most primitive and awkward products, 
displays a total, rather than gradual, divergence from the animal’s […] – fluid 
boundaries are not even conceivable here” (ibid.). He defines the image as “an 
intentionally produced likeness with the visual appearance of a thing […] in the 
static medium of the surface of another thing. It is not meant to repeat the 
original or pretend that it is the original, but to ‘re-present’ it” (ibid.).43 The image 
is thus a product of will which depicts an idea (eidos, the ‘look’ of a thing) 
through semblance: “[a] figure of Pinus sylvestris in a work on botany is a 
                                                          
43 The distinction between ‘art’ and ‘image’ is worth noting here. As is well known, modern art 
gradually eschewed representation as a criterion, so that although paintings such as Mondrian’s 
are works of art, they are not images, since the latter entails likeness. Similarly, paint daubed on 
a canvas by an elephant or chimpanzee is not an image – though whether it is art is another 
matter. For my part, I suspect this question is only soluble with reference to Arthur Danto’s 
theory of the ‘artworld’ (1981), which would not at present answer affirmatively. 
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representation not of this or that individual fir tree but of any fir tree of that 
species. The antelope of the bushman drawing is every antelope remembered, 
anticipated, identifiable as an antelope” (PL: 165). Jonas argues that the 
capacity for image-making – though carried out with the hands – is primarily an 
achievement of vision, in that the eidos is abstracted therefrom (168).  Through 
this connection Jonas again links vision back to philosophical notions – this time 
more plausibly – as an image “has to be more or less true to the object” (172). 
The fact that an image can succeed or fail in its aim of representation thus 
paves the way for rudimentary experiences of truth and falsehood as 
correspondence.44 
 However, it is the grave, Jonas’ last object of study, which he fully invests 
with transcendent significance. Whereas humanity’s earliest pictorial 
achievements – a cave painting of a bison, for example – represent the eidos or 
appearance of the bison, Jonas holds that the grave represents abstract ideas: 
those which cannot be observed and do not, therefore, permit of simple sensual 
representation.45 The presence of the grave “tells us that a being, subject to 
mortality, reflects about life and death, defies appearances, and raises his 
thinking to the realm of the invisible, utilizing tool and image for this purpose” 
(MM: 85). Not only that – Jonas also argues that in reflecting upon death 
humanity thereby becomes a problem for itself. Apparently alone amongst living 
beings, we possess a self-conscious concern for our existence that in the grave 
“takes on concrete form: ‘Where do I come from; where am I going?’ and 
ultimately, ‘What am I – beyond what I do and experience at a given time?’ With 
these questions reflection emerges as a new mode of dealing with the world” 
(83-4). Thus the highest freedom is achieved by humanity who alone can reflect 
on life, death, and its own place in the world, all encapsulated in the invention of 
the grave. 
Such is the basic outline of Jonas’ philosophical anthropology, which we 
shall now refine through further comparisons with Heidegger’s analytic of 
Dasein. Firstly, we can say a little more about how Jonas takes up the category 
of ‘thrownness’. As indicated above, Jonas construes the organism as a 
                                                          
44 Here Jonas diverges from Heidegger’s conception of truth as unconcealment, as Lindberg 
notes (2005: 177) 
45 Cf. Hegel’s discussion of ‘symbolic’ art and architecture in his masterful Aesthetics: Lectures 
on Fine Art (1975). 
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potentiality-for-being which has not given itself to itself, and he thereby adopts 
Heidegger’s definition of the structure. But at the same time, Heidegger’s 
account drew, at least implicitly, on the notion that Dasein was set apart from 
other beings in having care as its mode of being. This coloured his existential 
phenomenology with an almost Gnostic sense of isolation amidst mere life. 
Jonas, by contrast, shows us that Dasein is unremarkable in having care as its 
mode of being, and is instead remarkable in how care manifests itself therein: 
as a symbolic existence which is connected to our physical constitution. As 
such, although human world-openness has unique characteristics, it is also the 
product of a tendency in Being itself. Put another way, although we are thrown 
into being the throwing itself is not blind: as human beings we are part of a 
movement in Being. In this way Jonas is able to reconcile human existence with 
the character of the natural world, overcoming the Gnostic tendency which 
survived in Heidegger’s work. 
The final contrast to be drawn with Heidegger concerns historicity. We 
recall from the Introduction that Jonas co-opted certain existential categories 
from Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein, while arguing that others – fallenness and 
authenticity – were in fact socially and historically contingent. Curiously, 
historicity itself is notable by its absence from either camp: it is neither rejected 
nor incorporated into Jonas’ philosophy of life. The reason is presumably that 
human beings alone are historical. This is not to say that humanity always and 
everywhere has actual knowledge of history, let alone what Hans-Georg 
Gadamer called historically-effected consciousness – awareness of one’s 
consciousness as historical (2004: 299-301). The point is rather that historicity 
is an essential component of human existence and one way in which we are 
distinguished from animals. But how is this possible given that, on Jonas’ 
account, the existential categories are meant to be present in nuce from life’s 
beginning? The answer is that historicity is, according to Heidegger, a possibility 
grounded in the temporality of Dasein: “[a]uthentic being-toward-death, that is, 
the finitude of temporality, is the concealed ground of the historicity of Dasein. 
Dasein does not first become historical in repetition, but rather because as 
temporal it is historical” (2010a: 367, emphasis removed). Of course, Jonas 
argues that temporality and being-toward-death are not only structures of 
human Dasein, but of organismic being as such. On his schema, then, 
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historicity is a property emerging only in humans but from the structure of 
temporality belonging to all life.  
Since Jonas abandoned the notion of authenticity, however, historicity 
cannot for him be connected to an authentic reclaiming of our being-toward-
death, as Heidegger supposed. Rather, Jonas more plausibly argues that 
historicity is the symbolic transformation of organismic temporality. Decisive in 
this regard is language: the most prominent manifestation of symbolic being and 
without treatment of which no philosophical anthropology would be complete.  
As we have seen, images and language occupy a central place in human 
life and rise to ever-higher levels of abstraction, hence our status as the animal 
symbolicum. The existential consequence of our symbolic being, Jonas argues, 
is that the past becomes a vista of meaningful experience: a history. Take cave 
paintings and rock art. In these rudimentary symbolic works a world is 
eidetically preserved for posterior generations: even if we cannot grasp what the 
painting or sculpture means, that it had meaning for its creator is given in our 
basic encounter with it, imbuing the past with significance. But, as stated, it is 
above all else language which transforms the past into history. At the most 
basic level the human use of language can point beyond the immediate to 
things, people, and states that have been present but are no longer. The 
invocation of the (potentially distant) past occurs through meanings afforded by 
our world. Often the past invoked is not a factual one but mythological: a culture 
might have a creation myth, for instance, or even conceive of the past as 
eternally identical to the present. Regardless, the universal ‘conceiving-of-the-
past-as’ indicates historicity as an existential consequence of symbolic being. 
Language is also, according to Jonas, intimately connected to more 
tangible aspects of human life. We have already discussed the importance of 
social life and the symbolic products of tools, images, and graves for human 
beings. Jonas later stresses that these phenomena – which together form the 
beginnings of what we call culture – cannot really be separated from linguistic 
communication: 
Rearing of the young means for man essentially teaching them how to 
speak – by speaking to them. Kinship and authority relations are defined 
and transmitted through speech. Even our dreams are permeated with 
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words. How much more do words dominate in the life areas indicated by 
the tool, the image, and the tomb – in planning, work, remembrance, and 
veneration. And how completely speech-dependent are the worlds of 
politics and law, and most of all, the relations with the invisible, which 
nowhere gains form but in words. Man, then, is first and foremost a 
creature of speech – productive of speech and the product of it. […] The 
philosophy of language must stand in the center of every philosophical 
anthropology. (265) 
The general point is that language and image create a cultural world which to a 
great extent shapes the world of Dasein. This is not to deny the importance of 
our organismic constitution, which is, after all, the basis of our having any world 
at all. Moreover, Jonas’ phenomenological approach entails that experience – 
both of ourselves and other entities – is not always linguistically mediated, but 
also pre-cultural and pre-linguistic. Nevertheless, what is peculiarly human is 
the prominence of this cultural world in our total existence. 
VII. Criticisms of Jonas’ Phenomenology 
Having reconstructed Jonas’ philosophy of life I would now like to consider two 
different objections levelled at it: Renaud Barbaras’ phenomenological criticism 
of Jonas’ understanding of life, and Andrew Johnson’s illuminating 
Heideggerian critique of existential differences between humans, plants, and 
animals. Thus far I have generally interpreted Jonas’ ideas exegetically, at most 
suggesting minor problems at specific points which can be fairly easily 
overcome. The following criticisms, however, constitute potentially major 
oversights in Jonas’ metaphysical schema, and consequently require more 
substantial treatment. 
(α) Renaud Barbaras on Movement 
The first major objection to Jonas’ philosophy of life comes from the 
French phenomenologist Renaud Barbaras. Barbaras argues that Jonas 
misrepresents life as metabolism and survival – the avoidance of death – and 
as such fails to grasp what it is to be alive as Leib rather than Körper (2008: 9-
10). In particular he charges Jonas with falling into a circular argument:  
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Life […] is defined as preservation of the living being, that is, as the 
renewal of life itself: living is staying alive, it is preserving life as living. 
But what is it to be living? The only possible answer will once again be: it 
is to preserve itself. In short, in an infinite kind of regress, […] life is what 
presupposes itself. (10) 
Bararas instead argues that a true phenomenology of life would have to move 
beyond metabolism and the avoidance of death to identify what makes both 
possible. Harking back to Aristotle’s Physics, he claims that “movement […] is 
the fundamental descriptive feature of the living being” (11). Without movement 
there is no metabolism, no satisfaction of desires, no freedom, or precarity. A 
being without movement would be entirely self-contained, like a mountain – in 
short, it would not be alive. On Barbaras’ reading, therefore, the flaw that 
Heidegger recognised in his own work – that he had not engaged with the 
motile character of the living being as such – is equally true of Jonas. Barbaras 
concludes: “Jonas is a prisoner of presuppositions […] which lead him to miss 
life’s vitality and thus life’s essential mobility” (12).  
 Barbaras is partly correct: it is true that Jonas emphasises metabolism, 
and not movement per se. The following indicates its centrality in his philosophy 
of life: “metabolism can well serve as the defining property of life: all living 
things have it, no non-living thing has it” (MM: 88). While Barbaras is therefore 
correct to say that Jonas is preoccupied with the individual metabolising being 
as an observable indication of life itself, one might reply that this is necessary if 
we are to distinguish living beings from those moving but unalive. Glaciers, fire, 
and machines all move, but none are alive. Metabolism is essential in order to 
identify immanently teleological movement, which is unique to the living. In a 
way, Barbaras admits as much when he defines movement as “a process by 
which something […] is accomplished, as a movement that is not displacement 
but realization” (12; emphasis added). This presumes that we already know 
which movements constitute realisation and which constitute displacement, 
which cannot simply be taken as given. To animists, for example, a storm or an 
earthquake is immanently purposeful. We can only disprove this claim by 
distinguishing between displacement and realisation as forms of movement. 
Jonas’ integration of scientific evidence (derived from the Körper) and 
phenomenological insight (of ourselves and other beings as Leib) allows us to 
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do so, revealing metabolism to be the first empirical instance of being alive 
which we know ourselves to be. So although Barbaras is right to note that 
Jonas emphasises metabolism in his account of life, it is to solve a problem 
which Barbaras’ method cannot. 
(β) Andrew T. Johnson on Existential Differences 
 The second key criticism I will consider comes from Andrew T. Johnson’s 
insightful comparative account of Heidegger and Jonas. Johnson is chiefly 
concerned with their accounts of the manifestations of existence. He recognises 
the attraction of Jonas’ notion of gradated existence over Heidegger’s eventual 
division between human Dasein and non-human life, but rightly observes that 
Jonas’ philosophy of life does not, in fact, always live up to its gradualist 
principles. When it comes to detailing the empirical indications of degrees of 
freedom, Jonas occasionally imbues the differences between life-forms with 
exaggerated significance, and in one instance denies plants an existential 
structure altogether. 
 The first questionable distinction Jonas draws is between humans and 
animals, and on the basis of image-making. In being able to perceive and 
create images representative of something, he argues that we hold the status of 
a “speaking, thinking, inventing, in short ‘symbolical’ being”, which, he says, “is 
not a matter of degree” (PL: 158). Johnson rightly asks, however: “[o]n what 
grounds is this exemption justified?” (2014: 269). After all, an animal’s ability to 
use tools is surely also evidence of an ‘inventing’ and so ‘symbolical’ being. For 
arcane Heideggerian reasons Johnson then argues that the denial of a symbolic 
existence to animals means that Jonas denies a proper self-world relation to 
non-human life: “he cannot avoid, in exactly the same manner as Heidegger, 
quietly divesting life of certain basic structures that he otherwise so insistently 
portrays as constitutive of its essence” (270). This charge is misplaced, 
however, since Jonas accounts for the self-world relation with reference to 
metabolism, as we have seen. Nevertheless, his refusal to accept that 
symbolical being could be a matter of degree does point to an exaggerated 
difference, confirming Johnson’s suspicion that Jonas unjustly diminishes 
animal existence.  
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 Johnson is again partially correct in his criticism of Jonas’ analysis of 
plant life. Jonas suggests not only that plant and animal being differs greatly – 
which they evidently do – but also that “[w]ith its adjacent surroundings the plant 
forms one permanent context into which it is fully integrated, as the animal can 
never be in its environment” (PL: 104). As a result of this lack of motility the 
plant’s horizon is merely a “dimension of dependence and necessity” rather 
than a “dimension of freedom” (OF III: 4). Johnson suggests that in this 
characterisation Jonas surreptitiously withholds temporality and spatiality as 
existential structures from plants (2014: 270). This is again wide of the mark, as 
these structures were also accounted for in the analysis of metabolism, but 
once again Jonas does create another exaggerated difference between life 
forms. Moreover, and crucially, he entirely fails to account for being-with-others 
as a structure of plant existence, which then appears ex nihilo in animal life. To 
a degree, then, Johnson is correct to say that Jonas’ scala naturae is 
elaborated in a way which is at odds with his underlying gradualist thesis. 
The inconsistencies in Jonas’ philosophy of life somewhat undermine the 
promise of his ontology: that it should account for the evolution of life and 
existence without succumbing to reductionism or old dualisms. Johnson 
concludes that this is inevitable as Jonas “was too liberal in his desire to 
attribute full existence (formally – i.e., it is only the richness and intensity of the 
structures that vary in Jonas’ account) to every manifestation of life” (274). In 
line with Heidegger, Johnson says this is because “it is impossible to overlook 
that ‘abyss of essence’ that separates the most sophisticated animal from the 
most primitive human being” (273). But this intuition remains untested. For it is 
not self-evident that Jonas’ failure to consistently pursue his thesis means that it 
is impossible to do so. This would only be the case if it were demonstrated that 
the differences between plant, animal, and human life could not be accounted 
for without necessarily withdrawing certain existential structures. To abandon a 
Jonasian philosophy of life may therefore be somewhat premature, and I will 
now show that the problems raised by Johnson can indeed be overcome.  
(γ) Revising the Scala Naturae 
The most promising way to improve Jonas’ scala naturae is to point 
toward phenomena – some of the evidence for which has emerged in recent 
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decades – indicating that his exaggerated divisions between plants, animals, 
and humans do not stand up to scrutiny. Firstly, we recall that Jonas attempts to 
justify a stark gap between plant and animal life with reference to movement. In 
both The Phenomenon of Life and Organism and Freedom the crux of Jonas’ 
interpretation is that as a rooted being the plant has a “non-motile existence […] 
in immediate commerce with its environment” (OF IV: 62). He elaborates on this 
theme by noting that prior to the arrival of animals,  
life is passive in relation to space and active only in its internal 
processes. External things have to happen to it or to refrain from 
happening: suitable matter must come near, actual contact has to come 
about by the accidents of environment so that the freedom of metabolism 
can come into play. (OF III: 3) 
This is clearly factually incorrect, however. Although plants lack locomotion, 
they evidently possess motility: a flower turns to the sun, a tree’s roots take hold 
in the earth, and a Venus fly trap snaps shut upon its prey. Quite why Jonas 
failed to acknowledge this is unclear – perhaps it is because, as Scheler notes 
(1961: 9), a plant’s pace of movement is usually so much slower than our own 
that it is invisible to the naked eye, giving the impression that it does not really 
move in an immanently teleological way.  
Whatever the reason Jonas apparently recognised his error and changed 
tack, arguing in the later essay ‘Biological Foundations of Individuality’ that 
although plants do move it is unlike animal movement as not “under the agent’s 
control” (PE: 205). He admits that “for the opening and closing of blossoms and 
even for the startling performance of certain insectivorous plants […] the 
outward likeness to the animal pattern is indeed strong” (ibid.). The key 
difference, he claims, is that “the ‘direction’ here is not central but strictly in 
response to local stimulation, with no central control involved” (ibid.). 
Presumably Jonas’ reference to ‘central control’ is not meant to imply a 
conscious intention, given that according to his basic analysis of the organism 
this is not necessary for teleology. The likelihood is that he is referring to the 
greater unity of the animal organism courtesy of its centralised nervous system, 
which is lacking in plant life; indeed, a reference in Organism and Freedom 
suggests this interpretation is correct. There Jonas says that “centralization […] 
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raises the unity and individuality of the organism to an entirely new level”, and 
stresses that “centralization is not the same as the organic unity of the complex 
whole, nor always accompanying such unity, but is a new fact in the evolution of 
multicellular organisms, confined to animal life, and coincident with the evolution 
of sentience” (OF IV: 6-10; emphasis added). Here Jonas draws a distinction 
between the plant’s unity and the animal’s centralisation – an apt observation, 
no doubt, but one wonders whether acknowledgement of the former 
undermines the distinction Jonas would like to make. It seems far truer to the 
phenomena to say that animal centralisation and locomotion offer a far greater 
and richer world than vegetative unity and motion, but that in the latter we may 
still identify a rudimentary sort of reaching out into the spatial world. In doing so 
we would do fuller justice to plant life. 
This still leaves the existential dimension of being-with-others 
(Heidegger’s Mitsein) unaccounted for in our analysis of plant life. Now, it is 
admittedly counter-intuitive to claim that plants possess a social existence, even 
to a minimal degree, but this may prove to be a mere prejudice. There is 
accumulating evidence for the ability of plants to communicate with one another 
through the release of volatile organic compounds in the air and soil, allowing 
them to alert neighbouring plants of danger (Karban 2015; Blande and 
Glinwood, 2016). Given that plants are non-locomotive beings, and therefore 
cannot flee from danger, there appears to be little individual benefit in this as an 
evolutionary trait. However, studies have shown that plant communication is 
greater between kin, and might therefore serve to evolutionarily benefit the 
group (File, et al., 2012; Karban et al., 2013). We recall that Jonas argued that 
reproduction necessitated a social existence, and here we might have evidence 
of communication benefitting the plant’s reproductive group. These speculations 
are tentative, but assuming the emerging evidence of plant communication is 
correct it would indicate a rudimentary manifestation of being-with-others, and 
so bear out the notion that the existential categories can be found at least 
minimally in all forms of life. 
We can now attempt to rectify Jonas’ account of the difference between 
animal and human existence. His questionable claim, as mentioned above, is 
that the inability to make images excludes abstract thought and a symbolic 
world from animal life – not an existential distinction, therefore, but unfair all the 
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same, as the empirical observation Jonas offers as justification does not stand 
up to scrutiny. Against him one could argue that the creation and use of tools 
does in fact indicate a capacity for abstraction. For instance, in using a stick to 
draw termites from a nest a chimpanzee shows that it can take up this object for 
that invented end, shaping it – albeit crudely – for that purpose. We might also 
mention the avian capacity for nest-building, the beaver’s construction of a dam, 
or even an ant hill, all of which are distinct from creative uses of bodily functions 
(such as a spider spinning a web). Jonas claims that what is different about 
human tool-making is that, like image-making, it is created according to the 
“eidetic power of imagination and eidetic control of the hand”, which lies 
“beyond the ability of animals” (MM: 78-79). To be sure, by virtue of 
physiological advantages such as the opposable thumb a human can certainly 
better shape the stick, and according to more complex and disinterested ideas, 
but a chimpanzee must still have some idea of the tool – which it learns from 
others – in order to repeatedly make it. For further evidence we could point to 
those chimpanzees who have been observed using tools to make other tools, 
implying a chain of symbolic thinking (Sugiyama, 1985: 361), or the successful 
attempts to teach chimpanzees and gorillas sign-language (Savage-Rumbaugh, 
et al., 1998). The latter, in particular, indicates beyond reasonable doubt a 
capacity for symbolic thought and expression open to at least some animal life.  
Finally one might question whether the sort of freedom for abstraction 
demonstrated in the grave – a capacity for religion, ethics, and metaphysics – 
does categorically set humanity apart, since this rests on Jonas’ observation 
that “no animal buries or gives further consideration to its dead” (MM: 83). This 
may also be empirically false: Cynthia Moss reports witnessing a group of 
elephants who, upon encountering the carcass of an elephant not belonging 
their herd, “began to kick at the ground around it, digging up the dirt and putting 
it on the body. A few others broke off branches and palm fronds and brought 
them back and placed them on the carcass” (2000: 270). Clearly this is not 
equal to the human burial mound, which draws its ritual significance from a 
religious (or post-religious) metaphysics. Nevertheless, if accurately described it 
would indicate that the elephants have some understanding of mortality, and not 
just a being-toward-death manifesting in instinct. Contra Jonas, therefore, we 
can say with some confidence that at least certain higher animal species – 
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elephants, chimpanzees, and gorillas – are capable of behaviour which 
indicates a symbolic existence. Even if the capacities in question are not 
sufficiently central to their existence for qualification as beings who truly inhabit 
a symbolic world, it shows that symbolic existence is a matter of degree after 
all. 
The qualitative difference between the symbolic existence of humans 
and such animals – namely, that we not only use symbols but also exist as 
symbolic animals – has to be explained with reference to a subtler capacity. The 
most plausible candidate has been put forth by Hans Lenk: second-order 
symbolic understanding. This is the uniquely human capacity to use symbols to 
conceptualise and talk about symbols, thereby creating ever-greater degrees of 
abstraction from the immanent. For instance, a chimpanzee may be able to use 
the sign ‘apple’ to refer to the fruit of that name, but only humans can talk about 
the sign ‘apple’ as a sign and so understand how we use it. For this reason 
Lenk says that the human being is “not only the animal symbolicum, but the 
animal meta-symbolicum, the being that not only interprets, […] but who in turn 
interprets its interpretations and interpretation processes” (2007: 31). It is 
perhaps this ‘meta-symbolic’ capacity which underpins the richness of the 
symbolic world we inhabit. Moreover, the reflexivity evident in the capacity for 
meta-symbolic communication appears to chime with the eccentricity identified 
by Plessner as the defining human characteristic: just as we both have bodies 
and are bodies, we can both talk about language and with language.  
Our corporeal and inner existence are coloured by ambiguity courtesy of 
this ability to objectify ourselves and distance ourselves from ourselves. 
However much we may occasionally wish to ‘return’ to the perilous yet blissfully 
simple immediacy of animal being, we cannot: we eccentrically exist in a world 
of symbols no less than we do a world of objects. This appears to be a 
promising way to identify the human’s differentia specifica, and if Jonas’ theory 
is supplemented in this way then it seems his desire to set humans apart by 
their relation to symbols is tenable. 
VIII. Post-Modern Ontology 
Having set out Jonas’ philosophy of life and considered two major objections to 
it, let us briefly look back at its pros and cons. On the one hand we have a 
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radical yet plausible metaphysics which can account for the existential nature 
and teleological capacities of human and non-human life. This is achieved by 
placing living beings under investigation, both as they appear to biology (the 
Körper) and to phenomenological reflection (the Leib). From this methodological 
perspective we can trace the development of living beings from the unicellular 
organism and on to the complex forms of plant, animal, and human life, each 
stage signifying an increase in world-openness and freedom. As stated, Jonas 
at times exaggerates the differences between these forms of life, in way which 
does an injustice to plants and animals. Perhaps here Jonas’ humanism led him 
into error, or perhaps it was just a result of insufficient evidence available 
(particularly in the cases of plant communication and animal symbolic 
existence). Regardless, by taking full stock of the evidence we are able to 
correct these oversights in Jonas’ scala naturae, and show how plants and 
animals reach heights of existential freedom that Western thought has generally 
failed to recognise. 
In so doing Jonas sets about turning the page on Cartesian substance 
dualism and its contemporary progeny. Rather than rejecting Descartes’ 
bifurcation of nature into mind and matter only to exclusively accept the latter – 
as many contemporary philosophers either intentionally or unwittingly do – 
Jonas weaves the two threads back together. We have here a ‘post-modern’ 
ontology (in the literal sense) which respects the scientific facts at the same 
time as disputing their materialist metaphysical underpinning, the latter being 
incompatible with the very act of self-reflection. Only an integral monism of this 
sort can account for the full record of Being. The upshot is not only theoretically 
valuable, however, but also practical: by overcoming Cartesianism we are also 
able to restore to non-human life its proper share of dignity and value. The 
groundwork for this is laid in the rehabilitation of immanent teleology to plants 
and animals. But what kind of ethic does this yield? One which remains 
anthropocentric, or casts off this legacy in favour of a biocentric or even 






Chapter Three: Teleology, Value, and the Good 
I. Moral Patients 
The present chapter will deal with axiology, in particular the questions of from 
where value originates in Being, and how value relates to goodness. We will 
ask what sorts of values there are in the world, which beings possess them, and 
whether, drawing on Jonas’ references to species and the nisus of Being, it 
makes sense to speak of values held not just by individuals but even the 
biosphere itself.  
As we saw in the Introduction, central to modern nihilism is the conviction 
that nature itself possesses no value, positively or negatively: it simply is, and 
any value to be found in the world is instead a subjective human evaluation. 
From this belief follows the purported freedom to treat non-human life as we 
please: after all – so the argument goes – if nature possesses no interests, 
preferences, or purposes then it cannot be harmed and so makes no ethical 
claims of us. But this argument implicitly rests on the materialist conception of 
life as devoid of ends, which we have duly discarded. Having done so, the 
identification of values present in the world – the demonstration that nature 
does care – can be undertaken. We shall see that although Jonas is unable to 
combat nihilism to the desired extent, we are nevertheless able to reveal a far 
richer and greater ream of value in Being than modern thought is typically 
capable of. This is enough, I argue, to underpin the ethic for modern technology 
he seeks. 
An early indication of Jonas’ axiology can be found in his essay on the 
biologist and psychologist Kurt Goldstein.46 There Jonas tells us:  
The wisdom of the body discloses itself only to a wise mind. The 
recognition of the teleological structure of all living things, which 
establishes self-realization as the intrinsic principle of their being, is 
acknowledgement of their dignity and is ultimately rooted in reverence for 
life. (KGP: 163) 
                                                          




This claim is only a rudimentary indication of Jonas’ mature thought, however, 
which differs in two significant ways. Firstly, we have here the invocation of 
Albert Schweitzer’s famous doctrine of ‘reverence for life’ (1965), which Jonas 
later rejects in favour of responsibility for life (IR: 90). Secondly, the earlier 
formulation refers to the ratio cognoscendi, or the means by which something is 
known: the ethical attitude precedes the ontological insight, Jonas claiming that 
‘the recognition of the teleological structure of all living things is ultimately 
rooted in reverence for life’. By contrast, the core purpose of The Imperative is 
to account for the ratio essendi – the reason for something’s existence – in this 
case, the attempted derivation of the good from Being. Central to this later work 
is the claim for the immanent teleology of life grounding its value, and ultimately 
our obligations. Reconstructing and evaluating this argumentative move is the 
aim of both this chapter and the next, building from Jonas’ existential philosophy 
of life.  
Jonas’ axiological and ethical positions can be clarified with reference to 
one of the foremost theoretical concerns of environmental ethics: the 
“demarcation problem” (Muraca, 2011: 375), i.e., the question of which beings 
are considerable as moral patients. Although this problem pertains to all 
branches of moral thinking, it has been pursued most radically in environmental 
ethics. The common positions and their technical labels are as follows, each 
representing a further widening of the ‘moral circle’: humans 
(anthropocentrism); sentient beings (pathocentrism); living beings (biocentrism); 
ecosystems (ecocentrism); and the biosphere – or even Earth – as a whole 
(holism). The first, anthropocentrism, is the most familiar, having been a 
historically dominant aspect of Western moral thought. The second, 
pathocentrism, has been hugely influential on the animal rights movement of 
recent decades, and was theoretically supported by the works of Peter Singer 
(1995) and Tom Regan (2004). The third, biocentrism, found an early 
formulation in Schweitzer’s work and was expanded upon by environmental 
ethicists such as Paul Taylor (1986), while perhaps the most well-known version 
of the fourth, ecocentrism, is the deep ecology of Arne Næss (1989). The last, 
holism, has been advocated by Holmes Rolston III (1988). 
In the secondary literature there is little consensus as to where Jonas’ 
thought is situated on this widening spectrum of moral concern, which, I would 
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argue, reflects apparently conflicting statements in his work. For instance, in the 
space of a few pages he argues that the anthropocentric underpinning of prior 
ethical systems is inadequate to the challenges of our age (IR: 4), and yet goes 
on to formulate his categorical imperative as follows: “[a]ct so that the effects of 
your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life [on 
Earth]” (11). The inclusion of ‘on Earth’ – which is only present in the original 
German – indicates Jonas’ concern for ecology, but at the same time does not 
make the Earth a direct object of duty. It is not surprising, then, that Richard 
Bernstein should comment that in this respect “[t]here is an unresolved tension 
in his thinking” (1995: 18). The ambiguity has allowed Jonas to be interpreted 
as a proponent of “following nature” (Krebs, 1999: 99), even while Robin Attfield 
laments Jonas’ “anthropocentric tendencies” (1991: 202). In an attempt to 
account for this, Lawrence Vogel argues that Jonas manages to “have it both 
ways” by “undercutting the very distinction between anthropocentrism and non-
anthropocentrism” (1995: 37). Then there are those such as Michael Hauskeller 
who regard Jonas’ ethics as “clearly anthropocentric, but not ruthlessly so” 
(2015: 42).47 Evidently some conceptual clarification is required to establish 
which of these interpretations is correct, and why they can all seemingly claim 
textual support. 
We will also look in detail at the broader normative framework Jonas 
employs, which, as Theresa Morris rightly notes, embraces “certain aspects of 
Kant’s ethics” and is “decidedly leery of […] utilitarian reasoning” (2013: 166-
167). With a reformulation of the categorical imperative at the heart of his moral 
philosophy Morris is prima facie correct, but again we find in the secondary 
literature the contrasting view of Jonas’ ethics as “heavily consequentialist” 
(McKenny, 1997: 211). Once more we shall have to establish who is right – but 
we will only arrive at a final answer to this question in the next chapter. We shall 
first of all address the issues of who and what counts as a moral patient, and 




                                                          
47 See also Strachan Donnelley (1989: 647). 
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II. The Axiological Dimension of Teleology 
(α) Behaviour 
In the previous chapter we identified immanent teleology, or ‘goal-directedness’, 
as essential to the organism, and this in two forms: self-organisation and 
behaviour. Taking the latter first, we characterised each organism’s being-in-
the-world as care. The specificities of each case are determined by the needs of 
the organism, but typically in a means-end relationship. The structure of this 
relationship is critical to axiological considerations. In general, an end is 
something sought-after and obtained through a means. We are all familiar with 
this from our own decisions and activities. Say I decide to become a doctor with 
Médicins Sans Frontières so as to provide medical help to the world’s needy. 
The ‘becoming a doctor…’ is the means and the ‘provide medical help…’ the 
end, linked by the ‘so as to’. Of course, this requires conscious formulation 
based on an understanding of medicine, health, and charity. Providing medical 
assistance is clearly not an end, nor is becoming a doctor a means, that could 
exist outside of the symbolic domain of human culture.  
For a more basic example of an end – one which is not only essential to 
human existence, but also much animal life – Jonas offers that of walking: “[n]ot 
the legs walk, but the walker walks with them; not the eyes see, but their 
possessor sees with them; and the ‘in order to’ also indicates, besides the 
purpose, a control on the part of the subject” (IR: 57).48 One might be walking in 
order to visit a friend, collect water from the well, or one might simply be walking 
for the pleasure of it. Such purposes demonstrate that in human life the capacity 
to walk is subject to the will, which can even redirect some otherwise automatic 
bodily functions. Think here of the distinctions between seeing and looking, 
hearing and listening, and smelling and sniffing. The focus and control inherent 
to the latter of each of these distinctions suggests a deliberate intent, indicative 
of human beings’ eccentric relations to their own bodies. Are animals also 
capable of willingly directing their attention? It would certainly seem so, at least 
some of the time. A cat hears a faint scratching and sits bolt upright, eyes and 
ears fixated on the source – here we suspect that it acts instinctually rather than 
                                                          
48 When we say of someone that they are wandering aimlessly ‘for no reason’ and with no 
apparent destination in mind, I suspect that what is meant is that one is walking just for the sake 
of it, which is still a purpose (unless, that is, we are referring to the mentally ill, who are 
characterised as such partly because their purposes are so dubious or opaque to us). 
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wilfully. Momentarily, however, the cat realises the source of the sound was no 
prey, and relaxes and reclines: the difference in speed and intensity manifest in 
the cat’s body language suggesting to us that the latter movement was 
deliberately undertaken.  
Even if this is simply a misleading impression, at some point on the scala 
naturae descending from humans into plants the wilful direction of ends surely 
does drop out, then sentience altogether, yet purely organismic ends are no 
less real for being “silhouetted in premental form” (75). The axiological 
consequence is this: each organism possesses a subjective good and bad as a 
matter of logical necessity, since something can then be better or worse for it 
according to the satisfaction or otherwise of its ends. To pick a striking example 
from nature: the ‘zombie fungus’ Ophiocordyceps unilateralis kills ants of the 
Camponotus leonardi genus by infecting the body and manipulating the 
behaviour of the host. The ant is driven to climb the stem of a plant and, using 
its mandibles, secure itself to the vein of a leaf. The host thereafter dies as the 
fungus grows spores from inside the body of the ant outwards, through the head 
first. Clearly, this grisly death is a good only for the fungus, and certainly not the 
ant (on the contrary, for the ant it constitutes a terrible harm). But the mere fact 
of the fungus’ end entails a subjective value, a ‘good of its own’, regardless of 
whether it is felt as such. We cannot, by contrast, ascribe the notion of a good 
of its own to a non-living being, as Paul Taylor notes:  
Suppose […] that someone tells us that we can further the good of a pile 
of sand by, say, erecting a shelter over it so that it does not get wet in the 
rain. […] Perhaps we would interpret the statement to mean that, since 
wet sand is no good for a certain purpose, it should be kept dry. In that 
case it is not the sand’s own good that would be furthered, but the 
purpose for which it is to be used. […] Concerning the pile of sand itself, 
however, it is neither true nor false that keeping it dry furthers its good. 
The sand has no good of its own. (1986: 60-61) 
The pile of sand – or river, or star, or any other inanimate being – as non-living 
has no ends; only organic, metabolising being has ends, and therefore a 
subjective good of its own.  
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Now, it might be objected that modern technology blurs this distinction 
between living and non-living. We could think, first of all, of a car, which needs 
petrol, oil, and water, amongst other things, to run properly and not break down. 
Is this not identical to the organism which requires sustenance in order to 
continue living? In fact there is only a superficial similarity between the relations 
of car to fuel and organism to sustenance. The first key difference is that the car 
utilises the fuel without the fuel ever becoming the car, whereas metabolism 
means that the organism actually reconstitutes itself. This processual being is 
the organic condition: for as long as the organism lives it is irreducible to its 
material composition, only becoming the latter when it ceases to metabolise – 
i.e., die.49 A machine, on the other hand, has a material identity which is 
complete whether switched on or off, and it is this self-containment, the lack of 
any need grounded in its being, which explains why the machine has no world 
to which it relates in the manner of care. That said, it is true that the workings of 
more complex machines are reminiscent of an organism in their ability to 
respond to environmental stimuli. Cybernetic devices such as homeostats, for 
instance, are through feedback loops able to regulate their own functioning 
apparently in accordance with a central structure. This may well look like care 
and self-organisation, but once again it is merely a formal likeness. Here we 
come to the second key difference between organism and machine, which is 
that the teleological principle of the latter is not immanent (or self-generated, or 
autopoietic), but rather transcendent, placed there from without.50 
Turning back to the issue at hand, we should note that Taylor’s account 
of the connection between teleological ends and value risks collapsing into a 
circularity. We are told that if we adopt the “biocentric outlook on nature” we can 
conceive of an organism as having a good of its own (44-45). However, the 
realisation that each organism has a good of its own then acts a justification for 
adopting the biocentric outlook (99-100) – which has already been 
presupposed. By contrast, Jonas’ philosophy of life gives us a solid grounding 
for the move to axiology. He tells us that with “any de facto pursued end […], 
attainment of it becomes a good, and frustration of it, an evil; and with this 
distinction the attributability of value begins” (IR: 79). Again, this does not refer 
                                                          
49 The closest exception is the dormant state of a seed, during which it still respires. 
50 It may well be that a technology one day exists which is truly autopoietic – perhaps an 
immensely complex super-computer which somehow becomes self-conscious of its own accord. 
I do not rule out the possibility, only note that to date no machine possesses such properties. 
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to conscious valuing, but is rather a necessary counterpart of the organism’s 
teleological constitution.51 And crucially, as Jonas notes, this organismic value 
does not yet imply judgement of the objective goodness or badness of the value 
in question – that is a separate issue. Rather, it is “relative value, for something” 
(52).  
(β) Self-Organisation 
 Self-organisation, the second form of immanent teleology, furthers the 
notion of each individual organism having a subjective good. As recounted in 
the previous chapter, the organism is structured in a particular way and largely 
maintains it over time, the end differing only gradually according to the 
developmental and aging processes. We recall that Jonas characterises the 
structure of the organism as a part-whole relationship: “[e]very organ in an 
organism serves a purpose and fulfils it by functioning […] everything is de facto 
so arranged that in effect it contributes to the maintenance and performance of 
the whole” (65). Since the parts are subservient to the life of the whole, we have 
a value-criterion by which to judge their activity. The heart, for example, pumps 
blood around the body: this is its function.52 Its purpose is that this function aids 
the organism in its pursuit of continued existence, which then corresponds to a 
value. The significance of this for our axiological discussion is that, once again, 
the good of the organism exists prior to any psychological valuation: having a 
working heart is good for me on the organismic level whether I would like to be 
healthy or not. For all living beings, health – and its opposite, illness – pertain to 
a value which pre-exists conscious positing. And, as before, the step from value 
to subjective good is clear – the organism has a good of its own not only in its 
                                                          
51 This holds even in the extreme example of suicide, which indicates the exclusively human 
ability to knowingly direct the will against one’s own organismic telos of continued existence. 
However, two supplementary points are of note here. Firstly, in the case of suicide, the 
individual presumably does not psychologically find any positive value in their life and on this 
basis decides to kill themselves, finding such value only in death. Even so, their organismic 
ends and the associated values continue to exist even as they are ‘overridden’ by the willed 
ending of such valuing. Secondly, self-sacrifice and martyrdom are different to suicide 
altogether, since they derive their significance from the affirmation of the continued existence of 
another end, whatever this may be. It is thus self-sacrifice, rather than suicide, which 
characterises the actions of those animals such as female octopuses which die as a result of 
devotion to brooding at the expense of sustenance. Jonas, however, disagrees entirely with this 
interpretation of animal self-sacrifice (IR: 235) – arguably an oversight following from the 
insufficient attention he paid to reproduction and sociality. 
52 Jonas’ own example of organic self-organisation is the contribution of the digestive system 
which, oddly, he refers to as “the digestive organ” (IR: 65) as though it were one such entity 
rather than a system of organs. Presumably this is a misleadingly literal translation of the 
original German compound noun “Verdauungsorgan” (PV: 130). 
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goals which reach out into its world, but also the goals immanent in its very 
constitution. 
(γ) The Organism as End-in-Itself 
The move from teleology to subjective good represents an advance in 
Jonas’ attempt to overcome modern nihilism with a new ethic. We can go 
further, however, and differentiate between the different sorts of values which 
follow from natural teleology. An appropriate distinction to introduce at this 
juncture is that of instrumental and intrinsic value, which has preoccupied 
environmental ethicists since the development of the sub-discipline.  
While no consensus exists in the literature as to the precise meaning of 
the terms, Rolston offers a useful account with the additional category of 
‘extrinsic’ value.53 He defines these as follows. Instrumental value refers to 
something’s use-value as a means to an end posited by the valuer. For 
instance, “[o]bjective natural things and events may contribute to […] subjective 
interest satisfactions, a tree supplies firewood, a sunny day makes a picnic 
possible” (1994: 13). Secondly, extrinsic value is that which we find in 
something disinterestedly, without reference to instrumental needs: “[t]ourists in 
Yosemite do not value the sequoias as timber but as natural classics, for their 
age, strength, beauty, resilience and majesty” (14). From Rolston’s example we 
can see that aesthetic valuing is one such manifestation. While we might want 
to say that a person who could only value the giant sequoia in instrumental 
terms was a philistine, we should note that extrinsic value does not exist in the 
world independently of the valuer, but is instead still denoted by the subject 
(ibid.). We could not say, therefore, that the hypothetical person was objectively 
ignorant. Finally, intrinsic value refers to those beings which are capable of 
doing the valuing: in Rolston’s word-play, they are quite literally “value-able, 
able to produce values” (29). Such entities have intrinsic value as it belongs to 
them, is a part of them, rather than being a value imposed from without. 
Which beings, then, are intrinsically valuable – able to value other beings 
either instrumentally or extrinsically? Rolston’s examples of instrumental and 
extrinsic valuing given above are drawn from human experience and so 
                                                          
53 In particular, John O’Neill (1992) has provided a subtle analysis of the manifold senses of 
intrinsic value, but for my purposes Rolston’s division of intrinsic and extrinsic will be sufficient. 
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anthropogenic (i.e., originating in humans), but such valuing may just as 
plausibly belong to all organic existence (and so are, for want of a better term, 
biogenic). As Rolston says: 
Animals hunt and howl, find shelter, seek out their habitats and mates, 
care for their young, flee from threats, grow hungry, thirsty, hot, tired, 
excited, sleepy. They suffer injury and lick their wounds. Here we are 
quite convinced that value is non-anthropogenic, to say nothing of 
anthropocentric. (15) 
In at least some of these cases – in particular hunting and seeking out mates – 
the value in question appears to be instrumental to the animal’s need: the prey 
is a means to the end of satiating hunger. The same would also be true, in a 
non-conscious form, of the functioning in plant life: as we have seen, something 
is valuable for the plant insofar as it fulfils the plant’s teleological needs. But 
what of extrinsic valuing? It would certainly be counter-intuitive to claim that 
animals (let alone plants) were capable of aesthetic disinterest, but then this 
was only one form of extrinsic valuing – the broader meaning was valuing a 
being without reference to instrumentality. Do animals or plants value anything 
in this sense? Rolston argues that there is one way in which all organisms do 
so, namely, in their striving for life. Given that “[a] life is defended for what it is in 
itself, without necessary further contributory reference” (17), it seems to follow 
that each organism values its ongoing existence extrinsically. With the capacity 
for both instrumental and extrinsic valuing identified in organismic activity, 
therefore, Rolston concludes that all life is intrinsically valuable. 
Now, from the anthropogenic perspective, this discussion of non-
conscious organismic valuing is self-evidently nonsensical. According to this 
point of view, value – whether instrumental or extrinsic – only belongs to human 
beings since our ends are governed by the light of reason. Therefore, on the 
definition given above, only human beings are of intrinsic value. Quite why 
reason is necessary for valuation – rather than additional to it – is unclear, 
however. More plausible is Singer’s position, which we labelled pathogenic. 
This is to say that the scope of valuation pertains to humans and animals who 
have interests regarding the pleasure and pain they are able to feel. He says: 
“[t]he capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having 
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interests at all […]. A stone cannot have interests because it cannot suffer” 
(1993: 57). Singer is right to claim that the stone cannot have interests, but 
wrong about the reason – they lack interests because they lack the necessary 
immanent-teleological basis. With his formulation Singer succumbs to what 
Rolston calls the “subjectivist fallacy” (1994: 19), namely that value is 
synonymous with a felt interest. On the contrary, through Jonas’ philosophy of 
life we have seen that valuing is entailed by immanent teleology, which is by no 
means always accompanied by consciousness or the will. Put simply, 
organismic ends, pre-existing both consciousness and will, allow for fulfilment or 
frustration: a better or a worse for the organism. 
Jonas’ position is therefore altogether more radical than Singer’s, as we 
can see by mapping Rolston’s divisions of valuation on to Jonas’ understanding 
of organic being. Firstly, instrumental valuing appears to belong, as its 
ontological correlate, to both care and the part-whole relation inherent to self-
organisation. This alone would be enough to confer the status of intrinsic value 
to all life-forms. Additionally, however, we can argue that self-organisation 
serves to bring about extrinsic valuing. Although he does not use the term 
‘extrinsic’, Jonas says: “[t]o secure survival is indeed one end of organic 
endowment, but when we ask ‘Survival of what?’ we must often count the 
endowment itself among the intrinsic goods it helps to preserve” (MM: 93, 
emphasis added). Jonas’ reference here to ‘intrinsic’ good is unfortunate given 
that we have reserved this term for the capacity to value. However, we could 
say that since Jonas refers in the preceding paragraph to something valued 
“beyond all instrumentality” (ibid.), the fact that the organism maintains itself in 
being simply for itself, would indeed, in the terms which we have adopted from 
Rolston, refer to a form of extrinsic valuing.  
With this last step we have arrived at a key moment in Jonas’ axiology, 
when he declares that the organism is conceived of as an “‘end in itself’, that is, 
something being its own end” (IR: 56).54 Each life form has this status not 
                                                          
54 To my knowledge, this notion first appears in Jonas’ work regarding the ordering of the parts 
of the universe in ancient Greek cosmology, a structure which Jonas likens to “a living body”. 
He continues: “[t]o the same pattern corresponds every entity in nature, if in lesser degrees of 
completeness and self-sufficiency. Each is part of a greater whole, an end in itself and a whole 
for its parts” (PL: 95). Here Jonas is discussing the end-in-itself in the context of a strictly 
historical formulation of the idea, but it is clear that in reference to the organism it survives in his 
later work not only as a descriptive notion, but also an ethical one. 
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because of its capacity to feel, or to uphold the moral law (as in Kant), but rather 
because of its orientation toward its continued existence. 
III. Greater Goods? 
We have now shown how Jonas’ philosophy of the organism bridges biology 
and axiology via teleology at the level of the individual organism. It would seem 
that on this basis his axiological position is biogenic. However, some 
environmental ethicists, Rolston foremost amongst them, have attempted to 
extend the domain of intrinsic value yet further, such that species, ecosystems, 
and even the biosphere as a whole are deemed to be loci of such valuation. 
Although Jonas does not make sustained arguments for these positions, there 
are enough hints scattered throughout his work to suggest he was at least 
sympathetic to the notion that species and the biosphere could have a greater 
axiological significance than that of mere instrumental value for us. In order to 
establish what he might have meant, I shall locate his comments in the debates 
in environmental ethics over the possible attribution of value to these 
collectives. 
(α) Species 
References to species are infrequent in Jonas’ published works, which 
typically focus on the individual organism or life as such. The following 
exception suggests that the idea is, for Jonas, imbued with normative 
significance: “any wanton and needless extinction of species becomes a crime 
in itself” (TSE: 894).55 Why this is the case is not fully explained by the context. 
However, in an unpublished manuscript Jonas offers the following observation, 
which introduces a different sort of value than that discussed so far:  
Now, something can be termed ‘good’ by its own intrinsic standards, 
unrelated to anything else and regardless of my likes or dislikes: for 
instance this living body – snake, bug or bear – if complete in its proper 
parts, all in good working shape, each doing its proper work in proportion 
to the others and the whole. It is then a ‘good’ specimen of its species, of 
which there can also be impaired, imbalanced or disordered specimens. I 
may wish the whole species extinct and must still grant that by its internal 
                                                          
55 For similar remarks see Jonas’ interview with Der Spiegel (CBE: 22-23), and his lecture ‘On 
Suffering’ (OS: 24; 30). 
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criteria of wholeness and excellence, this happens to be a very good 
representative of it. (WGM: 2, emphasis added) 
At first the quotation appears to reiterate the idea expounded in the previous 
section that the individual organism is an end-in-itself by virtue of its teleological 
structure. However, Jonas then moves to the notion that the structure of the 
individual is in accordance with that of the species, and on this basis can be 
judged as a good or bad of its kind. We shall attempt to make sense of this. 
The basic idea is that each species exists in a way which is particular to 
it, and this provides us with a standard by which to judge the individual 
specimen as a good (or bad) of its kind. This is, essentially, an Aristotelian 
notion. Aristotle tells us in the Nicomachean Ethics that “[t]he excellence of a 
thing is relative to its proper function” (1984d: 1139a). For Aristotle this applies 
to us as both organismic and social beings: if I am someone’s friend there are 
criteria by which to judge whether I am a good friend or nor; if I am a chef there 
are criteria by which to judge whether I am a good chef or not, and so on. 
According to Taylor, the normative concept at work here is merit, which he 
describes as “apply[ing] grading or ranking standards” to the individual and 
determining “whether it has the ‘good-making’ properties (merits) in virtue of 
which it fulfills the standards being applied” (1986: 130). Jonas himself makes 
room for this in the above quotation with his reference to “a ‘good’ specimen of 
its species, of which there can also be impaired, imbalanced or disordered 
specimens”. Again, as with the goal-directed behaviour of an individual 
organism, this good of its kind need not itself be good. For instance, a good 
criminal is one which commits a crime and evades capture, though we are loath 
to say that being a criminal is itself good. In the case of an organism Jonas 
likewise suggests that, regardless of our personal valuation of the species, a 
species-valuation is always present. 
The problem with this argument is not normative but ontological, 
pertaining to what a species actually is. While few people – unless they doubted 
the existence of the external world altogether – would maintain that an organism 
does not exist, with species it is not so simple. Are we looking for a class or 
category which is really there, or just one more-or-less contingently imposed by 
us on the phenomena? Aristotle argued for the former – namely that species 
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were eidetically identifiable natural kinds – and it seems that with Jonas’ 
reference to an ‘internal criteria’ he follows suit. But elsewhere he recognises, 
correctly, that a species is not fixed but merely “relatively stable, and that this 
stability represents only the temporary equilibrium among the forces which 
generally determine the structure as successful” (PL: 50). Having acknowledged 
this it then becomes difficult to see how he could argue for an internal criterion 
of species-valuation, since the standard by which we are to judge is lacking. For 
Aristotle to do so was entirely reasonable given that he had no concept of 
evolution, but after Darwin and the expansion of the fossil record it is difficult to 
view species as ongoing in the sense that Jonas would apparently like to. 
It is possible, perhaps, to charitably interpret Jonas and attempt to save 
the concept of species as a natural kind by introducing a temporal dimension to 
the definition, thus accommodating evolution. This is the inspiration for the 
biological (as opposed to ‘morphological’) species concept advanced by Moritz 
Wagner, Theodosius Dobzhansky, and later Ernst Mayr. According to Mayr, 
what matters is whether a population of organisms have the ability to breed 
amongst themselves: “[s]pecies are groups of interbreeding natural populations 
that are reproductively isolated from other such groups” (1988: 318). While it 
might be objected that Mayr’s reference to ‘natural’ populations unduly 
complicates matters, for our purposes the introduction of an interbreeding 
criterion allows for the concept of species to take on a temporal dimension. On 
this definition we could say that a generational sequence of organisms does 
constitute a natural kind, provided they are reproductively isolated and until 
such a time as the ancestor is no longer genetically compatible with the 
descendent. At this point we would then be considering two different species.  
Unfortunately this definition is vulnerable to a diachronic ‘family 
resemblances’ problem. For instance, the following scenario is at least logically 
possible: specimen A, existing at the present time, and specimen B, which 
existed at some point in the fairly distant past, are closely related enough to 
have been able to breed and therefore constitute members of the same 
species. However, specimen C, which existed in the very distant past is too far 
removed from A to have been able to breed with it, but is closely related enough 
to B to have been able to breed with the latter. We would then have a situation 
whereby A and B belong to one species, and B and C belong to another. But to 
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say that specimen B simultaneously belonged to more than one species seems 
absurd, and is certainly not what we understand by the term ‘species’. A second 
problem is the synchronic implications of the notion of reproductive links. Firstly, 
as Hans-Johann Glock notes, there are organisms which reproduce asexually 
(2012: 124), each instance of which might then have to be considered a single 
species. Moreover, there are species – as the term is generally understood – 
which are able to interbreed, and have done so not just in captivity but also in 
the wild. For example, as a result of climate change polar bears are moving into 
grizzly bear territory in northern Canada, with the two species occasionally 
interbreeding. Since polar bears and grizzly bears are no longer geographically 
isolated, and evidently able to have offspring, ought we now consider them a 
single species? According to Mayr we should not, given that the interbreeding is 
not natural but rather a consequence of anthropogenic climate change. Yet this 
seems arbitrary: is the dog not a distinct species, despite having been bred from 
domesticated wolves?  
Both problems might be solved by the ‘evolutionary species concept’ 
(sometimes also known as the ‘cladistic’ concept) which emphasises the 
ancestry of organisms in order to delimit one population from another as 
species. One could argue that a species refers, after all, back to the first fossil 
or collected specimen of its kind discovered, and that this is the referent for the 
possibility of reproduction – in the given case, presumably the first crossbred 
polar-grizzly bear. But then the question turns to what essential and not simply 
contingent difference the original classification was made on, as John Dupré 
notes (2001: 209). Although Dupré goes on to list several criteria for 
classification in defence of the evolutionary species concept, these are 
inescapably rough.  
Are we then condemned to say that biological goodness is appropriate 
only to the individual organism as it develops autopoietically? Not necessarily. 
We could, perhaps, take a cue from Jonas and switch to an ‘existential’ 
perspective: one which attempts to tie the being of the organism to its 
physiological characteristics. Contra Aristotle, we must say that although 
species are only relatively stable lineages, with ill-defined and overlapping 
borders. But we might nevertheless be able to capture what marks these out 
from one another with the notion of a “mode of being” (IR: 81), or a “form of life” 
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(Skidelsky, forthcoming). These concepts are meant to circumvent Aristotelian 
essences through admitting plasticity of organic form, yet still account for the 
eidetic continuity we witness across extensive timespans. Rolston makes the 
very same attempt when claiming that “[a] species is a coherent, ongoing form 
of life”, which nevertheless “reforms itself […] and sometimes passes over to a 
new species” (1989: 200, 202). And because of this degree of continuity we can 
say that there is a limited sense in which species have goods. The good of a 
horse of the present day will no doubt differ by degree from the goods of its 
ancestral species, insofar as these species are a different mode of being having 
a different organismic constitution. But the good of the present-day horse surely 
is the same as those of its more recent predecessors, and perhaps even the 
same good as those of the horses depicted on the walls of the Chauvet-Pont-
d’Arc Cave some 30,000 years ago.  
This alternative is only a tentative suggestion, which I shall attempt to 
refine later. For our immediate purposes we may note that this ontological 
quandary is probably why the notion of species-valuation remained 
undeveloped in Jonas’ writings, at least compared to the “hard order of ecology” 
(IR: 137), which I turn to now. 
(β) The Biosphere 
 As stated, Jonas’ greater concern is with the biosphere, references to 
which are scattered throughout his work from the late 1960s onwards, and 
which features prominently in The Imperative (6-8; 136-140). The biosphere has 
a conceptual advantage over the notion of a species as it is rather more easily 
identifiable: it is the totality of all living things on planet Earth and the relations 
between them. This is not to say, of course, that there are no vital connections 
between the biosphere and non-living entities such as the atmosphere, or extra-
terrestrial beings like the Sun, upon both of which the biosphere’s existence is 
dependent. But the boundaries of the biosphere itself are clear, and – helpfully 
for our purposes – as a collective it is axiologically comprehensive, referring to 
all known beings capable of valuing. 
Of critical importance is that Jonas refutes the “‘Aristotelian’ idea of a 
safe teleology of ‘Nature’ (physis) as a whole that attends to itself and 
automatically ensures the harmonizing of the many purposes into one” (138). In 
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other words, just as we are forced to abandon the notion of the eidos of a 
species as anachronistic, so too are we led to the conclusion that there is no 
permanence or harmony to the biosphere. Rather:  
[E]ncroaching on other life is eo ipso given with belonging to the kingdom 
of life, as each kind lives on others or codetermines their environment, 
and therefore bare, natural self-preservation of each means perpetual 
interference with the rest of life’s balance. […] The sum total of these 
mutually limiting interferences, always involving destruction in the 
particulars, is on the whole symbiotic but not static, with those comings, 
goings, and stayings known to us from the dynamics of prehuman 
evolution. (137) 
Most radically of all, the entire biosphere’s symbiosis is disrupted with the 
advent of modern technological civilisation, itself, through us, a part of nature. 
This is conceptually problematic since it suggests no grounds for the kind of 
extrinsic valuing identified in the individual organism, which, in contrast, acts in 
pursuit of continued existence and thus posits itself as valuable. As Jonas 
memorably puts it: “Nature could not have incurred a greater hazard than to 
produce man” (138).  
Where, then, does non-instrumental value fit in this picture of an 
antagonistic and self-imperiling biosphere? Jonas points toward an answer in 
that the interaction of living beings comprising the biosphere, though often 
hostile for those individual valuers, is nevertheless the framework which allows 
valuing beings to exist. This constitutes one of life’s basic tensions: some 
individual organisms’ ends will be subordinate to the “more comprehensive 
ends of the biosystem” in order for life as a whole to flourish (235). Taking 
Jonas’ invocation of ends here as literal, we can once again flesh out his 
thinking by comparing it to that of Rolston. In this instance the relevant concept 
is that of “systemic value” (1988: 188) applied to the biosphere as a whole. 
Rolston defines systemic value as a “productive process; its products are 
intrinsic values woven into instrumental relationships” (ibid.). In producing 
valuing beings and their inter-relationships – however antagonistic these may 
be – the biosphere appears to perpetuate its own existence, presupposing this 
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as extrinsically valuable to it. As such, the system itself would also be 
intrinsically valuable.  
However, this firstly raises a moral worry regarding the subordination of 
the individual to the collective. Rolston says “[t]he objective, systemic process is 
an overriding value, not because it is indifferent to individuals but because the 
process is both prior to and productive of individuality” (191, emphasis added). 
The quote appears to preempt and counter the charge of eco-fascism, or at the 
very least accusations of “a detached indifference to individual welfare” 
(Callicott, 1984: 303). This is a genuine concern for the simple reason that 
attributing intrinsic value to a system like the biosphere, which requires death 
and a fortiori suffering to function, entails that organisms otherwise deemed to 
have a good of their own are subsidiary to the greater good. Rolston essentially 
admits as much when he says that “[s]ubjective self-satisfactions are, and ought 
to be, sufficiently contained within the objectively satisfactory system” (1988: 
191, emphasis added). The descriptive claim seems justified, but the normative 
claim less so. Jonas, too, has no qualms about endorsing such a position: 
rejecting a “sentimental” approach to the interdependencies of the biosphere, 
he claims “[i]n simple words: to eat and be eaten is the principle of existence” 
(IR: 137). Again, even if we accept this principle as factually necessary, the 
attribution of intrinsic value to it makes us decidedly uneasy. 
 This concern aside, perhaps the most pressing problem with the notion 
of systemic value is whether or not it is actually a meaningful concept. 
Apparently without realising it, Jonas’ work on the organism undermines the 
idea. The reason is that, in contrast to even the lowly amoeba, the biosphere is 
not itself a purposeful being but only a collective of such beings. Put another 
way: unlike an organism, the form of the biosphere is not autopoietic, organising 
its parts, but is rather reducible to its parts. It is true that some ecologists have 
attempted to interpret the biosphere as autopoietic: James Lovelock’s Gaia 
hypothesis, for instance, conceives of the Earth as a complex, self-regulating 
system of interactions, forming a ‘super-organism’ of individual organisms in 
much the same way as an individual organism is formed of cells (2006). 
However, this likeness appears to be merely formal. Although an organism 
consists of cells, the arrangement of these is the work of the organism as an 
immanently teleological unit – in Jonas’ words, “the membership of elements in 
[114] 
 
an organism is an achievement of the latter for its sake” (OF II: 33). This 
accounts for the high degree of formal cohesion among parts, standing in stark 
contrast to the largely autonomous organisms comprising the biosphere, which 
are not ordered by the Earth, and do not act for its good but their own (and of 
course, the Earth’s non-living components do not act purposefully at all). 
This raises the question of whether any good of its own can be attributed 
to the biosphere which is not simply an aggregate of those of its component 
parts. Rolston certainly thinks it can, telling us: “[t]he value in this system is not 
just the sum of the part values” (1988: 188). But given that the biosphere is only 
a collective it is hard to see how this can be. The good of a family, or a nation, 
or any other social group, is a common good formed of an aggregate of its 
individual components’ goods. We cannot say that there is some sort of greater, 
hypostasised good belonging to the group itself, and the same is true of the 
biosphere. Elsewhere Rolston refines his position by conceding that “[n]othing 
matters to Earth, perhaps, but everything matters on Earth, for Earth” (1994: 
28). But this amounts to an admission that the Earth has no good of its own, 
and consequently no intrinsic value. The biosphere can only be instrumentally 
good for its component valuing beings, as Robin Attfield remarks:  
Certainly everything which is of [intrinsic] value (and located anywhere 
near our planet) is located in the biosphere, and the systems of the 
biosphere are necessary for the preservation of all these creatures. But 
that does not give the biosphere or its systems intrinsic value. Rather it 
shows them to have instrumental value, since what is of value in its own 
right is causally dependent on them. (1991: 159) 
This seems to me unanswerable. Accordingly, an account of the systemic good 
of the biosphere, based on what Jonas referred to as its ‘ends’, is indefensible. 
  This cursory look at two different types of good hinted at in Jonas’ work, 
and elaborated upon via Taylor and Rolston’s comparable theories – a species-
relative merit and the systemic value of the biosphere – has led to something of 
a dead-end. The former, attributing merit to an individual with reference to the 
collective good of its kind, makes logical sense but seems to lack an ontological 
foundation. However counterintuitive, establishing the reality of species as 
natural rather than conventional, which would be the condition of possibility for a 
[115] 
 
‘good of its kind’, proves problematic. Conversely, the reality of the biosphere is 
uncontroversial: there are indeed living beings on planet Earth which impact 
upon one another, the sum total of which can be called the ‘biosphere’. This, 
however, is a mere collective rather than an immanently teleological system, 
and so, lacking ends, one cannot attribute valuation and therefore intrinsic value 
to it. 
IV. From Goods to the Good 
Through the negative conclusions of the previous section we have arrived at a 
concrete axiological position: namely, a biogenic rather than ‘ecogenic’, or 
holistic, theory of the origin of value. This is enough to refute the nihilistic 
doctrine that humanity is alone in an uncaring world with its projected meanings. 
Rather, humans are situated atop the scale of living beings which all share in 
the condition of valuing continued existence, and thereby possess intrinsic 
value. As Jonas succinctly puts it, “Nature harbors values because it harbors 
ends and is thus anything but value-free” (IR: 78). However, the demonstration 
of this does not represent a victory over nihilism – as Jonas notes, “no 
obligation can be derived” from the discovery of values in nature, which “seem 
to enjoy no other dignity than that of mere facts” (79). Any ethic appropriate to 
technological civilisation built on this basis cannot, therefore, be regarded as 
binding.  
To overcome this limitation Jonas attempts to demonstrate the objectivity 
of his axiological findings. Unfortunately his attempt to do so – though admirably 
bold – is probably the philosophically weakest aspect of his system. Jonas 
freely confesses to running “head-on against the stone wall of two of the most 
firmly entrenched dogmas of our time: that there is no metaphysical truth, and 
that no ‘ought’ can be derived from ‘being’” (OG: 51). He commendably 
“refuse[s] to be intimidated by either” (ibid.), but this has predictably exposed 
him to criticism, in particular from his German interlocutors. Karl-Otto Apel, for 
example, claims that Jonas “reaches back behind Kant” in his argumentation, 
reverting “to a religio-metaphysical belief that is incapable of a rational 
foundation” (1996: 225, 219). Similarly, Ullrich Melle claims that he “falls back 
on a pre-transcendental, objectivist metaphysics”, although he concedes that 
this recourse “is not completely uncritical, i.e., dogmatic [...] since Jonas does 
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not claim ultimate justification or absolute truth for it” (1998: 340-341). Perhaps 
most straightforwardly, Wolfgang Kuhlmann laments Jonas’ “unsuccessful 
philosophical foundation of the proposed basic norms” (1994: 282).56 We shall 
see that although there is truth in these accusations, Jonas’ movement from 
goods to the good is not without merit. 
Somewhat polemically, Jonas observes that both the prohibition of 
metaphysics and the truth of the fact-value distinction have today “almost 
attained the status of articles of faith” (MM: 192). He is right, however, to note 
that both can and should be freely challenged; no philosophical theory is 
beyond reproach. Having accounted in the previous chapter for the validity and 
necessity of Jonas’ integral monism as an alternative to the dominant scientific 
materialism, I take him to be on strong ground here. The second of Jonas’ 
philosophical faux pas is his rejection of the is-ought gap: Hume’s observation 
that a normative conclusion does not logically follow from a statement regarding 
the way the world is. The famous passage from A Treatise on Human Nature is 
worth quoting in full:  
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, [...] I am 
surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, 
and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, 
or an ought not. [...] For as this ought, or ought not expresses some new 
relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and 
explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what 
seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a 
deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. (1969: 521) 
In order to overcome this problem one must provide an incontrovertible 
normative principle which can mediate the is- and the ought-statements. In his 
attempt to do so, however, Jonas falls short. 
His answer to Hume comes in two stages. The first relies for its 
persuasive force on the concept, discussed in the previous chapter, which I 
have called the nisus of Being – namely, its tendency towards greater 
complexity – a speculation which alone can explain why evolution is not merely 
                                                          
56 It should be noted that Kuhlmann is sympathetic to both Jonas’ pre-theoretical moral intuitions 
and his ethic of responsibility (300) – he just does not accept that the former can objectively 
demonstrate the latter. 
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change, but also an advance. Jonas suggests that the biosphere has an 
instrumental value in systemically sustaining the accomplishments of Being’s 
nisus – life itself – as becomes clear in the following quotation: 
Great is the power of tigers and elephants, greater that of termites and 
locusts, greater still that of bacteria and viruses. But it is blind and unfree, 
although driven by purpose; and it finds its natural boundary in the 
counterplay of all the other forces which carry on the natural purpose just 
as blindly and choicelessly and in the process hold the manifold whole in 
symbiotic equilibrium. It can be said that here the natural purpose is 
administered severely but well, that is, the intrinsic task of being fulfils 
itself automatically. (IR: 129, emphasis added) 
Jonas here refers to a ‘task’ and ‘purpose’ of Being, thereby lending the notion 
of nisus a fully teleological aspect which, properly understood as tendency, it 
does not possess. As such, we can only make sense of the quotation by 
assuming that he is speaking figuratively. But the key point to grasp is that life 
as such, preserved in being by the biosphere, is an accomplishment – one 
unforeseen and by no means inevitable – of the nisus of Being. 
 What has this to do with the refutation of Hume’s Law? It is intended as 
the ultimate metaphysical refutation of the doctrine that nature does not care 
one way or the other, that what-is has no regard for what-should-be. For if 
Jonas is correct, through nisus we have a ‘preference’ for the manifestation of 
life and inwardness in Being over their remaining silent, and it is here that the 
deepest axiological vein can be located. In the pivotal passage of The 
Imperative, Jonas argues that “[i]n purposiveness as such […] we can see a 
fundamental self-affirmation of [B]eing, which posits it absolutely as the better 
over against non[B]eing. In every purpose [B]eing declares itself for itself and 
against nothingness” (81). Elsewhere Jonas articulates the idea as follows: “life 
says ‘yes’ to itself […] which ever reasserts the value of Being against its 
lapsing into nothingness” (MM: 91). In either formulation the crucial point is that 
Being as such is not axiologically neutral. On the contrary, having given rise to 
life – which “is its own purpose, i.e., an end actively willing itself and pursuing 
itself” (173) – Being, that which is, declares what ought to be. In this way Jonas 
hopes to close the is-ought gap.   
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  Assuming one finds Jonas’ speculative arguments for the nisus of Being 
persuasive, we have here a powerful axiological challenge to modern nihilism. 
Nevertheless, by itself it is insufficient for the express purpose of overcoming 
the fact-value distinction. As Jonas himself concedes, it does not logically follow 
from that the fact that Being says ‘yes’ to itself that it is objectively good; “it can 
always be doubted whether this whole toilsome and terrible drama is worth the 
trouble” (IR: 49). To this end, and constituting the second step in his response 
to Hume, Jonas rather disappointingly falls back on an argument from intuition: 
he claims as “axiomatic” and grasped “with intuitive certainty” that “the mere 
capacity to have any purposes at all [is] a good-in-itself” (80). Obviously the 
veracity of this intuition, even if universally shared, cannot be simply assumed – 
hence the scorn Jonas drew from his German critics. In his defense he does 
offer a justification of sorts: that the denial of this axiom is paradoxical, since it 
would betray a value-preference for the non-existence of values. Jonas 
wonders whether this makes his axiom an analytical statement, but admits that 
he is “not certain” that it does, only that “there is plainly no going back behind it 
for something more basic to underpin it” (ibid.).57 One might add that although a 
value-preference for the non-existence of values may well be logically 
contradictory, it makes perfect emotional sense: this is, after all, precisely the 
sentiment underpinning what Nietzsche identified as the ‘passive nihilism’ of 
Buddhism and Schopenhauer’s philosophy.  
After what Gerald McKenny calls Jonas’ “herculean labors” (1997: 62) to 
identify an objective value, the fact he concludes his ontological grounding for 
goodness with an argument from intuition is somewhat anticlimactic. Although 
we are able to describe the individual organism as intrinsically good courtesy of 
its telos, and even life as such as an end-in-itself based on the nisus of Being, 
we cannot prove that either is really, objectively good: the sceptic will always 
note in response that these are only subjective facts, and that no binding ‘ought’ 
can be derived therefrom. To his credit, Jonas subsequently admitted as much, 
noting that “[t]he validity of such intuition can, however, be debated; indeed, any 
                                                          
57 Vittorio Hösle has defended this aspect of Jonas’ ethics from the position of discourse ethics, 
arguing that what Jonas has identified here is a transcendental limit of reason. Hösle suggests 
that Jonas’ axiom “could be grounded with the transcendental-pragmatic reflection that 
arguments themselves have a teleological structure which is already presupposed when we try 
to deny it” (2001: 44). Jonas does not pursue this line, however, presumably because he is 
wedded to an unashamedly metaphysical ontology and axiology. And, as will become apparent, 
I shall offer an alternative metaethical solution. 
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individual can deny having it” (MM: 107). This is where Jonas’ critics are 
correct: he ultimately fails to defeat nihilism by accounting for an objective good.  
V. Moral Traditions 
There are, however, ways to account for the force of the intuition Jonas cites. 
Although these alternatives concede any claim to objectivity, they nevertheless 
allow us to shore up his theory. Lawrence Vogel suggests a “Humean story that 
would build on feelings,” which might not have “the systematic force of Jonas’ 
cosmic deontology, but it may be more concrete and genuinely persuasive” 
(1995: 38). In that very spirit, Theresa Morris argues that Jonas’ position can be 
defended as “full knowledge and [teleological] understanding of the natural 
world and the place of the human within it will often lead naturally to a 
recognition of value, and a response that includes obligation” (2013: 117). 
Clearly, this ‘often’ is not a ‘must’, and so represents a subjectivist adaptation of 
Jonas’ original position. 
After writing The Imperative, Jonas himself conceded that a “combination 
of biologism and subjectivism”, as advocated by Morris, “cannot really be 
refuted” (MM: 108). That said, we may be able to go further and explain why a 
recognition of value is liable to bring with it a sense of moral obligation. The 
answer, I suggest, is that we are not only organismic but also symbolic beings, 
belonging to a particular historical and moral tradition that we might call the 
Greco-Roman-Judeo-Christian West. I will now pursue this line, which typically 
goes by the name of relativism, as an alternative to both Morris and Vogel’s 
subjectivism and Jonas’ original objectivist attempt. Moral relativism is not, I 
suspect, a position Jonas would have happily endorsed, but it allows us to 
resolve the present issue consistently with his wider thought. 
(α) Hermeneutics and Finitude 
We saw in the previous chapter that human beings not only have a world 
shaped by our organismic being, but also a cultural world courtesy of our 
symbolic being, and which is to a great extent intertwined with the former. 
Although non-human life expresses itself through movement and certain 
functions, some of which are intelligible to us, in human life “this whole natural 
groundwork is overlaid with system upon system of invented, constructed, and 
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freely manipulated expressions and symbols, culminating in speech and 
imagery” (PE: 249). Bodily expression remains one way in which humans 
communicate, but language is our foremost means of understanding one 
another. This is particularly true of understanding the record of the past, which 
is itself evidently not physically present:  
The word is […] the eminently ‘historical’ above the substructure of the 
ever-repeated themes of the species. Through the agency of the word 
history produces itself; in its medium, it expresses itself; with its record, 
historical understanding has to deal first and last. (257) 
In this way Jonas seeks to explain how language allows for much 
understanding, at the same time as accounting for a “subhistoric” and pre-
linguistic “biological dimension which we tacitly presuppose” in understanding 
all life (253). Although we cannot always be sure of having arrived at an 
accurate (let alone complete) understanding of other human beings, as human 
beings we nevertheless share a common ground which allows for 
understanding to take place. And of course, with effort we are able to come to a 
better understanding of one another, particularly among contemporaries with 
whom we can participate in immediate dialogue (hence why Plato elevated 
speech above writing). 
However, in stressing the possibility of shared understanding across 
history and culture Jonas arguably overstates the extent to which this occurs. 
One might say that he does not offer a full account of our hermeneutic situation, 
which also includes what is particular to historical traditions and inaccessible to 
pre-cultural and ‘sub-historic’ understanding. One such phenomenon, I will 
argue, is ethical judgement. To begin to make sense of this claim we can turn 
back to Heidegger, and in particular Gadamer, for further explanation of our 
historicity. For Heidegger, our existing in a historical moment and for a limited 
duration conditioned the “fore-structure” of Dasein’s being-in-the-world (2010a: 
146-147). This was the hermeneutic consequence of our thrownness: that we 
cannot but understand according to the context in which we happen to exist. 
Even if this picture is exaggerated – as Jonas shows with reference to the 
understanding of life inherent to corporeal being – it is nevertheless instructive 
regarding the cultural world we inhabit as symbolic beings.  
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Gadamer, even more so than Heidegger, brought this line of thinking to 
fruition. Central to Gadamer’s ‘philosophical hermeneutics’ are the concepts of 
tradition and horizon, which together illuminate our historical finitude. The 
general hermeneutic method begins by looking beyond our immediate 
circumstances to the historical, cultural, and linguistic context in which 
consciousness is situated. To do this is to acquire what Gadamer calls 
“historical consciousness” (2004: 303) of living within a tradition – where this 
term denotes not something local or institutional, but rather something like ‘the 
Western tradition’. This temporal and cross-cultural perspective is the condition 
of possibility for historical and anthropological enquiry, but for a hermeneutical 
theory it is insufficient. For what is essential, yet goes unacknowledged in 
historical consciousness, is that understanding not only occurs from a particular 
time and place, but is largely relative to that time and place. Recognition of this, 
which Gadamer calls “historically effected consciousness 
(wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein)” (301), transforms our self-
understanding. We now realise that to understand historically or 
anthropologically is not to lever consciousness out of one historical-cultural 
tradition and into another. It is, on the contrary, to recognise that this is an 
illusory goal and that all understanding must in fact take place from a given 
standpoint.  
Historically-effected consciousness is not hermetically sealed in a place 
and time, however – clearly, we do interpret entities which originate from 
outside our linguistic, cultural, and historical context. It is because of this 
openness that Gadamer characterises consciousness as a “horizon” (ibid.), and 
the bringing together of two different historically- or culturally-situated beings a 
“fusion of horizons” (305). This notion can be better understood by considering 
a real-life example. For clarity’s sake we can imagine a Western anthropologist 
undertaking ethnographic research of an island society. Philosophical 
hermeneutics can help us see how the anthropologist understands the 
behaviour of the islanders to whose culture they do not belong. Habermas 
describes the central structures of difference which must be transcended in 
order for understanding to take place: 
Each of the partners between whom communication must be established 
[…] lives within a horizon. […] This is true both for the vertical plane, on 
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which we overcome a historical distance through understanding, as well 
as for the process of understanding on a horizontal plane, which 
mediates a linguistic difference that is geographical or cultural. (1988: 
151) 
The example of the anthropologist and islanders is a horizontal – that is, 
geographic and cultural – rather than a vertical, or historical, act of 
interpretation. But either makes the encounter a hermeneutic challenge: the 
greater the historical or cultural distance, the greater the obstacle to achieving a 
fusion of horizons.  
Recognition of these difficulties does not make Gadamer’s theory 
solipsistic. The fact that a fusion of horizons can take place entails that both 
parties have a shared ground which allows for a bridging of horizontal and 
vertical differences. But what is this shared ground? Gadamer argues that it is 
language. Have been thrown into being, we belong to a particular linguistic 
tradition and have no choice in the matter; that English is my mother tongue is 
as much a part of my facticity as my being born male and toward the end of the 
twentieth century. The language we use governs much of our lives – inside and 
out, in thought and in action – hence we not only possess a language, but are at 
the same time possessed by it. Gadamer goes so far as to claim that language 
“operates in all understanding” (1976: 29), and is “the universal medium in 
which understanding occurs” (2004: 390). Even if this is not entirely true, as 
Jonas showed with regards to corporeal understanding, what is true is that our 
symbolic being accounts for the vast majority of what can be expressed and 
understood. Just as what we do cannot be understood without reference to the 
body that we are, what we say and think is made possible by the language we 
are delivered over to. Together these constitute the horizon of our 
understanding, and therefore the conjoining of Gadamer and Jonas’ 
hermeneutics allows us to acquire a fuller picture of our historicity. 
(β) Sentiment and Custom 
What has any of this to do with the question of the goodness of Being, 
which motivated our turn to hermeneutics? The answer is that an understanding 
of historicity allows us to explain why the existence of value is liable to strike us 
as objectively valuable. The connecting thread is that our thrownness into 
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being, including the taking up of a historico-linguistic tradition, determines what 
is ethical for us. In other words, our horizon of understanding is also a moral 
horizon. This is compatible, I would argue, with Jonas’ philosophical 
anthropology, which stresses humanity’s moral being as a formal aspect of our 
transcendence but does not presuppose a universal moral content. Specific 
moral injunctions are instead accounted for by the tradition into which we are 
thrown – even if the capacity for morality itself belongs to that which is thrown. 
We shall explore this idea through an engagement with the work of Alasdair 
MacIntyre, which is, by his own admission, heavily indebted to Gadamer (1976; 
2002). On this basis we may, I believe, improve Jonas’ theory. 
MacIntyre’s seminal text, After Virtue (2007), is a critique of Western 
moral thinking from the Enlightenment onwards and a call to return to a prior, 
erroneously discredited, form of ethics. In short, MacIntyre’s diagnosis is this: 
our historical moment is characterised by conflicting moral discourses and 
prescriptions, such that confusion reigns over what constitutes right action both 
individually and collectively (2). Following the death of God we lack any divine 
authority by which to appeal when contemplating right and wrong. This has a 
philosophical reflection in the theory of emotivism: that statements regarding 
what is good and bad have no factual content, but are instead expressions of 
subjective emotional states, which may, or may not, lead to consensus (21). We 
might add that Heidegger’s existentialism – according to which Dasein must 
make commitments but without any normative guidance in doing so – is another 
reflection of the same predicament. Do we, in a given situation, prioritise 
consequences and attempt to maximise utility, or do we rather adhere strictly to 
principles? Are our claims to moral rights founded on what universally benefits 
us, or do they rather accord with the dignity that belongs to us as rational 
beings? There are no categorical answers to these questions because, as 
Nietzsche most forcibly showed in his devastating analyses of modern ethics, 
neither Kantianism nor utilitarianism can compensate for the death of God.  
Worse, this is not a matter of individual failure on the parts of Kant, 
Hume, or Mill, as though we simply require a yet-greater philosopher to correct 
their mistakes (which is in fact the pretence of much academic philosophy). 
Rather, according to MacIntyre, the ‘Enlightenment project’ of philosophers 
attempting to rationally justify right and wrong had to fail “because of certain 
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shared characteristics deriving from their highly specific shared historical 
background” (51). What is that background? It is, once again, the anti-
Aristotelian turn taken by the West in the seventeenth century. The scientific 
revolution led to an “elimination of any notion of essential human nature and 
with it the abandonment of any notion of a telos” toward which ethics, as it had 
been previously understood, was orientated (55). The destruction of a 
conception of humanity-as-it-should-be – eudaimonia for Aristotle, beatitude for 
Aquinas – left in its wake “a moral scheme composed of two remaining 
elements whose relationship becomes quite unclear” (ibid.). These two 
elements are, on the one hand, “a certain content for morality” belonging to the 
Greco-Roman-Judeo-Christian tradition, and, on the other hand, “a certain view 
of untutored-human-nature-as-it-is” (ibid.). As the original purpose of our moral 
injunctions was to help realise humanity as it should be, these “are clearly not 
going to be such that they could be deduced from true statements about human 
nature”, which was precisely what the Enlightenment moral philosophers had 
attempted to do: Kant from the perspective of reason, Hume from the passions 
(54). All subsequent attempts to rationally account for a specific moral content – 
and Kant’s has not yet been matched for philosophical brilliance – were doomed 
to fall victim to the same problem, as it belongs not to the individuals concerned 
but rather their historical situation. 
Our moral beliefs are instead best accounted for as a combination of 
sentiment and custom. This is to say that morality originates in emotions rather 
than reason, and that its content is largely shaped by the tradition to which we 
belong. Taking the former first, Hume was right: whatever we approve or 
disapprove of, find just or unjust, think admirable or despicable, ultimately 
cannot be demonstrated to objectively hold these properties. They are rather 
qualities projected onto the phenomena by moral beings. As we have seen, 
Jonas’ philosophy ultimately encounters this problem: at the most abstract level 
he rationally demonstrates the existence of subjective values in living beings, 
but cannot, in the end, demonstrate the objective value of values, leaving us 
with an argument from intuition. Nevertheless, the latter has a strong persuasive 
force, and this is due to the sentimental appeal that reasons can conjure. Hume 
was again correct to observe that “reason is perfectly inert, and can never either 
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produce or prevent any action” (1969: 509). But it may alert us to something 
emotionally compelling, leading us to act accordingly.  
Hume was incorrect, however, to suppose that what “constitutes virtue or 
happiness and vice or misery” – i.e., a specific account of what is good – 
“depends on some internal sense or feeling which nature has made universal in 
the whole species” (1975: 169). Here he conforms to the Enlightenment attempt 
to think outside of the hermeneutic standpoint of tradition which is in fact 
presupposed. As Gadamer showed us, our horizon of understanding is in fact 
constituted in large part by the tradition into which we are thrown, such that the 
fore-structure, or ‘prejudices’, with which we are endowed allows us to 
understand symbolic existence at all. Hume unfortunately exemplifies “the 
fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment”, which is “the prejudice against 
prejudice itself” (2004: 273) – hence the negative connotations attached to the 
word today. Proper recognition of the fore-structure of understanding, however, 
reveals these prejudices to be neither arbitrary nor necessarily pernicious – 
although if left unexamined they certainly can become that – but rather the 
basis for any understanding of others at all.  
Hume was closer to the mark when speculating in the Treatise that at 
least much of what we deem virtuous “arises from the circumstances and 
necessity of mankind” (1969: 529) – provided, that is, we take him to mean that 
the virtues follow from our social and historical being. For as we have seen, the 
collective pre-exists the individual who inherits the tradition in question, and the 
significance of this fact is precisely that moral beliefs are neither universal nor 
subjective, by formed by custom. The emotions we feel and aesthetic 
judgements (in the broad sense) that we make of phenomena are highly 
contextualised: even if all human beings feel displeasure at intense physical 
pain, this subjective valuation has different moral significance according to 
different traditions. If the Buddhist tradition adheres to universal compassion for 
the suffering of others, it is fair to say that the pre-Christian Nordic peoples did 
not. As emotion is ultimately the ground of morality, what is regarded as good, 
right, and just varies – to a greater or lesser extent – depending on the 
traditions in question. Moreover, there can be no correct answer independent of 
tradition: as we have seen, the symbolic rather than corporeal dimension of our 
hermeneutic situation, to which judgements of right and wrong belong, is 
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defined by the tradition into which we have been thrown. Hence Gadamer 
concludes that “[t]he real force of morals […] is based on tradition”, this being 
“the ground of their validity” (2004: 282). In our case that moral tradition is 
largely Judeo-Christian (with some remaining elements of Greco-Roman and 
other pagan virtues), and it is on this basis that we find Jonas’ claim for the 
intuitive certainty of the objective value of values persuasive. The combination 
of a teleological understanding of life and the demonstration of axiological 
consequences is liable to bring with it a normative conclusion – that the 
existence of subjective goods represents an objective good – because of the 
ethical tradition into which we are thrown. 
VI. Post-Modern Virtue Ethics 
Sentiment and custom, rather than reason, may account for moral beliefs, but 
evidently neither are immune to rational contestation: the sceptic can always 
deviate from their moral tradition because it is, as Gadamer says, “freely taken 
over” (ibid.). Indeed, a great part of the history of ethics has consisted of the 
constructive questioning of tradition: we need only name Jesus, the Buddha, 
Socrates, or – exemplifying destructive questioning – Nietzsche. Even if it is 
socially and psychologically hard to actually live by such a deviation (it being no 
coincidence that two of these figures were put to death and the others self-
imposed exiles), it is very much possible to intellectually do so. The reason for 
this is, as Habermas notes, that questioning the tradition one belongs to breaks 
its “quasi-natural” status: even if its content is subsequently accepted, one’s 
relation to it is altered through the act of contestation (1988: 168). Here the 
freedom of our reason and the finitude of our thrownness are in productive 
tension, allowing for a tradition to change. 
Where, then, do we go from here? Ought we, with Nietzsche, declare our 
ethical tradition to be nothing more than a manifestation of the will-to-power 
perversely turned against itself? MacIntyre suggests that this would be the 
intellectually honest conclusion if, and only if, the original anti-Aristotelian turn 
taken in the seventeenth century were valid – for, as we recall from the 
Introduction, it was this epochal event which paved the way for modern nihilism. 
Hence the reverse is equally true: if “Aristotle’s position in ethics and politics – 
or something very like it – could be sustained, the whole Nietzschean enterprise 
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would be pointless” (2007: 117). And on the basis of our previous findings we 
may say that core aspects of modernity’s intellectual revolution are in fact 
mistaken. In spite of what scientific materialism claims, all living beings are 
immanently teleological both in their activity and self-organisation, and Being 
itself has a tendency toward life which we have here called its nisus. These 
findings represent a radical break with modern ontology, with similar 
consequences in axiology, as demonstrated in the present chapter.  
The first question is whether this revived teleology can fulfil the role that 
MacIntyre believes it occupied in pre-modern moral systems: namely, providing 
an essential standard by which to orient ethical action, both individually and 
collectively. It must be admitted that the kind of teleology we have rehabilitated 
– immanent rather than transcendent – cannot do so. Just as a Christian virtue 
ethics is unsustainable after the death of God, so too is an orthodox Aristotelian 
virtue ethics after Darwin. We have already seen in this very chapter that the 
idea of species as fixed and determinate, allowing for standards by which to 
judge each member, has to be abandoned. Unfortunately this was precisely the 
form that Aristotle’s ethics took: according to that schema, the human species 
has a rationally discoverable essence which provides the telos for individuals 
and collectives to aim toward. MacIntyre recognises this problem, and admits 
that Aristotle’s “metaphysical biology” has to be supplanted (196). The question 
now is whether ‘something like’ Aristotle’s ethics can be revived regardless. 
MacIntyre shows that it can, and his proposed alternative is two-fold: the good 
as it manifests in our symbolic being, and the good pertaining to organismic 
being. 
(α) The Good in Symbolic Being 
MacIntyre’s method in After Virtue is to identify virtue in practices 
(understood broadly) which are shaped by a tradition. The basic idea is that our 
thrownness into social existence involves participating in practices which 
possess “internal goods” (191). The virtues are the qualities which allow us to 
achieve these goods, and the vices those traits which hinder our achieving them 
(ibid.). The task of practical wisdom is then to reconcile the competing 
obligations of practices in a single life, as we must: this is our telos.  
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For example, at the most basic level, utterly unchosen, is my having 
been born into a family unit. That I am a son and a brother entails duties 
because the family unit has a good of love, care, and respect, as defined by the 
tradition I belong to. I am free to ignore these obligations, of course, but doing 
so would mark me out as a bad family member, bringing with it the shame of 
others’ judgement (even if a subjective sense of guilt, which also ought to be 
present, is absent). And each family unit is itself to be judged according to the 
most fundamental morals of the tradition: should the adult members fail to 
respect one another or care for the children, then the family has to change 
accordingly. Likewise, that I belong from birth to a particular state brings with it 
certain obligations, which if I ignore make me a bad citizen. These obligations 
once consisted in participation in public life, contributing to the commonweal, 
and defending the integrity of the polis from internal chaos and external threats. 
Today we have recognisable (if much weakened) counterparts to each in voting, 
paying taxes, abiding by the law, and – albeit rarely – military conscription. 
Once again, the state is itself to be judged by the standards of the tradition, 
such that it ought to be just, and should it fail to be so then one’s obligations to it 
are diminished accordingly. One’s obligations to a completely unjust state are 
perhaps reduced to revolutionarily overthrowing the government, or even 
committing to its military defeat, as Jonas exemplified in the case of Nazi 
Germany. 
Such obligations can clearly come into conflict with other practices – 
work, leisure, friendships, romantic relationships, and so on – each of which 
have their own internal goods as defined by a tradition. Even the obligations of 
family and state described above can dramatically compete: Sartre famously 
spoke of a student who, during the Occupation, wanted to know whether he 
should take up arms with the Free French Forces in Britain or stay in France to 
care for his mother (1946: 35-37). Sartre’s response was to tell the student that 
he was condemned to freely choose in the face of competing demands, since 
no moral code could recommend one action over the other. Sartre was correct 
to the extent that the student faced what MacIntyre calls a “tragic confrontation 
of good with good”, but overlooked the fact that “there may be better or worse 
ways” to work through these impasses (2007: 224). The criterion for judging this 
‘better or worse’ is the extent to which one successfully reconciles the virtues in 
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“a life that can be conceived and evaluated as a whole” (205). Acts and their 
goodness can usually only be fully judged in the context of the actor’s life as a 
whole, just as each individual’s life cannot be judged without reference to their 
acts. Thus Sartre’s student may have been bound by conflicting duties – to care 
for his mother and to help liberate his country from tyranny – but like all of us he 
could only live a single life, and the wise choice would be that which helped him 
do so in a balanced way. Had he previously displayed a lack of family loyalty 
(leaving the care of his vulnerable mother to his late brother, say) then 
committing to help her now would go way some way redressing this. 
Conversely, had he until now shown little public spiritedness, then risking his life 
for the liberation of France would be the ultimate way to contribute to the 
common good.58 Thus we can decide, with some guidance, how to live well in 
the face of competing demands. 
Proceeding in this way allows us to revive a relativist virtue ethics.59 
MacIntyre’s theory does not overcome nihilism in the way Jonas would like, 
therefore, but it is still able to account for the good beyond mere subjectivity: we 
can identify a moral telos in our living a single life and belonging to a tradition, a 
tradition that, as we have seen, supports Jonas’ claim for the objective value of 
values as intuitively valid. In so doing we once again refute in part the anti-
Aristotelian turn of modernity, arriving at a ‘post-modern’ virtue ethics in much 
the same way as we developed a post-modern ontology in the previous chapter.  
Thus far, however, these two domains are only distantly linked: the 
connecting thread is that our moral tradition explains why the recognition of 
living beings as teleological – and thus possessors of subjective value – is liable 
to strike us as objectively valuable. In other words, ontology and ethics are 
bridged by the symbolic realm, in the form of a tradition, rather than being 
rooted in the strictly organismic dimension of our being. This is valid as far as it 
                                                          
58 And had his life until now been characterised by a perfect balance of commitments to his 
mother and his country, then his future self would have to act as guarantor, repaying the debt to 
whichever he chose against in the moment of decision. Set out in this way there is still no 
simple answer: it would be easier to care for his mother after the War than to repay an 
unspecified duty to his country, but only if they both survived the Occupation, which is precisely 
what the other course of action makes doubtful. 
59 MacIntyre staunchly denies that he is a relativist (2007: xii), highly implausibly, in my opinion, 
since on the very next page he reaffirms that “there are no neutral standards available by 
appeal to which any rational agent whatsoever could determine which tradition is superior to 
which” (xiii). Perhaps, if we are being charitable, we could say that MacIntrye’s philosophy is 




goes, but not entirely in keeping with the spirit of Jonas’ thought which has 
much more to say about our corporeality than our historicity. More pressingly, it 
does not allow us to say what constitutes the good of a life which is not 
symbolic, as in the case of plants and most animals. It would seem apt, 
therefore, to tie Jonas’ neo-Aristotelian ontology closer to the neo-Aristotelian 
ethics I have sketched out here. I propose to do so through an engagement with 
the second way in which MacIntyre rehabilitates virtue ethics: namely, 
connecting the good to the demands of organismic being, taking the human 
condition as an example. 
(β) The Good in Organismic Being 
 In Dependent Rational Animals, MacIntyre’s other critical text, he seeks 
to demonstrate that what is good for us, and the virtues which help us realise 
this good, are rooted in our biological constitution. Now, we have already 
stressed above that invoking a species norm is ontologically problematic. The 
issue, to reiterate, is that species lack the determinate essence Aristotle 
supposed them to have, which allowed him to conceive of an individual 
specimen as a good or bad of its kind. After Darwin we must acknowledge that 
species are, as Jonas says, merely “relatively stable, and that this stability 
represents only the temporary equilibrium among the forces which generally 
determine the structure as successful” (PL: 50). The upshot is that we cannot 
point to an essence of ‘toad’, for example, in order to objectively judge the 
individual specimen as a good or bad toad, and in the very same way we are 
prevented from appealing to a human essence which would allow us to 
definitively judge individual people as good or bad human beings. Precisely this 
ontological indeterminacy undermines the neo-Aristotelian naturalism of Martha 
Nussbaum (2004), Rosalind Hursthouse (1999), and Philippa Foot (2001) the 
last leaning particularly heavily on the idea of species norms.  
It was for this very reason that MacIntyre set Aristotle’s “metaphysical 
biology” aside in the first place. And yet in Dependent Rational Animals he 
does, at least at times, invoke something similar. He tells us, for instance, that 
what a “plant or animal needs is what it needs to flourish qua member of its 
particular species. And what it needs to flourish is to develop the distinctive 
powers that it possesses qua member of that species” (1999: 64). There is a 
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degree to which thinking in this way is pragmatically indispensable, of course. 
Regarding needs, I can only identify the sustenance I require to survive by 
asking what others like me require. I will look to other humans for proof that, for 
example, I simply cannot survive on wood, and disregard the fact that some 
other living beings, such as termites, can. Therefore we cannot in practice 
identify what is good for me without invoking a minimal account of the kind of 
being that I am. But of course, we would like a far stronger definition of the 
human good than this, and I shall now attempt to provide it. We concluded the 
earlier discussion of species with reference to what Jonas called ‘modes of 
being’, and noted that this existential route might be a less problematic way to 
identify the good of a kind. The challenge is to go beyond our largely formal 
definition – derived from Jonas’ philosophical anthropology – of humanity as the 
definitively symbolic being, but without resorting to an Aristotelian essence. The 
concept which I will use to this end is not human nature, but the human 
condition.  
 For a preliminary definition of the human condition we may turn to 
Hannah Arendt’s magisterial work of that name (1958). Arendt points to four 
kinds of activity – labour, work, action, and thinking (6) – which define a human 
life lived between the poles of natality and mortality (11). Each such life is in 
turn made possible by the Earth: “the very quintessence of the human 
condition” (2). Now, it is true that all living beings labour in Arendt’s sense, that 
they are born, must die, and their doing so is made possible by the Earth. 
Therefore action and thinking aside, which are for her symbolic activities, these 
are not specifically human traits (although to live with an understanding of our 
natality and mortality may qualify as such). We might also add that some 
humans, living in great luxury, are relieved of the necessity of labouring. 
Nevertheless, whatever we would want to call human life, from our most distant 
ancestors to the present day, must surely have existed in a way which 
conformed to these criteria, such that were all humans in a given community to 
cease labouring then human life would quickly end.60 
                                                          
60 This would hold even if mass automation – which Arendt presciently discusses (4) – came to 
pass, as someone, somewhere would still have to tend to the machines which laboured (or 




Now, as we have seen from Jonas’ philosophical anthropology, these 
activities and existential structures cannot be separated from certain physical 
traits, in particular: sight, a high relative brain size, the opposable thumb, and 
upright posture. Again, this holds even if some humans lack some of these 
physical traits: human life only is what it is because of them, and were we to 
collectively lose any of them we would no longer be recognisably human. 
Moreover, because the human condition has its basis in this bodily form, we 
may then make certain claims regarding the qualities of the latter. To this end 
Edward Skidelsky (forthcoming) introduces the idea of capacities – which might 
be intellectual, physical, or even psychological – with given parameters. 
Physical strength, for example, is  
relative to particular forms of life. A strong man suffers nothing by 
comparison with a gorilla, for his is a specifically human strength, 
perfectly adequate to the tasks that humans are called on to perform […]. 
Of course, there is a good deal of cultural and historical variety here. 
Some ways of life demand more in the way of physical strength than 
others. But this is a variety within limits. No human society calls on its 
members to pluck trees out by their roots or to kill buffalo barehanded. 
These are not ‘normal’ human activities. (Ibid.) 
In the same way, it is remarkable for a human being to live for much more than 
a century, whereas a giant tortoise would be expected to do so. Likewise – to 
take a non-physical case – it makes no sense to ask why a duck does not 
evaluate the relative worth of its desires, but regarding human beings an 
inability to do so is unusual. And the baseline and upper limit presupposed in 
each capacity is what allows us to say that someone is strong or weak, old or 
young, wise or foolish, and so on. This definition of the human condition – which 
could admittedly be much further refined – therefore allows for judgements 
about human beings, without, I think, resorting to an unsustainable species 
essentialism.  
What matters for our purposes is that the human condition thus 
understood provides a sufficient ontological foundation for what MacIntyre calls 
“the virtues of acknowledged dependence” (1999: 133). Precisely because 
natality, mortality, and sociality belong to the human condition, because each of 
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us is vulnerable to harm, limited in capacities, and dependent on others, certain 
qualities will help to compensate. In other words, when I acknowledge my 
dependence on others, abandoning the libertarian fantasy of total individualism, 
I see that certain virtues allow me and others like me to flourish. What are these 
virtues? MacIntyre points to just generosity, beneficence, misericordia (mercy), 
hospitality, respect, and demonstrating humanity as the virtues which best do so 
(121-128). It is fairly clear how some of these account for the vulnerabilities of 
the human condition: doing good by others, for example, will help them 
overcome their weaknesses, and hospitality will help alert us to who is in need 
of help. These might at first sound like the virtues of fortunate but magnanimous 
individuals caring for those worse off. But MacIntyre’s point is rather that the 
human condition entails that all of us require such treatment from others, 
regardless of our station in life. Hence the just generosity MacIntyre invokes has 
an inbuilt reciprocity: it is “a generosity that I owe to all those others who also 
owe it to me” (120). Crucially, the end point is not to encourage excessive 
dependency on the good will of others, but to reveal that we are all of us already 
dependent on others for our basic existence, and recognition of this allows for a 
more substantial conception of the human good. 
VII. From Virtue to Responsibility 
Through MacIntyre’s virtue ethics we are able to explain not only why the 
existence of value strikes us as objectively valuable – because we belong to a 
certain moral tradition – but also how this symbolically-derived tradition 
intertwines with a good connected to our very organismic being. For the 
avoidance of misunderstanding it must be stressed that this intertwining, as I 
have called it, is neither proof of the correctness of the good of the moral 
tradition we have inherited or the good of the human condition. For the sceptic 
will, once again, note that the facts of the human condition do not entail that we 
ought to be justly generous, humane, and so on. In other words, it cannot be 
demonstrated that this moral content follows logically from our natality, 
mortality, sociality, and so on. To give an obvious counter-example, the 
Spartans understood the human condition to entail a very different set of virtues 
to ourselves. But what this supplementary theory does allow for is the 
broadening of our theory of moral relativism, from the good of traditions to the 
good of the human condition. Even if the latter only derives substantive content 
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from the perspective of the former – which is why our position remains relativist 
– we can nevertheless develop a richer and more demanding relativism than 
the vulgar sort typically encountered. On this basis – which is rather different to 
the one Jonas envisaged, but still consistent with his wider thought – we turn to 



























Chapter Four: New Dimensions of Responsibility 
I. Old and New Ethics 
One of the debates central to environmental philosophy is whether the 
ecological crisis requires new ethical principles by which to act individually and 
collectively, or whether the necessary ideas are already present, albeit 
supressed, in traditional moral thought. An equivalent question is largely absent 
from Anglophone bioethics, meaning that Jonas’ search for a new ethic 
appropriate to the technological age is best situated in the former area of 
practical philosophy. I shall sketch out the debate and show how Jonas 
contributes to it. 
The starting point was Lynn White Jr’s 1967 article ‘The Historical Roots 
of Our Ecological Crisis’. White argues that “we continue to live, as we have 
lived for about 1700 years, very largely in a context of Christian axioms” and 
that “in its Western form, Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion the 
world has seen” (1967: 1205). White’s justification for the latter claim is that 
firstly, the creation story of Genesis teaches that “no item in the physical 
creation had any purpose save to serve man’s purpose”, and secondly, that 
“[b]y destroying pagan animism Christianity made it possible to exploit nature in 
a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects” (ibid.). He then 
suggests that since Christianity continues to essentially underwrite Western life 
“the remedy must also be essentially religious”, and on that basis he 
recommends that we look to Zen Buddhism and (in particular) Saint Francis of 
Assisi for a corrective: Francis’ belief in the equality of all creatures making him, 
White says, the “greatest spiritual revolutionary in Western history” and a 
potential “patron saint for ecologists” (1207). 
 White acknowledges that his reading of Christianity is sweeping, but 
maintains that Christianity “bears a huge burden of guilt” (1206). His critique 
was subsequently challenged as too strong by J. Baird Callicott, Robin Attfield, 
and John Passmore, all of whom point toward the alternative Biblical tradition of 
stewardship: the idea that “human beings hold the Earth as a trust” for the sake 
of future generations (Attfield, 2014: 21). Attfield argues that White’s reading of 
Genesis is a basic misinterpretation, and that no despotic or anthropocentric 
interpretation of the Old Testament “could be credited at all” (31). He insists that 
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the key (though oft-overlooked) distinction is between dominion and domination, 
where the former implies benign control and the latter exploitation (22). Attfield 
is right to draw our attention to the stewardship interpretation, but it cannot be 
justified with reference to such a questionable semantic distinction, and in any 
case, God’s accompanying command to “subdue” the earth is unequivocal 
(Genesis 1:28). Callicott is able to account for this discrepancy by taking a less 
absolutist line than either White or Attfield, arguing that the conflict between 
despotism and stewardship is actually in the text itself. Drawing on Biblical 
scholarship he notes that Genesis is likely woven together from different 
sources: the Priestly version of creation (comprising Genesis 1-2:4) contains the 
key textual support for the despotic reading, whilst the older Yahwist creation 
myth (Genesis 2:4-4:26) better supports a stewardship interpretation (Callicott, 
1989: 138). Notably, the command to “dress” and “keep” the garden (Genesis 
2:15) implies cultivation and a relation of care, so Callicott is right to say that 
Genesis provides support for both readings and that Christian scripture is 
consequently not entirely hostile to environmental concerns. 
Passmore is closer to Callicott insofar as he holds the message of 
Genesis to be ambiguous (1980: 27-29), but he also advances the debate. In 
contrast to White’s somewhat monolithic history, Passmore argues that the 
ecologically crucial moment in Western history was not Christianisation but 
modernity’s fusion of humanism and the despotic interpretation of Christianity. 
As we have seen, one reading of Genesis could sanction the view that 
everything was made for humanity’s sake, but this alone “did not encourage 
man to undertake the transformation of nature” (17). On the contrary, it could 
just as conceivably sanction quietism. “It is only when coupled with a Pelagian, 
humanistic, attitude to man, which sees him not as essentially corrupt but as 
having the duty to create, by his own efforts, a second nature, […] that it can 
either provoke or be used to justify a scientific-technological revolution” (20). 
Passmore singles out Bacon and Descartes as the foremost exponents of this 
doctrine (19-20) which continues, in a secularised form, to underwrite 
contemporary civilisation. He concludes that Christian metaphysics and ethics 
are not solely to blame for the origin of the ecological crisis: rather, the 
Renaissance fusion of a particular interpretation of that worldview with the 
competing Western tradition of humanism led to the modern belief in “nature as 
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nothing but a system of resources, man’s relationships with which [are] in no 
respect subject to moral censure” (27).  
Finally, Passmore tackles the second of White’s justifications: that 
forgoing animism made environmental exploitation possible, meaning that the 
adoption of Eastern traditions such as Zen might act as a counterweight. 
Passmore notes that “[n]owhere […] is ecological destruction more apparent 
than in today’s Japan, for all its tradition of nature worship” (176), to which we 
might add that in recent decades almost all of Asia, whether traditionally Hindu, 
Islamic, Buddhist, or Taoist, has industrialised in an ecologically destructive 
manner. Passmore suggests that a new ethic, if it is to take hold in the West, 
must draw on alternative currents within that tradition, namely the stewardship 
interpretation of Christianity and the German Idealist notion of perfecting nature 
through co-operation with it (32-40). 
 It is at this point that Jonas may be brought in, since his ideas 
complement Passmore’s and take the debate yet further. As discussed in earlier 
chapters, Jonas shows that the direct origin of the ecological crisis lies in the 
reconceptualisation of nature as matter in modernity, a theoretical revolution 
that stripped Being of teleology and cosmic significance. However, he claims 
that the way was paved to modernity, both metaphysically and morally, by the 
Gnosticism of antiquity. Firstly: 
The created world of Genesis is not a god and is not to be worshipped 
instead of god. […] Jewish monotheism had abolished the deities of 
nature and all intermediary powers, leaving God and world in clean-cut 
division. The Christian hierarchy of angels and saints bridged, not the 
gulf between God and the world, but that between God and the human 
soul, which itself is not of the natural order. (OF I: 17) 
He continues: “[t]hus the idea of a mindless or ‘blind’ nature which yet behaves 
lawfully – that is, which keeps an intelligible order without being intelligent – had 
become metaphysically possible” (ibid.). And later, Jonas claims that Adam’s 
naming of every living creature in Genesis “is the first step towards man’s 
coming mastery over nature” (OF V: 36). Thus its stark dualism and 
anthropocentrism make Christianity the chief culprit. However, the Greco-
Roman tradition is not exempt from blame either. Although it metaphysically 
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“calls for the retention of the older pan-psychism” (OF I: 16), it nevertheless 
morally informs the “ruthless anthropocentrism” of “the Hellenic-Judeo-Christian 
ethic of the West” (IR: 45). Following our reading of Callicott it seems that 
Jonas’ attribution of blame to Genesis is too strong and must be qualified. 
Otherwise, however, we may plausibly trace the origin of the ecological crisis to 
the scientific revolution, which was itself made possible by the deeper Gnostic 
tendency of the West. 
As we have seen, Jonas seeks to metaphysically counter the Gnosticism 
of modernity by reinstating a meaningful notion of immanent teleology and the 
scala naturae into the organic world, which together account for the manifold 
values inherent in Being. In terms of an ethic which could draw on these 
axiological findings and rise to the challenges of technological civilisation, Jonas 
begins by discussing what makes previous ethical systems insufficient. He 
notes that all share four basic characteristics which limit their scope. Firstly, as 
human action could not affect the integrity of the biosphere our dealings with it 
“did not constitute a sphere of authentic ethical significance”. Secondly, “all 
traditional ethics is anthropocentric”, as even in our dealings with individual 
plants and animals these were not considered to be of moral concern. Thirdly, 
“the entity ‘man’ and his basic condition was considered constant in essence 
and not itself an object of reshaping techne”.61 Fourthly, and finally, “[t]he good 
and evil about which action had to care lay close to the act, either in the praxis 
itself or in its immediate reach […]. Ethics accordingly was of the here and now” 
(4-5, emphasis removed). The clearest example of an ethic sharing all four 
characteristics is the Biblical exhortation to ‘Love thy neighbour’, referring only 
to human beings in spatial and temporal proximity (5). For the most part such 
injunctions were adequate: although pre-modern humans certainly made 
greater inroads into the natural world than they were presumably aware of at 
the time, it is true to say that overall the symbiotic balance remained intact.62 As 
such, there was little practical need – although there may of course have been a 
moral one – for an environmental ethic. 
                                                          
61 Technē being logically distinct from phronēsis, under which rubric Stoic and Buddhist ideas of 
self-cultivation would fall. 
62 Plato is sometimes cited as providing an early awareness of anthropogenic environmental 
degradation, but his lamentation of the state of Attica’s forests and topsoil in the Critias is not 
really to do with human influence, but rather natural disasters (1997: 111a-112d). 
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  Now, to claim that all previous ethics share these four characteristics is 
not strictly true, as demonstrated by our recognition of Christian stewardship. In 
this connection one could also mention the Buddhist and Jain ethic of non-
violence toward all living beings – although in the former, at least, this is a 
virtue-like component of achieving Nirvana rather than a direct duty (James and 
Cooper, 2005). A few pages later Jonas seems to recognise that there are 
indeed exceptions, referring to stewardship of the natural world (IR: 8), and in a 
separate essay softens his claim to encompass only “most former ethical 
systems, religious and secular” (TSE: 894, emphasis added). In line with this 
weaker argument it can be plausibly argued that the core of what we in the 
previous chapter called the Western moral tradition – classical virtue, 
Catholicism and Protestantism, and later Kantianism and utilitarianism – have 
generally conformed to the characteristics Jonas gives above. Regarding the 
source of a new ethic, religious or secular, he is clear that the former is no 
longer an option: “religion in eclipse cannot relieve ethics of its task” (IR: 23). 
From a pragmatic point of view one sympathises with Jonas over White’s call to 
engage with Zen and Franciscan theology. Jonas clearly regrets the demise of 
the sacred – “the category most thoroughly destroyed by the scientific 
enlightenment” (ibid.) – and attempts to accommodate for this loss with an 
objective, yet secular, version of the stewardship ethic (OS: 29). We saw in the 
last chapter that this hoped-for objectivity eludes Jonas. Nevertheless, as he 
draws on core aspects of the Western moral tradition in a secular fashion, his 
new ethic can be defended on the ‘deep’ relativist basis provided. 
II. The Problem of the Future 
The need for a new ethic can be best justified with reference to the temporal 
horizon of power radically opened up by technological civilisation, which 
traditional ethics cannot accommodate. On utilitarian or deontological grounds, 
for instance, we can establish obligations to future generations, assuming that 
they will exist. But the novel threat of contemporary technology is precisely that 
through either the biotechnological reshaping of humanity, or through a global 
calamity such as nuclear war or catastrophic climate change, future generations 
might never exist. Why then should human beings continue to be? Would 
anything essential really be lost in the event of our extinction, or radical 
transformation, and if so, are we obliged to preserve it? These questions, which 
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in earlier epochs must have seemed hypothetical, now very much demand 
answers. 
The problem, as stated, is that no traditional moral philosophy can 
provide any. This most obviously applies to virtue ethics. Jonas begins The 
Imperative with a reading of the Chorus of Sophocles’ Antigone, as an example 
of the ancient Greek ambivalence toward nature (IR: 2-4). According to 
Sophocles, nature is to be respected only as a force in its own right: an attitude 
which is no longer appropriate, and perhaps no longer possible since we have 
so effectively subdued it. But while virtue ethics can certainly make room for 
respect for nature and care for non-human life (Sandler, 2007), it cannot 
accommodate considerations of future generations without assuming their 
existence, since the cultivation of good character requires that there be 
character in the first place. 
The same basic limitation affects rights theory. On most models, moral 
rights are derived from an individual’s justified and inalienable claim to 
something, life being “the most fundamental of all rights” on which all others rest 
(RD: 31). A right, whether morally or legally grounded, entails obligations to 
uphold those rights in practice: hence we might suppose that future generations 
have a right to life, entailing duties for us to procreate and leave behind a 
habitable world.63 But, as Jonas correctly points out, only an entity which has 
claims can make them of us, which first of all means that the entity must exist, 
and of course “[t]he non-existent makes no demands and can therefore not 
suffer violation of its rights” (IR: 38-39). Furthermore, since rights arguably rest 
on a relationship of reciprocity – your right entails my duty and vice versa – by 
virtue of their non-existence future generations are incapable of having duties 
towards us, which would again mean that they are incapable of bearing rights.64 
It is clear, therefore, that the concept of moral rights cannot establish obligations 
                                                          
63 My reference here to ‘upholding’ a right is deliberately left ambiguous as depending on the 
nature of the right – for instance, a claim right or a liberty right – it can entail different things. A 
liberty right (such as freedom of speech) merely entails that others do not actively prevent 
someone from having that freedom, whereas a claim right (such as a right to legal 
representation in court) entails that others are obliged to assist them in achieving it. 
64 As stated, the principle of reciprocity is not a universally accepted component of rights theory, 
as becomes clear regarding the rights nevertheless attributed to infants, the severely mentally 
ill, and animals. Jonas does subscribe to the principle of reciprocity (IR: 38), arguing that it 
applies to infants as they are potentially able to have duties and thereby rights. Animals, on the 
other hand, can never have duties and therefore cannot have rights either (OS: 26-27). Even if 
Jonas is wrong, and the principle of reciprocity is not necessary for rights, the problem of future 
generations’ non-existence still stands. 
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to future generations without simply assuming their existence, which is precisely 
what is newly endangered. 
 This problem applies equally to Kantian and consequentialist attempts to 
account for future generations, but demonstrating this requires a more 
substantial discussion. Derek Parfit famously illustrated certain difficulties of 
applying classical utilitarian thinking to future generations with the “non-identity 
problem” (1984: 351-379). In short, the problem is that when considering the 
utility (or, if preferred, the benefitting and harming) of future people we run into 
the problem that certain morally-relevant actions affect who exists, such that 
had we acted otherwise a particular person would have not come to be. On this 
basis it is difficult to see how such individuals could be harmed by said action – 
provided their life is not so bad as to be not even worth living – since in the 
alternative scenario the different action would lead to a different person existing 
altogether (359). Parfit brings out these undesirable implications with a thought 
experiment, which I here greatly simplify. Say that we are considering Policy A 
which would bring about a higher standard of living in the next century than 
Policy B, the harmful alternative. Policy A will lead, he says, to people making 
different life-decisions and consequently different people being born at different 
times than if we were to implement Policy B. Given that after long enough (Parfit 
thinks three centuries) no-one would be alive as a result of implementing Policy 
A who would also be alive had we implemented Policy B, and vice versa, we 
can say that nobody is either benefitted or harmed by the policy we adopt. 
 On the macro level this argument clearly only applies to events 
significant enough to eventually affect everyone’s life: Parfit mentions 
technological developments such as the invention of railways and cars (361), 
but we might also think of major wars or economic upheavals. That is precisely 
why his argument is relevant, however, since we are here concerned with the 
new global and temporal reach of our actions. The conclusion Parfit draws is 
that the consequentialist will have to abandon the person-affecting harm 
principle and endorse an impersonal utility calculus instead, which allows one to 
say that Policy A is preferable. However, even this move cannot address the 
problem Jonas raises, as one still has to assume the existence of future 
generations per se to make such a calculation. In other words, what the theory 
cannot do is explain why there ought to be people in the first place; only the 
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utility of those already in existence can be taken into account. The utilitarian 
might respond by saying that it is better for people to exist than for them not to, 
as it is better for some happiness to exist than none at all. But when we ask 
who exactly it is better for, the utilitarian can only respond: for those already 
assumed to exist. For this reason consequentialism, like a rights-based 
approach, is an insufficient ethical framework for considering the existence of 
future generations in light of global crises. 
Finally there is Kant’s theory, which at its most elementary states that I 
must act in accordance with the moral law holding for each rational being. This 
essentially means that the principle guiding my action has to be binding in and 
of itself, without recourse to ulterior motives or ends which would render it 
applicable only in certain cases. Hence an imperative which takes the form ‘if x 
then y’ is merely hypothetical, while an imperative that holds for all moral agents 
under all circumstances is categorical. Hence the principal formulation of Kant’s 
categorical imperative is: “[a]ct only according to that maxim whereby you can 
at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (1993: 30). This is a 
purely formal version, however, and Kant provides two further formulations of 
the categorical imperative – one moral, the other political – which he held to be 
synonymous.65 The second formulation requires us to “[a]ct in such a way that 
you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, 
always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” (36). And the 
third formulation runs: “[a] rational being must always regard himself as 
legislator in a kingdom of ends rendered possible by freedom of the will, 
whether as member or as sovereign” (40).  
Jonas argues that all of these formulations of the categorical imperative – 
the Formulae of Universal Law, Humanity, and the Kingdom of Ends, 
respectively – once more pertain only to already existing beings and those 
which we assume will exist: “[g]iven the existence of a community of human 
agents […], the action must be such that it can without self-contradiction be 
imagined as a general practice of that community” (11, emphasis added). The 
reason for this is that “there is no self-contradiction in the thought that humanity 
would once come to an end, therefore also none in the thought that the 
                                                          
65 Christine Korsgaard has pointed out that Kant’s imperatives are not, in fact, synonymous and 
that the first is more permissive than the others (1986: 327). However, Jonas’ criticism is 
centred on that formulation, and therefore it also applies to the stricter versions. 
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happiness of present and proximate generations would be bought with the 
happiness or even nonexistence of later ones” (ibid.). And again:  
Just as I can will my own end, I can will that of humanity. Without falling 
into contradiction with myself, I can prefer a short fireworks display of the 
most extreme ‘self-fulfilment’, for myself or for the world, to the boredom 
of an endless continuation in mediocrity. (Ibid.) 
Regarding the second and third formulations, it seems yet clearer that neither 
can provide a justification for the continued existence of human beings, since 
they refer to the obligations we have towards ends-in-themselves, not that 
ends-in-themselves ought to be. If correct, this means that the categorical 
imperative is incapable of deriving a duty amongst an existing community to 
ensure that there be future communities. Let us see if this is the case. 
Jonas’ claim that ‘I can will my own end’ is at face value curious since 
Kant famously argued that suicide violated an “irremissible”, or perfect duty – as 
opposed to a “meritorious”, or imperfect duty – to oneself (1993: 32). Kant says: 
“[o]ne sees at once a contradiction in a system of nature whose law would 
destroy life by means of the very same feeling that acts so as to stimulate the 
furtherance of life” (30). However, Jonas may be right insofar as there is a 
difference between their claims. Kant regards the act of suicide on the basis of 
“self-love” (ibid.) – for which we could perhaps substitute the term ‘self-
indulgence’ – as logically contradictory since it requires the termination of that 
same self. Jonas, on the other hand, has in mind the eventual coming-to-an-end 
of oneself (which will happen in any case) and humanity (which he wants to 
argue should not occur). To break this down somewhat, we can imagine that I 
formulate the maxim of my action as: ‘live a life of consumption that is beyond 
ecologically sustainable limits for the sake of greater pleasure’. Upon 
universalisation we of course see that the Earth’s resources would quickly 
expire, leading to the impossibility of future generations living so indulgently, 
and perhaps not existing at all. Clearly this is an unattractive prospect, but it 
does not entail a contradiction in conception: adopting such a maxim appears to 
be logically valid since it does not lead to the destruction of those present-day 
ends acting out of self-indulgence. Again, it only applies if we assume the 
existence of future generations of ends, and consequently we cannot on this 
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basis derive a perfect, irremissible duty to live sustainably and so guarantee 
their existence. 
On the other hand, and maintaining the assumption that the first 
formulation binds the actions of a contemporary community, one might address 
the issue from a proactive angle by asking whether there is a moral obligation to 
procreate. If such a duty could be established then Kantianism would seemingly 
deal with the problem of future generations’ existence, as each generation 
would be obligated to generate the next. If I formulate the maxim of my action 
‘do not procreate’, when universalised I see that this would lead to the extinction 
of humanity. Once more, however, although this is an unappealing prospect it 
does not seem to constitute a contradiction in conception, since the eventual 
extinction of humanity is again compatible with willing the end of my maxim: a 
refusal to procreate is perfectly compatible with the identical actions of those 
beings capable of being bound by the moral law. Curiously, Kant did believe 
that procreation formed part of “a human being’s duties to himself”, not in virtue 
of one’s rationality but rather as an end of one’s “animality” (1996: 175). 
However, as Roger Sullivan notes, “[i]t is not clear why the preservation of the 
[human] race should be classed, along with self-preservation and self-
development, as an end that pure practical reason identifies as morally 
obligatory for each individual” (1989: 354). This, I take it, is where Jonas’ theory 
is intended to surpass Kant’s: by conceiving of the preservation of humanity as 
a general duty from which the individual’s may be derived (IR: 12; 40). 
III. The Imperative of Responsibility 
We now turn to Jonas’ solution to the above problem. Having shown the 
existing theories to be individually inadequate, Jonas draws on aspects of each 
to develop his moral philosophy – to supplement, not replace, traditional ethics. 
He states that “the intrusion of distant future and global scales into our 
everyday, mundane decisions is an ethical novum which technology has thrust 
on us; and the ethical category pre-eminently summoned by this novel fact is: 
responsibility” (TSE: 893). Why? Because responsibility is a correlate of free 
action, and “the claims on responsibility grow proportionately with the deeds of 
power” (ibid.). Since we now have the power to dictate not only the condition, 
but the very existence of future generations and the biosphere, we require an 
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ethic which can accommodate this change. In this way Jonas justifies the form 
his “ethics of the future” (IR: 27) and the environment takes:  
[I]t comes about that technology […] installs in man a role which only 
religion has sometimes assigned to him: that of steward or guardian of 
creation. By enhancing his might to the point where it becomes palpably 
dangerous to the total scheme of things, technology extends man’s 
responsibility to the future of life on earth, now exposed to, and 
defenceless against, the abuse of that might. Environmental ethics […] is 
the expression of this unprecedented widening of our responsibility. 
(TSE: 894-895)  
Jonas seeks to show that this instance of responsibility can be accounted for 
both subjectively and objectively. The reason is not only that this strengthens 
his theory, but also that it is clearly possible to be mistaken about when one is, 
in fact, responsible for others. Three criteria must hold for objective 
responsibility, therefore: moral agency on the part of the subject, moral 
considerability on the part of the object, and the subject having power over the 
object. We shall look at each in detail. 
(α) The Formal Aspects of Responsibility 
Perhaps the most basic criterion for responsibility is moral agency. In 
everyday life we ascribe responsibility to individual persons: we would say, for 
example, that if I ran through an antiques shop and smashed a priceless vase 
then I would be responsible for this in two ways. Firstly I am causally 
responsible in that the vase smashed because of my actions alone and, 
secondly, I am morally responsible for my reckless behaviour since as a 
mentally competent adult I should know to act with care around valuable 
objects, yet failed to do so. Here harm is not done directly to a morally 
considerable being, but only indirectly to the shopkeeper via the destroyed 
antique (and perhaps to ourselves, in failing to act virtuously). It is not the first 
sort, causal responsibility, that we are concerned with here, but the latter, moral 
responsibility.  
Clearly, most beings lack moral responsibility even if they can be said to 
be causally responsible for events. Geological phenomena, plants, and animals 
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all have causal power – and in some cases a power far greater than any 
human’s – but this alone is insufficient for being morally responsible: whilst I can 
be held accountable for recklessly smashing antiques, the bull in the china shop 
cannot. Only moral agents, those with the power to freely exercise their will and 
act accordingly, are answerable for their deeds. Only (adult) humans are free in 
this way, a freedom made possible by our eccentric relation to our own bodies 
which involves the ability to objectify our own actions and motives.66 Thus we 
are morally responsible not only for the actions we do undertake, but also for 
those we ought to have undertaken but failed to. For instance, if I babysit my 
friend’s young daughter and through lack of precaution fail to prevent her 
running into traffic, I am morally responsible for it. We can, moreover, ascribe 
collective moral responsibility to groups of adults, as illustrated by the 
hypothetical case of my wife and I both babysitting in the above example and 
both failing to take the appropriate measures.  
As stated, Jonas’ theory of responsibility is not merely formal, pertaining 
to who is morally responsible. It is primarily a theory of what we are responsible 
for over and above our own actions: a “substantive, goal-committed concept of 
responsibility” for “[t]he well-being, the interest, the fate of others, [wherever 
this] has, by circumstance or agreement, come under my care” (IR: 93). This 
sort of responsibility manifests in a variety of ways in everyday life, but in moral 
and political philosophy it exists primarily in the social contract theories of 
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, and, as we have seen, in the Christian tradition 
of stewardship. Stewardship is an example of circumstantial responsibility, God 
having supposedly placed humanity in charge of the natural world, whilst the 
social contract is evidently responsibility by agreement (or, in its weaker forms, 
tacit consent). If the notion has played scarcely a greater role in Western 
philosophy than that it is because, as Jonas says, this form of responsibility 
tracks the power of the moral agent over the morally considerable being: a 
power which was historically confined only to the immediate. Power, our second 
                                                          
66 Jonas only briefly touches upon the metaphysical question of moral responsibility in The 
Imperative of Responsibility, and appears to adopt a compatibilist position: “freedom […] is not 
absolute but confined to the latitude which physical necessity itself allows it” (221). And again: 
“[f]reedom consists and lives in pitting itself against necessity” (198). His most extensive 
discussion of the issue is in the lecture course Problems of Freedom (PF), but there his own 
position emerges only obliquely via interpretations of Aristotle and the Stoics. A full treatment of 
this issue represents too great a digression here, however, and so we shall proceed on the 
assumption that Jonas’ compatibilist claims are tenable on the basis of his integral-monistic 
ontology, which portrayed life as an ascending scale of freedom. 
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criterion, is essential to the phenomenon because to have responsibility for 
something entails that it comes under my sphere of influence; it must be 
something that I can, at least in principle, act upon. Where such causal power is 
lacking moral responsibility is a logical impossibility: I could not, for example, be 
responsible for the condition of life on distant planets (if indeed it exists), since it 
lies beyond my power to affect. 
Of course, power over another being does not alone entail responsibility 
for it. For instance, on a whim I could destroy all the material goods in my 
possession and yet have done nothing wrong (unless one argues on 
Aristotelian grounds that such destructive behaviour is a vice). The objects 
themselves are not morally considerable, and I have no dependents who would 
be harmed through the destruction of my property. Power only becomes a 
matter for ethics in those cases where it directly or indirectly concerns a morally 
considerable being: it is this which ultimately grounds “the ought-to-do of the 
subject” (ibid.). Our third criteria, then, is moral considerability. We have already 
covered Jonas’ argument for the existence of morally considerable beings in the 
preceding chapter, arguing that the immanent teleology of living beings, and the 
nisus of Being toward life, meant that these had intrinsic value and subjective 
goods. Unfortunately Jonas’ argument for the objective value of these values 
was ultimately found wanting, and therefore any responsibility for these beings 
cannot be incontrovertibly proven. Nevertheless, we argued that according to 
the moral tradition to which we belong a teleological understanding of life, and 
recognition of its intrinsic value, is apt to lead to an intuitive sense of its 
objective goodness. On these relativist grounds we may transcend pure 
subjectivism to reach a responsibility for others which exists “over against the 
will” (84). 
Responsibility of the sort Jonas is concerned with is not only experienced 
as a moral state of affairs, however. Central to the phenomenon is that it is also 
felt. For this reason Jonas seeks to account for the way in which the morally 
considerable being makes a demand upon the moral agent, which he 
characterises as being “called to its care” (93). This occurs when the above 
conditions of responsibility meet in our encroaching on a vulnerable being, the 
“perishable qua perishable” (87). To be vulnerable is to have ends, and thus a 
subjective good, which is open to harm. Consider, by contrast, a being which 
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was both absolutely good and invulnerable: a god, say. Despite its goodness, 
such a being cannot be an object of responsibility for me since I objectively 
have no power over it and its invulnerability makes no subjective demand of me; 
the two sides are complementary. The true call of responsibility depends on my 
bearing witness to vulnerability and its possible protection through my person. 
Hence Jonas modifies Kant’s dictum ‘ought implies can’ to instead read: “[y]ou 
ought because you can” (128, emphasis added).  
In stressing both the cognitive and non-cognitive aspects of 
responsibility, Jonas goes a step beyond Kant who argued that “moral worth 
depends […] not on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the 
principle of volition according to which, without regards to any objects of the 
faculty of desire, the action has been done” (1993: 13, emphasis added). 
Emotion does play a supplementary role in Kant’s ethics, but only through our 
“reverence” for the “moral law within” (2015: 129, emphasis removed). What this 
means in practice is that I am moved to act not by the particulars of any 
situation to which the moral law applies – helping those in dire need, say – but 
simply by the law itself. Evidently this follows from the formalism of Kant’s 
ethics, but minimal reflection on the experience of responsibility reveals his 
claim to be inadequate as a normative dictum. The more convincing position 
was advocated by Hume. Although, as we have seen, Hume took morality to be 
primarily a matter of sentiment – reason being the “slave of the passions” (1969: 
462) – he also noted that reason plays a role in alerting us to the existence of a 
fact which then sparks a motivating emotion in us (511).  
Jonas’ approach is intended to bridge reason and emotion, Kant’s theory 
and Hume’s, by arguing that in the case of responsibility “the two sides are 
mutually complementary and both are integral” (IR: 85). Thus he writes: “not the 
moral law motivates moral action but the appeal of a possible good-in-itself in 
the world, which confronts my will and demands to be heard – in accordance 
with the moral law” (ibid.). Of course, my interpretation of Jonas finds fault in his 
rational argumentation, and construes his meta-ethics as, at the last, Humean. 
Fortunately, in the case of responsibility at least, Hume’s theory can 
satisfactorily account for the role played by reason. When it is demonstrated 
that I have a power over a morally-considerable being – thereby fulfilling the 
above criteria – the accompanying feeling is the motivating force to take 
[149] 
 
responsibility for it. Conversely, a misplaced feeling of responsibility can be 
diminished by the rational realisation that I am not, in fact, responsible for that 
being, should any of the necessary criteria not hold. As such, we may account 
for responsibility as a moral phenomenon ultimately grounded in sentiment, but 
which is nevertheless responsive to reasons insofar as they are persuasive. 
 (β) Responsibility for the ‘Idea of Man’ 
As the above criteria suggest, Jonas’ theory entails that the “precarious, 
vulnerable, and revocable character, the peculiar mode of transience, of all life, 
[…] makes it alone a proper object of ‘caring’” (98). Although I might care deeply 
about certain inanimate beings, this is ultimately only for some other purpose 
which has its origin in a living being (that artistic beauty elevates the soul, for 
example). Only life, teleologically pursuing continued existence and so 
constituting an end-in-itself, is a proper object of responsibility. More will be said 
specifically about responsibility for non-human life later. First of all, we must 
look to one instance of responsibility in particular which stands out in our 
experience. 
Jonas observes that the “timeless archetype of all responsibility” (130) is 
the parent’s responsibility for the newborn, which is “so spontaneous that it 
needs no invoking the moral law, [and] is the primordial human case of the 
coincidence of objective responsibility and the subjective feeling of the same” 
(90). This responsibility is clearly not contractual, but rather circumstantial, the 
child having been brought into being through sexual reproduction. This fact 
alone does not point toward its uniqueness, however: after all, through creative 
acts we can be causally responsible for the existence of many new beings 
(artworks, buildings, laws, etc.). But the moral responsibility which follows in the 
case of the infant is qualitatively different from any other. First of all, as Jonas 
says, no invocation of the moral law can fully account for its subjective force: 
when confronted with a newborn baby its “mere breathing uncontradictably 
addresses an ought to the world around, namely, to take care of him. Look and 
you know” (131). Jonas’ point here is phenomenological: in the immediate 
experience of the newborn, shorn of reductive abstractions, the is and the ought 
are given as one. In other words, to properly perceive the infant is nothing less 
than to perceive an ethical demand: “the plain factual ‘is’ evidently coincides 
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with an ‘ought’ – which does not, therefore, admit for itself the concept of a 
‘mere is’ at all” (130).  
Phenomenologically speaking this is undoubtedly correct: it is 
fundamentally mistaken to separate the factual statement that a newborn child 
is crying out, helpless, from the normative claim that it demands my protection. 
Rather, the moral command is there in our perception of the child, and only a 
complete reprobate could deny it. Logically, however, the sceptic can always 
draw a distinction between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’. This move, forcing us on to 
the terrain of reasons – which are here insufficient – leads us to try to explain, 
as far as is possible, why we find Jonas’ description of the incontrovertible call 
of responsibility so compelling. Unfortunately the answer is not, as Jonas would 
like to claim, that we are objectively responsible for the newborn: as we have 
seen, no moral injunction can be so proven. It is instead, I suggest, because 
this instance of responsibility is both the most fundamental ethical experience 
prescribed by our tradition, and follows as closely as possible from our organic 
being. This is how I shall make sense of Jonas’ claim that it is a responsibility 
“instituted by nature” (94). 
Since pertaining to our organic being, it is unsurprising that responsibility 
for the newborn has antecedents in animal life. Living beings which rear their 
young in broods realise a form of sociality which is unprecedented in 
comparison to prior manifestations of that existential structure. As Jonas says, 
with regards to mammalian life: 
The relation of the mother to her young cannot be compared with 
anything else in the field of animal emotions and whatever is found 
elsewhere of protective and tender instincts [–] e.g., also in sex-relations, 
which of themselves are of much earlier origin in evolution [–] has its 
roots in the rearing situation. (OF IV: 69) 
Notice that reproduction, the biologically prior fact, is subsequently transformed 
by the new heights of social existence achieved in rearing. This, Jonas 
speculates, allows for “the development of the whole scale of emotions which 
we comprise under the name of ‘love’” (68-69). Romantic love aside, the intense 
bond evidenced in mammalian rearing is also, I suggest, the ground for moral 
responsibility for the newborn, since conforming to the same relation between 
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adult and infant. In the latter something qualitatively different occurs, however: 
humans alone can experience intuitive care for their offspring as a moral 
responsibility, a responsibility for the end-in-itself of the infant.  
Once again, it must be stressed that even if responsibility for the 
newborn has its ground in animal existence in the way I suggest, this does not 
prove that it gives rise to objective moral duties. For although our moral being 
allows intuitive animalistic care to become responsibility proper, whether it does 
so or not is a matter of our symbolic being. History, language, and culture 
constitute traditions which bequeath a certain ethical content, ultimately 
meaning that judgements of right and wrong are relative. This entails, of course, 
that while the organismic good of care for the infant can be transformed into a 
moral good, certain traditions do not do so. The practice of exposure, common 
enough throughout world history, is proof of this. But what matters is that our 
tradition does construe care for infant human life as a moral good; indeed, not 
only a moral good, but the most fundamental of all such goods, and it is for this 
reason that we find the sceptic’s division of the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ so 
objectionable here. Jonas concedes that that not every culture has recognised 
responsibility for the newborn as the first of all duties: “[f]or although the 
ontological capacity for responsibility cannot be lost, psychological openness to 
it is an historically acquired, vulnerable possession” (MM: 106). Nevertheless, 
he argues that this particular instance of responsibility is worth protecting and 
promoting due to its unique significance. This next step in Jonas’ theory of 
responsibility is one of the most remarkable in his entire philosophical system. 
In terms of duration, responsibility for the newborn is neither momentary 
nor usually lifelong, but rather dependent on the development of the child. More 
specifically, it continues “until the fulfilment of the immanent-teleological 
promise of eventual self-sufficiency releases [the parent] from the duty” (IR: 
131). In other words, as the infant becomes a child, an adolescent, and finally 
an adult, the parent is gradually released from the total responsibility to which 
they were initially committed. But this responsibility is not merely tied to 
organismic development, as is made starkly clear by cases of severe mental 
disability where the parent’s responsibility never expires. What is it, then, which 
in adulthood relieves the parent of their duty of care? It is the achievement of 
full personhood and the ability to account for oneself: the capacity for moral 
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responsibility. And this means that the telos of the parent’s responsibility for the 
infant is the coming-to-be of another responsible being.  
It is in this aspect of responsibility for the newborn that we may locate 
transcendent significance, the objective side thereby harmonising with the 
subjective experience of absolute responsibility. Jonas’ argument for the former 
is, if I understand him correctly, as follows. Although all living beings, as morally 
considerable, can become for us objects of responsibility, the fact that human 
beings alone are capable of taking responsibility sets us above the rest of life in 
the order of moral significance. Not only does this tell us why the existence of 
human beings is our principal responsibility, it also tells us how human beings 
should continue to be: i.e., morally responsible. This argument is most explicitly 
set out by Jonas as follows:  
The appearance of this value [i.e., responsibility] in the world does not 
simply add another value to the already value-rich landscape of being but 
surpasses all that has gone before with something that generically 
transcends it. This represents a qualitative intensification of the 
valuableness of Being as a whole, the ultimate object of our 
responsibility. Thereby […] the capacity for responsibility as such […] 
becomes its own object in that having it obligates us to perpetuate its 
presence in the world. (MM: 106) 
In other words: humanity is of a qualitatively greater significance than other life 
thanks to its capacity for morality, a significance that demands humanity’s 
continued existence as responsible beings, and to which we are subjectively 
committed in witnessing the infant. Hence Jonas concludes: “[w]ith every 
newborn child humanity begins anew, and in that sense also the responsibility 
for the continuation of mankind” (IR: 131). 
Now, it will be noted that the object of responsibility which Jonas prizes 
so highly is not human life per se, but rather our capacity for morality. This 
Jonas concedes, stating: “the possibility of there being responsibility in the 
world, which is bound to the existence of men, is of all objects of responsibility 
the first” (IR: 99). And again: “the presence of man in the world […] has itself 
become an object of obligation: the obligation namely to ensure the very 
premise of all obligation, that is, the foothold for a moral universe in the physical 
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world” (10). As the latter quotation makes clear, Jonas is not claiming that all 
human beings are good persons and deserving of continued existence on that 
basis (nor, it goes without saying, that only good persons are deserving of life). 
In fact, he suggests that if it were possible to devise a universal calculus of the 
good and the bad brought about through human history the latter would 
probably outweigh the former (99). Regardless of humanity’s dubious moral 
record the worth of its existence is accredited by its moral being, and the ever-
present possibility for moral goodness this represents. Because this is only a 
possibility, an ideal, “we are, strictly speaking, not responsible to the future 
human individuals but to the idea of Man, which is such that it demands the 
presence of its embodiment in the world” (43).67 
Having established this duty as absolute, Jonas summarises it in a series 
of purportedly synonymous categorical imperatives, the principal formulation of 
which is: “[a]ct so that the effects of your action are compatible with the 
permanence of genuine human life [on Earth]” (11).68 Thus his theory is given a 
Kantian veneer, Jonas’ new categorical imperative being intended to 
supplement the old. Reflection reveals, however, that Jonas’ imperative of 
responsibility only applies when humans already exist. One wonders, therefore, 
whether it is truly categorical since it appears not to hold in all logically possible 
situations: for instance, the possible world in which the extinction of the 
dinosaurs did not occur (which paved the way for the triumph of mammalian 
and eventually human life), or simply the one in which life could not realise itself 
on Earth at all. Jonas is unconcerned by this, admitting as much and claiming 
that it is nevertheless categorical: 
Groundless itself (for there could be no commandment to invent such 
creatures in the first place), brought about with all the opaque 
                                                          
67 Clearly, this also means that any non-human life – or even artificial intelligence – which had 
the capacity for morality would also count as an embodiment of the idea of Man. It has been 
argued that some non-human animals may in fact be moral agents, insofar as their behaviour is 
logically consistent with acting for moral reasons (Rowlands, 2012). I am dubious about this 
claim, but if correct it would certainly revolutionise Jonas’ theory. More troublingly, any humans 
who lacked the capacity for moral agency would not count as candidates for the idea of Man. As 
I have indicated, however, our responsibility in these cases remains intact on legitimate 
subjective grounds, even if it cannot be rationally accounted for by Jonas’ theory. 
68 As with Kant’s categorical imperatives, Jonas’ are not synonymous: the third version refers to 
“humanity” per se rather than “genuine human life” or the “wholeness of man”, which are 
intended to capture the fact that our responsibility is to humanity as a moral being (IR: 11). 
Moreover, only the third makes the requirement that this has to be on Earth explicit (although 
the first also does in the original German). 
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contingency of brute fact, the ontological imperative institutes on its own 
authority the primordial ‘cause in the world’ to which a mankind once in 
existence, even if initially by blind chance, is henceforth committed. (100, 
emphasis added) 
Accordingly his imperative holds that if humanity exists then its existence must 
be safeguarded on Earth. This would represent an overselling of the status of 
his imperative, but one might defend Jonas by noting that all imperatives share 
this presupposition yet some are nonetheless conceivably categorical, such as 
Kant’s Formula of Humanity. In other words, any moral command must be 
issued to existing moral agents in order to have purchase; ethics as such is 
moot without this ontological given. As Jonas’ imperative holds in the only world 
there is, I am inclined to say that its status as hypothetical or categorical is for 
all intents and purposes irrelevant. 
With this we may conclude our basic reconstruction of Jonas’ theory of 
responsibility. It is, in short, an argument for the duty to ensure the continued 
existence of human beings, who, as far as we know, are alone in embodying 
the transcendent worth of the idea of Man: moral goodness. And because we 
are committed to preserving human life on the basis of our moral being, moral 
beings we must remain. Even if this command is not fully rationally 
demonstrable – as no moral injunction can be – it is compellingly argued for, 
drawing on and aligning with the subjective experience of responsibility. In our 
bearing witness to the newborn in its utmost vulnerability we are unconditionally 
called to its care: a care which has its antecedent in immediate organismic 
being, but which ultimately reaches well beyond this. It might be objected that 
the moral relativism adopted in the previous chapter is too weak to uphold this 
conclusion, but I see no reason to think so. Although responsibility for the 
newborn is ultimately relative to moral traditions, those which recognise this 
obligation connect the human condition to a transcendent duty. In this way we 
can uphold Jonas’ ultimate riposte to Heidegger, whose analysis of the call of 
conscience in Being and Time was purely formal and devoid of content. Jonas, 
by contrast, concludes that “[i]n the light of such self-transcending width, it 
becomes apparent that responsibility as such is nothing else but the moral 
complement to the ontological constitution of our temporality” (107). 
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IV. Future Generations and Global Ethics 
We may now turn back to the more concrete questions of our duties to future 
generations and life on Earth: concerns forced upon us by modern technology, 
but which traditional morality cannot fully account for. It must be admitted that 
Jonas’ theory is also limited in its own way, since it permits little fine-grained 
detail here. Specific obligations – the just distribution of resources, say – are not 
accounted for except in the broadest of terms. This is a consequence of the 
nature of his theory of responsibility, which is intended to account for our most 
fundamental duties, acting as a basis and orienting principle for other theories 
(utilitarianism, virtue ethics, or Rawlsian justice, say). For this reason the 
following will remain at a fairly high level of abstraction. 
Taking our obligations to future generations first, we may split these into 
two fundamental categories: obligations pertaining to their being, and 
obligations pertaining to their well-being. The former is straightforwardly 
accounted for by Jonas’ theory of responsibility since our principal obligation is 
to the continued existence of human life (objectively, because we have the 
capacity for morality, subjectively complemented by our experience of 
responsibility for the newborn). This is, after all, the great theoretical 
achievement of his ethics. The question is then what we owe to future 
generations regarding their well-being. At the most general level, we may say 
that following logically from the duty to bring about future generations is the 
obligation to leave behind a habitable world, which in turn means that a 
sustainable form of life has to be achieved in the present. As this principally 
concerns technological and economic systems, rather than individual behaviour, 
the means of achieving this change are largely political, and we shall address 
how Jonas thinks this should be done in the next chapter.  
More specifically, we might ask what resources, institutions, and goods 
we should leave behind. For all moral theories this question necessarily has a 
degree of uncertainty about it, since we do not know precisely what the material 
requirements of future generations will be: technological change and population 
booms or slumps could have effects we cannot predict. But we may provide the 
outlines of an answer by recalling that Jonas’ theory demands not only the 
existence of human beings, but human beings capable of responsibility:  
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[R]especting this transcendent horizon, the intent of the responsibility 
must be not so much to determine as to enable, that is, to prepare and 
keep the capacity for itself in those to come intact, never foreclosing the 
future exercise of responsibility by them. […] Its highest duty, therefore, 
is to see that responsibility itself is not stifled, whether from its source 
within or from constraints without. (Ibid.) 
Evidently this entails, as a bare minimum, the provision of adequate but 
sustainable sources of energy and sustenance, shelter, and stable political 
institutions. Cultural goods are less obviously accounted for, with the notable 
exception of education: whether conducted formally or otherwise, the moral 
component of education is arguably the highest aspect of what we owe to those 
to come since pertaining to the source of responsibility within. If these all sound 
like obvious aspects of any generational legacy, recall that at present our 
unsustainable form of life makes their provision anything but certain. 
 It is true that Jonas’ theory alone cannot tell us in quantitative terms what 
‘adequate but sustainable’ sources of energy and sustenance would amount to: 
only economists and health experts can do so. But as a point of principle it can 
guide the latter, in particular speaking against a practice – frequently adopted 
by economists and policy-makers regarding the well-being of future generations 
– known as discounting. This is the idea that the (instrumental or extrinsic) 
value of a given resource is greater in the present than in the future, based on 
widely-shared subjective preferences, and even if the thing itself is unchanged. 
Now, there is certainly a banal sense in which this is true. Say someone offers 
me £100, which I can have either now or in ten years’ time. Assuming that my 
personal needs are stable, that inflation is nil, and the relative value of 
currencies are identical across that decade – all meaning that the £100 is worth 
exactly the same at the two points in time – it is normal to prefer to have the 
money now. Why wait when we can have it immediately? Moreover, it is equally 
common to prefer an offer of less money now over more later – £100 now 
versus £120 in a decade, for example – simply because I can have the former 
right away. Crucially, this implies that I value the present over ten years hence 
by at least 20%. At some point my preference will almost certainly tip toward 
posterity (few of us are likely to take £100 now over £1000 in a decade), but the 
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widespread preference for goods in the present allows us to calculate their 
relative worth across time, and discount value accordingly. 
Whether this logic can be translated to the needs of future generations is 
dubious, however. This is clearest if we consider a concrete example of 
resource allocation. We might well prefer to squander the proceeds of an oil 
field right now, rather than stagger their usage across time. The logic of 
discounting would then hold. But those who come to exist decades hence are 
then denied the resource they could have accessed, despite the fact that its 
value to such individuals will be the same for their present as it is for me in 
mine. That is to say: discounting discriminates against future generations for our 
benefit. Of course, only we can make decisions now, so why should we then 
give weight to the envisioned preferences of future generations? Here Jonas’ 
theory of responsibility forcefully responds: because we are duty-bound to bring 
about those future human beings, and the moral worth of each of us – existing 
now or yet to be – is exactly the same. While other theories (Kant’s in particular) 
afford equal moral significance to existing human beings, only Jonas’ can 
satisfactorily extend that logic to future human beings by showing that their 
existence is not morally optional, but rather demanded. The upshot is that we 
can justifiably discount value for ourselves across time, but not when comparing 
our present to that of future generations, and therefore the value afforded to 
goods must not be less in projections of the future. This conceptual shift alone 
would constitute a step toward sustainability. 
Remaining at a relatively abstract level of debate, we may switch focus 
from intergenerational to intragenerational ethics, and ask what Jonas’ theory of 
responsibility concretely tells us about the obligations of contemporaries to one 
another. After all, the ecological crisis does not just threaten the well-being of 
future generations, but also that of people of the present. Moreover these harms 
are not borne equally, nor by those who are best able to cope, nor even by 
those who are causally responsible for the harms coming about in the first place 
(any of which would have some claim to being a just distribution). Rather, the 
harms of climate change and associated ecological degradation are 
disproportionately borne by those who are least well-equipped to cope, and 
least causally responsible; i.e., the citizens of poorer nations. On this basis it 
might seem as though a global justice framework would be best suited to 
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account for the wrongs committed against contemporaries, and the duties owed 
to one another: particularly since the inexistence of the vulnerable – the 
problem Jonas’ theory tackles and which no other can – is not here an issue. 
Nevertheless, the theory of responsibility can contribute to our understanding of 
this area, as I will demonstrate. 
Jonas offers an intragenerational ethic thanks to the nature of 
responsibility itself. The call of care for the infant, which points toward our 
futural obligations, may be the first and most forceful example of responsibility, 
but the phenomenon can be both subjectively felt and justifiably extended to 
contemporaries. Subjectively speaking, I take it as given that the feeling of 
responsibility for other adults is known to all of us. As to its rational justification, 
Jonas notes that responsibility is, in principle, “reversible and includes possible 
reciprocity. Generically, indeed, the reciprocity is always there, insofar as I, who 
am responsible for someone, am always, by living among men, also someone 
else’s responsibility. This follows from the nonautarky of man” (98), a aprt of the 
human condition. Clearly, there can never be a total asymmetry of power and 
vulnerability between adults of the sort exemplified by the parent-child 
relationship, hence the subjective force of the former is so much weaker than 
the latter. Nevertheless, socio-economic circumstances can be such that 
dramatic power imbalances occur (homelessness and destitution, for instance). 
Ontologically this follows, as Jonas says, from the basic precarity of all life 
coupled with the social dimension of existence, which for human beings takes 
the form of communal living. Morally it follows from those traditions – and we 
would be astonished if this did not include most moral traditions – which 
recognise some degree of obligation amongst kin and neighbour. Of course, our 
moral tradition compels us to recognise responsibility for the vulnerable good 
which is in our power to protect. As a consequence, having responsibility for 
family members, friends, fellow citizens, and human beings as such is also 
appropriate wherever they are endangered and within the reach of our care. 
And equally my vulnerability means that I, too, can be an object of responsibility 
for any of those others, provided the conditions hold.  
Climate change is one such case, and because of its scale perhaps the 
most dramatic in human history. With Jonas, we may note firstly that “[s]hared 
danger surely establishes reciprocal duties” amongst those who are both its 
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cause and subject to its effects, as is true in the case of Westerners (236). 
Curiously, however, he suggests that the relevant moral demand here is not 
responsibility, but rather the “virtues which the trial of the situation may require”: 
in particular, “courage, resolution, [and] constancy” (ibid.). The rare invocation 
of virtue here is welcome, but it is not clear why the presence of the latter 
should exclude responsibility, rather than assisting in the carrying out of our 
duties, as Kant would argue. After all, the logic of the ecological crisis is that we 
have endangered each other and have the power to alleviate the threat. Since 
Jonas’ criteria are thereby fulfilled, it follows that we the guilty are in fact 
responsible for protecting one another from the harms of climate change, and 
that certain virtues will help us do so.  
In cases where the shared danger is the result of unilateral action 
between adults, Jonas suggests that responsibility is indeed the appropriate 
ethical concept (ibid.). Of course, this is also the case with climate change. 
Citizens of poorer nations are at risk of ecological harm overwhelmingly 
because of the actions and behaviour of citizens of industrialised nations.69 
Think, for example, of people in the low-lying Pacific islands at risk of being 
submerged by rising sea levels: this is our fault, whereas they have done little, if 
anything, to bring it about. In a case such as this the emotional side of 
responsibility is clearly far weaker than that of the parent for the child, but it is 
nevertheless present, and can be heightened by images or accounts of the 
threat which traverse the spatial distance. Then it becomes clear that these 
people’s lives are endangered by our way of life, and thus the emotive 
dimension of responsibility may align with the rational. 
One might object that Jonas’ framing risks condescension: that our 
having responsibility for the global poor infantilises the latter, or at least affords 
them less dignity than conceiving of them as candidates for just treatment does. 
This is unfortunate, if true, since there is little ethnocentrism to be found in 
Jonas’ philosophy: as all humans share the same existential precarity, and fulfil 
the idea of Man as moral beings, responsibility is always in principle reversible 
across the globe. In an ideal world, perhaps, no group of adults would have to 
be an object of responsibility for another. But the present situation, which is a 
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result of technological and socio-economic circumstance, means that we are 
not equal in terms of the power to affect one another. And this inequality of 
power entails a responsibility on the part of Westerners: a responsibility to free 
the global poor from the danger in which we have placed them. Jonas’ theory of 
responsibility can thereby not only underpin, but also actively orient other 
accounts of our intergenerational and intragenerational climate obligations. If 
few specifics can be drawn out then this is simply the price to paid for such a 
fundamental theory, which could be complemented by more explicitly 
consequentialist or virtue-based frameworks. These would have to point, 
however, toward the ultimate object of our obligations: the continued existence 
of humanity as a moral being.  
V. Duties to Non-Human Life 
We are now in the position to answer a question posed right at the beginning of 
the previous chapter: whether Jonas’ theory is deontological, consequentialist, 
or Aristotelian in nature. With its emphasis on responsibility as a duty, with 
virtues playing only a facilitating role, it seems fair to say that Jonas’ ethic is 
primarily Kantian: a “cosmic deontology”, as Lawrence Vogel said (1995: 38). 
However, it departs from Kant’s moral philosophy in two key respects. The latter 
asked only what existing rational beings are obliged to do by the moral law – 
“an ever-present order of abstract compatibility” – whereas Jonas’ imperative 
“extrapolates into a predictable real future as the open-ended dimension of our 
responsibility” (IR: 12). His theory is thus teleological in a way that Kant’s is not, 
establishing a duty to the continued realisation of a particular being. Secondly, 
with its accommodation of the emotive aspect of responsibility it has a strong 
Humean element. And of course, my revision of Jonas’ metaethics made his 
theory yet more Humean, at the same time as introducing a neo-Aristotelian 
component in the form of our thrownness into tradition. We can therefore say 
that the deontological interpretation is closest to the truth, but not the whole 
story. 
(α) Anthropocentrism and Biocentrism 
The second question raised at the beginning of the last chapter – 
whether or not Jonas’ theory of responsibility is anthropocentric – poses a 
greater difficulty. Given that he developed a biogenic axiology, built on a 
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teleological philosophy of life, it might seem strange that the moral 
consideration of living beings as such shrank into the background of Jonas’ 
ethical concerns in favour of humanity. Why, after all, should we privilege 
human life if life as such is of intrinsic value? Is his doing so an indefensible 
anthropocentric bias following, perhaps, from stressing the subjective force of 
responsibility for the infant? Jonas thinks not, and with good reason. His focus 
on our obligations to humanity is explained by a conscious attempt to fuse 
together responsibility for life and responsibility for future generations, thus 
bypassing the anthropocentric-biocentric distinction. Early on in The Imperative 
he raises the issue of anthrpocentrism, wondering whether our responsibility for 
life is a direct moral duty, or rather just an indirect requirement for the survival of 
human life (6-8). Several chapters later he answers his own question by stating 
that “we can subsume both duties [to future generations and non-human life] as 
one under the heading ‘responsibility toward man’ without falling into a narrow 
anthropocentric view” (136). We shall examine how Jonas comes to this 
conclusion. 
In the pivotal section regarding non-human life’s moral significance (136-
140) Jonas makes two arguments. Firstly, he offers the common-sense 
observation that “care for the future of all nature on this planet [is] a necessary 
condition of man’s own” (136). If this were the only reason for being concerned 
about the existence of a functioning biosphere then his ethic would undoubtedly 
be anthropocentric, and philosophically indefensible given his recognition of 
life’s intrinsic (and not simply instrumental or extrinsic) value. However, Jonas’s 
second argument moves beyond mere utility by way of a thought experiment: 
he asks that we consider a future wherein humanity had entirely replaced non-
human life with an artificial environment. The prospect of such a future focuses 
the mind on the possibility that “the plenitude of life, evolved in aeons of creative 
toil and now delivered into our hands, has a claim to our care in its own right” 
(ibid.). He justifies this as follows: 
[E]ven if the prerogative of man were still insisted upon as an absolute, it 
would now have to include a duty toward nature as both a condition of 
his own survival and an integral component of his unstunted being. We 
have intimated that one may go further and say that the common destiny 
of man and nature, newly discovered in the common danger, makes us 
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rediscover nature’s own dignity and commands us to care for her 
integrity over and above the utilitarian aspect. (137, emphasis added) 
Jonas believes the two reasons highlighted justify the claim that his ethic moves 
beyond a narrow anthropocentrism, so we shall take them one at a time.  
The first is somewhat ambiguous in that it is unclear whether having a 
duty as such (i.e., being a moral agent) is the integral component of a full 
human life, or if it is that the duty is toward nature which is essential. From the 
context it initially seems as though the latter is correct. This would, however, 
have the repugnant implication that the ecological crisis alone has allowed us to 
fully realise ourselves, since, for Jonas, prior to endangering the biosphere we 
could not be responsible for it. This would also be inconsistent with his 
philosophical anthropology which holds that “genuine man is always already 
there and was there throughout known history” (200). For this reason I interpret 
Jonas’ claim as follows. Humanity’s relation to the Earth is essential to our 
being, but not because we now happen to be responsible for it. Rather, the 
Earth is our “worldly home in the most sublime sense of the word” because it is 
where humanity carves out its world, and realises itself (137). As Hannah 
Arendt notes, “[t]he earth is the very quintessence of the human condition, […] 
providing human beings with a habitat in which they can move and breathe 
without artifice” (1958: 2).70 According to this line of thinking we belong to the 
natural world in the fullest sense of the word, and a humanity living within an 
entirely artificial environment “would only result in the dehumanization of man, 
the atrophy of his essence” (IR: 136). A moral duty to nature is not, therefore, 
integral to being human, even if our existing on Earth is. 
The alternative interpretation – that it is responsibility per se which is 
integral to being human, not that it now encompasses life on Earth – is 
consistent with Jonas’ wider thought. He says that the hypothetical artificial 
future dehumanises us because it contradicts the reason for preserving 
humanity “as sanctioned by the dignity of his essence”, namely, that we are 
responsible (137). Destroying nature would mean destroying an object of our 
responsibility, and there would then be nothing to confront “the arbitrariness of 
our might” (ibid.). This would contravene the idea of Man qua responsible being, 
                                                          
70 Both here demonstrate their debt to Heidegger, who proclaimed that “[d]welling is the manner 
in which mortals are on the earth” (1977: 350). 
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and this is the reason Jonas argues that nature has become for us a 
“metaphysical responsibility” (136). As he puts it elsewhere: “it is not so much a 
moral duty, it is really a metaphysical or ontological duty of ours to minimize our 
necessary, our on-the-whole inevitable [and] destructive impact on our 
environment” (OS: 29-30). The ‘not so much’ reiterates that there is a moral 
duty to life as such, but this is folded into responsibility for our future because it 
now “comprises the rest under its obligation” (IR: 137). The argument thus 
escapes crude anthropocentrism by subsuming nature’s survival under the idea 
of Man, hence Jonas’ claim that the “causes converge from the human angle” 
(136). 
(β) Dignity and Integrity 
 Jonas’ second claim, which he thought fully evaded the charge of 
anthropocentrism, was that “the common destiny of man and nature, newly 
discovered in the common danger, makes us rediscover nature’s own dignity 
and commands us to care for her integrity over and above the utilitarian aspect”. 
The key notions to be extracted here are those of nature’s ‘dignity’ and 
‘integrity’. Since these are somewhat vague terms, and Jonas does not define 
them precisely, his meaning must be inferred from the context. Doing so will 
allow us to justify Jonas’ grading of human beings above non-humans in the 
scheme of moral significance.  
At various points in his writings Jonas refers to the dignity or integrity of 
living beings, species, and nature as a whole, usually in criticism of the scientific 
materialist account which denies these entities such qualities. For instance, 
characterising the Baconian worldview, Jonas reformulates the famous line from 
Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov “[w]ithout God [...] everything is 
permitted” (1990: 589), to read: “[i]f nature sanctions nothing, then it permits 
everything. Whatever man does to it, he does not violate an immanent integrity, 
to which it and all its works have lost title” (PE: 71). Jonas’ use of integrity here 
refers, in the last clause of the latter sentence, to both nature as a whole and its 
‘works’, which implies species or individual organisms (or both). On the same 
theme, he says that scientific materialism has divested nature “of any dignity of 
ends”, and yet “a silent plea for sparing its integrity seems to issue from the 
threatened plenitude of the living world” (IR: 8). By contrast, as part of his 
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recasting of the Darwinian revolution as a blow to materialism (as recounted in 
Chapter Two), Jonas says the re-established connection between humans and 
nature meant “some dignity had been restored to the realm of life as a whole” 
(PL: 57). Finally, there are references throughout his work to the dignity (IR: 46; 
99; 197-198) and integrity (21; 34; 202) of human beings, in particular to the 
idea of Man.  
We shall try to shed some light on Jonas’ invocations of dignity and 
integrity, taking the latter first. The general sense of integrity is captured nicely 
by Jan Vorstenbosch, who defines it as the “‘wholeness’, ‘intactness’, and 
‘unharmed or undamaged’ state of something, presumably a living being” (1993: 
110). Vorstenbosch’s application is unnecessarily limited, however, since we 
can also speak of the integrity of collectives, such as a family or parliament, and 
even non-living beings such as a building or artwork. What these beings have in 
common, as Vorstenbosch notes, is that there is a particular way in which they 
ought to be. They have, in other words, a telos, either immanent and autopoietic 
or transcendent and externally ascribed: the orange tree organises and 
maintains itself through metabolising, whereas the building is supposed to be in 
accordance with the architect’s intention.71 Given that Jonas refers to ‘immanent 
integrity’ it seems he has the former concept in mind, and his application of it to 
living beings and nature as a whole allows us to employ a distinction of Michael 
Hauskeller’s and say that Jonas is here invoking “biological integrity”, and 
“ecological integrity”, respectively (2007: 37).72  
Now, the problem we encountered in the previous chapter was that whilst 
it makes sense to speak of the immanent telos of an organism, one cannot say 
the same of the biosphere, which is not a self-organising being but rather a 
system of beings whose actions affect one another, and only more or less 
maintain equilibrium. For this reason it seems that one may only speak of 
ecological integrity in the same sense as familial integrity, i.e., a standard which 
is ascribed to the unit. Immanent integrity therefore appears to apply only to 
individual living beings insofar as they are ‘whole’ and ‘intact’ in accordance with 
                                                          
71 Cf. Jonas’ discussion of biological and social purposes in the third chapter of The Imperative 
of Responsibility, ‘Concerning Ends and Their Status in Reality’, (51-78). 
72 The Anglo-American conception of ecological integrity seems to have its roots in Aldo 
Leopold’s famous ‘land ethic’ from A Sand County Almanac: “[a] thing is right when it tends to 
preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends 
otherwise” (2001: 189). 
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their teloi. But which is true of the integrity of the idea of Man – i.e., the human 
being as responsible – invoked by Jonas? If there is no immanent integrity 
without a biological telos it appears that the idea of Man, qua idea, also cannot 
be said to possess this status. It would presumably then follow that the integrity 
of the idea of Man is ascribed, somewhat like the moral integrity of a parliament 
or court of law. On this basis, at least, there appears to be no reason for 
prioritising humanity in our moral considerations, since all living beings possess 
immanent integrity whilst the idea of Man does not. So while the appeal to 
integrity duly absolves Jonas of the charge of anthropocentrism, it actually 
undercuts his claim for humanity’s “superior right” (IR: 137), which would require 
a strong qualitative distinction. This is the function of his use of dignity. 
As mentioned above, Jonas refers to both ‘human dignity’ and the 
‘dignity of ends’ as such. Hauskeller draws a distinction between “personal 
dignity” and “non-personal dignity” (2007: 63) which neatly corresponds to the 
notions invoked by Jonas. Historically speaking, the two conceptions of dignity 
emerged from different traditions which over time became conflated under a 
single term (ibid.). Personal dignity comes from the notion of dignitas, which 
human beings alone are supposed to enjoy by virtue of being made in the 
image of God: the imago Dei. Although Jonas claims that central to the imago 
Dei is the ability to perceive good and evil, presupposing language and reason 
(MM: 75-76), this interpretation is surely incorrect since knowledge of good and 
evil are supposed to have derived not from Creation but rather the Fall. It is in 
fact language and reason – the logos – which constitutes the substance of the 
imago Dei according to Christian tradition. The ability to act in accordance with 
the Good is in fact the Kantian twist given to dignitas. Kant says: “morality is the 
condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in himself […]. 
Hence morality and humanity, insofar as it is capable of morality, alone have 
dignity” (1993: 40-41). Thus dignity, for Kant, refers to the status of personhood 
attained in moral autonomy. Jonas invokes Kant’s conception of personal 
dignity (IR: 89), likewise pointing to the capacity for responsibility as the criterion 
for being “a member of the moral order” (99). Humanity’s record in realising its 
responsibilities is of course mixed, hence Jonas concludes that the “dignity of 
man per se can only be spoken of as potential, or it is the speech of 
unpardonable vanity” (ibid.). For Jonas, then, personal dignity, emerging from 
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the tradition of dignitas, belongs to human beings alone insofar as they have the 
capacity for moral agency and responsibility. 
 The second tradition which constitutes our contemporary understanding 
of dignity is bonitas. Bonitas, according to Hauskeller, derives from the notion 
that “everything created by God is good. […] It emphasizes the community: the 
common needs, the vulnerability and mortality of everything that is alive” (2007: 
63). In drawing on notions of need, vulnerability, and mortality as shared 
properties of living beings, bonitas chimes with Jonas’ invocation of the ‘dignity 
of ends’ belonging to living beings as such. As we saw in the second chapter, 
Jonas characterises organic life – both human and non-human – by the paradox 
of needful freedom: the very same immanent teleology which characterises 
metabolism and grants a degree of world-openness simultaneously makes the 
organism’s existence dependent on the satisfaction of those ends. Now, given 
that bonitas, or non-personal dignity, refers to the status acquired by virtue of 
being able to value, it appears to coincide with the notion of intrinsic value as 
expounded in the previous chapter. Indeed, that is precisely the equivalence 
Hauskeller draws: “[i]f there is a particular kind of dignity (that is, intrinsic value) 
that does not arise from moral autonomy but from having a good of one’s own, 
then this dignity is something that humans and (other) animals have in 
common” (62, emphasis added). On the basis of our previous findings we might 
add that plants, too – indeed all forms of life – possess non-personal dignity 
courtesy of their teleologically-grounded needs. 
VI. Morality and Human Dignity 
By comparing these two traditions we can make sense of Jonas’ invocation of 
life’s ‘dignity of ends’ as non-personal bonitas, and his references to human 
dignity as referring to our unique personal dignity, or dignitas. At face value this 
would indeed seem to give humans a qualitatively ‘higher’ status than non-
human life, insofar as they alone possess personal and non-personal dignity, 
whereas non-human life has only the latter to take into account in our moral 
considerations. Although Jonas does not sketch out the claim in detail, it does 
indeed seem as though he holds that the ‘higher’, more existentially free the 
animal, the greater its dignity and capacity to be wronged (OS: 24-25). To be 
sure, this position has an intuitive plausibility, but there is a complication: we 
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noted that Jonas drew on Kant’s understanding of human dignitas based on our 
capacity for moral agency. For Kant this form of dignity is equivalent to 
“absolute worth” (1993: 35), which Hauskeller notes is functionally identical to 
intrinsic value – the very concept to which bonitas is also supposed to pertain. 
Hauskeller continues: “what personal dignity […] on the one hand, and non-
personal dignity, bonitas, or simply integrity, have in common is the notion of 
intrinsic value, which is supposed to be the value a thing has in its own right and 
not by reason of its being valued by others” (2007: 64). If correct this means 
that there can be no ranking of humanity as higher than non-human life: 
although humans also have the status of personal dignity, since it arguably 
refers back to intrinsic value this would not make it qualitatively different from 
non-personal dignity which refers to the same. 
All these paths – dignity, integrity, intrinsic value, and something being 
an end-in-itself – appear to lead back to the possession of an immanent telos 
which characterises life. As such, it would seem Jonas’ claim that humanity’s 
moral being ‘surpasses all that has gone before with something that generically 
transcends it’ is only half-correct: although responsibility corresponds to a 
uniquely human personal dignity – and in that sense is distinguished from the 
dignity of all other life – this difference only denotes another aspect of the 
intrinsic value possessed by all life. This would leave us, as a result, with a 
resoundingly biocentric ethics, at odds with Jonas’ original intentions. Of course, 
one might reasonably ask why we should want a principle which allows us to 
morally distinguish between human and non-human life. The answer, I suggest, 
is to supplement our theory of biogenic intrinsic value which cannot otherwise 
decide in favour of a human being over a bacterium. The gulf that exists 
between the call of responsibility for these beings is simply too great to ignore, 
and remains so even if we substitute a conscious animal for the bacterium. The 
question is then whether, according to the interpretation of Jonas’ philosophy 
provided, it is possible to justify an overriding obligation to humanity whilst 
respecting the intrinsic value of all living beings. I believe that it is. 
One option is to follow Jonas’ suggestion that the “egoism of the species 
– each species – takes precedence […] and the particular exercise of man’s 
might vis-à-vis the rest of the living world is a natural right based on faculty 
alone” (IR: 137). At first this looks suspiciously like a ‘might is right’ argument. 
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However, in a later lecture he supplemented the idea that superior power 
legitimates its own use by arguing that there are nevertheless moral constraints 
on our conduct toward non-human life. Firstly, he suggests, we ought not to 
treat individual animals cruelly:  
And not out of respect, not out of awe, not out of admiration, but from 
simple decency. It is just indecent to relish in making a sentient being 
suffer merely for the sake of enjoying their suffering, or enjoying one’s 
powers of destruction and inflicting pain. So this has little to do with the 
general question of how we should relate to the living world[;] it has more 
to do with the question of what kind of human beings we ought to be. 
(OS: 25) 
This point appears, then, to be a virtue-based case against cruelty rather than 
one of responsibility for the integrity or dignity of non-human life. The latter only 
arises when he discusses the general treatment of non-human life, in particular 
the methods of mechanised agriculture which deny animals a life in accordance 
with their immanent teloi, and thus their biological integrity.73 So we can see 
that, at least in his later work, Jonas did not advocate the use of force against 
individual living beings with the sole condition that the biosphere remains intact. 
There are also questions of moral character, which Jonas claims follow from 
“limiting the guilt which is ours by our dealings with the natural world” (24). 
However, one might ask whether invoking such moral restrictions is really 
consistent with the general argument that “our right to use all the rest of the 
living kingdom […] simply derives from our power, because this is the only 
warrant in the whole realm of life which, as it were, entitles from the beginning a 
species to do what it does” (28). The latter claim holds for non-human beings, to 
be sure, but precisely because they are not moral beings subject to the 
demands of duty and virtue. For this reason we cannot accept it as a principle of 
human conduct. 
                                                          
73 “[Think of w]hat we do to our domestic animals – the way we deprive our chickens of any life 
of their own by not having them in the barnyard anymore[,] and not in the chicken coop[,] but 
having […] egg factories in which a chicken never even experiences a life of a chicken in the 
open world. [Think of o]ur meat factories. Or the denial of sexual intercourse, the fruits of which 
we constantly demand from them, but with artificial insemination. I recently visited such an 
establishment for horses, and learned that the females never meet a male and the males never 
meet a female. There we do something on a grand scale […]. I have other impressions on a 
visit to Europe where I can see how the cows are still grazing on meadows, how they are driven 
out to the mountain meadows in the early summer, and have a life outside and are returned to 
their stables and so on, and it’s a joy to see those cows” (OS: 25). 
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 The more fruitful alternative is to find an overarching principle allowing us 
to divide (formal) moral considerability and (relative) moral significance. The 
failure to do so has hampered biocentrism ever since Kenneth Goodpaster first 
observed that moral considerability and moral significance were not equated 
(1978: 311). The idea that an egalitarianism of intrinsic value need not entail an 
egalitarianism of obligation was defended by both Rolston and Attfield, the latter 
arguing that “because of the good which creatures concerned stand to gain or 
lose, lives in which some capacities are realized are more valuable than those 
in which they are not or cannot be” (1991: 176). In practice this is intended to 
prioritise sentient over non-sentient life, and human beings over both, according 
to the degree of mental capacities present. However, as Paul Taylor notes, this 
ranking of significance cannot follow from the biocentrism to which Attfield and 
Goodpaster are committed. He asks: “is it not unreasonable to judge 
nonhumans by the values of human civilization, rather than by values 
connected with what it is for a member of that species to live a good life?” 
(1986: 131). Invocation of species norms aside, Taylor is correct: if each living 
being has a good-of-its-own (the basis of its intrinsic value) then we cannot say 
that one sort of subjective good is better than another, unless there exists an 
independent standard beyond these subjective goods by which to measure 
them. 
 This would seem to settle the point – except that Jonas’ philosophy, 
unlike those of Taylor, Rolston, Goodpaster, and Attfield, does contain such a 
standard: the nisus of Being. Although we failed in the last chapter to rationally 
demonstrate the objective value of values, we were able to make sense of the 
idea of Being’s striving upwards to new heights of psycho-physical freedom, 
from inanimate nature through to plant, animal, and finally human life. To 
reiterate, on Jonas’ schema this is not a transcendent telos entailing that 
humanity was posited as a goal by a divine agent. It is instead the weaker 
notion that time enough and favourable circumstances – as on Earth – will allow 
an immanent tendency in Being to manifest: the tendency toward life and 
freedom. As Jonas says: “[i]n organic life, nature has made its interest manifest 
and progressively satisfies it, at the rising cost of concomitant frustration and 
extinction, in the staggering variety of life’s forms” (IR: 81). On this basis Being 
itself has a good-of-its-own in that the fulfilment or frustration of its nisus allows 
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for one to speak of a better or a worse for it. We can then say that it is better for 
Being that life came into existence than if it had not, and better again that 
vegetative and then sentient life followed. And of course, this striving has 
culminated in humanity: the qualitatively significant feature of which is its moral 
being. 
It is this last point which is crucial: the unique personal dignity of human 
beings, guaranteed by the capacity for morality, then becomes the crowning 
achievement of Being: “[t]his blindly self-enacting ‘yes’ gains obligating force in 
the seeing freedom of man, who as the supreme outcome of nature’s purposive 
labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from 
knowledge, can become its destroyer as well” (82). It is this additional claim 
which allows Jonas to escape Taylor’s criticism of Attfield, Rolston, and 
Goodpaster. Recall that Taylor claims that: 
One entity is correctly judged morally superior to another if it is the case 
that, when valid moral standards are applied to both entities, the first 
fulfils them to a greater degree than the second. This would not be the 
case, however, if humans were being judged superior to animals and 
plants, since the latter are not moral agents. (1986: 132) 
Contra Taylor, Jonas’ philosophy allows us to say that humans, when judged 
according to the nisus of Being and insofar as they have the capacity for 
morality, are indeed of greater moral significance than non-human life according 
to a standard independent of any lifeform. It is thus human personal dignity, or 
the idea of Man as a responsible being, which rescues my interpretation of 
Jonas’ ethics from a biocentric egalitarianism. If integrity and non-personal 
dignity are aspects of intrinsic value, humanity’s personal dignity – the capacity 
for morality – indicates something greater still: a cosmic significance.  
VII. A Future for Life on Earth 
Jonas’ ethics thereby achieves an appealing balance of human and non-human 
interests. The demonstration of the integrity, non-personal dignity, and intrinsic 
value of all life fulfils the moral promise of his biogenic axiology: all these 
qualities make non-human life an object of responsibility in its own right, and 
thus his thought escapes the crude anthropocentrism which has underpinned so 
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much of Western thought. At the same time, Jonas’ ethics has a humanist 
streak in affirming the transcendent value of the idea of Man, requiring the 
continued existence of humanity as its bearer, who for that reason occupy a 
privileged place in the hierarchy of moral significance. We may conclude, 
therefore, that Jonas’ philosophy is axiologically biogenic, yet ethically weakly 
anthropocentric. 
Where my interpretation of his position lacks intuitive appeal is in its 
remaining egalitarianism between the interests of animals and plants. The 
former cannot be more morally significant than the latter, since neither has the 
capacity for morality, and so neither obtains the status of personal dignity which 
allowed for the qualitative distinction between otherwise equivalent appeals to 
intrinsic value. Jonas himself equivocates on this point. He argues that “the 
gradings of world openness, capacities, modes of experience, modes of action, 
[and] modes of life” mean that “certain instances of life […] have higher value 
and greater goodness” (OS: 27). This may be so, according to the independent 
standard provided by Being’s nisus, but we still cannot say that we owe more to 
a higher animal than a lower one, or a lower animal lower animal than a plant, 
since all possess only non-personal dignity. Jonas seemingly contradicts 
himself on precisely this issue, speaking of a “grading of life as an underpinning 
for differentiating modes of behaviour towards them”, yet also claiming that 
higher beings are not “entitled to particular advantages” (ibid.).74 We must 
conclude, on the basis of the arguments above, that only an egalitarianism 
between animals and plants stands to reason. This is regrettable, but we were 
at least able to uphold what Jonas correctly regards as the transcendent value 
of humanity amidst the already value-rich landscape of Being. 
 What does this mean in practical terms? Once again, we must admit that 
Jonas’ ethic provides us with a broad principle of action rather than a calculus 
for fine-grained decision-making: such is the shortcoming of his theory, which 
would have to be supplemented with an adequate theory of justice in order to 
be comprehensive. Nevertheless, as a broad principle it allows us to firmly 
conclude that non-human life deserves a future for its own sake, prior to the fact 
that its continued existence is necessary for our own. And for metaphysical 
                                                          
74 The explanation of this discrepancy is perhaps the aforementioned distinction Jonas makes 
between our virtue-based conduct toward individuals, and our obligations toward species, or 
‘forms of life’. 
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reasons we must not replace the natural world with artifice: this would 
contravene the idea of Man as a responsible being, the continued existence of 
which is the object of our overriding obligations. For this very reason, however, 
we are relieved from the paralysing consequences of a biocentric 
egalitarianism. We are permitted to take non-human life to the necessary 
extent, even if in so doing, according to Jonas, “we incur a certain amount of 
guilt”: for “life, as soon as it is manifold in form, is of necessity […] combined 
with conflict, and conflict [u]nto death” (23-24). Our task, in short, is to achieve a 
sustainable present so as to ensure a future for life on Earth. This is the new 






















Chapter Five: The Politics of Nature 
I. From Principle to Practice 
The concluding chapters of The Imperative of Responsibility are concerned with 
the political realisation of our new planetary and intergenerational 
responsibilities. This shift in focus is not so surprising when we recall that the 
development of modern technology, as both a metaphysical and a socio-
economic revolution, provided the original impetus for Jonas to devise a new 
ethic. As we have seen, the technological reach of action in contemporary 
society has spatially and temporally outstripped the scope of our historically-
given norms, and so Jonas sought to rectify the situation by supplementing the 
latter. This attempt includes, almost as a matter of course, reflection on the way 
in which his ethical principle might be put into practice:  
If the realm of making has invaded the space of essential action, then 
morality must invade the realm of making, from which it has formerly 
stayed aloof, and must do so in the form of public policy. […] In fact, the 
changed nature of human action changes the very nature of politics. (IR: 
9) 
Jonas’ claim that morality has “formerly stayed aloof” from production at first 
appears strange: the two are strongly connected in socialist economies, and 
even politicians in the United States, at the time of its inception, held economics 
to be subordinate to civic virtue (Sandel, 1998: 123-200). We can, however, 
make sense of Jonas’ criticism by levelling it at contemporary (neo)liberal 
democracies, which indeed allow the market unprecedented freedom. 
Jonas’ ethics, by contrast, taking the form of a categorical imperative, 
generates a concrete obligation around which to organise action when 
transposed into the political domain. His attempt to do so results in two key 
insights: firstly he devises an early formulation of the precautionary principle, 
and secondly he recasts the state’s duties along ecological lines. As such, 
Jonas politically prioritises ecology over biotechnology, even though both pose 
a threat to the image of Man. The reason is that the latter is a ‘micro-level’ 
crisis, whereas the former is a macro-level “approaching storm […] that we, its 
unintentional creators, have the planetary duty of trying to avert” (51). It follows 
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that although politics, like ethics, previously pertained only to the affairs of 
humans in states – the polis – it must now reach beyond and account for the 
very Earth which is the condition of possibility for such polities. Jonas writes: 
“the boundary between ‘city’ and ‘nature’ has been obliterated”, and, as such, 
“[i]ssues never legislated come into the purview of the laws which the total city 
must give itself so that there will be a world for the generations of man to come” 
(IR: 10, emphasis added). The central problem is that this ‘total city’ exists 
technologically and economically but not politically, which is the principal way of 
ensuring our new responsibilities are upheld. Rectifying this is the political task 
of a theory of responsibility. 
However astute Jonas’ diagnosis will prove to be, his aforementioned 
solutions are controversial. The better received of the two is his formulation of 
the precautionary principle, which has since become an accepted 
environmental policy mechanism in Europe. By contrast, Jonas’ statecraft was 
and still is subject to a significant degree of opprobrium. His vision has been 
variously characterised as “antihumanist” (Ferry, 1995: 81), “paternalistic” 
(Bernstein, 1995: 17), and even an “eco-tyranny” (Furnari, 2006: 152). It cannot 
be denied that these criticisms are, at face value, not without justification. 
However, on an alternative reading of Jonas’ work all are the result of a basic 
interpretative error: according to Nathan Dinneen (2014; 2017), Jonas’ flirtation 
with authoritarianism is merely a heuristic device, and not at all to be taken 
literally. In this chapter I set out Jonas’ political theory and come to a settled 
position on this debate, using a range of sources rather than just The Imperative 
of Responsibility. Doing so also reveals moments in Jonas’ last works which 
point towards a different theory of citizenship and the state than developed in 
The Imperative. Although these suggestions and asides go undeveloped, a 
degree of extrapolation shows that Jonas was moving towards a theory of civic 
republicanism.75 But we must first return to Jonas’ philosophical anthropology 
and the place of politics therein. 
 
 
                                                          
75 I shall nevertheless remain closer to Jonas’ thought than Murray Bookchin (1982) and David 
Levy (1987), both of whom use aspects of his thinking to develop their own quite different 
political philosophies: social ecology and conservative environmentalism, respectively. 
[175] 
 
II. The Nature of Politics 
Two political themes recur throughout Jonas’ work: freedom and the polis. 
Jonas’ interest in the latter is perhaps not surprising given his close friendships 
with Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss, even if he rarely discusses their work.76 
The former theme, freedom, runs like a thread throughout Jonas’ œuvre. It is 
the focus of an early publication on St. Augustine (APF), is covered in great 
depth in the lecture course Problems of Freedom, and of course, it 
characterises his philosophy of life, as indicated by Organism and Freedom. 
The last is both Jonas’ richest contribution to understanding freedom and the 
analytically necessary starting point, since the phenomenon is constitutive of 
organismic being as such.  
We saw in the second chapter that Jonas identifies freedom as an 
achievement of metabolism, which is the defining property of life. In 
reconstituting itself the organism obtains a formal independence from 
substance, although the ceaseless nature of this process and its reliance on 
material satisfaction means that this freedom is far from unconstrained: it is 
instead a paradoxically needful freedom. If freedom is therefore formally co-
existent with life, in tracking the various teleological means of satisfying 
metabolic needs it also admits of degrees. We recall that the freedom of the 
plant is apparently minimal, seemingly restricted to growth, photosynthesis, and 
some motility (although we noted that the emerging science of plant 
‘intelligence’ and communication may yet complicate this analysis). Animals, by 
contrast, possessing sentience, emotion, and locomotion attain a progressively 
greater degree of freedom from the strictures of their environments, building a 
richer world. Finally, humans possess the greatest freedom of all lifeforms in 
their vastly increased ability to make images, speak, think abstractly, and 
radically reshape their surroundings.  
To clarify Jonas’ usage of freedom here we may refer to its positive and 
negative variants, which he mentions only in passing (PF: 267). The classic 
distinction, generally attributed to Isiah Berlin (2002: 166-217), is as follows: 
positive freedom is the ability to act wilfully, whilst negative freedom is the 
                                                          
76 Exceptions include an obituary to Arendt (HA) and reflections on her more overtly 
philosophical thought (AKT). The two also briefly appeared in public debate together (Arendt, 
1979). Jonas’ references to Strauss are even less frequent. 
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absence of external interference. A third form of freedom, which Berlin does not 
consider, belongs to the civic republican tradition and conceives of freedom as 
non-domination. The relevance of this alternative will become apparent later; for 
now, the positive-negative distinction is sufficient to elucidate the freedom 
belonging to organismic being. Taking both conceptualisations together, we 
might say that the degree of an organism’s freedom is the extent to which it can 
set itself ends and carry these out without external interference. Hence a rabbit 
is far freer than a weed in the positive sense, but a fox is negatively far freer 
than the rabbit on which it preys, despite the two mammals sharing many of the 
same capacities and so being roughly equally free in the positive sense.  
Problematically, however, Jonas’ usage of freedom to describe life 
stresses the positive dimension alone. For him, organismic freedom is 
determined by life’s process of individuation in which it increasingly wrests itself 
from the remainder of Being. The importance of this oversight cannot be 
overstated: conceiving of life’s freedom solely in terms of the capacity to act, 
and not also in terms of non-interference or non-domination, has fateful 
consequences for Jonas’ political theory, as we shall see. 
Positive freedom is sufficient, however, to describe the human capacities 
which give rise to politics as a sphere of existence. In his philosophical 
anthropology Jonas stressed the freedom identifiable in our faculties of 
creativity (demonstrated by the invention of tools and images) and reason 
(courtesy of language and metaphysics), which together make us the animal 
symbolicum. Recalling Arendt’s terminology, we may say that while all life 
labours – i.e., individually or collectively engage in the activity of sustaining their 
lives – few animals work, and humans, apparently alone amongst living beings, 
also engage in action (1958: 8-9). The realm of work concerns the creation of 
material and cultural artefacts, bestowing a degree of permanence to an 
otherwise transient existence, whilst action corresponds to the symbolic 
organisation of our collective life: at its highest permitting immortality in the form 
of words and deeds remembered through the ages. Jonas concurs, arguing that 
symbolic existence is the condition of possibility for politics, the latter being “a 
new dimension of existence closed to animals other than man” (PF: 260). At the 
same time, should politics succeed in providing an ordered life it increases the 
opportunities to exercise our symbolic capacities. As Jonas says, it “affords [the] 
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power to act otherwise than by dictate of sheer necessity”, and is therefore the 
“real phenomenon of [human] freedom” (267-268). Although Jonas holds up the 
Greek polis and Roman res publica as the paradigmatic examples of political 
units, the concept is meant to far exceed the institutions and cultures of 
antiquity. Politics is for him a philosophical anthropological notion, like Aristotle’s 
zōon politikon, but requiring only a symbolically organised life beyond the family 
unit. 
To reiterate, Jonas’ understanding of politics here is as a capacity – a 
manifestation of our existential freedom – which does not logically entail any 
particular political content; nor, we might note, does it prohibit any. But there is 
nevertheless a worry that his biological and anthropological conception of 
freedom as purely positive, and not also negative, allows Jonas to endorse a 
positive theory of freedom when considering the state and citizenry. We shall 
return to this point later on, at present merely noting that the ontological ground 
of politics is humanity’s symbolic existence, which is itself the highest 
manifestation of life’s movement toward freedom. We shall now look at how 
Jonas substantiates his formal analysis of politics with his ethic of responsibility, 
leading first of all to his influential formulation of the precautionary principle. 
III. New Rules for Action 
(α) The Heuristic of Fear 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Jonas’ categorical imperative holds that 
we must safeguard the existence of human beings on Earth in accordance with 
the idea of Man. To bring this ethic to bear on the realm of public policy, Jonas 
calls for a “science of hypothetical prediction, a ‘comparative futurology’”, to 
underpin a “heuristics of fear” which might guide our actions (26, x). In 
introducing such a dubious-sounding concept it should be noted straight away 
that the heuristic of fear is supposed to respond to scientific, rather than 
arbitrary, predictions. Jonas has in mind descriptive analyses of “presently 
recognizable trends in the technologic-industrial process” allowing for the 
forecasting of “certain, probable, or possible outcome[s]” (26, 30). We might 
then ask who would make such assessments. Jonas suggests that “the 
biologist, the agronomist, the chemist, the geologist, the meteorologist, […] the 
economist and engineer” could pool their knowledge to form a “global 
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environmental science” (189). Their predictions, he says, would have to be of “a 
still higher degree” of rigour than that “which suffices for the short-range 
prediction intrinsic to each work of technology by itself”, because such a 
forecast “is on principle inadequate for the long-range prediction” (28-29). What 
the criteria are for this rigour, and who decides upon them, is not addressed – 
this being presumably a matter for the scientific community. The end result 
might, perhaps, look like a more ambitious version of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change. 
Of course, policy does not rest on scientific knowledge alone, but also 
concerns what is and what is not desirable. As such, the heuristic of fear would 
also utilise narrative to bring hypothetical situations to life. In this connection 
Jonas mentions Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World: a “well informed thought-
experiment” (30) pertaining to biotechnology and which to this day has not lost 
its power to repulse. A contemporary example fitting Jonas’ criteria might be 
The Road by Cormac McCarthy, which envisions a world in ecological and 
societal collapse. The particular value of such works – provided they are 
scientifically and technologically plausible – is in “developing an attitude open to 
the stirrings of fear in the face of merely conjectural and distant forecasts – a 
new kind of éducation sentimentale” (28). For an example we might quote 
McCarthy, who imagines a future Earth devoid of life so as to inspire care for it 
now:   
Once there were brook trout in the streams in the mountains. You could 
see them standing in the amber current where white edges of their fins 
wimpled softly in the flow. They smelled of moss in your hand. Polished 
and muscular and torsional. On their backs were vermiculate patterns 
that were maps of the world in its becoming. Maps and mazes. Of a thing 
which could not be put back. Not be made right again. In the deep glens 
where they lived all things were older than man and they hummed of 
mystery. (2006: 306-307) 
The legitimacy of drawing on such texts follows from Jonas’ theory of 
responsibility, which sought to be not only rationally demonstrable, but also to 
account for the feeling of responsibility for the vulnerable good. Hence we are 
not to be guided by a “pathological […] but rather a spiritual sort of fear” for 
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what might be lost through human (in)action: both the vulnerable good itself, 
and the idea of Man in failing to fulfil our obligation to care for that good (IR: 28). 
Even if one accepts Jonas’ elision of the descriptive and the normative 
one might ask why he focuses on fear and not, say, hope. His reason for doing 
so is reminiscent of the moral psychology advocated by Hobbes, “who also, 
instead of love for the summum bonum, made fear of a summum malum […] 
the starting point for morality” (ibid.). Hobbes tells us that humans in the state of 
nature are in “continuall feare, and danger of violent death”, and for this reason 
are driven to peaceful co-operation and the establishment of civil society (1914: 
65-66). It is each individual’s fear of what might be lost – their life – which alerts 
them to what is most valuable: security.  
Now, according to Jonas this is an example of the pathological fear that 
is unsuitable as a basis for collective decision-making: individual security, whilst 
of great value, is not an absolute never to be risked. There are, after all, things 
worth dying for. The general structure of the principle, however, remains sound: 
“the perception of the malum is infinitely easier to us than the perception of the 
bonum […] an evil forces itself upon us by its mere presence, whereas the 
beneficial can be present unobtrusively and remain unperceived, unless we 
reflect on it” (27). In the case of imagined but realistic future scenarios we are 
led to that object within which we must not risk: the existence and essence of 
humanity. Having perceived the threat, brought to our attention by the faculty of 
fear and applied to an object whose intrinsic value we can rationally account for, 
we can then act so as to not bring that harm about. The paradox here, as Jean-
Pierre Dupuy observes, is that the imagined threat must in one sense be our 
future, and yet not actually become our present (2012: 588). Jonas alludes to 
this in the following: “[t]he prophecy of doom is made to avert its coming, and it 
would be the height of injustice later to deride the ‘alarmists’ because ‘it did not 
turn out so bad after all’. To have been wrong may be their merit” (IR: 120). 
(β) The Precautionary Principle 
Jonas admits that the “uncertainty of prognostications” (28) poses a 
problem for his heuristic. In short, when applied to hypothetical situations it only 
prohibits actions of which we can be more certain than not of the 
consequences. For example, it is highly likely that a nuclear war would make 
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humane life an impossibility – and perhaps even extinguish human life itself – 
and so it clearly falls foul of his method. However, there are technologies which 
present us with great uncertainty as to their effects. The development of artificial 
intelligence could lead to sustainable material security for all, or to the effective 
obsolescence of humanity. According to Nick Bostrom (2014) – no Luddite he – 
it could even result in the very extinction of the human race. The problem is that 
we cannot predict with much certainty which is correct: the benefits and harms 
are at this stage too remote and conjectural. How then are we to know which 
assessment we should side with? To deal with this impasse Jonas offers an 
early formulation of a new rule by which to guide collective high-stakes actions 
in the face of uncertainty: the precautionary principle. 
In the event that a particular action or technology poses the threat of 
catastrophe – however uncertain the threat, and benign the other possible 
outcomes – Jonas recommends that we give precedence to “the bad over the 
good prognosis” (IR: 31). The reason harks back to his categorical imperative: 
any action in which either the existence or essence of humanity are at stake is 
ruled out in advance. It is essential to note, however, that the risk to life must 
pertain to the whole rather than the individual or group.77 One common reductio 
ad absurdum of the precautionary principle is that it rules out any action which 
poses a great and irreversible threat to life: travelling by aeroplane, say, or even 
crossing the road in busy traffic. Certainly, either activity risks an irreversible 
loss of life for minimal gains. But to say that precautionary logic rules them out 
is a wilful misunderstanding of the principle, or at least of Jonas’ version of it. 
Individuals and groups have justifiably risked their lives throughout history, and 
there is no reason why contemporary technology should change this. What 
contemporary civilisation does endanger, in extreme cases, is the existence of 
humanity as such, and it is this which Jonas’ precautionary principle is designed 
to counter. Hence Jonas states – even coming close to using the phrase 
‘precautionary principle’ – “we must bow to the command to allow, in matters of 
such capital eventualities, more weight to threat than to promise and to avoid 
apocalyptic prospects even at the price of thereby perhaps missing 
                                                          
77 But not when it concerns a threat to the essence of humanity, which is as violated in a single 
instance as it is en masse. This will be argued in the next chapter in the context of 
biotechnology and scientific research. 
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eschatological fulfilments. It is the command of caution” (32; emphasis 
added).78 
If the purpose of precaution is the avoidance of infinite loss, its price is 
the renouncing of finite gains. In this respect his theory is reminiscent of 
Pascal’s wager, albeit with one key difference. Pascal’s argument famously 
holds that it is better to live a life according to God than not, as the cost of doing 
so and being wrong is minimal compared to wrongly doubting God’s existence 
and being subsequently condemned to eternal damnation. We might say that 
Jonas’ theory likewise bids us to avoid catastrophe in the future by making a 
comparably minimal sacrifice now. The difference is that unlike in Pascal’s 
version, where heavenly bliss is one possibility, there is no future utopia to be 
had, only the preservation of the status quo. However, if Jonas is correct, this is 
no reason for despair: the avoidance of the infinite loss in the future 
presupposes that we possess something of equivalent value now, namely, 
human life on Earth. For all the overwhelming (but necessary) negativity of his 
formulation, Jonas’ precautionary principle is therefore also motivated by an 
affirmative rationale: “an emergency ethics of the endangered future must 
translate into collective action the ‘Yes to Being’ demanded of man by the 
totality of things” (140). 
Kerry Whiteside is perhaps the only English-language commentator to 
recognise Jonas’ influence on the precautionary principle, and raises key 
questions about his formulation of it.79 Above all, Whiteside observes that the 
largely Kantian basis of Jonas’ conception – the new categorical imperative – 
means that although we are unconditionally barred from taking certain actions, 
these actions are in practice relatively few (2006: 107-108). In other words, 
what we gain in clarity we lose in breadth of application, as “it is made in such a 
way that it almost never applies” (108). As noted above, nuclear warfare is one 
example which falls foul of Jonas’ formulation, but we hardly need a new 
principle of action to know not to start one. By contrast, other technologies 
                                                          
78 The original German for the precautionary principle is ‘Vorsorgeprinzip’. Nowhere, to my 
knowledge, does Jonas use this precise formulation, but his great work is of course Das Prinzip 
Verantwortung (literally, the responsibility principle), in which he repeatedly refers to Vorsorge 
(PV: 85, 90, 218, 219). In the English translation Jonas and Herr slightly awkwardly render 
Vorsorge as “farsighted providence” and “promotional care” (IR: 39, 121). 
79 Jan Schmidt (2014) and Nathalie Frogneux (2014), from the German and French traditions 
respectively, insightfully discuss Jonas’ thinking in this regard. 
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which are often seen as paramount cases for a precautionary approach do not 
fall under the remit of Jonas’ version of the principle. Take agricultural genetic 
engineering: opponents sometimes claim that a proliferation of genetically 
modified crops and livestock could be damaging for biodiversity and the global 
food supply. Crucially, such effects are possibly irreversible as the intervention 
is designed to be hereditary. But no opponent of genetically modified 
organisms, however strident, believes that it risks the end of human life on 
Earth or humanity as a responsible being, as Jonas’ principle demands for a 
precautionary veto. 
We could pick a number of other technologies – nuclear power, 
geoengineering, synthetic biology – the widespread adoption of which could 
have disastrous ecological effects and yet not come under the remit of Jonasian 
precaution. It is presumably for this reason that where the precautionary 
principle has been adopted in law it is in a weaker but more broadly applicable 
form. Take, for instance, Principle 15 of the UN’s Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development:  
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation. (United Nations, 1992) 
The advantage this strictly consequentialist formulation has over Jonas’ is that it 
applies to threats of serious or irreversible harm to the environment, and not just 
when the existence or essence of humanity is at stake. However, the stipulation 
that the principle be “widely applied” by states – which is already vague – is 
further weakened by the caveat “according to their capabilities”, just as the remit 
of precaution is here limited only to uncertainty not being “used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures”. Clearly this formulation also has serious 
flaws, albeit of a different sort to Jonas’. 
A slightly more robust consequentialist version of the precautionary 
principle can be found in Article 11b of the earlier UN World Charter for Nature, 
which states:  
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Activities which are likely to pose a significant risk to nature shall be 
preceded by an exhaustive examination; their proponents shall 
demonstrate that expected benefits outweigh potential damage to nature, 
and where potential adverse effects are not fully understood, the 
activities should not proceed. (United Nations, 1982) 
The principle as it is expressed here still poses problems. The first clause refers 
only to those technologies likely to pose a significant risk to nature, rather than 
posing a significant risk simpliciter. Then the second clause seeks to weigh 
“expected benefits” against “potential damage to nature”, and so only the latter 
phrase explicitly refers to the environment or non-human life whereas the 
former could be taken to encompass just human interests. As such, any activity 
which overwhelmingly benefitted humans, even if it were at the expense of the 
environment, might not be ruled out. Moreover, the final clause – “the activities 
should not proceed” – replaces the mandatory ‘shall’ from the first clause with 
the normative ‘should’, which is not synonymous. Nevertheless, the value of 
such a formulation is that at least some potentially harmful technologies, such 
as those mentioned above, are brought under its remit.  
 This brief comparison of varieties of the precautionary principle shows 
that Jonas’ strict but narrow formulation is not the only version available. It is, 
however, the only one which follows from his premise of the new categorical 
imperative. Does this pose a problem for Jonas? I would argue not. Firstly, it is 
simply not the case that “critics are right to dismiss versions [of the 
precautionary principle] that follow a logic analogous to Pascal’s wager, 
because that argument requires the assumption of an infinite catastrophe, 
which is seldom, if ever, the case in environmental decisions” (Johnson, 2012: 
9). We might be justified in dismissing a principle if it never applied in real-world 
scenarios, but why should we do so if it does apply in some cases, albeit rarely? 
Secondly, remember the scope of Jonas’ imperative of responsibility: to 
supplement, rather than replace, traditional morality. Conventional 
consequentialist reasoning can justify a broader but weaker version of the 
precautionary principle, whereas Jonas’ version categorically tells us what we 
must not put at stake; the two are complementary, not mutually exclusive. 
Finally, recall that the level at which Jonas envisioned the application of his 
principle was not just that of individual technologies, but also the general 
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trajectory of contemporary civilisation, which is indeed bound for catastrophe. 
We turn now to how this is to be institutionally enacted. 
IV. Farewell to Utopia 
Øjvind Larsen criticises Jonas for not making the institutional link between his 
ethics and politics sufficiently clear, claiming that he “does not take the 
necessary next step, which must be to point out how the principle of 
responsibility could be an actual force in political life that could resist the 
dominance of technological-instrumental rationality” (2009: 129). As discussed, 
this is the very purpose of Jonas’ heuristic of fear and precautionary principle, 
and therefore Larsen’s charge is prima facie erroneous. It does, however, lead 
us to wonder how, according to Jonas, the recommendations derived from the 
heuristic of fear are to be transmitted into concrete action. Which political and 
economic systems are most capable of doing so?  
Given the context of the Cold War in which he was writing, Jonas 
develops an answer by examining the relative virtues of the two available 
systems: capitalism and communism. His approach is reminiscent of Aristotle’s 
Politics (1984f) which proceeds by comparing the political systems of ancient 
Greece. The difference is that Jonas’ investigation is not guided by “the 
question as to which of the various political ideologies and programs is 
inherently best for human beings”, which he dubiously claims is now “not 
significant” (M: 202, 210). Instead he asks only “which offers the greatest 
likelihood of meeting successfully the completely new challenge confronting 
human society: how we can live with nature – or how nature can survive 
together with us” (210). From these remarks it is easy to see how Jonas arrives 
at such a controversial vision of the state, a vision which, it must be said, draws 
inspiration from some of the most questionable political theorists in the Western 
canon: not only Hobbes, but also Plato, Machiavelli, and Lenin. In Jonas’ 
defence, however, he first of all develops an astute critique of the utopianism 
built in to modern civilisation, both capitalist and communist. 
 We recall from the first chapter, on Jonas’ philosophy of technology, that 
part of technology’s interaction with socio-economic life was at the level of 
ideology. Two notions were discussed in this regard: progress and utopianism. 
We defined progress as the belief in technological development as a good in 
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itself, one which goes awry only under a malign influence. We then identified a 
utopianism in the work of Descartes, Bacon, contemporary transhumanists, and 
eco-modernists through their invocation of a paradisiacal end of history made 
possible by science and technology. In addition to these explicit manifestations, 
Jonas diagnoses a latent utopianism in the productionism of modern civilisation 
per se. As discussed in Chapter One, through competition, innovation, and 
ever-greater consumption, creating new ‘needs’ where previously there were 
few, we are supposed to arrive at material satisfaction. We have for decades 
now been aware that such a vision sows the seeds of ecological ruin, and yet 
contemporary civilisation carries on as though there were no limits to such 
activity. Thus what was in Bacon’s time merely “Promethean arrogance” has 
become a wilfully blind utopianism (143). Although a productionist tendency 
belongs to both of the political systems he examines – the capitalist West and 
the then-communist East – he regarded it as stronger in the former, indeed, as 
almost synonymous with capitalism, which is characterised (or perhaps 
caricatured) as “the unrestrained use of the world’s resources, of the 
environment, of nature, impelled by the pocket-motive and competition” (CR: 
217). As such, Jonas is sceptical on a priori grounds that it could rise to the 
challenge, demanded by his imperative, of averting the course of disaster (IR: 
145-146). 
What of Soviet communism, the only readily available alternative at the 
time?80 Jonas notes that the moral force of Marxist-Leninism is that it “proposes 
to bring the fruits of the Baconian revolution under the rule of the best interests 
of man” (143). Of course, this once again poses a fundamental problem since 
the Baconian revolution is precisely the source of our ecological predicament. 
The fact that the techno-utopian drive is here inspired by a sense of distributive 
justice is commendable, but little help regarding the question of ecological 
limits. Jonas takes Ernst Bloch as the “foremost prophet” (188) of this 
dimension of Marxism, since the theme of utopia is so explicit in his work and 
acts as a foil for Jonas’ politics of responsibility.81 Bloch’s key work, The 
Principle of Hope (1986), envisions a society freed from the necessity of human 
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of them he really means the ideology and political economy of the USSR, which I here call 
Marxist-Leninism or Soviet communism. 




labour through the rational application of technology and equitable distribution 
of goods. Jonas criticises Bloch’s vision partly on principle, regarding the 
transfer of meaningful work to automated industry as unbefitting of humanity’s 
creative capacities (IR: 197-201). But the relevant objection here is the practical 
one of consumptive limits: if the Earth cannot withstand continued capitalist 
production, then neither can it contain an “onslaught on resources” in the name 
of utopian communism (187). Hence the “dawning truth of ecology puts a 
hitherto unknown damper on progressivist faith, socialist no less than capitalist” 
(189).82 
The virtues of the Soviet communist system, if any are to be found, will 
then be in its ability to constrain rather than promote the Baconian ideal. Jonas 
argues, again on a priori grounds, that Marxist-Leninism holds the “promise of a 
greater rationality in the management of the Baconian heritage” (145). 
Empirically, of course, this belief has to contend with a record of bureaucratic 
inefficiency and the fact that ‘communism in one country’ finds itself at odds with 
actively – or at least ideologically – hostile foreign powers, and is almost 
necessarily driven to raise production in response. Even if we suppose that 
there were a communist world state (hardly an imminent possibility, even in the 
1970s), Jonas notes that centralisation of the sort associated with a command 
economy would require efficient infrastructure, communications, and 
bureaucracy, and this alone could be sufficient impetus for technological 
development and economic growth (TPT: 36).83 To all this we must add that 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union its unprecedented degree of 
environmental mismanagement became clear – this being, for Jonas, “one of 
the great disappointments” of the Soviet experiment (CBE: 29).84 Prior to the 
                                                          
82 It might be objected that in taking Bloch as his representative of Marxist thinking Jonas 
unfairly represents the school of thought. There are, after all, those such as André Gorz who 
have sought to reconcile Marxism with environmentalism. Gorz argues that “the ecological 
movement is not an end in itself but a stage in a larger struggle”, and that only a “cultural 
revolution that abolishes the constraints of capitalism” could establish “a new relationship 
between the individual and society and between people and nature” (1980: 3-4). While Gorz’s 
socialism eschews any Baconian influence in terms of production, it nevertheless remains 
explicitly utopian. In an extended narrative section Gorz describes in detail “one of several 
possible utopias”, including a 24-hour working week, free public transportation, decentralised 
and self-sufficient economic units, organic farming, lifelong holistic education, and so on (42). 
How this is to be achieved is not clear, but as an ideal it arguably escapes Jonas’ critique. 
83 Perhaps here, too, is a trace of Heidegger’s influence on Jonas in the former’s claim that both 
the USSR and the USA were “metaphysically the same” (2000: 48) since “determined by 
planetary technology” (1990: 54). 
84 Elsewhere he rightly warns that “we should be careful not in our jubilation [following the 
USSR’s demise] to think that it is capitalism, that is the unrestrained use of the world’s 
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emergence of this latter evidence, however, he thought it better able to act in 
accordance with ecological limits than a capitalist economy. 
Jonas’ central political claim in The Imperative of Responsibility, then, is 
that we should opt for a Marxist-Leninism shorn of its utopian productionism. 
And with these means must go their envisioned end: a communist society 
composed of ‘true’, i.e., emancipated, humans, this being the theory’s “noblest 
and hence most dangerous temptation” (IR: 156). Why dangerous? Precisely 
because it bids us to forego what is of ultimate value – the existence and 
essence of humanity – for an imaginary perfected form of that being. Such 
eschatological promise justifies virtually all means, not least the Baconianism 
which unwittingly puts that very end at risk. Jonas does not reject the 
egalitarianism of Marxist-Leninism, which he claims ought to be preserved 
(144). But its productionist aspect contravenes the heuristic of fear by 
imperilling that which must not be imperilled: genuine humanity, which “is 
always already there” in having the capacity for morality (200). Protecting this 
being is the object of a politics of responsibility, necessitating the abandonment 
of radical hope for material emancipation, and leading Jonas to advocate a 
“post-Marxist”, or anti-utopian, form of Marxist-Leninism (127). 
V. The Statesman and Tyranny 
Jonas’ preference for an ecologically-minded command economy over the free 
market is, I would argue, forgivable in itself. Although he takes the Soviet Union 
as his paradigm case, there is no necessary connection between production for 
need and totalitarianism, and so nothing said in praise of an austere form of 
Marxist-Leninist economics should entail approval for its political model. 
Unfortunately this is not a distinction Jonas upholds. As Walter Weisskopf 
notes, by framing his discussion in terms of the central Cold War belligerents 
Jonas pairs capitalism with democracy and socialism with dictatorship (2014: 
32). And, since he is concerned with which system is in principle best for the 
relationship between humanity and the natural world, rather than for human 
beings alone, Marxist-Leninism appears to offer better prospects. But there is 
another reason why Jonas arrives at this unhappy conclusion, which is that he 
                                                                                                                                                                          
resources, of the environment, of nature, impelled by the pocket-motive and competition which 
we should now salute as having been vindicated” (CR: 217). 
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takes his theory of responsibility to entail, almost by logical extension, a 
paternalistic form of government. We shall see if this is really the case, and how 
it feeds into his acquiescence to an authoritarian politics. 
 Jonas draws a parallel between private and public responsibility, 
between the responsibility of the parent for the infant and that of the statesman 
for their citizens.85 The basis of his comparison is as follows: firstly, both have 
other humans as their object, in accordance with his imperative. Secondly, both 
pertain to the “totality”, “continuity”, and “future” of those beings (IR: 98). The 
quality of totality, refers to “all aspects” of the object of responsibility, “from 
naked existence to highest interests” (101). In the case of the infant this makes 
sense, but regarding citizens is surely too strong a claim. In defence of it Jonas 
cites Aristotle, who argued that the state “came into being so that human life 
would be possible, and continues in being so that the good life is possible”, from 
which Jonas concludes that this “is also the object of the true statesman” (ibid.). 
Clearly, however, the fact that the state exists to make the good life possible 
does not entail that it is concerned with every aspect of citizens’ lives. 
Backtracking somewhat, Jonas then claims that any political executive who 
leads public opinion rather than follows it upholds something of the statesman’s 
ideal. But once again, such leadership is clearly not equivalent to total parental 
responsibility. Perhaps the most we can say is that in securing the body politic 
from outside threats, ensuring law and order, and providing access to education 
and the arts, the statesman has some – not total – responsibility citizens’ lives. 
 The second quality was continuity. As with the above, this follows from 
the vulnerability of the body politic: “the insistent knowledge that the res publica 
too exists precariously” (104). For this reason it “cannot allow itself a vacation or 
pause, for the life of the object continues without intermission” (105). Here 
Jonas’ comparison appears sound, as in neither case is the responsibility 
periodic. Regarding the final quality, however – the future of the object of 
responsibility – it is again questionable. The parent’s responsibility for the infant 
is continuous only up to the point of maturity, and in accordance with this 
immanent telos must gradually relinquish its claim to totality, as Jonas himself 
                                                          
85 Jonas’ main example of the latter is Churchill (IR: 97), who was a “hero” to him (M: 173). A 
contemporary example might be the French President Emmanuel Macron – a one-time 
assistant to Paul Ricœur, and who wrote his Master’s thesis on Machiavelli and Hegel – with his 
self-consciously ‘Jupiterian’ understanding of statesmanship. 
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points out (108). Responsibility for the body politic, by contrast, is unending – 
though, as I say, never total – and passed on from one government to the next 
(117).86  
The final similarity Jonas draws is that in both cases the responsibility is 
also to the future possibility of there being responsibility. As we saw with the 
parent, their responsibility is directed toward the idea of Man as responsible 
agent embodied in the infant. Jonas argues that the statesman, too, in taking up 
a position of responsibility for the polity is duty-bound to ensure the continuation 
of statesmanship: i.e., those who are politically responsible. Echoing his earlier 
categorical imperative Jonas writes: “there follows a highly general, but by no 
means empty, imperative precisely for the statesman […] to do nothing that will 
prevent the further appearance of his like” (118). Here we are inclined to agree 
with Jonas, insofar as the finitude of the human condition requires any political 
leader to prepare, or at the very least not obstruct, others who will eventually 
take their place. To do otherwise would risk the future of the polity for which 
they are responsible. 
 If Jonas underestimates the extent to which the qualities of parental and 
political responsibility differ, he is at least honest about one significant 
difference: the self-chosen nature of the statesman’s responsibility. Jonas notes 
that “nobody is formally bound to run for public office” and take up the mantle of 
responsibility for the community which pre-exists them (96). The infant, by 
contrast, having been brought into existence by the parent makes of them an 
irrevocable call of responsibility. Even so, Jonas goes on to blur the distinction 
by claiming that “he who feels the calling for [leadership] in himself seeks the 
call and demands it as his right” (96-97). Jonas’ invocation of a political call 
echoes, surely deliberately, Heidegger’s discussion of the “call of conscience” in 
Being and Time (2010a: 262). For Heidegger, the “call does not say anything, 
does not give any information about events of the world, has nothing to tell. […] 
‘Nothing’ is called to the self which is summoned, but it is summoned to itself, 
                                                          
86 Jonas notes that any description of a political community as youthful, mature, or decrepit is 
merely figurative, there being – contra Hegel and Marx – no telos to history (109-111). He 
argues that where there appears to have been such, as with Lenin’s action in October 1917 
supposedly fulfilling the prophecy of a proletarian revolution, this is only a post hoc judgement. 
The fact that Lenin acted when he did by itself made the theory correct, as the prediction, 
provided it holds enough appeal, “acquires causal power itself in order to help its truth to gain 
reality, thus with intent contributes to the coming true of its prognoses” (115). 
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that is, to its ownmost potentiality-of-being” (263). Precisely this purely formal 
understanding of conscience allowed Heidegger, Jonas claims, to align himself 
with the Nazis when he felt such a call, as in Heidegger’s philosophy it is “not 
for what or against what one resolves oneself, but that one resolves oneself” 
(HRR: 201). In an excoriating passage Jonas says: 
Heidegger’s being […] is an occurrence of unveiling, a fate-laden 
happening upon thought: so was the Führer and the call of German 
destiny under him: an unveiling of something indeed, a call of being all 
right, fate-laden in every sense: neither then nor now did Heidegger’s 
thought provide a norm by which to decide how to answer such calls – 
linguistically or otherwise: no norm except depth, resolution, and the 
sheer force of being that issues the call. […] Heidegger’s own answer is, 
to the shame of philosophy, on record and, I hope, not forgotten. (PL: 
247) 
According to Jonas’ analysis of the political call of conscience, by contrast, 
“[t]he object of the responsibility is the res publica” and the good life of its 
citizens – all citizens – which it exists to promote (IR: 96). 
 We have seen, then, that Jonas was wrong when comparing parental 
and political responsibility to claim that “common traits make them blend into [...] 
the primordial phenomenon of responsibility” (98). The one arises in witnessing 
the vulnerable infant while the other – assuming it can be properly understood 
as a call – emanates from the collective of which one is a part. This distinction 
goes to the heart of their difference: responsibility for the infant rests on a 
fundamental asymmetry of power and vulnerability between the two parties (at 
least initially), whereas the statesman emerges from a group of equals to which 
they return in due course. It is thanks to this pre-existing equality that the 
statesman’s responsibility lacks totality, and should instead be understood only 
as a temporary suspension of previous relations. As discussed above, however, 
Jonas does not fully acknowledge this and is happy to more or less draw an 
equivalence. He even goes on to argue that in the case of children both forms 
of responsibility coincide. Insofar as to rear a child is also to rear a citizen, the 
role played by education therein means that the state does both, and can even 
assume total responsibility for the infant in the case of parental neglect. This 
[191] 
 
might not be a problematic observation in itself, but what is questionable is that 
Jonas does not say what an inappropriate degree of state intervention in child-
rearing would be. Considering the communist argument for abolishing the family 
altogether, he suggests that “this extreme case only magnifies what we assert 
about the responsibility of the statesmen in general and its affinity to that of 
parents” (103). There can be no doubt, therefore, that Jonas finds a 
paternalistic form of government at least palatable. 
The combination of several factors – freedom understood only positively, 
tolerance of paternalism, and the endorsement of a parsimonious Marxist-
Leninist command economy – leads Jonas’ political theory to a distasteful 
conclusion. Considering again the advantages of the Soviet system to reign in 
Baconian productionism, he counts “total government power” amongst them – 
the only stipulations being that it must be “well-intentioned [and] well-informed” 
(146, 147). The reason given is that “decisions from the top, which can be made 
without prior assent from below, meet with no resistance (except perhaps 
passive) in the social body and […] are assured of implementation” (146). Such 
decisions could include, crucially, those of productive and consumptive austerity 
which run counter to the immediate self-interest of citizens, and would therefore 
“be difficult to get adopted in the democratic process” (ibid.). One example 
given, apparently without irony, is China’s one-child policy: “a shining example 
of what a communist regime can accomplish” (152). In his defence, Jonas 
regards this power as advantageous only if we can trust an authoritarian 
government to take the right course of action (151). He acknowledges that 
failure to use such power wisely risks far worse outcomes than capitalism is 
capable of (145), but unfortunately does not recognise that such failure is, in 
fact, the overwhelming likelihood in an oppressive form of government, as John 
Stuart Mill long ago taught us. 
If this were not concerning enough, Jonas asks how loyalty to such a 
government might be managed. As stated, the sorts of policies Jonas regards 
as necessary for the survival of human and non-human life on Earth are unlikely 
to be popular with the general public, at least without immediate evidence 
before our eyes of the consequences of our productionist form of life. And if by 
‘immediate evidence’ we mean that the tides must begin to rise in London and 
New York before we are spurred on to tackle the ecological crisis, then it will of 
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course be far too late. Hence, for Jonas, the Soviet communist system once 
again appears advantageous, as “only a maximum of politically imposed social 
discipline can ensure the subordination of present advantages to the long-term 
exigencies of the future” (142). The sort of “social discipline” Jonas has in mind 
is not that of violent repression, but rather the ideological cultivation of a public 
“spirit of frugality” (147). The tools of propaganda employed in the Soviet Union 
could be used, Jonas argues in a Machiavellian vein, to inspire not productive 
utopianism but the very reverse: “enthusiasm for austerity” (148). And if the 
propagated truth of our ecological predicament fails to inspire such action, then 
he claims that government would be required to engage in a sort of political 
mythology, convincing citizens that the ascetic society is the good society. He 
speculates that “[p]erhaps this dangerous game of mass deception (Plato’s 
‘noble lie’) is all that politics will eventually have to offer: to give effect to the 
principle of fear under the mask of the principle of hope” (149). 
Jonas thereby arrives at eco-authoritarianism as the most plausible 
alternative to ruin. It cannot be stated forcefully enough that Jonas does not 
regard such governance as ordinarily desirable. On the contrary, when 
considering what constitutes the best state for human beings alone Jonas 
points to democratic government, civil liberties, nationalised industries, and a 
welfare state: i.e., post-war European social democracy (174-175). 
Unfortunately, since he is comfortable with the notion of paternalistic 
governance, and concerned above all with how to rein in productionism and 
thereby ensure that there be a good future for human beings, democracy 
appears in that light as an acceptable, if regrettable, sacrifice. Here Jonas 
betrays an uncomfortable affinity to Heidegger’s post-war political statements. 
After Heidegger had ceased actively promoting the Nazi cause – though he 
never fully renounced it intellectually – he remained openly sceptical about the 
value of democracy. In his infamous Der Spiegel interview, Heidegger says “[a] 
decisive question for me today is how a political system can be assigned to 
today’s technological age, and which political system would that be? I have no 
answer to this question. I am not convinced that it is democracy” (1990: 54). 
Several decades later, also in an interview with Der Spiegel, Jonas comes to a 
strikingly similar conclusion: “I too suspect that democracy in its present state, 
with its short-term orientation, is not a suitable form of government in the long 
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run. And why should it be?” (CBE: 25). So we have here a great irony: in spite 
of his fierce criticisms of Heidegger’s politics and their lack of ethical foundation, 
the political theory Jonas arrives at is, at least in one respect, not so different 
from his teacher’s later public position. 
We have already identified the three philosophical oversights which leads 
Jonas politically and theoretically astray. Firstly, there is his understanding of 
organismic freedom as purely positive, and not also negative. Although there is 
no necessary link between this conception and authoritarianism, the path to the 
latter is certainly cleared if one thinks of freedom solely as the ability to act 
wilfully. The application of this notion of freedom to economics is acceptable, if 
severe, but its application to political life more broadly has unpalatable 
consequences, as we have seen. Secondly, there is his binary framing of 
political alternatives – capitalist democracy versus Soviet communism – as 
though the economic and political domains are inseparable either in practice or 
in principle.  
The third and final reason Jonas errs is that he mistakenly compares 
responsibility for the infant to the statesman’s responsibility for their citizens. In 
this Jonas in fact betrays the influence of Gnosticism, as becomes clear when 
we recall Voegelin’s identification of how the Gnostic principle is at work in 
modern politics. The ‘immanentisation of the eschaton’ has two key facets: that 
there is a telos to history, discernible only by the few, and that this telos leads to 
a paradisaical end state. Although the goal of Jonas’ politics is certainly not 
utopian, and to that extent clearly evades the ecologically ruinous Gnosticism of 
Bacon, in his analysis of statesmanship Jonas’ does conform to the tendency. 
The proper statesman, according to Jonas, is not only an exemplary individual, 
but also one who correctly recognises the truth and governs in accordance with 
it. And should that truth elude the polloi, led astray by their material wants, the 
statesman is obliged to govern against their express interests in the name of 
their true interests. Indeed, Voegelin notes that this very aspect of Gnostic 
movements is what leads them so easily into totalitarianism (1952: 132). This is 
the spectre of Gnosticism Jonas failed to banish from his thinking, and that he 
cites the noble lie of Plato – who is surely second only to Descartes in 
philosophically exemplifying the Gnostic principle – is all-too apt.  
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VI. Rival Interpretations of Jonas’ Politics 
(α) Dinneen’s Heuristic Reading 
Can Jonas’ political ecology be saved, and if so, how? As stated earlier, Nathan 
Dineen suggests one original – if not entirely convincing – way of doing so.87 He 
stresses the role played by the heuristic of fear in Jonas’ political thought, and 
argues that the subsequent analysis of authoritarianism can only be understood 
in light of it. He specifically points to a passage which precedes the discussion 
of Marxist-Leninism’s advantages over capitalism, where Jonas says: “[a]ll this 
holds on the assumption made here that we live in an apocalyptic situation, that 
is, under the threat of a universal catastrophe if we let things take their present 
course” (IR: 140). For Dineen this reveals Jonas’ true and much-misunderstood 
intention: that if we fail to prevent ecological collapse then tyranny will force 
itself upon us by necessity, and it is therefore our duty to envision this possible 
outcome precisely to avert it. Hence the invocation above of “universal 
catastrophe” – one which is both ecological and social. In this way Jonas can be 
understood not as endorsing authoritarianism, but in fact the very opposite: 
engaging in the kind of “well-informed thought experiment” that his heuristic 
demanded so as to alert us to the likely terrible outcome of our present course 
of action. In Dineen’s words: “Jonas uses political dystopianism to counter the 
possibility of a political dystopia from coming into being” (2014: 18). 
 Dineen’s interpretative twist finds textual support in a lecture (which he 
does not cite) where Jonas says the following: 
My dire prognosis that not only our material standard of living but also 
our democratic freedoms would fall victim to the growing pressure of a 
worldwide ecological crisis, until finally there would remain only some 
form of tyranny that would try to save the situation, has led to the 
accusation that I am defending dictatorship as a solution to our problems. 
I shall ignore what is a confusion between warning and recommendation. 
[…] This is, I want to emphasize, a worst-case scenario, and it is the 
foremost task of responsibility at this particular moment in world history 
to prevent it from happening. (MM: 111-112, emphasis added) 
                                                          
87 This interpretation can also be found – albeit in an undeveloped form – in Kurasawa, who 
classifies Jonas as a “[l]eft dystopian” (2007: 113). 
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We could also point to a late interview in which Jonas suggests that “[i]n a 
lifeboat situation all rules cease to apply”, and therefore “we must prevent that 
lifeboat situation from coming about” (IHJ: 367). It appears, then, that Dineen is 
correct to say that Jonas’s discussion of tyranny is an application of his heuristic 
of fear to the domain of political theory. On this reading the true meaning of The 
Imperative only emerges when considered as a whole, with the key argument of 
the second chapter – that “the creatively imagined malum” can “instill in us the 
fear whose guidance we need” (IR: 27) – explaining why a terrible political 
future is envisioned in the fifth chapter. 
The suspicion lingers, however, that Jonas’ explanation above – given at 
a conference organised by the social-democratic Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung – may 
simply be an ex post facto excuse in response to the heavy criticism he 
received. The main reason for thinking so is the absence of evidence in The 
Imperative that Jonas’ advocacy of tyranny was not literal. The sole passage 
Dineen points to as evidence could easily be read as meaning that since we live 
in an “apocalyptic situation” right now the political recommendations are meant 
accordingly. Then there is Jonas’ admission that he does not “stand aghast at 
the thought” of using a noble lie to lead the population into austerity (149). This 
does not sound like part of an elaborate thought experiment, but very much 
sincere, which brings us to a fundamental problem with Dineen’s reading: it 
becomes unclear when we can take Jonas at face value and when we must 
assume he is speaking heuristically. The discussion of the statesman’s 
responsibility – which as we have shown is clearly paternalistic, paving the way 
for authoritarianism – is presented as following on principle from his theory of 
responsibility. At what point in this chain does Jonas’ argument cease to be 
serious? For all these reasons it seems more likely that Jonas’ arguments in 
The Imperative are literal.  
Taking together various remarks, his post-Imperative position on the 
necessity of authoritarianism appears to be as follows: ecological collapse is 
one possible future but not yet a certainty, hence “at this moment fatalism is a 
deadly sin” (FWT: 54). For one thing, preliminary ecological shocks – the initial 
tremors before the earthquake – may well spur us on to act before it is too late. 
Harking back to the heuristic of fear, Jonas speculates that this might be 
enough to prevent the worst-case scenario of environmental turmoil leading to 
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an eco-dictatorship: “[w]hat I can imagine […] readily is an outbreak of dire 
events leading to compromise among economic, political, and social power 
groups who would then reach an arrangement that is relatively acceptable in 
terms of people and planet” (CBE: 25). In the event that we should fail to take 
such action, however, he is willing to make the “terrible concession” that 
“tyranny would still be better than total ruin” (MM: 111-112). It would in those 
circumstances alone be acceptable for a government to “employ such means, 
which we now abhor or at least deplore, in order to save their own existence” 
(IHJ: 366). Such a system is therefore now conceived of as a last resort, 
preferable only to an alternative of ecological collapse precipitating a new 
“stage of primitivism”: the future McCarthy envisions of “mass poverty, mass 
death and mass murder, the loss of all treasures that spirit has produced” (CBE: 
22).  
A more welcome development is that Jonas is at this point no longer 
under any illusions as to the dangers of tyranny: 
We can design a plan in theory for a dictatorship of saviors of humanity. 
But what makes us think that a truly selfless elite will come to power, will 
remain selfless, and, what is more, will be appreciated for its 
selflessness? That idea totally exceeds my powers of imagination. It is a 
kind of utopianism that cannot be translated into reality. (25) 
This is little comfort, however, as it means he later regarded the prospect of a 
benign eco-dictatorship as utopian, and yet could still countenance it. Jonas’ 
final caveat is that if an eco-dictatorship should prove necessary, he hopes this 
will be a temporary measure only, holding freedom in trust until such a time as it 
might be allowed to flourish once more: 
We can make a terrible concession to the primacy of physical survival in 
the conviction that the ontological capacity for freedom, inseparable as it 
is from man’s being, cannot really be extinguished, only temporarily 
banished from the public realm. […] Given this faith, we have reason to 
hope that, as long as there are human beings who survive, the image of 
God will continue to exist along with them and will wait in concealment 
for its new hour. (MM: 112) 
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With this remark – bleak partly because of its collapse into eschatology – Jonas’ 
final word on authoritarianism fails to satisfy. Indeed, it very much conforms to 
Voegelin’s observation that Gnostic political movements, in arguing for a truth 
revealed only to the few, necessarily “repress the truth of the soul” (1952: 165). 
(β) Wolin’s Vitalist Reading 
If, as I suggest, Jonas initially regarded authoritarianism as our best 
chance of survival, does it follow that his underlying theoretical framework – the 
ethic of responsibility, heuristic of fear, and precautionary principle – is also 
objectionable, his thought having revealed its true face? Richard Wolin argues 
as much in his book Heidegger’s Children (2015: 101-133), an interpretation we 
shall briefly consider as an alternative to Dinneen’s. Wolin provocatively argues 
that Jonas’ ethical, political, and metaphysical commitments place him in the 
tradition of Lebensphilosophie: the life-oriented school of German thought 
whose representatives include Nietzsche, Oswald Spengler, Ludwig Klages, 
Ernst Jünger, and – at least in some respects – Heidegger. One immediately 
notes a political commonality amongst these thinkers in their proximity to 
fascism, either through intellectual association, appropriation, or, as in 
Heidegger’s case, active participation. The explanation for this is a shared 
hostility to the modern epoch. According to the Lebensphilosophen, modernity’s 
rejection of life, quality, and Seele in favour of materialism, equality, and Geist 
has led to the demise of Western humanity. The charge levelled by Wolin is that 
Jonas’ analysis – that the scientific revolution has led to nihilism and 
technological threats to the existence and essence of humanity – amounts to 
more or less the same.  
In support of this claim Wolin cites Jonas’ ethical foundations, which as 
we saw involve a recognition of the intrinsic value of non-human life, in turn 
accounting for our responsibility towards it for its own sake. For Wolin, a “risk 
entailed by Jonas’s insistence on life as an absolute value is that our conception 
of the human good is devalued. Instead of setting our sights high and aiming at 
a notion of the good […] Jonas’s metaphysical vitalism tends to privilege ‘mere 
life’ or survival” (121). According to Wolin, this “quasi-Darwinian” (124) tendency 
explains Jonas’ acquiescence to authoritarianism, preserving life even at the 
cost of the good life. The underlying motivation is a “resolutely antimodern 
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epistemological orientation” (125) and “a disconsolate, Spenglerian sensibility” 
(129).  As final proof Wolin points to an interview in which Jonas rhetorically 
asks: 
Was modernity perhaps a mistake that needs to be corrected? Are we on 
the right path with this combination of scientific/technological progress 
and increased individual freedom? Has the modern age put us in certain 
respects on the wrong track, which must not be pursued further? (CBE: 
26) 
Jonas offers no answer to these questions, but a critic might be able to divine 
one from his heuristic of fear. If we apply the latter to the trajectory of 
technological civilisation as a whole, then presumably the entire modern epoch, 
which eventually gave rise to the ecological crisis, was indeed an error which 
ought to have been avoided. 
However, the charge of anti-modernism only holds if one ignores key 
moments in Jonas’ thinking. Yes, he bases his politics on his ethics, and his 
ethics emerge from his philosophy of life. But one can only arrive at Wolin’s 
conclusion by overlooking the all-important idea of Man as a moral being, which 
tells us both why and how humanity must continue to be: the overriding 
importance of this duty is precisely why his ethics remains humanistic. Then 
there is Jonas’ heuristic of fear which does not, in fact, entail that modernity was 
an error. The heuristic requires that we extrapolate “from presently recognizable 
trends in the technologic-industrial process”. This means that action to avert the 
ecological crisis should have been taken from roughly the 1960s, and our great 
sin is in failing to do so from that point on. It goes without saying that Jonas 
does not believe early modern Europeans should have envisaged, and acted to 
prevent, the ecological destruction which would eventually follow from the 
scientific revolution, since it was not at that time conceivable as an empirically-
informed prediction. It is true that Jonas suggested we not “be too modern” (SE: 
20), but this was precisely a matter of rejecting “certain developments which are 
ominous, which are dangerous, or which are undesirable”, not that “modernity 
as such was somehow a mistake” (OR: 3).  
Finally there is the charge of a reactionary politics. It certainly cannot be 
denied that Jonas’s theory of the state leads to an authoritarian conclusion, and 
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to that extent I share Wolin’s distaste. But it is not the case, as Wolin claims, 
that social democracy “fails to make an impression” on Jonas (2015: 126) – 
quite the opposite. And we must also note that Jonas’ political thought owes 
nothing to a social-Darwinian hierarchy of the fittest, a theory of ‘natural 
characterology’, or indeed any comparison with the natural world of the sort 
favoured by the Lebensphilosophen. On the contrary, he discusses at length the 
overwhelming dissimilarities between non-human life and the strictly symbolic 
and open-ended constitution of human society (OF II: 22-41). Therefore Jonas’ 
theory of the state, however objectionable, does not truly resemble that of a 
Lebensphilosoph like Spengler. 
VII. The Civic Republican Alternative 
One might ask: how is Dinneen right to say that Jonas’ ethic of responsibility, 
heuristic of fear, and precautionary principle are of genuine and ongoing value, 
at the same time as Wolin is right that Jonas’ theory of the state is authoritarian, 
given that the latter is meant to follow from the former? The answer is that both 
are wrong to think that Jonas’ theory of the state follows from his ethic of 
responsibility and philosophy of life. In truth, this is also an error Jonas himself 
makes, misapplying notions from the ethical and metaphysical spheres to that 
of politics.  
Firstly there is the account of freedom Jonas uses to characterise life, 
which is solely positive. Already inaccurate as a description of the freedom open 
to organismic being, when carried over to the domain of human political activity 
it also offers no basis to resist authoritarianism. Secondly, as discussed above, 
Jonas’ account of the statesman’s responsibility as akin to that of a parent for 
their child all too easily collapses into paternalism. Jonas’ argument for 
paternalism, contrary to what he apparently believed, is actually at odds with his 
theory of responsibility. For the parent’s responsibility for the infant “is to see 
that responsibility itself is not stifled, whether from its source within or from 
constraints without” (IR: 107). The latter is precisely what Jonas does when 
arguing that freedom be banished from the public realm, as the ability to 
collectively deliberate and shape our existence is the political dimension of 
moral responsibility. Not for nothing did Kant argue that a Kingdom of Ends 
followed from our free will and human dignity. 
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Taking a cue from Kant I shall now attempt to develop an alternative 
political model from Jonas’ categorical imperative: one which recognises the 
value of republican freedom from domination. Not only does this move fully 
capture the freedom of living beings, it also follows, I suggest, from the 
responsibility engendered between equals discussed in the previous chapter. 
Thus it upholds, rather than contradicts, Jonas’ theory of responsibility by 
extending it to the res publica. Moreover, a civic republican interpretation can 
even find textual support in his post-Imperative work. As Jonas retreated from 
viewing authoritarianism as our best hope for survival, he began to sketch out 
something like an ecological republicanism as the ideal political embodiment of 
responsibility. When we synthesise his various suggestions and asides we shall 
see that it offers a sadly incomplete alternative to his earlier theory of the state, 
and a way of redeeming Jonas as a political theorist. 
(α) Freedom as Non-Domination 
We mentioned at the start of this chapter that Jonas understood the 
political realm to be a manifestation of humanity’s existential freedom: one 
which did not by itself recommend any politically substantive form of freedom. In 
search of such a theory, however, we might draw on his discussion of the 
Athenian city-state. In line with his philosophy of life, Jonas characterises the 
freedom afforded by the polis as still, in one sense, needful, since “man 
imposes on himself by the ordering of his life through the act of forming 
civilisations” the obligation to partake in political action (PF: 264). More 
specifically, “to be a citizen of the Greek polis means to be a lawgiver and to be 
a lawgiver means to institute orders that bind others as well as oneself”: 
therefore “this is a freedom which acknowledges voluntary restrictions” (263). Of 
course, in ancient Athens the status of citizen was restricted to propertied, 
slave-owning men. The slave, by contrast, is unfree since “deprived of making 
use of [his] will through the overpowering condition of a social order in which the 
sanctions imposed on his opposing the will of his master are overwhelming” 
(257). Both the full freedom of the Greek citizen and the captivity of the slave 
are therefore to be understood as relational, a “power-condition” which is 
“embodied in a legal order” devised by citizens (ibid.).  
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This depiction of freedom and its opposite is neither purely positive nor 
strictly negative, but is instead closer to the republican variety: freedom 
understood as non-domination. According to Philip Pettit, republican freedom “is 
negative to the extent that it requires the absence of domination by others” and 
“positive to the extent that, at least in one respect, it needs something more 
than the absence of interference; it requires security against […] interference on 
an arbitrary basis” (1997: 51, emphasis added). What provides this security? It 
is, Pettit says, the legal order that citizens form through deliberation. In both 
respects Jonas’ presentation of the polis broadly aligns with this definition of 
freedom: the slave is unfree not because they are interfered with per se, but 
because they are dominated – interfered with totally and arbitrarily – whereas 
the citizen’s freedom from domination is secured by the legal order they 
participate in constituting. The negative aspect is the absence of domination, 
and the positive the active constitution of the legal order which secures that 
non-domination. It goes without saying that the restriction of citizenship to 
propertied males is reprehensible, but this classical feature is by no means 
inherent to the civic republican tradition. On the contrary, in 17th and 18th 
century Europe and North America the republican ideal was gradually extended, 
before being superseded by Benthamite liberalism. Liberalism, the poor relation 
of republicanism and which remains the dominant political ideology of the West, 
holds freedom to be largely negative. To be truly free, however, requires that 
responsible agents partake in what Arendt, retrieving the ideal of the polis from 
antiquity, saw as the highest dimension of the human condition: the discursive 
constitution of our collective life in political action (1958: 7-9). 
Jonas was initially highly sceptical of the possibility of recovering the 
Greek polis or Roman res publica for our times. Speaking of the nostalgia for 
antiquity characterising the work of three fellow émigrés – Arendt, Voegelin, and 
Leo Strauss – he says: 
To be sure, the memory of those times […] is […] essential for our not 
getting lost in the necessities and compulsions and pushes of our 
modern age, which certainly has the danger of estranging us entirely 
from these eternal origins. But to hark back to them as a still available 
option is an anachronism, an escapism. (OR: 3) 
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Nevertheless, Jonas later drew on the republican ideal of citizenship as a way 
to cultivate new ecologically appropriate virtues. Speaking shortly before the 
end of his life, Jonas says: 
This is the one thing that keeps alive in me a modest hope […]: that the 
sustained reflexion on the human good, on what is a worthy life for man, 
individually and collectively, and what we owe to it, may (with the help of 
some hard lessons) generate an internal tribunal of common conscience 
and good taste, to which even the noncaring must pay some obeisance, 
because too blatant a transgression of its norms would incur the censure 
or revulsion of one’s fellow citizens. (CR: 217) 
We have here the familiar invocation of ‘hard lessons’, presumably of the 
ecological variety and generating knowledge in accordance with the heuristic of 
fear. But we also have a reference to citizens’ collective cultivation of the good, 
which he elsewhere suggests might then be “raised by the power of custom to a 
social norm” (TME: 75).88 Drawing on other late remarks I will attempt to 
develop this line of thought. 
 Responsibility can morally underpin both freedom from domination and 
the cultivation of ecological virtues which facilitate it. However, this would not be 
responsibility of the private kind – the parent-child paradigm – which proved so 
problematic when transposed to the public sphere domain. Instead we would 
point to a different sort of responsibility, discussed in the previous chapter: 
responsibility amongst equals. This form of responsibility, that of the community 
for each individual, follows from the limitations, vulnerabilities, and 
dependencies constitutive of the human condition, interpreted through our moral 
tradition. If our social and symbolic existence is the ontological ground of the 
polis, it is the “nonautarky of man”, as Jonas puts it, which makes the political 
realm necessary (IR: 98). And our moral tradition, in recognition of this fact, 
instils in us a public responsibility to care for one another precisely because 
each of us belongs to the wider group which has greater power than any one 
member. This is, for example, the moral foundation of collective care for those 
living in hardship (economic or otherwise). The subjective aspect of this 
responsibility is known to us from the all-too-frequent encounter – at least on 
                                                          
88 The 1983 essay in which he argues this – ‘Auf der Schwelle der Zukunft’ – is in my opinion 
the turning point in Jonas’ political thinking. 
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the streets of British cities – with homelessness and destitution. The call of 
responsibility is made of us less as an individual – since few of us can alone 
fully relieve others from poverty – but is rather made of us as a member of the 
community, because before us is a vulnerable good within our collective power 
to protect. 
As stated, this alternative form of responsibility might underpin the 
republican kind of freedom described above. In order to be positively free 
citizenship involves participating in the establishment of the legal order, but to 
do so on an equal basis requires freedom from domination. As indicated, one 
example which ought to be guaranteed is support for vulnerable citizens: both 
freeing them from the domination of destitution and freeing them to participate 
in public life. More fundamental, however, are obligations to safeguard the 
existence and integrity of the polis itself, for without this, of course, it cannot 
afford freedom to each member. In antiquity such safeguards included personal 
and property rights, provocatio (in the Roman Republic, at least), military 
service, and a range of other institutions to protect citizens and the polis from 
internal disorder and external threats. Whichever of these we deemed 
necessary to preserve, contemporary republicanism would now also have to 
consider the ecological sustainability of the polis, since its bare existence is 
imperilled through our own technological and economic activity. In other words, 
our responsibility to ensure the survival of the polis for the sake of each member 
means collectively imposing limits on economic development and activity. We 
have here a public manifestation of responsibility for the idea of Man, but a call 
made to all of us as citizens, rather than just the paternalistic statesman. 
(β) The Institutions of Freedom 
Jonas makes three suggestions regarding institutions which might 
cultivate and formalise the norms which could guarantee such sustainability.89 
The first is education. In The Imperative Jonas had characterised education as 
the space where private and public responsibility coincided, insofar as both 
parent and state are responsible for the child’s future (102-103). The republican 
alternative I have been developing would here agree, but only by first 
                                                          
89 Jonas also suggests that we might witness the arrival of a “bizarre new religion” demanding 
“the utmost in asceticism” – a suggestion reminiscent of Heidegger’s claim that only a god can 
save us now – but dismisses this option out of hand: “there’s no point in speculating about such 
things” (CBE: 23-24). 
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incorporating its different understanding of public responsibility. On the 
paternalistic model of governance Jonas advocated, education, to the degree 
that it is a public responsibility, would presumably be an imposition of 
statesmen. According to the republican alternative, however, education would 
be guided by the responsibility of equals, thereby aiming to develop equal 
citizens who may partake in the collective life of the polis. As to the content of 
such an education, Jonas gives us a clue: 
Through education, through the way we bring up our youngsters and 
inculcate a style of life, we can have an influence on the forming of our 
consumption habits and make a certain frugality, a greater modesty, part 
of the social climate – or, [to] put it the other way, impose some penalty 
of shame, a social blemish[,] on excessive and vulgar hedonism [and] 
consumerism. (CR: 217) 
This appears to refer to education’s capacity to cultivate virtue and vice, one 
that it already exercises, but now with the end of upholding our new ecological 
responsibilities. I will briefly attempt to justify this claim. 
As we saw in Chapter Three, the virtues are character traits which, along 
with material and other circumstantial factors, contribute to flourishing 
(eudaimonia). An uncontroversial list of virtues – to those belonging to the 
Western tradition – would include courage, honesty, benevolence, and wisdom. 
The vices play an opposing role, diminishing eudaimonia through either an 
excess or deficiency of a particular trait: the virtue of courage, for instance, 
occupies the ideal middle ground between recklessness and cowardice. Now, 
the cultivation of virtue is not a merely private concern. According to Aristotle, 
politics aims at citizens’ common good: either that which is good for all, or a 
good which can only be achieved by the collective (freedom from domination, 
we might note, fulfils both definitions). More specifically, public education – as 
well as private – in part concerns morality. In addition to teaching rules of 
conduct, moral education aims to cultivate virtue and discourage vice, drawing 
on a moral tradition for its content. Jonas’ hope is that collective and sustained 
reflection on our new responsibilities might determine new ecological virtues 
and vices, which would then be incorporated into education. The core virtues he 
identifies are “caution”, “frugality”, and “modesty” (TME: 67) – all ancient, 
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forgotten, and now in need of revival – to which we might add respect for life. 
The vices he points to are vulgar hedonism and consumerism, which, 
preventing us from carrying out our duties, would accordingly be a source of 
shame (69). Through this derivation of newly appropriate virtues and vices, 
citizens would better carry out their responsibilities: thus Jonas’ ethics once 
again demonstrates its Kantianism. 
The second institution we could point to is law, deriving moral justification 
from the norms just mentioned. Here Jonas explicitly takes inspiration from 
antiquity: 
[F]reedom can exist only if it limits itself. The unlimited freedom of the 
individual destroys itself because it is incompatible with the freedoms of 
the many […]. In ancient Rome, for example, there were laws limiting 
private ostentation. Elected censors had the right to investigate whether 
displays of luxury were excessive. […] This was a major infringement of 
personal freedom, but it was done specifically in the name of a self-
governing citizenry. (CBE: 25-26) 
Building on our discussion so far, we may say that although limitations on 
personal consumption clearly violate negative freedom from interference, they 
are nevertheless compatible with republican freedom from domination. If the 
citizenship endorsed legislation to limit consumption, for example, this would be 
justified by increasing the ecological sustainability of the polis, and conforming 
to the aforementioned virtues which help safeguard the existence and essence 
of humanity. One might object that there is a danger here in that any public 
intrusion in the sphere of the individual could then be justified in the name of the 
polis and the idea of Man. This is a real worry, to be sure, reminiscent of an 
objection often levelled at Rousseau’s republicanism: if the general will is 
sovereign, then the individual may succumb to a tyranny of the majority. As 
Pettit argues, government would be at risk of becoming “a law unto itself” and 
the individual “vulnerable both in relation to the state and in relation to our fellow 
citizens” (2012: 24-25). This problem is not inherent to republicanism, however. 
The Anglo-American tradition – Locke, Harrington, Madison, and Jefferson – 
stressed the kinds of institutional safeguards which protect individuals and 
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ensure contestability of legislation, thereby mitigating an otherwise legitimate 
concern. 
The final suggestion which may be extracted from Jonas’ later work 
pertains to international law and governance. Tackling the ecological crisis is 
predominantly the responsibility of industrialised nations, and so co-ordination 
of this effort will have to be – at least to some extent – an international effort. In 
The Imperative Jonas had envisioned a global government as best able to rise 
to this challenge, but given that the alternative I am developing takes inspiration 
from the polis or res publica – i.e., the city-state, or at most the nation-state – it 
appears to be incompatible with operating on such a scale. It is true that the 
Roman Republic, even before its transition into the Empire, stretched across the 
Mediterranean, and was therefore not geographically confined in the same way 
as the Athenian city-state. But this was, of course, achieved militarily, and 
therefore at odds with the central republican principle of freedom from 
domination.  
Jonas suggests, therefore, that the solution must be the political creation 
of a “peaceably united humanity” (TME: 71). This would have to be achieved 
through international law and treaties binding individual polities: “it is clear to me 
that bodies must be established which address these [global] issues and enjoy 
a sort of international authority which governments and corporations cannot 
easily escape. […] This would be a step on the road to a real cosmopolis” 
(FWT: 118). Through such a system – a United Nations with real authority, 
perhaps – the polis would be situated within a cosmopolis, and politics could 
thereby legislate on the global workings of technological civilisation. Jonas 
hopes that on such a basis the ecological crisis might be averted, without 
authoritarianism becoming a necessity. To be sure, this goal may well be 
utopian. Jonas does not offer much detail as to how it might be achieved, and 
indeed, “a mysterious evolution of mankind toward peace and world order” is 
included by Voegelin in his list of Gnostic utopias (1952: 172). Jonas concedes 
as much, but with the mere possibility of an internationalist solution to the threat 
of ecological ruin is “more hopeful than at the point when, fifteen years ago, I 
published my book Das Prinzip Verantwortung” (FWT: 119). On an 
uncharacteristically optimistic note, then, I conclude my attempt at devising an 
alternative political theory from Jonas’ work. 
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VIII. Responsible Freedom 
Jonas’ political philosophy is quite clearly the most objectionable component of 
his philosophical system. This is demonstrated not only by the criticisms 
levelled at his theory in The Imperative, but also by the fact that my attempt to 
find an alternative, in civic republicanism, could only draw on suggestive 
remarks and asides. I hope, however, that I have been fairer to Jonas’ 
intentions than more vehement critics such as Wolin, while not making excuses 
for his obviously paternalistic and authoritarian arguments, in the manner of 
Dineen. Moreover, Jonas’ contributions as a political theorist are not without 
merit. His rejection of the liberal assumption of neutrality between competing 
conceptions of the good, though controversial, is defensible given that the moral 
content he suggests is responsibility for the idea of Man and life on Earth: duties 
to which no-one could reasonably object. Then there was his heuristic of fear 
and associated precautionary principle, the latter of which has even been taken 
up, in weaker forms, by the United Nations and European Union. 
Finally there was Jonas’ nascent republicanism. This embodiment of the 
imperative of responsibility derives its appeal, in part, from the flaws of his prior 
attempt, in particular the three key errors made in his argumentative chain: 
firstly, the description of freedom as purely positive; secondly, Jonas’ framing of 
the choice between political systems as simply capitalist democracy or 
communist dictatorship; and finally, the analogy he drew between political 
responsibility and the parent’s responsibility for the child. Correcting the first 
mistake is simple enough, as it merely requires a demonstration of the fact that 
freedom is, from human beings all the way down the tree of life, both positive 
and negative. The second error is also easy enough to rectify, as the economic 
and political spheres can be logically distinguished: we are then able to accept 
that an alternative to Baconian economic productionism is indeed necessary, 
while rejecting the Marxist-Leninist form Jonas considers. The third mistake is 
corrected by noting that political responsibility follows not from the private, 
‘vertical’ relation of parent and child, but rather the public, ‘horizontal’ relation 
between equal adults. Taking all three corrections together shows us how 
ecological goals might be achieved without recourse to authoritarianism: 
namely, through the tradition of civic republicanism. The republican alternative, 
as I have sought to appropriate it, is able to justify productive and consumptive 
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constraints through the political domain, without sacrificing freedom or simply 
reducing it to its positive form. As such, the polis or res publica becomes the 
ideal of a politics of responsibility, ensuring the continued existence of humanity 
through the legal order and the cultivation of new ecological virtues. Once more, 
then, a solution to the failures of modernity can take inspiration from Aristotle. 
It might be argued that this alternative recasts Jonas as one of those 
thinkers he mocked for nostalgically harking back to antiquity: Arendt, Voegelin, 
and Strauss. But in a sense Jonas’ political philosophy as presented in The 
Imperative already conforms to this type. The only the difference is that 
whereas Arendt, say, sought to revive the highest aspects of classical political 
theory, Jonas draws on the most dangerous. I have in mind the dictatorial 
powers which the Roman Republic would temporarily grant to a chosen 
magistrate in times of crisis. The Senate would suspend democracy for six 
months or until the danger to the Republic, either internal or external, had been 
dealt with. Jonas’ call for a suspension of democracy to confront the ecological 
crisis – a suspension which he later specified should last only as long as is 
necessary – is curiously reminiscent of this constitutional practice. By contrast, 
my attempt to develop an ecological republicanism from other aspects of his 
thought neatly aligns with the normal conditions of the Roman Republic: a 
clearly preferable source of inspiration. Moreover, it also conforms to a principle 
which Jonas himself advocated: “to keep watch over the humaneness of the 
measures by means of which we are trying to avert catastrophe. For these 
measures could be such that the whole thing we are trying to save goes to the 











Chapter Six: Bioethics and the ‘Idea of Man’ 
I. Responsibility for Human Dignity  
Of the novel ethical problems posed by technological civilisation, we have so far 
discussed those relating to the environment, and analysed Jonas’ theory of 
responsibility accordingly. Establishing the norms which might prevent 
ecological catastrophe was, after all, the central task that he ascribed to moral 
and political philosophy (MM: 51), and this of course motivated The Imperative 
of Responsibility. But Jonas’ ethics has a second practical dimension, pertaining 
to biotechnology and the life sciences. The importance of bioethics to his 
thought, and its connection to his wider philosophical system, is clear from the 
reference in The Imperative to an envisioned “applied” counterpart dealing with 
such issues (IR: 21). Jonas’ subsequent volume, Technik, Medizin und Ethik, 
explicitly fulfils that promise (TME: 9), collecting the majority of his essays on 
bioethical issues. In this chapter we shall see how these writings relate to his 
theory of responsibility, by allowing us to think through the novel problems 
posed by developments in biotechnology and the life sciences. In particular, we 
shall see that Jonas was an early and perceptive critic of what has since 
become known as transhumanism: the drive to alter the human condition itself 
through biotechnology. As such, his thinking once again demonstrates its 
contemporary relevance. 
According to Albert Jonsen, “Jonas was the first philosopher of eminence 
to arrive on the medical ethics scene”, but his influence was limited thanks to a 
style which “was, perhaps, too ontological and conservative for the typical 
American ethicist” (1998: 77).90 If accurate, this is less a reflection of Jonas’ 
significance than of the lamentable state of Anglophone bioethics. What is true 
is that Jonas’ arguments draw on his wider ethical and metaphysical thought, 
which no doubt limits their appeal in a discipline oriented toward instrumental 
solutions. And again, it is true that on occasion the force of Jonas’ rhetoric – as 
distinct from the substance of his arguments – can be dogmatic. He claims, 
however, that both features are part of an attempt to counterbalance the 
                                                          
90 One might note that Jonas’ arguments have influenced the American ‘bioconservative’ school 
of thought, most notably through the work of Francis Fukuyama (2002) and Leon Kass. Indeed, 
Kass co-dedicated Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity to Jonas for his “moral passion and 
philosophical courage” (2002: 299). Furthermore, his bioethical thought received some degree 
of public recognition via testimonies given to the US Senate. 
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reckless pursuit of progress, crudely understood, of which Anglo-Saxon 
bioethicists are so prone (IR: 203). In truth, a nuanced approach is more 
appropriate given the central context in which bioethical issues arise: 
healthcare. Healthcare has an inherent normative thrust – curing disease – 
marking it out from technē as such (IR: 4). In this context, the ethicist cannot 
often prescribe “a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ […]; instead, we find an area of fluid 
boundaries, subtle value judgments, and controversial decisions” (MM: 50).  
At this point, one might ask exactly why bioethics may make 
prescriptions for scientific and technological research – the arts and humanities, 
by contrast, are subject to no such public sanctions. The difference, of course, 
is that the latter belong exclusively to the domain of speech and ideas, whereas 
the former also belong to the realm of action. As we saw in the very first 
chapter, modern natural science is distinguished from its pre-modern forebear 
by emphasising experimentation, from which theory subsequently follows. As 
such, modern science – both natural and social – is inseparably tied to practical 
action. While freedom of expression is conceivably an absolute right, there is no 
equivalent right to freedom of action: we regulate action where there is the risk 
of wrongdoing or harm to others (SB: 255-8). This includes, least 
controversially, material and personal harms captured by a hedonic calculus. 
Jonas’ central concern, however, is that even with a utilitarian sanction, the will 
to medically assist can come into “conflict with human dignity” (ibid.). We shall 
see that this worry motivates his reflections on experimentation on human 
beings, medical issues at the threshold of life and death, and genetic 
engineering. Even if moral philosophy, in response to such cases, “has nothing 
to offer except compromises between conflicting principles” (ibid.), it remains a 
responsibility to think through such developments and ensure that the highest 
good is not sacrificed in the name of amelioration. 
 How, then, are such issues to be adjudicated? From where do we derive 
our notion of human dignity, and how is it meaningfully substantiated? 
Postponing the former, procedural question for now, Jonas provides an answer 
to the latter with his heuristic of fear and ethic of responsibility. We recall from 
previous chapters that the ultimate object of our responsibility was the idea of 
Man as a moral being, requiring, by necessity, the presence of human life as its 
bearer. This was enough to account for a responsibility to ensure the existence 
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of future generations, but it does not tell us a great deal about how human life 
ought to be, only that it must have the formal capacity for morality. This 
functioned as an ethical absolute in Jonas’ new categorical imperative (‘Act so 
that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine 
human life’), hence those developments which threaten the existence of 
humanity as a moral being can be ruled out simpliciter. In the realm of the life 
sciences these are few, however. Certainly, one can envisage a stunted, 
stupefied form of human life biotechnologically stripped of its capacity to act 
morally (such beings might even be seen as useful to states in certain military 
contexts). In destroying the human essence, a crime even in a single instance, 
this would obviously fall foul of Jonas’ categorical imperative, but the vast 
majority of bioethical issues are not so easy to evaluate according to his 
imperative. 
The threats to the idea of Man which typically follow from biotechnology 
and the life sciences are more ambivalent, requiring the kind of deliberation 
mentioned above. It is in this connection that Jonas’ heuristic of fear has 
another role to play. We recall from the previous chapter that the heuristic’s 
function was to help us avert courses of action in which the existence and 
essence of human life was threatened. As stated, in the cases of humanity’s 
bare existence or its capacity for morality the nature of the threat is fairly clear. 
But for those instances where the human essence might be compromised or 
violated, the fear itself helps us to identify and better understand precisely what 
is at stake: “we need the threat to the image of man – and rather specific kinds 
of threat – to assure ourselves of his true image by the very recoil from these 
threats” (IR: 26-27, emphasis removed). Now, this might sound circular, 
presupposing that which is subsequently discovered: as though we imagine a 
threat to the idea of Man, but only through our fearful response to that threat do 
we discover the idea of Man. However, whilst Jonas admits that his argument 
has an air of paradox about it, it is not, I think, circular in the sense just given. 
What I take Jonas to mean is the following: the demands made of us by human 
dignity – which follows, we recall, from our status as moral beings – only reveal 
themselves when we perceive a violation of that dignity. It is in this sense that 
we discover the ‘full’ idea of Man, and hence come to “know the thing at stake 
only when we know that it is at stake” (27). 
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A little more has to be said in justification of this claim. Human dignity, a 
dimension of the idea of Man, functions in this oblique way because dignity in 
general is not the kind of thing which can be comprehensively described 
independently of circumstances.91 It is not an object, but a status, denoting both 
the moral significance of a being and the particular ways in which I can and 
cannot treat it. While the former is rationally demonstrable – as we saw in 
Chapter Three – the latter can only be discovered contextually. And the 
question of context is here paramount: historically, the stable temporal and 
spatial reach of our actions broadly aligned with our time-honoured norms 
governing inter-personal relations. But since emerging technologies and novel 
scientific practices provide us with unprecedented ways of relating to fellow 
living beings, we now have to draw on observation, and imagination guided by 
fear, to discover which of these violate dignity.  
A brief thought experiment will suffice to show how this works as a 
general method. We recall that there are two different categories of dignity, the 
personal and non-personal. Personal dignity belongs to humans alone by virtue 
of our moral being, whereas non-personal dignity is accorded by having ends 
and is therefore possessed by all life. Now, although non-personal dignity is 
formally discovered in identifying a being as immanently teleological, I can only 
come to know what this morally entails when it is violated, either in reality or the 
imagination. If I perceive an organism which is prevented from behaving in the 
way proper to it – keeping a bird caged, say – the perception of the fact is given 
inseparably with that of its violated dignity: this bird before me is not being 
treated in the way it ought to be. Even if the bird in question does not 
demonstrate any physical or emotional discomfort – perhaps the cage is all it 
has ever known, meaning it does not long to fly – the sense of violation prevails. 
Indeed, in one sense the violation is greater still if the bird does not mind that it 
cannot behave and fly: we would then have established total domination over its 
telos.  
                                                          
91 Confusion can also arise when ‘human dignity’ is invoked, as it is often unclear whether the 
appeal being made is to personal dignity alone or to both personal and non-personal dignity at 
once – i.e., to the kind of dignity which belongs exclusively to humans, or to the kinds of dignity 
which humans possess. For the sake of clarity I will use ‘human dignity’ in the former sense, to 
mean the dignity possessed exclusively by humans. 
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One cannot conclude from this, however, that one may never violate a 
being’s non-personal dignity. After all, we must do so in order to live, both in the 
consumption of other living beings and in self-defence against human and non-
human threats. If these acts remain wrong, as appears to be the case, then 
wrongdoing is a tragic necessity of life. As Jonas says, following Schweitzer, 
“we make ourselves guilty by insisting on being here” (OS: 24, emphasis 
removed). The challenge for practical reason is to minimise such guilt by 
carefully distinguishing between the unnecessary and the regrettably necessary 
violations of non-personal dignity, taking care to avoid the former. Making such 
judgements tends to be an imprecise art, as we can only do so by weighing 
duties against consequences and virtues: potentially conflicting moral registers. 
However, courtesy of Jonas’ new categorical imperative, and the unequivocal 
responsibility it entails for the essence of humanity, we may draw some stronger 
conclusions regarding human dignity. It belongs, we recall, to humanity as a 
moral being, and so wherever this sort of dignity is at stake we risk a violation of 
the idea of Man. The distinction between personal and non-personal dignity, 
and the requirements of each, is therefore functionally equivalent to Kant’s 
distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. Jonas’ method may lack the 
precision of a utilitarian calculus, but it will nevertheless be shown to be superior 
in accommodating, rather than overlooking, that which transcends mere utility. 
This brings us back to the unanswered procedural question of how 
bioethics should be conducted and feed into legislation. Jonas’ suggestions 
here notably contrast with his earlier application of the heuristic of fear. Unlike 
the ecological crisis, which is a matter of quantifiable threats to the existence of 
humanity, threats to human dignity are qualitative, and less permitting of 
expertise. While one can be an expert in climate science, it is not clear how one 
could be an expert in perceiving violations of human dignity.92 This is also true 
of those bioethical cases which are concerned with the weighing of integrity and 
non-personal dignity against other considerations – virtue, utility, justice, and so 
on. While the bioethicist’s training might allow them to avoid errors of reasoning, 
there is no objectively correct balance to be struck. For this reason, combined 
with the fact that scientific and biotechnological progress is always optional, 
Jonas suggests that bioethics should be conducted in a publicly participatory 
                                                          
92 Or rather, all of us, provided we are morally competent to a normal degree, are experts in 
perceiving violations of human dignity – but in that case ‘expertise’ becomes meaningless. 
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fashion. At present, when public opinion is taken into account during policy-
making and legislation it is only informally. Jonas instead suggests that 
bioethical decisions ought to be made by bodies “constituted by laymen from all 
walks of life”, since they concern the “extra-scientific sphere and wider society” 
(TME: 79). The advantage of such an approach is that it may better avoid “the 
danger of subjective arbitrariness”, present whenever we deal with qualitative 
properties which “only become apparent in personal perception” (86). The 
following reflections, then, are not a claim to bioethical expertise, but an attempt 
to articulate concerns underpinned by our moral tradition and which might be of 
decisive importance. 
II. Human Beings as Means 
We shall start with the broad question of experimental medical research on 
human beings, and the possibility of violating human dignity that it entails. 
Indeed, one of the central reasons for the development of bioethics as a 
discipline was responding to very real violations of this kind, not only in 
totalitarian states (such as Josef Mengele’s Auschwitz experiments), but also in 
liberal democracies. The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment run by the United 
States Public Health Service from 1932-1972 is a notorious example of the 
latter. 600 impoverished African-American participants were enrolled in the 
study to observe the effects of untreated syphilis: 399 of the participants already 
had the disease, while the remainder acted as healthy controls. However, none 
of the infected actually knew they had syphilis: they were told only that they 
were under observation for ‘bad blood’, and even after penicillin became an 
established treatment for the disease in the mid-1940s, none were cured. As a 
result, dozens of participants died, forty sexual partners contracted syphilis, and 
nineteen children were born with its congenital form. 
 The Tuskegee Experiment is a stark example of the kinds of wrongdoing 
we are concerned with here. Clearly, one can make a strong utilitarian case 
against the great physical harm done to the participants and their dependents, 
and the great psychological harm of subsequently discovering that from a 
certain point in time the former was entirely preventable. This hugely outweighs, 
one could argue, the utility of any discoveries forthcoming from the experiment. 
Although we would not want to object to this claim, an argument could be 
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hypothetically made in defence of Tuskegee-style experiments, on the grounds 
that the interests of a few individuals are outweighed by society’s interest in 
developing a cure for the disease. The only problem with the experiment, our 
fictional interlocutor might argue, was that the participants were not given 
access to the cure when it was discovered. They could even suggest that a 
great number of such experiments carried out in a limited period of time, might, 
by increasing the chances of discovering cures, maximise utility in the long run 
through the countless future lives saved. 
 No contemporary bioethicist, to my knowledge, has made this case, 
although in the discipline’s infancy such questionable appeals to the ‘greater 
good’ were not unheard of. It is in that context that Jonas wrote his seminal 
essay ‘Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects’ (PE: 
107-133). We shall draw on it in examining the above hypothetical argument so 
as to develop our understanding of the violations of dignity which can be done 
in experimental situations.  
To begin with, our fictional defendant of Tuskegee-style experimentation 
relies on a number of dubious empirical assumptions: firstly, that cures will 
actually be discovered, and, secondly, that this will occur in a sufficiently short 
length of time. Let us grant both for argument’s sake – although we certainly 
have no reason to believe the latter – since we do not want a strictly scientific 
claim to be the crux of our objection. This brings us to the next assumption, 
namely that collective happiness would be greater if citizens knew they, or their 
loved ones, could be used in this way. However unappealing the prospect, this 
is disconcertingly plausible. The hypothetical argument assumes that the 
collective utility of all subsequent generations benefitting from the cures would 
outweigh the harm done to the few used in experimentation now, and it very 
well might. Although future people may well regret the use of coerced subjects 
in medical experimentation, if it resulted in cures they may still prefer, on 
balance, that it occurred. One suspects that this is, in fact, a widespread attitude 
toward the dubiously-acquired medical advances we enjoy today. We could of 
course maintain in response that the fear, misery, and suffering of the coerced 
would be greater than the happiness of the cured it allowed for. But in doing so 
we lose sight of the full ethical picture: a hedonic calculation of this sort fails to 
comprehensively account for our resistance to the argument. The latter can only 
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be captured in a different ethical vocabulary, principally that of human dignity. In 
developing this claim we shall identify the limits that human dignity places on 
what can be done to individuals in experimental research, and how this 
overrides any utilitarian justification for the latter. 
To begin with we might posit that a sacrifice made for medical research 
be exactly that: a sacrifice, something which, as Jonas says, “must be 
absolutely free” (111). In the bioethical literature this is typically characterised 
as giving one’s informed consent to be used in research. Clearly, in the 
Tuskegee Experiments the lack of informed consent from the participants – 
leading to the unknowing infection of sexual partners and subsequent children – 
is one cause for our repugnance. But even informed consent, if left 
unsubstantiated, is insufficient (SB: 260-1). For example, if the ill and 
impoverished participants of the Tuskegee Experiment had given their informed 
consent in exchange for some sort of financial compensation, we might regard 
this as taking advantage of the vulnerable. In order to avoid such exploitation in 
the recruitment of research participants, thereby ensuring that informed consent 
is truly free, we require some robust criteria. Jonas suggests that we prioritise, 
and progressively work down from, those volunteers who simultaneously a) 
least need remuneration, b) have the best understanding of the experiment and 
the risks involved, and c) most believe in, or identify with, the purpose of the 
research (PE: 123). Not only does this totally reverse the “availability and 
expendability” logic of the Tuskegee researchers, it also makes the researchers 
themselves the most suitable candidates for participation (124). Impractical 
though this may be, “with all its counter-utility and seeming ‘wastefulness’, we 
feel a rightness about it” (125). 
For what reason do we insist that truly free informed consent be a non-
negotiable “minimum requirement” (121), and why do we prefer Jonas’ strong 
criteria for selection over the weaker ones usually adopted? The answer, as 
indicated above, is the human dignity preserved on behalf of those participating 
in the experiment. Truly free informed consent is a minimum requirement not 
just because it implies less harm to feed into a hedonic calculus (although this is 
clearly part of its importance). It also matters because making the decision to 
partake for the sake of the research upholds our status as moral agents, true to 
the beings that we are. In a Kantian vernacular, we might say that by 
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consenting in this way the participant remains an end while also being treated 
as a means; without doing so they are instrumentalised and their human dignity 
violated. Making this very point, Jonas claims that “[o]nly genuine authenticity of 
volunteering can possibly redeem the condition of ‘thinghood’ to which the 
subject submits” in an experimental situation (109). We have here, then, an 
example of how the demands of human dignity emerge from a concrete 
situation: in an experiment our dignity is violated if we are treated as a thing 
rather than a person, revealing the ethical necessity of truly free informed 
consent, and rendering Tuskegee-style experiments impermissible in principle. 
There is an ambivalence in Jonas’ argument, however, which we must 
address. On the one hand, he claims – and we have argued that this is correct 
– that a robust definition of informed consent is necessary to avoid a violation of 
human dignity in the experimental situation. On the other hand, when drawing 
up his criteria for how to ensure truly free informed consent, Jonas suggests 
that they are ideals, not absolutes: “a descending order of permissibility leads to 
greater abundance and ease of supply, whose use should become 
proportionately more hesitant as the exculpating criteria are relaxed” (123). We 
have here a concession to pragmatism on the grounds that strictly observing his 
criteria would suffice “neither in numbers nor in variety of material” for 
statistically meaningful experiments (122). Could they be relaxed without 
treating participants merely as means, and if so, how? We can imagine a 
degree to which two of the three criteria could be loosened: we might allow for 
someone who did not grasp the finer points of the research project in which they 
participated, as long as they fully understood its potential risks, or someone who 
identified with the purpose of the research only because they felt that it was 
worthwhile. Much more troubling would be relaxing the criterion of recruiting 
those who least need material remuneration, which was included to prevent 
exploitation of the socio-economically vulnerable. So even if we do not accept a 
wholesale weakening of Jonas’ criteria, we can, then, allow some degree of 
pragmatism, and demand that informed consent entail a belief in the purpose of 
the research, comprehensive understanding of its risks, and a lack of socio-
economic vulnerability.93  
                                                          
93 Needless to say, testing these would be difficult in practice – but this is no fundamental 
objection to their rightness. 
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Here we have shown a crucial way in which human dignity imposes 
constraints on what can be done to individuals in the context of research. 
However, even proceeding in this way implies that the burden of proof lies on 
the side of the individual, and that the societal demands made of us in this 
domain are legitimate unless shown to be otherwise. But why should we 
assume this to be so? For it would only hold if the medical-scientific enterprise 
bestowed researchers with overwhelmingly strong grounds to make demands of 
individuals, and it is not obvious that it does. So why not think the opposite: that 
science shoulders the burden of proof? Certainly, we have acknowledged that 
healthcare is a generic good, but it does not follow that we have obligations to 
contribute to its progress. Should we refuse to volunteer, such that no novel 
research took place, society would not collapse. On the contrary: 
If cancer, heart disease, and other organic noncontagious ills, especially 
those tending to strike the old more than the young, continue to exact 
their toll at the normal rate of incidence (including the toll of private 
anguish and misery), society can go on flourishing in every way. (117) 
There is, to reiterate, no obligation to contribute to medical research for 
society’s sake: it will be just fine. What might provoke a self-sacrifice – either of 
possessions, such as time and money, or perhaps even a part of one’s bodily 
self – is the vulnerability of individuals suffering from the diseases. Even this, 
however, is not obviously binding. There may exist an absolute duty to help 
others if it is within one’s power to do so and the risks are not prohibitively great. 
But the link between participation in medical research and saving lives is not 
straightforward: the former only potentially increases the chances of the latter, 
and to a highly variable degree. So although participation might be 
commendable – an imperfect duty, as Kant would say – it would not seem to 
amount to an obligation. 
 What of the principle of reciprocity? Might we be indebted to those who 
have already participated in medical research? This claim could be understood 
in two ways: either as an indebtedness to those who have historically helped 
medical science to progress to its present state, from which I benefit in many 
respects, or as a reciprocity to my contemporaries who make a sacrifice now for 
the sake of improving medical science in the future. The first is a broader claim 
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insofar as it encompasses a greater timespan, but also more concrete in that it 
appeals only to those from whom I actually benefit. The second claim is 
historically narrower, but normatively broader in that it suggests our 
indebtedness is not only to those from whom we actually benefit, but simply 
those who make a sacrifice for the sake of medical progress per se. Both, I 
would suggest, have some appeal, the latter perhaps more so than the former. 
The first claim draws strength from the fact that we do, indeed, benefit from a 
great number of individuals who have gone before us and made sacrifices.94 
However, the very fact that they are our predecessors means that beneficence 
can only be unilateral: while they have benefitted us, we cannot benefit them, 
and so the principle of reciprocity cannot be logically upheld. Indeed, this 
reflects the specific goodness of their legacy. 
The second claim does not suffer from this problem, since the 
participants in question are my contemporaries. Now, they might contribute to a 
study which is irrelevant to my needs, or, if not, the results might yet be useless. 
But we shall assume for the sake of argument that some contemporaries of 
mine have contributed something to medical science from which I will benefit. 
Can we be said to have reciprocal duties to these participants? I would again 
argue that we cannot. As discussed, a true sacrifice, made either in the past or 
present, must be voluntary: it is from this that it derives its goodness, above and 
beyond the utilitarian aspect. And of course, this very fact entails that I cannot 
be expected to do the same should I not wish to. If it were conceived of as an 
obligation, then it would no longer be truly reciprocal since the acts would be 
qualitatively different. All that a historical or contemporary sacrifice can do is 
give us a reason to be grateful to previous volunteers, and so provide us with an 
additional motive to freely make such a sacrifice ourselves. This is stronger in 
the case of contemporaries, by virtue of their example being closer at hand and 
more readily identifiable with, and, as discussed, the fact that their being alive 
means that I may be able to truly reciprocate. But even in the case of 
predecessors, to whom I cannot reciprocate, the memory of their sacrifice may 
still motivate me despite the historical distance. Neither is insubstantial, but nor, 
to repeat, do they not establish a perfect duty: the strictly voluntary nature of 
                                                          
94 I am here setting aside the fact that that plenty of medical advances and scientific discoveries 
made in previous historical epochs were with involuntary participants, which, as immoral, cannot 
justify the same now. 
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their sacrifice means that if I am to make a reciprocal sacrifice for medical 
science, it must be qualitatively the same. For this reason, as Jonas says, 
“precedence must not be used as a social pressure” to extract consent where it 
is not genuinely forthcoming (120).  
However, there are limits to the line of argument developed, as Jonas 
himself acknowledges. Our rejection of duties to society rested on the 
observation that it will continue to exist without my contribution to the progress 
of medical science. But there are, at least hypothetically, circumstances where 
this will not be the case. Can we then be said to have duties to society? And 
what role does human dignity then play? Perhaps an analogy can be drawn with 
military emergencies. Jonas suggests that in wartime, “society itself supersedes 
the nice balance of the social contract with an almost absolute precedence of 
public necessities over individual rights […] a near-totalitarian, quasi-communist 
state of affairs is temporarily permitted to prevail” (115). This claim is too broad 
if meant for just any conflict, since not all wars imperil society. But we would be 
willing to concede that intrusions into the private realm, such as the requisition 
of private property, and even military conscription, are permissible if necessary 
for the very survival of a just nation-state. Note the requirement that the nation-
state must itself be just: conscription is not a moral right we would be willing to 
extend to tyrannical regimes (although they would probably be the most likely to 
make a claim to the legal right), since the military defeat of such a government – 
North Korea, for instance – might actually benefit citizens and protect human 
dignity. The crucial point, therefore, is that it is not the needs of society per se 
which justifies conscription, but a morally commendable form of society. 
If it is acceptable to place (adult) lives at risk in such an emergency, and 
on a compulsory basis, might there be a parallel with using individuals in 
compulsory medical research if it were necessary to combat a deadly 
pandemic? There are similarities, to be sure. Both cases are for good ends: a 
just war and averting societal collapse. Both might ultimately be to no avail: the 
war might not be won, the pandemic not averted. And again, in both cases 
human beings are used as means: the soldier is trained and ordered to kill, the 
research participant submitted to experimentation. Are they then alike, the one 
as permissible as the other? There might yet remain a subtle but significant 
difference which prevents us from concluding in the affirmative. Although the 
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soldier must carry out their orders under pain of being court-martialled, refusal 
is always a possibility. Thus they retain a degree, however slight, of agency and 
consequently virtue in how they act. And when the soldier does carry out their 
orders they can remain an end whilst being treated as a means: the soldier can 
be brave or fearful, cunning or dim-witted, they can excel or be merely 
adequate. The conscripted experimental subject, by contrast, can be none of 
these things – or rather, while they might be otherwise virtuous people, they 
cannot be virtuous qua experimental subject. The research participant has no 
scope for agency and excellence because they are reduced to a mere thing, a 
source of data, while even in conscription the soldier retains a modicum of 
personhood and with it, human dignity, in their having some choice between 
actions and conduct. Although this distinction is very slight, it may allow us to 
differentiate between forms of conscription. 
III. The Threshold of Life and Death 
We will turn now to issues involving the ending of human life which advances in 
medical science have made a matter of public debate. Though we cannot hope 
to cover the topic in its entirety, Jonas wrote insightfully on the ethics of 
euthanasia, particularly in its ‘passive’ form: i.e., the withholding or withdrawing 
of medicine, rather than the active ending of a life. We will then look briefly at 
the issues of abortion and infanticide, largely with reference to Jonas’ theory of 
responsibility. Here we have instances of actively taking human life: what, if 
anything, makes them qualitatively different from active euthanasia? And if we 
find abortion to be permissible, at least in some circumstances, does anything 
make that different from infanticide? Our first topic, however, is the ethical 
significance of how we demarcate death for the purposes of acquiring organs. 
(α) Organ Harvesting 
In 1968 the Harvard Medical School published a report arguing that 
irreversible coma should become the medical definition of death. Jonas wrote 
an ethical critique in response – ‘Against the Stream’ (PE: 134-142) – which, as 
Marcus Düwell notes (2013: 213-214), remains of philosophical significance for 
what it tells us about the conceptions of humanity presupposed in bioethical 
debates. This broader point emerges from Jonas’ more immediate argument, 
which is against the motivation of the report’s authors. For the purpose of the 
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proposed redefinition of death as irreversible coma was not strictly scientific – 
i.e., the best-informed theory available – but rather instrumental: to maximise 
the number of organs available for transplantation.  
Now, there is a clear utilitarian rationale for such a redefinition, which 
ought to be given its due: people regularly die for want of available organs, 
organs which will never again be consciously valued by their original possessor 
if he or she is in an irreversible coma. Both of these statements are true, and 
have persuasive force. And yet we feel uneasy when presented with this as a 
case for redefining death. The reason is the aforementioned instrumentalism: 
the report is not concerned with whether the irreversibly comatose patient really 
is dead, but whether we should declare them dead so as to allow us to freely 
make use of them. It is the former issue alone which concerns medicine, 
whereas the latter, in Jonas’ words, conforms to “the ruling pragmatism of our 
time which will let no ancient fear and trembling interfere with the relentless 
expanding of the realm of sheer thinghood and unrestricted utility” (PE: 142). 
Insofar as the motivation is to reduce the patient to a mere means, violating 
human dignity, we are inclined to agree. 
 In response, one might argue that this only begs the medical question of 
whether an irreversible coma is an appropriate definition of death. For one could 
say that, yes, the motivation behind the report is deplorable, but this does not 
prove that the proposed definition of death is itself wrong. If it turned out to be 
correct, then the report would not be reducing human beings, in the fullest 
sense, to repositories of useful tissues, but rather dead human beings to such 
things. And although this might still trouble us, it would not do so to a 
comparable degree. In formulating a reply to this line of argument, Jonas’ 
philosophical biology and anthropology become relevant once again. The idea 
that a human being is dead once the higher functions of the brain are 
irreversibly lost betrays, he says, “a curious remnant of the old soul-body 
dualism. Its new apparition is the dualism of brain and body” (140-141). The 
notion implies that once certain faculties – those which are peculiarly human, to 
be sure – are irretrievably lost, the human being is dead, or as good as. But why 
draw this very Gnostic equivalence, when, as we saw in the Chapter Two, 
human beings are both mind and body, the latter referring to not only the brain 
but rather the organism as a whole? As Jonas says, “identity is the identity of 
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the whole organism […]. How else could a man love a woman and not merely 
her brains? How else could we lose ourselves in the aspect of a face? Be 
touched by the delicacy of a frame? It is this person’s, and no one else’s” (141). 
  Now, this argument is beset by a problem of its own, namely the 
ambiguity concerning when the organism as a whole is dead. Part of the 
discomfort with declaring an individual to be dead on the basis of irreversible 
coma – or even brain stem death, the current medical definition in the UK – is 
that they might still be circulating blood and breathing, even spontaneously so 
(i.e., without medical assistance). A breathing, moving, metabolising being 
cannot be dead, even if permanently unconscious: it is not by accident that in 
Ancient Greek pneuma named both ‘soul’ and ‘breath’. However, if we follow 
the claim that an individual can only be dead once they have ceased to breathe 
and circulate blood, we are faced with the problem that hair and nails will 
continue to grow for a period. Here is evidence, however small, of the very 
metabolic activity by which Jonas characterised life. Ought we then say that an 
individual is only dead once even these processes have ceased? It seems that 
consistency would demand it – yet Jonas argues that this stringent definition is 
not, in fact, required by his theory. Rather, even if some localised metabolic 
activity continues after respiration, circulation, and sensation have irrevocably 
ceased, with these latter cessations the organism understood as an integrated 
whole has died: “the effect of their functioning, though performed by 
subsystems, extends through the total system and insures the functional 
preservation of its other parts” (137). His definition, then, ultimately relies on the 
organism as a teleologically-organised being. We could note that, after all, the 
body as a whole will decay – surely evidence of death – while hair and nails 
continue to grow, but as long as the respiratory and circulatory systems are 
intact it will not. 
 Though this definition is imprecise, it is more satisfactory than those 
which rely on brain stem death or irreversible coma as their criterion. On the 
basis of a non-reductive theory of the organism, we can account for the intuition 
that breath, a beating heart, and sensation are evidence of life, and that prior to 
their irreversible cessation an individual cannot be declared dead. If this lacks 
the clarity of a brain-oriented definition of death, then this may simply be truer to 
the phenomenon. As Jonas says, paraphrasing Aristotle: 
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Giving intrinsic vagueness its due is not being vague. […] Reality of 
certain kinds – of which the life-death spectrum is perhaps one – may be 
imprecise in itself, or the knowledge obtainable of it may be. To 
acknowledge such a state of affairs is more adequate to it than a precise 
definition, which does violence to it. (136) 
To return, then, to the issue with which we began: what does this tell us about 
the permissibility of acquiring organs and other tissues from human beings? 
Certainly, it does not provide us with a categorical prohibition, for the following 
reason. If only human dignity represents an inviolable principle, but an organism 
permanently lacks the capacity for morality which denotes such dignity, then it 
would not enjoy its protection. And if organ harvesting from the living is an 
action prohibited by human dignity, then a human being either in an irreversible 
coma, or whose brain stem has died, would not possess the specific dignity 
violated by such an act.  
 Even if not categorically prohibited, we may still account the for intuited 
wrongness of the act, however. Firstly, we could point to the utilitarian 
consideration of any distress and horror which might be caused by seeing loved 
ones put to death, and the fear of a state which executed its citizens, even if for 
organs which might save others’ lives. Whether the former concerns would 
hedonically outweigh the latter is not obvious, but it is only right that we 
consider the emotional harms which such a policy could entail. A second 
objection follows from the fact that the being in question is alive, which is 
sufficient, even in the condition discussed, to be wronged. They may no longer 
be a person in a Kantian sense, but the organismic person is nonetheless still 
there. On this basis they possess integrity and non-personal dignity – the dignity 
of ends – both of which would be violated by killing for the harvesting of organs. 
However, the ultimate reason for our objection to live organ harvesting, though 
admittedly problematic, is the following. It is the knowledge that this living being 
was a person in the Kantian sense, even if they are no more. There remains in 
the living body an echo or trace of the full person that was there, and although 
they do not possess human dignity now, the mere fact that they did (or are 
presumed to have done) colours our perception of said body. However 
‘irrational’ it may be, the brain-dead individual is always still a ‘he’ or a ‘she’, not 
yet an ‘it’. To put them to death solely to make use of their tissues is to 
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instrumentalise a being historically connected to personhood, and although this 
might not provide us with a rational categorical objection, it provides an 
emotionally compelling one. 
 This argument suffers, as indicated, from an obvious weakness. It is 
rooted only in what the non-conscious human being was, rather than what it is. 
A critic might then ask whether one could extend this sentiment to anything that 
bears the trace of the human being that was: a dead body, a skeleton, ashes, 
even medical waste? The suggestion is perhaps not as absurd as it seems at 
first. We do treat the deceased with a degree of respect, after all: closing their 
eyes to appear at peace, cleaning the body, and of course holding a funeral to 
pay our respects. Presumably this treatment is, to a great extent, a religious 
legacy, but it is nevertheless a core part of our moral tradition. Even though a 
dead body cannot be harmed, it makes some sense to say that it can be 
wronged, by, for example, manipulating the limbs like a puppet (as medical 
students are reportedly wont to). Our disapproval is not just because we 
suppose that friends and relatives of the deceased would be upset if they knew 
their loved one’s body were being treated in this way. Nor is it because we do 
not want our dead bodies to be so treated. It is at least partly because the dead 
body was once living and a person, in the Kantian sense, an echo of which 
survives in their flesh, even – albeit to a far lesser extent – in their bones. At 
some point during decomposition the body may no longer be recognisable as 
such, and the percieved trace of the person gradually vanishes in accordance 
with this process. But even then, if what remains is known to have previously 
been a person, it makes certain demands upon me which other inanimate 
objects do not. Such is the case with cremation: ashes are not burnt matter to 
be swept aside, but someone’s ashes.95 Scattered in a particular place, it is 
henceforth experienced differently. This argument – such as it is – is not meant 
to imply that a dead body makes any strong ethical demands of us, only that it 
makes sense to say that it presents some, which weaken the further removed 
from the living being we eidetically move.  
Back to the issue at hand. The free harvesting of the dead’s tissues 
strikes us as problematic, and, once more, the utilitarian concern – that friends 
                                                          
95 Note that this appears to hold only for remains of the whole organism: dust, hair, and nail 
clippings from the living are swept aside without thought. An amputated limb is a curious 
intermediary case, which might retain a degree of significance for the amputee. 
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and relatives would disapprove of their loved ones being utilised in this way – 
does not fully account for our reluctance. (Indeed, such a policy would likely find 
ample justification on utilitarian grounds.) Something deeper is at stake, which 
the preceding reflections illuminate. Although the dead have no integrity or non-
personal dignity to be violated – unlike the permanently non-conscious – we feel 
that their echo of human dignity still prohibits us from harvesting their organs 
without prior consent. To do so would wrong the dead in light of what they were. 
Note the stipulation of consent: just as we argued that using humans in 
experimental research was permissible only if they gave fully-informed consent, 
the same principle holds here. The importance of consent, we recall, is that it 
ensures that the person remains an end even while becoming as means, 
thereby preserving human dignity. Now, of course the dead person no longer 
has human dignity, only a trace of it, and less even than the permanently non-
conscious. For this reason, the harvesting of their organs without prior consent 
is not comparable to doing so to the permanently non-conscious, let alone the 
fully Kantian person. But it makes some sense, even if ‘only’ emotionally, of why 
we oppose doing so. 
(β) Dying with Dignity? 
 The above discussion began with the question of when a person can be 
medically declared dead, with a view to establishing the permissibility of 
harvesting their organs. The proposal of the Harvard Medical School essentially 
amounted to non-consensual active euthanasia – killing patients who cannot 
assent to it – and this for an instrumental purpose.96 Such a prospect amounted, 
we argued, to a violation of integrity, non-personal dignity, and the lingering 
echo of their human dignity. And yet human dignity is often invoked as a 
justification for euthanasia. This is generally with regards to two different types: 
consensual active euthanasia (when someone willing but unable to end their life 
is assisted in doing so), and non-consensual passive euthanasia (when 
                                                          
96 The difference between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ euthanasia aligns, to some extent, with the 
difference between killing and letting die – except that passive euthanasia involves, as we shall 
see, the removal of life support systems or cessation of treatment. This is clearly an act, one 
which brings about death, and one might ask what distinguishes this from, say, letting go of 
someone hanging over a precipice (a removal of life support in a very literal sense). The answer 
is that the latter brings about death through causes external to the body. By contrast, the 
removal of medical life support brings about death through causes which are internal to the 
body, and which were only temporarily arrested through active intervention. This also explains 
the logical difference between removing medical life support systems, and a dying from an 
illness caused by others’ actions (cancer from passive smoking, for example). 
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someone permanently incapable of consenting to death has life support 
mechanisms removed). The former is fraught with practical problems, some 
possibly compelling enough to rule out its legalisation.97 And yet, it is more 
obviously justified in principle through the criterion of human dignity: if, as we 
have argued, only consent can make instrumentalisation by others permissible, 
then it at least appears plausible that the same might be true of consensual 
active euthanasia. There may, of course, be valid reasons why it is 
objectionable on a case-by-case basis – duties to dependents, and the like – 
but not, it seems, an objection on the basis of human dignity.  
 What of non-consensual passive euthanasia? Once again setting aside 
practical concerns, is it consistent with the demands of human dignity to 
withdraw life support from those who are permanently incapable of consenting 
to it? Jonas argues that it is. Such a patient would have to be alive solely by 
virtue of medical intervention, and permanently incapable of regaining 
consciousness. The consent criterion might yet be fulfilled if the patient had 
previously expressed, in an advance notice, that under such circumstances they 
would want life support to be removed. But let us assume the patient has not 
done so. In that case, Jonas says that “[r]eason, sanctity, and humanity” 
suggest that “the patient ought to be allowed to die; stoppage of the sustaining 
treatment should be mandatory, not just permitted” (RD: 35). The reason for this 
very strong claim is that “something like a ‘right to die’ can […] be construed on 
behalf and in defense of the past dignity of the person that the patient once 
was, and the memory of which is tainted by the degradation of such a ‘survival’” 
(ibid.). This appears to be the very same appeal to the ‘echo’ of human dignity I 
invoked above as a reason for not harvesting the organs of the permanently 
non-conscious and the dead. And yet Jonas seemingly invokes the principle to 
argue that the permanently non-conscious should be allowed to die as a matter 
of course. Is there then an inconsistency here?  
Perhaps something subtler is in fact at play, involving the alignment or 
misalignment of the echo of human dignity with non-personal dignity and 
                                                          
97 For instance, the epistemological difficulty of establishing, beyond reasonable doubt, the 
consent of someone who is unable to end their own life. In many cases, after all, those who are 
physically incapable of committing suicide will likely be physically incapable of the less 
demanding act of giving consent (clearly this does not hold for those paralysed below the neck). 
And if they are only motivationally incapable of committing suicide, then one might worry that 
they do not really want to die. 
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integrity. The issue could be whether the entire organism – mind and body – 
has ceased to live spontaneously, or whether only one half has done so. To 
allow the permanently non-conscious patient to die through withdrawal of life 
support is to “let the poor shadow of what was once a person die, as the body is 
ready to do, and end the degradation of its forced lingering” (ibid.). The intuition 
relied upon here is that a life artificially perpetuated at only the most basic level 
is not one that befits their trace of human dignity: the entire person has ceased 
to live of its own accord, and thus permanently lacks non-personal dignity and 
human dignity. In such a situation, their echo of human dignity might well be 
better respected by withdrawing treatment and allowing death to take its course 
(we stop short, however, of concurring with Jonas’ claim that it is obligatory). By 
contrast, when the body is alive of its own accord, still possessing non-personal 
dignity and integrity, then the trace of human dignity demands that we not 
actively end their life: one half of the psycho-physical personhood lives of its 
own accord. Likewise, if the person remains conscious, but survives only 
through life support, their human dignity of course demands the artificial 
perpetuation of their organismic ends. Here we have an example of the subtlety 
of the demands of dignity, as befits the complex questions at hand. 
(γ) Abortion, Taboo, and Infanticide  
Probably the most hotly-debated bioethical issue since the discipline’s 
inception has been the permissibility of abortion. Persuasive deontological 
arguments can be marshalled on either side: those who oppose abortion can 
appeal to a human right to life (Lee and George, 2005), whilst defenders can 
make a case for a woman’s right to bodily autonomy (Thomson, 1971), at least 
up to a certain point in the pregnancy. Of the other central ethical systems, 
virtue ethics might be seen to justify abortion under certain character-relevant 
circumstances (Hursthouse, 1991), whilst consequentialism is generally taken 
to justify it provided that the foetus is still incapable of feeling pain, or on other 
accounts, an adequate mental representation of that pain (Singer, 1993: 135-
174).98 
                                                          
98 A notable exception is Don Marquis (1989), who argues that abortion is immoral for the same 




 Jonas’ remarks on abortion are, to my knowledge, surprisingly scant: 
restricted to a digression in a discussion of negative eugenics (PE: 151-153).99 
There Jonas claims in a footnote that abortion “is always a violation of the most 
fundamental of all rights, the right to live” (148). This remark is later qualified, 
however, when he states that “our moral sense is willing to consider [abortion 
permissible] at sufficiently early stages” (152). On what grounds is this 
exception made? Jonas does not appear persuaded by “maternal 
disinclination”, and – presumably because of the aforementioned context – only 
really discusses “the anticipation of grave deformity, genetic or accidental” 
(ibid.). This is, he says, “the most defensible if not outright compelling ground” 
for an abortion (ibid.), based not on the rights of the mother, but rather the 
expected condition of the child. Jonas does not fully justify the claim, but 
mentions that one might be motivated either by “mercy” or the “prevention of the 
totally subhuman” if “[h]opeless idiocy” were anticipated (ibid.). The reason, 
perhaps, is that a condition of severe mental debilitation would not accord with 
the idea of Man as a moral being (assuming it precludes the possibility of moral 
agency). And yet he also mentions severe physical deformity as sufficient for an 
abortion on these grounds, citing the infamous thalidomide cases. This runs 
contrary to my interpretation, since there is no necessary reason why this would 
contradict human dignity.  
If these asides do not amount to a particularly insightful analysis of the 
rights and wrongs of abortion, they are nevertheless sufficient to develop our 
interpretation of Jonas’ bioethics. We argued above, on the grounds of human 
dignity, that although letting die is permissible if the patient is permanently non-
conscious, we are precluded from actively ending their life. We now need to 
clarify what the morally relevant difference is between the latter and an abortion. 
We said that a permanently non-conscious patient no longer has human dignity, 
by virtue of their condition, but nevertheless had a non-personal dignity and an 
integrity which could be violated. A foetus, too, has integrity and non-personal 
dignity, and lacks human dignity. The only difference appears to be connected 
to their relative developmental stages: the permanently non-conscious patient 
                                                          
99 This may be because, as Lawrence Vogel (2008: 313) notes, Jonas’ bioconservatism does 
not extend to social conservatism in the manner of his pupil, Leon Kass. According to Vogel, 
Kass seeks to protect human dignity understood explicitly according to the Judeo-Christianity, 
whereas Jonas seeks to protect human dignity in a largely secularised, Kantian sense. Like 
Vogel, I regard Jonas’ position as both philosophically advantageous and politically preferable. 
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still has an echo of human dignity following from the kind of being that they 
were. A foetus, however, lacks this, having never been a Kantian person. A 
normal human embryo, however, does possess potential Kantian personhood, 
and with it potential human dignity. Recognition of this fact belies any attempt to 
rhetorically construe an embryo as ‘just a cluster of cells’: because it is not just 
that, but also teleologically-oriented toward personhood.  
Now, if there is a clear logical difference between the foreshadowing of 
human dignity and its echo, it is far from clear whether this entails a moral 
difference: we are here dealing with subtle distinctions between admittedly 
vague concepts. The trace of human dignity perceived in the permanently non-
conscious patient arguably gains force from the life lived, and any good deeds 
done – in short, the legacy of the Kantian personhood – written into their face 
and body. By contrast, the foreshadowing of human dignity in the embryo has 
no such accompanying record to be discerned in their physical being, but rather 
an open future which contains the possibility for goodness. (It is for the same 
reason, of course, that prior consent is also an impossibility.) If the active 
arresting of the foreshadowing through an abortion strikes us as wrong, it might, 
we feel, be permissible provided certain circumstances hold and strong reasons 
are given in the form of virtues and consequences. These may well include 
mercy when a severe debilitation is predicted, overwhelming the embryo’s 
foreshadow of human dignity. We are conscious, however, that the difference 
between an echo of human dignity and its foreshadow might be too slight to 
bear such divergent conclusions, in which case we may have simply reached 
the limits of human dignity as a bioethical concept, and have to yield to 
alternative ethical explanations. 
One might also object to the above account by asking what the moral 
difference is between an embryo which possesses the foreshadowing of human 
dignity, and an infant which possesses the same. If one cannot be given, and 
we are willing to permit abortion at least in some circumstances, then it should 
follow that infanticide is also permissible under those very same circumstances. 
This is precisely the argument infamously made by Michael Tooley (1972), 
Peter Singer (1993), and, more recently, Alberto Giubilini and Francesca 
Minerva (2013). Singer, for one, sought to justify infanticide on utilitarian 
grounds in cases of great and incurable suffering (1993: 184), a position Jonas 
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regards as to some extent understandable but ultimately unacceptable (NCA: 
48-50). Jonas’ reasoning largely appeals to the potentiality for human dignity, 
but our analysis of the very same concept has ascribed it to both the foetus and 
the infant. Therefore, if there is a moral difference between abortion and 
infanticide it must be located elsewhere. To this end I turn to the notion of 
taboo, understood here not as a mere norm, but rather a fundamental 
prohibition shared by a moral community, the perceived transgression of which 
is generally accompanied by a feeling of disgust or horror. Taboo thus defined 
features only peripherally in Jonas’ thought. However, it can be fleshed out with 
reference to the ‘wisdom of repugnance’ advocated by Leon Kass, his one-time 
pupil.100 In making this argument I depart from Jonas’ thinking in quite a 
significant way, but do so in accordance with the different metaethical 
conclusions reached in Chapter Three. 
In Chapter Four we saw how the encounter with a helpless infant makes 
of us a call of incontrovertible responsibility. Explanations from evolutionary 
psychology and neuroscience to explain why this is seem vulgar and reductive; 
even the attempt to capture such a primal ethical intuition in strictly rational 
terms seems inappropriate. This is yet more vividly so when we consider the 
responsibility’s diametric opposite, the taboo of infanticide.101 Reason appears 
incapable of accommodating such a taboo: here an emotional force is present 
which we find we can neither dispell nor rationally account for. Kass has taken 
this point yet further by arguing that we should not even try to rationally account 
for taboos. He claims that the prohibitions on incest, murder, paedophilia, 
bestiality, cannibalism, and infanticide “are too important to be imperilled by 
reason’s poor power to give them convincing defence. [...] [L]ike the axioms of 
geometry, they might be at once incapable of proof and yet not in need of proof” 
                                                          
100 This phrase refers to Kass’ article of that name (1997), and does not appear in the 
subsequent book (2002). 
101 One might ask whether infanticide and responsibility really are mutually exclusive: after all, 
not committing infanticide might only mean refraining from harm, rather than actively taking 
responsibility. However, we are able to straightforwardly meet this objection by noting that to 
reject the infant’s call of care is to condemn it to death: this is the ethical importance of the 
infant’s utmost vulnerability. As Jonas says: “power of the object of responsibility [i.e., the infant] 
is here not only that of commission but also that of omission, which alone would be lethal” (IR: 
134). Just as we cannot kill the newborn we cannot leave it to fend for itself because, by virtue 
of its sheer helplessness, the latter is tantamount to the former. Although Jonas does not use 
the word ‘taboo’, he touches on a similar sentiment when claiming that “a child’s dying of 
hunger, that is, permitting its starving to death, is a sin against the first and most fundamental of 
all responsibilities which man can incur” (ibid.). On my interpretation this ‘sin’ extends to 
infanticide in any form. 
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(2002: 236). Whether or not the mathematical comparison is legitimate, the 
broader claim stands: if taboos cannot be rationally accommodated, then we 
have reached the limits of rationality in ethical judgement, not the limits of 
ethical judgement itself. 
Now, in ‘After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?’, Giubilini and 
Minerva argue the following:  
If criteria such as the costs (social, psychological, economic) for the 
potential parents are good enough reasons for having an abortion even 
when the fetus is healthy, if the moral status of the newborn is the same 
as that of the infant and if neither has any moral value by virtue of being 
a potential person, then the same reasons which justify abortion should 
also justify the killing of the potential person when it is at the stage of a 
newborn. (2013: 263) 
The authors’ case evidently rests on a set of highly contestable premises and 
might well be refuted on that basis. However, this would be to miss the crucial 
point, which is that no argument for infanticide, however logical, is relevant for 
one who perceives a newborn’s call to take care of it. For the responsible agent 
the crime of infanticide does not fully permit rational interrogation, devoid of 
ethical colouring; we cannot have a mental representation of the fact of 
infanticide separate from the ought-not-to since the imperative of responsibility 
belongs to the proper perception of the newborn. Hence, as Kass pointed out, 
arguments either way necessarily fail to account for the taboo’s force. What is 
missing is a full appraisal of the newborn, which is not, as Minerva and Giubilini 
claim, incapable of “attributing any value to their own existence” (ibid.). On the 
contrary, like all life the newborn actively seeks its continued existence in 
whatever way it can: in this case, crying out for food, warmth, and (human) 
comfort. To perceive the infant in this struggle for life is to perceive its 
fundamental vulnerability and interpersonal entreaty. Emmanuel Lévinas – 
another student of Heidegger’s – writes that to be confronted by the face of the 
other is to be subject to a “moral summons” of “the first word: ‘you shall not 
commit murder’” (1969: 196, 199). Nowhere is this clearer than in the presence 
of the newborn, radiating both innocence and humanity’s promise. 
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 We will consider some problems with the account just given. Firstly, we 
should note that our claim about the limits of rationality is not applicable beyond 
the most fundamental taboos. When considering mundane cases of wrongdoing 
– petty theft, for example – we find that the emotional aspect of our judgement 
is responsive to rational reflection on motives, consequences, and so on, either 
in defence or condemnation. We cannot, then, argue that emotion should 
always take priority over reason, which may well be just as dogmatic a stance 
as Giubilini and Minerva’s limitless rationalism. Kass’ work is a case in point. He 
claims that “some of yesterday’s abhorrences are today calmly accepted – not 
always for the better” (2002: 150). This may be true, but Kass cannot explain 
why some changes in public mores are degenerative and others not, because 
his theory rules out, in principle, any distinction between types of revulsion. 
What matters most for Kass is simply that something is objectionable according 
to the Judeo-Christian tradition, meaning that he cannot draw a logical 
distinction between disapproval of pre-marital sex and revulsion at incest or 
paedophilia. This is a legitimate worry – but a dividing line, however rough, can 
be discerned in our most fundamental taboos which lie beyond, and not within, 
the domain of rational reflection. 
In response it could be noted that the very fact that Giubilini and Minerva 
(and, before them, Tooley and Singer) were able to rationally argue for 
infanticide must mean that reason is able to separate the ‘is’ of infanticide from 
the ‘ought-not-to’. But it is of course possible to fail to recognise – and even 
contravene – the imperative by failing to properly bear witness to the infant, 
wilfully or otherwise. Such is the case with Singer, who claims that an infant 
does not morally count if it lacks a conception of itself as a temporally-persisting 
subject, or Minerva and Giubilini, who use “after-birth abortion” to name 
infanticide. Both abstract from the experience of the infant in its visceral struggle 
for life. Once that step is taken and the child-as-child has been destroyed in the 
imagination, infanticide may be advocated with chilling ease precisely because 
its object is misconceived. On this basis I will bite the bullet and insist that 
individuals who rationally argue about taboos such as incest, paedophilia, or 
infanticide are in a key sense morally blind. Even if they decided on strictly 
rational grounds that such activities were wrong, this still neglects the essential 
emotive and ‘perceptive’ aspect which accounts for the taboo’s moral force. The 
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fact that it is disproportionately bioethicists who fail to acknowledge this is 
merely a tragic indictment of that profession as it is generally practiced. 
IV. The Biotechnological Revolution 
The final bioethical issue which we shall consider at length blurs the boundaries 
of medicine and engineering: biotechnology. True to the technological character 
of modern science, knowledge of the structure of genetic material (genomics), 
obtained practically, invited its manipulation as a matter of course, firstly in the 
form of genetic engineering and more recently in synthetic biology.102 These, in 
turn, have led almost automatically to commercial applications, principally in 
agriculture and healthcare. I say ‘almost automatically’, a qualification which 
serves as a reminder of the important difference between Jonas’ substantivist 
philosophy of technology and Heidegger’s technological determinism. Jonas 
was sceptical that the lure of human enhancement would be resisted once the 
Pandora’s box of biotechnology had been opened (EBA: 503-504), but this was 
a speculative aside rather than a necessary consequence of his theory. By 
contrast, it followed from Heidegger’s fatalistic history of being that “[i]n all areas 
of his existence, man will be encircled ever more tightly by the forces of 
technology”, including “an attack […] upon the life and nature of man” through 
biotechnology (1966: 51-52). Crucially, “no group of men, no commission of 
prominent statesmen, scientists, and technicians, no conference of leaders of 
commerce and industry, can brake or direct the progress of history” (52). 
Heidegger was right insofar as the character of modern technology 
logically leads to biotechnology. We saw in the first chapter that the thrust of 
modern technology is largely Baconian: relieving humanity’s estate through the 
mastery of nature. For Bacon, we recall, this encompassed everything from ‘the 
meanest mechanical practice’ to making ‘perfect creatures’, and even 
‘immortality (if it were possible)’. In doing so he saw, correctly, that the mastery 
of nature by Homo faber applies no less to human nature than to the non-
human environment: in Cartesian terms, both are understood as bare matter 
(res extensa) to be manipulated by the res cogitans. And with this expulsion of 
teleology from the natural world modern humanity lost any credible basis for 
standards by which to judge our treatment of it. Jonas, however, holds out hope 
                                                          
102 Genetic engineering is now often referred to as ‘genome editing’, but to my mind this reflects 
only a dubious effort at rebranding rather than any substantial change in the science. 
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that if an ethic of responsibility can rectify this deficiency it might subsequently 
guide action, and not only on the individual level but the collective as well.  
There are reasons for siding with Jonas’ assessment over Heidegger’s. 
The commercial and clinical deployment of biotechnology is a case in point. 
Although the United States has enthusiastically pursued agricultural 
biotechnology, the European Union has, on precautionary grounds, only 
gradually and carefully permitted the cultivation of certain genetically 
engineered crops. More drastically, following the successful cloning of Dolly the 
sheep in 1996, public debate as to the permissibility of the practice led to a ban 
on cloning human beings in dozens of countries. If, therefore, ethics can exert 
some countervailing influence over the biotechnological tide – which we must 
be careful not to overstate – it is all the more vital that we clarify the nature and 
force of our concerns. Once again, Jonas proved an early and perceptive critic, 
and the essays collected in Technik, Medizin und Ethik have much to teach us 
about the permissibility of this branch of technology, even if we occasionally 
branch out from his arguments. Jonas’ reflections fall into two broad categories: 
the genetic engineering of non-human life – consideration of which involves 
balancing non-personal dignity against virtue and utility – and that of human 
beings, which threatens to violate the human condition, human dignity, and 
therefore the idea of Man. We shall look at each in turn. 
(α) Plants, Animals, and Non-Personal Dignity 
 As stated, the relevant ethical concerns regarding genetic engineering of 
non-human life are the violation of non-personal dignity and integrity, as well as 
utility, justice, virtue, and vice. On utilitarian grounds a case for the genetic 
engineering of plant life seems easy to make: since plants are non-conscious, 
they have no interests of their own to be taken into account. What matters, for 
the utilitarian, is that any manipulations serve the interests and desires of 
human and (at least some) animal life. However difficult this is to achieve in 
practice, the principle is straightforward enough.  
With genetic engineering of animal life, however, the picture is 
necessarily more complicated. Although an engineered animal cannot know that 
they exist in particular form due to human intervention, we can still easily 
imagine manipulations which made the life of an animal less pleasurable than it 
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would otherwise have been. Consider, for example, cows which had been 
engineered to produce more milk, with the side effect that their engorged 
udders made movement difficult or lying down uncomfortable. Here the 
diminished utility of the engineered beings would likely outweigh any increase in 
our utility from the greater supply of milk (not to mention that we might be 
outraged by the animals’ condition). However, if we imagine a manipulation 
which made the animals’ lives no less pleasurable and better served our 
interests, then the utilitarian would likely condone it.103 For a similar example to 
the above, we could imagine cows genetically engineered to lack horns: such 
cows would no longer accidentally gore each other when panicked, or 
alternatively have to undergo the removal of them with a saw (as I can from 
personal experience confirm happens), and we would still be able to obtain their 
milk as usual. 
Even on utilitarian grounds, however, this is far from the whole story. 
Utilitarianism can account for ecological consequences insofar as they have 
indirect hedonic implications. We mentioned, in the previous chapter, that 
opponents of agricultural genetic engineering often claim that a proliferation of 
engineered crops or livestock could be damaging for biodiversity and the global 
food supply. If this assessment is correct, the eventual harms would outweigh 
any immediate benefits accrued through the technology, and utilitarianism 
would provide no justification for it. Of course, we are considering only possible 
consequences, the relative likelihoods of which are not clear. To deal with this 
problem, as we again saw in the previous chapter, one might look to the 
precautionary principle, which is usually consequentialist in orientation. 
Although Jonas argued that the object necessitating precaution is our duty to 
ensure the continued existence and essence of humanity, a utilitarian could 
instead advance the principle for the sake of maximising utility, human or 
otherwise.104 In that case – to paraphrase the version of the principle in the UN 
World Charter for Nature – advocates of genetic engineering would shoulder the 
burden of proof, having to demonstrate that it did not pose risks which 
                                                          
103 Of course, as Singer argues the optimum outcome for a utilitarian who recognised non-
human utility would be the abolition of farming livestock altogether. 
104 Jonas argued that the precautionary principle be adopted for the regulation of genetic 
engineering, but, as I say, on more than utilitarian grounds: “we are entering an area where we 
should tread only with great caution; a quite new kind of responsibility rests here not only on the 
users but already on the biological inventors” (EBA: 495). 
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outweighed the benefits, and if it presented risks which are not fully understood 
then the deployment of that technology would not be allowed to go ahead. Once 
we incorporate this principle into our account, the utilitarian case for genetic 
engineering is at least qualified. A crop which risked giving rise to monocultures, 
say, would be proscribed, whilst one which demonstrated in rigorous 
examination that it did not pose such threats would be permitted. 
A deeper objection, however, can be made with recourse to the integrity 
and non-personal dignity grounded in an organism’s telos. Although such 
grounds lack the clarity of a hedonic calculus, through them we are 
nevertheless able to account for our intuition that a wrong can be done in 
genetic engineering even when there is no harm. We gave an example earlier 
of the violation of a bird’s non-personal dignity through being permanently 
caged, and noted that the violation would be yet worse if the bird experienced 
no physical or mental distress with its situation. In such an eventuality, the bird 
would not only fail to achieve its teleologically-grounded good – flying, hunting, 
nesting – but be subjectively content with doing so. Evidently, then, our concern 
here is not to do with utility, but with the failure of the bird to live the kind of life 
appropriate to it courtesy of our actions. Turning back to genetic engineering, 
we can draw an analogy between the caged bird and the hornless cow. The 
cow, too, would presumably be perfectly content in its hornless state, and would 
not be at risk of being accidentally gored by others. As such, it might actually be 
happier than it would otherwise have been. And yet, as with the contentedly 
caged bird, it would not be living in the way proper to it, but rather a way we 
wanted. To be sure, the force of our intuitive objection is here less strong than 
to the caged bird which cannot live at all according to its telos: the cow simply 
lacks horns which, in domestication, are functionally useless, an evolutionary 
legacy only really suited to their ancestors. But, looked at from another angle, 
the violation of non-personal dignity is in fact more pervasive than that of the 
bird. In making heritable modifications to the cow’s genome – and assuming 
these have phenotypic consequences – the very telos of the cow, and those 
cows following from it, is altered such that it is not even the being that it would 
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have been. In this way, non-personal dignity is violated at both the genotypic 
and phenotypic level.105  
One might respond by saying that this is no different in principle to 
traditional breeding, a practice to which most people have no objections.106 In 
breeding the telos of the organism changes through human intervention and 
could very well lead to a hornless cow eidetically indistinguishable from the 
genetically modified one. How then can we find the latter generally permissible 
but not the former? The (admittedly slight) difference, according to Jonas, is that 
breeding is less a technology that produces its object than “a mixture of art and 
luck” (EBA: 492). He continues: 
[B]reeding operates via the phenotypes and relies on the intrinsic whims 
of the germ substance as they happen to manifest themselves in this or 
that somatic property. The natural variability of reproduction is used to 
obtain the desired characteristics from the original genotype by selection 
of the phenotypes over the generations, that is, to increase these 
characteristics by summation of the small, spontaneous deviations in the 
preferred direction. […] Man, in other words, is manipulating what the 
existing range of species makes available to him with the distribution of 
its mutant store and further mutations. (492-493) 
The upshot, for our purposes, is that human intervention here acts as a guide 
rather than an author: the breeder might produce a hornless cow, but then they 
might not. The telos of the organism is still, at root, autopoietic, and it is this that 
the breeder responds to. As such, non-personal dignity is still respected insofar 
as organismic creativity is relied upon, unlike genetic engineering which seeks 
to eliminate it. 
The non-personal dignity objection only applies, however, to those 
beings which have an immanent telos as the ground of their integrity and non-
personal dignity. By contrast, with the development of synthetic biology – 
                                                          
105 As stated, this only holds if the genetic modification actually leads to changes in the 
phenotype. These do not, however, have to be the exact changes that were intended, simply 
changes per se. 
106 For the sake of argumentative flow, I here set aside any objections to breeding which results 
in malformed animals – where ‘malformed’ is understood to mean a difficulty in exercising basic 
capacities, either mental or physical (such as reproduction in the cases of certain breeds of 
dog). These objections might well be persuasive, but the consequentialist grounding makes the 
issue separate to the one at hand. 
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creating organisms from rudimentary proteins and DNA samples – the telos of 
an organism can now fundamentally be a human construction. Although the 
individual parts remain biological and immanently teleological, the organismic 
arrangement as a whole is artefactual. This ontological ambiguity poses an 
ethical dilemma for our analysis. On the one hand, in accordance with our 
analysis in Chapter Three, since a synthetic organism is alive it must be morally 
considerable. On the other hand, its telos is transcendent in origin, much like a 
machine. Does this entail a non-personal dignity, which we might be able to 
violate? It seems not. A typical organism has a pre-existing telos which we 
violate in genetic modification of it. By contrast, it is hard to see how we could 
comparably violate non-personal dignity by assembling biological parts into a 
synthetic whole, since it is the whole which is teleological. Of course, if a 
synthetic organism had the capacity to feel pain, or had human dignity through 
a capacity for morality, then we would still have clear moral guidelines as to how 
we should treat it. But, unlike natural organisms which lack those capacities – 
such as plants and fungi – in the synthetic case we are also unable to appeal to 
non-personal dignity (or its correlate, biological integrity). As such, the question 
of how we should morally conceive of and subsequently treat a synthetic 
organism is profoundly problematic. 
Jonas does offer us an alternative, however, by appealing to the moral 
register of virtue and vice. As a good product of the German gymnasia he cites 
Goethe, whose telling of Faust contains a scene where Wagner argues for the 
artificial creation of human beings. Wagner there tells Mephistopheles that “in 
the future we shall laugh at chance” (498). For Jonas this is a characteristic 
motivation of the biotechnological enterprise: unlike even in breeding, which 
relies on chance, biotechnology aims to produce life to order. Why is this a vice, 
detrimental to living well? Because it risks blinding us to the value of chance, 
which “surprises us with what is new and has never been” (499). The desire to 
make life function with machine-like regularity, as in synthetic biology, obscures 
this value and consequently may well diminish our lives.  
Now, the obvious counterargument is that although openness to chance, 
novelty, and surprise can be conducive to a good life, sometimes circumstances 
demand that we diminish the scope for these as far as is possible. Most 
obviously, Jonas’ precautionary ethics states that “[n]ever must the existence or 
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the essence of man as a whole be made a stake in the hazards of action” (IR: 
37). In other words, the value of humanity requires that we never allow its 
existence or essence to become a matter of chance. Other domains will be less 
absolutist, but still lean toward the elimination of chance. Take gambling with 
one’s savings: few would argue that openness to the possibility of going 
bankrupt is conducive to living well. The issue, clearly, is whether synthetic 
biology represents an appropriate restriction of chance, or whether it unduly 
diminishes the scope for openness to the world’s novelty. 
Here we might turn to Michael Sandel’s The Case Against Perfection, 
which refines this line of argument. Sandel connects the value of chance to an 
appreciation of ‘giftedness’ and its importance for living our lives well. Of 
course, what emerges by chance is not always perceptible as a gift – 
misfortunes and diseases cannot be generally viewed as such, except in rare 
circumstances where the sufferer is led to value life anew. But when chance 
does deliver something perceptible as a gift, appreciation of it has a particular 
significance which is conducive to living a well-rounded life. What is that 
significance? Sandel suggests that it is the constraining of the “drive to mastery” 
characteristic of technological civilisation (2007: 27). More specifically, he 
claims that perceiving life as a gift has this consequence: 
To acknowledge the giftedness of life is to recognize that our talents and 
powers are not wholly our doing, nor even fully ours, despite the efforts 
we expend to develop and exercise them. It is also to recognize that not 
everything in the world is open to any use we may desire or devise. An 
appreciation of the giftedness of life constrains the Promethean project 
and conduces to a certain humility. (Ibid.) 
Now, Sandel appears to be specifically referring to human life, and the human 
condition, as gifts to be appreciated as such rather than biotechnologically 
mastered – a topic we shall return to shortly. But there seems to be no reason 
why non-human life and even some non-living nature cannot also be 
appreciated as gifts. With the former the locus of its giftedness is perhaps that it 
has intrinsic value. Non-living nature lacks this, but still has what we earlier 
called extrinsic value. For what is it that we appreciate in a river or mountain 
beyond their utility? It is their beauty or sublimity, and the fact that beings with 
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such qualities are not created by us but given over to us.107 They are 
perceptible as gifts: literally, if sent by God, or figuratively, if simply disclosed in 
our world. 
Despite its religious overtones, Sandel’s argument is not one in support 
of quietism or asceticism. On the contrary, not unlike violations of non-personal 
dignity – which are necessary for survival – receptivity to the giftedness of life 
does not preclude killing and other destructive acts. As we stated at the outset 
of the chapter, bioethics is a matter of balancing competing moral registers and, 
human dignity aside, none has overriding authority. Recognising the giftedness 
of life entails only an underlying attitude which might, as Sandel suggests, place 
limits on the Baconian thrust of modern technology. Crucially, where non-
personal dignity could not explain our intuitive objections to synthetic biology, 
the value of receptivity to the giftedness of life can. The obvious reason why is 
that, as we noted above, synthetic organisms are artefactual. That is to say: 
their telos is not within but rather from without. Here we have perhaps the 
paramount example of the “drive to mastery” which Sandel claims undermines 
receptivity to the giftedness of life (27). In synthetic biology life is reduced to 
functionality which serves our interests, diminishing its perceptibility as a gift by 
becoming a product instead. Even compared to agriculture and animal 
husbandry – which are themselves far from ideal – this is not a practice 
conducive to the good life, or good society. 
(β) The Future of the Human Condition 
The other side of the biotechnological revolution, and the last topic to be 
addressed in the present chapter, is transhumanism: the desire to ‘enhance’ 
human beings through biotechnology. Enhancement is advocated in various 
forms, depending on the faculty or capacity in question. Future humans might 
be physically enhanced, becoming fitter and stronger, or cognitively enhanced, 
with greater creative abilities and powers of recall; they might be morally 
enhanced, becoming more empathetic and just, or even enhanced in lifespan, 
immortality being, according to John Harris, the “Holy Grail of enhancement” 
(2007: 59). This desire is not new: enhancement broadly understood has long 
featured in artistic, religious, and mythological texts, and, as we pointed out 
                                                          
107 This sort of appreciation of nature accords with the notion of “Naturgeness”, which Ott (2016) 
traces from German Romanticism to environmentalism of the present day. 
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above, Bacon himself saw immortality as a proper end of modern science and 
technology. What is new is the development of genomics and biotechnology, 
which have the potential to realise Bacon’s dream by making transhumanism a 
plausible scientific prospect. Greater immediacy calls for greater scrutiny, and in 
this regard Jonas proved a perceptive critical voice. His concerns fall largely 
into two strands: those pertaining to the ends of enhancement and those 
pertaining to the biotechnological methods proposed.  
In critiquing human enhancement, or transhumanism – terms I shall use 
interchangeably – we resume our refinement of the idea of Man. Our method 
was to identify the demands of human dignity through concrete violations of it, 
real or imagined. Experimental situations and organ harvesting showed us that 
our dignity prohibits the instrumentalisation of human beings, chiming with the 
Kantian maxim to never treat others as mere means, but always also as ends. 
But another concern is relevant here: the value of the human condition. Human 
enhancement threatens both our freedom, as it manifests in our unique degree 
of existential openness, and also our finitude, of which we are self-conscious. 
To be simultaneously constituted by both is the peculiarity of the human 
condition, the value of which is thereby revealed to us anew. The human 
condition does not carry the moral weight of personal, human dignity which 
belongs to us as moral beings. But we may instead appeal to our organismic 
non-personal dignity to explain its normative significance. As before, the latter 
does not represent an inviolable boundary, and so wherever transhumanism 
threatens only this, and not also human dignity, we cannot categorically object 
to it. We may, however, follow Jonas in doubting the wisdom of upsetting the 
delicate polarity of freedom and finitude which characterises the human 
condition. 
We shall look firstly at the key method discussed, namely, genetic 
engineering. Jonas offers an “existential critique” of genetic engineering, by 
which he means a reflection on what it would be like to be an engineered 
human being, in order to reveal problems which would be raised by the practice 
(PE: 165, emphasis removed). Although transhumanists often couch their 
arguments in terms of greater freedom – which means for them, freedom from 
biological finitude – Jonas’ method leads him to the conclusion that genetic 
engineering could in fact compromise our freedom. He makes two observations: 
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firstly, that genetic engineering would undermine our existential freedom, and 
secondly, that it would corrupt the relation between those who performed it and 
those who underwent it. These concerns pertain not to the physical 
consequences of manipulating the genome, but instead to the significance of 
such an intervention.  
 The first change Jonas points to is that the process of self-becoming is 
disrupted by the knowledge of having been manipulated in order to be a 
particular way. Regardless of whether that manipulation works as intended, the 
intention itself changes the person’s self-understanding as they second-guess 
the authenticity of their physical or psychological being. As Jonas says, “it does 
not matter one jot whether the [engineered] genotype is really, by its own force, 
a person’s fate: it is made his fate” (163). Knowing that one is intended to be a 
particular way is to be bound to this intent, whether in conformity to it or 
rebellion against it. What is lost, in other words, is the spontaneity of becoming 
by instead measuring oneself against a pre-established design: 
[T]he sexually produced genotype is a novum in itself, unknown to all to 
begin with and still to reveal itself to owners and fellow men alike. 
Ignorance is here the precondition of freedom: the new throw of the dice 
has to discover itself in the guideless efforts of living its life for the first 
and only time, i.e., to become itself in meeting a world as unprepared for 
the newcomer as [he] is for himself. (161) 
To reiterate, this is not a political or metaphysical conception of freedom: it is 
the existential freedom to become oneself, which would be compromised by the 
genomically ingrained idea regardless of whether it had direct phenotypic 
consequences. 
Jonas’ existential objection arguably has three limitations. Firstly, it would 
appear to apply only to those who do not believe in a creator deity: for if one 
already holds that life is created in a particular way, one would presumably not 
then experience any additional loss of existential freedom in having been 
genetically engineered. Secondly, many people who do believe they were 
created in a particular way by God or the gods seem not to find this belief 
alienating, but rather a source of comfort. Perhaps, then, knowledge of being 
genetically engineered would come to be perceived in the same welcome light. 
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To take the latter point first, one suspects that the believer’s comfort is more to 
do with the specific author of creation than being created per se. It is, in other 
words, the fact that we are thought to be created by a supernatural being, 
providing a transcendent reason for everything being as it is. Knowing that one 
is engineered by one’s predecessors would be categorically different, since 
lacking the transcendent status denoting infallibility. We can also reject the first 
possible objection. Being genetically engineered would still, I suggest, be 
experienced as a loss of existential freedom by those who already believe in a 
creator deity. Precisely because the religious assume a transcendent creator 
the intent behind creation is unknown: one discovers God’s (supposed) intent in 
its actual unfolding. As such, the religious do not experience one’s self-
becoming against a known prior intention, as would likely be the case in genetic 
engineering. 
The third problem with the existential objection, following from the 
responses just given, is that it would only hold in the case of persons who 
actually knew they were engineered. This much is true. The transhumanist 
might then suggest that, if possible, we enhance foetuses or infants: after all, if 
we never informed them it would thereby preserve their existential freedom 
through ignorance. This brings us to the second of Jonas’ objections to genetic 
engineering: that it would corrupt the relation between the generations by 
becoming one of manipulator and manipulated. It creates, as he puts it, an 
entirely one-sided control “of present men over future men, who are the 
defenceless objects of antecedent choices by the planners of today. […] 
[P]ower is here entirely unilateral and of the few, with no recourse to 
countervailing power open to its patients” (147). Here the concern is not to do 
with self-understanding, but one’s objective relation to others in terms of power. 
In being manipulated in a particular way – again, even if not deterministically – 
the enhanced become the object of someone else’s design. The worry is that 
this one-sided power relation once more undercuts freedom, although this time 
not of the existential sort. Rather, this state of affairs threatens our republican 
freedom of non-domination by others. 
Now, the proponent of human enhancement could argue that we 
regularly engage in a practice which conforms to this type of power-relation, one 
which we not only tolerate but actively champion: education. In both education 
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and cognitive or moral enhancement one person seeks to shape the character 
and values of another, so if the former practice is permitted presumably the 
other should be also. For example, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argue 
that “[t]here is no reason to assume that moral bioenhancement to which 
children are exposed without their consent would restrict their freedom and 
responsibility more than the traditional moral education to which they are also 
exposed without their consent” (2012: 113). To challenge this equivalence I turn 
to Jürgen Habermas, who in The Future of Human Nature explicitly built on 
Jonas’ insights.  
Habermas notes that education and genetic engineering in fact embody 
fundamentally different principles: the former operates according to the 
discursive principles of communicative rationality, and the latter according to the 
technical principles of instrumental rationality. What this means is as follows. 
Education, relying as it does on sensible communication, presupposes the 
mutual capacity for reason. Even if the pupil does not at the time fully 
understand the reasons behind educational content, as a rational being in 
development they are in principle able to – and in time hopefully will – 
comprehend those reasons. When they do, they are then free to accept or 
reject those reasons. This shared ground allows for a fundamental equality 
between agents despite the asymmetry inherent in the practice of education. As 
Habermas says, “expectations underlying the parents’ efforts at character 
building are essentially ‘contestable’ […] the adolescents in principle still have 
the opportunity to respond to and retroactively break away from it” (2003: 62). 
Indeed, one might go so far as to say that developing the ability to question 
what one has learned – to think for oneself – is an objective of education. 
However, this is not required for the present point. Even in instances where 
learning to think for oneself is not an objective of the educator, the nature of 
education itself means the content can nearly always be subsequently 
contested, as Habermas’ own schooling in Nazi Germany starkly demonstrates. 
By contrast, genetic engineering lacks the mutual ground of reason 
which allows for equality between participants. Instead, as a technical 
procedure carried out on the child as an object, the manipulation makes 
retrospective disagreement impossible:  
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With genetic enhancement, there is no communicative scope for the 
projected child to be addressed as a second person and to be involved in 
a communication process. […] It does not permit the adolescent looking 
back on the prenatal intervention to engage in a revisionary learning 
process. Being at odds with the genetically fixed intention of a third 
person is hopeless. (Ibid.) 
The difference in principle, therefore, is that the power-relation of genetic 
engineering is not only unilateral but also incontestable: the child is bound to an 
intent from which they cannot be released. There is, as Habermas says, no 
scope for autonomous contestation. By contrast, education, courtesy of its basis 
in rational communication, possesses an inherent reflexivity and thereby 
presupposes freedom as non-domination. Here Persson and Savulescu 
disagree. They claim “common sense and science” tell us that “it is surely 
evident that when small children are taught language, religion, basic moral 
rules, or whatever, this education is just as effective, irresistible, and irrevocable 
as biomedical intervention is likely to be” (2015: 52). But as Habermas’ theory 
shows, education as fundamental as religion, moral rules, or metaphysical 
beliefs can typically be questioned.108 The reason, in short, is that critical 
reflection breaks the “quasi-natural” status of educative content: even if it is 
subsequently accepted, one’s relation to the content is altered through 
contestation (Habermas, 1988: 168).  
A point of conflict needs to be resolved here, however. Although we 
nearly always possess the possibility of questioning educational content – 
thereby preserving freedom – we do not always do so. As discussed above with 
regards to taboo, morality occasionally lies beyond the reach of reason, 
delimiting what can be critically questioned. Tooley, Minerva, and Guibilini 
rationally argued for even the greatest of crimes, it is true, but only by 
conceptually evading the true object of their argument: the vulnerable newborn. 
                                                          
108 The most plausible generic exception is language, which holds a unique status due to its 
hermeneutic centrality: as Gadamer has shown (2004: 384-404), it is the foremost ground on 
which understanding occurs, allowing subsequent learning to take place. The first language 
learned, one’s mother tongue, is incomparable even with additional languages which are 
learned on the basis of the first. Even so, in grammar language possesses an internal logic 
which allows its usage to be refined or mastered, including in opposition to the way one was 
taught, thus preserving the fundamental symmetry of a shared rational ground. One might also 
note that a first language can be supplanted by a second through exclusive use of the latter, 
even though the second is initially learned through the first. 
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To properly perceive the newborn is to perceive a taboo on infanticide which 
resists rational reflection, and is therefore an exception to Habermas’ claims 
about moral education. Our relation to taboos is rather that we are delivered 
over to them and subject to their authority (which is precisely what concerns 
Habermas about Gadamer’s presentation of tradition – perhaps unfairly, as my 
argument here goes much further than Gadamer’s albeit within a much smaller 
remit). However, there is still a critical difference between being subject to the 
authority of taboos and the power-relation inherent in genetic engineering, 
which is as follows. In the former we are subject to an impersonal, or rather 
transpersonal authority, which is not, and cannot, be embodied in a single 
individual. Rather, the authority of taboo stands above persons and speaks 
through all of us insofar as we belong to the same tradition. As such, we are not 
unfree in the republican sense because there is a shared ground which cannot 
privilege one person over another. In the case of genetic engineering, by 
contrast, two or more individuals are necessarily in a dominating power-relation. 
Genetic engineering, as a unilateral and incontestable intervention, 
therefore remains qualitatively distinct. But how are our concerns about 
existential and republican freedom connected to dignity? Clearly, in altering the 
organismic telos of the person genetic engineering always represents a 
violation of non-personal dignity. But in particular cases it would violate human 
dignity also. Were genetic engineering to be carried out eugenically – i.e., to 
improve the species or national stock – we would be treated as mere means to 
the ends of the group. This alone provides us with strong grounds to reject a 
state-sponsored programme of genetic engineering, regardless of whether the 
effects were heritable or not: the absence of consent, which alone can excuse 
such instrumentalisation, would make it categorically impermissible. Less clear 
are the implications for human dignity in the event that genetic engineering is 
carried out for the sake of an individual’s well-being, as parentally-chosen 
genetic engineering would presumably be. (Obviously, if it were not, and were 
instead for the sake of others’ interests, such as the parent’s social status, then 
it would be as impermissible as a state-sponsored eugenics programme.) We 
assume for the sake of argument that such well-meaning genetic engineering 
would entail a commonly-accepted idea of what that good entails, which the 
individual is highly likely to retrospectively accept as such. In that case the 
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prospective children would simultaneously be treated as an end, with their likely 
interests motivating the intervention, in spite of the curtailments of their 
existential and republican freedom.  
This leaves us, it appears, with a human dignity-based objection to 
eugenic genetic engineering, but not when performed for the sake of the 
engineered person’s well-being. And yet, we can still draw on the violation of 
non-personal dignity to account for our discomfort. In seeking to mould an 
individual through genetic engineering, even if for their benefit, we risk curtailing 
existential freedom and republican freedom in unprecedented ways. This would 
hold most obviously for any decision made by one person for another, as in the 
parent-child engineering scenario, but could hold even in the case of somatic 
genetic engineering carried out on oneself. Even though the individual would 
almost certainly be treating themselves as an end – we assume they are 
uncoerced in volunteering for the procedure – they are still inescapably bound 
to their prior intention.  
Michael Hauskeller has extended the republican freedom objection to 
account for just this concern. He claims that the relation corrupted in such 
genetic engineering would not be between self and other, but between one’s 
past and present. The intention would belong to the past self and bind the 
present self, thus exerting a unilateral and incontestable control from which the 
latter cannot escape:  
The event would be similar to the case where someone voluntarily 
signed a contract that made them a slave for the rest of their lives. 
Although they would have freely chosen to be a slave, once a slave they 
would no longer have the choice not to be one, and it is not an 
uncommon intuition that therefore it is wrong (and should not be 
permitted) to make such a choice. (2017: 374) 
The worry is not so much that one might regret the decision to have undergone 
genetic engineering, but that the individual is beholden to that decision whether 
they regretted it or not. In this way, even genetic engineering of oneself would 
parallel the threat to freedom as non-domination. Although this does not provide 
us with a categorical objection based on human dignity, it goes some way to 
accounting for our lingering disapproval. 
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(γ) Transhumanism and L’Homme Machine 
Having extensively discussed his objections to its preeminent method, 
we shall now turn to Jonas’ objections to the ends of transhumanism, namely, 
the enhancement of human capacities and faculties beyond their given range. 
As stated, these capacities could be mental or physical, including even our 
moral psychology or lifespan. Rather than analyse each possible enhancement 
in detail, I shall question the wisdom of enhancement as such. Should humanity 
be improved upon by taking evolution in hand and becoming post-humans? 
Whether we have the right to do it, whether we are qualified for that 
creative role, is the most serious question that can be posed to man 
finding himself suddenly in the possession of such fateful powers. Who 
will be the image-makers, by what standards, and on the basis of what 
knowledge? […] These and similar questions, which demand an answer 
before we embark on a journey into the unknown, show most vividly how 
far our powers to act are pushing us beyond the terms of all former 
ethics. (IR: 21) 
The fear of eugenics lingers in the background here – not unreasonably, given 
that Jonas saw the utopian hopes of early-twentieth century eugenicists quickly 
devolve into the Nazi nightmare. Today, however, few transhumanists advocate 
a eugenics programme, which we have argued is always a violation of human 
dignity.109 Enhancement, they say, will be liberal: a matter of personal autonomy 
and reproductive rights. This we have already shown to be dubious – though 
not categorically impermissible – by examining its envisioned method. Let us 
continue our critique, this time on the basis of the envisioned outcome of 
enhanced human beings. 
The first problem one encounters in developing a critique of non-eugenic 
enhancement is that improvement of human beings seems to also be an end of 
healthcare: we treat, cure, restore, and otherwise try to ameliorate a variety of 
conditions, both physical and psychological. Drawing a qualitative, and not 
merely quantitative, distinction between healthcare and enhancement is in fact 
far more difficult than one might assume. I stated above that enhancement 
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entails the extension of capacities and faculties ‘beyond their given range’, but 
this notion, based on our understanding of the human condition, already permits 
some historical and cultural definition. After all (the transhumanist will object), 
we have for centuries enhanced lifespans and physical capacities through 
modern medicine: ‘the given range’ of human capacities is different for a 
contemporary European, an African farmer, and a mediaeval serf. If healthcare 
is a laudable practice, as we take it to be, and the consequences for our health 
and lifespan good, as we assume them to be, then enhancement may simply be 
the logical next step. But perhaps there is a misunderstanding here of the 
nature of healthcare which, properly understood, points toward a difference 
between it and enhancement. Jonas’ explorations of the organismic basis of 
health, when combined with Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutic investigations 
into the topic, allow us to account for this difference. 
The difference between healthcare and biotechnological enhancement is 
perhaps obscured by the fact that both would be, according to the Western 
canon, forms of technē. But there remains an essential difference between 
healthcare and all other technai, for in it nothing is produced. To be sure, its 
goal is health, but health is not a thing like an artwork or a tool, the creation of 
which are defined by their novelty. As Jonas says: “healing is not the production 
[Herstellung] of a thing, but the restoration [Wiederherstellung] of a state, and 
the state itself, although art is applied to it, is not artificial” (TME: 146). Since 
health is not produced by artifice, it follows that it is instead “defined by nature” 
(147). More specifically, health is defined by the immanent telos of the 
organism: “functional integrity alone is its object” (149). Jonas’ philosophical 
biology and anthropology here allow us to draw out, to a significant degree, the 
difference between healthcare and other forms of technē. In healthcare we 
follow the telos of the organism, assisting it where possible in its orientation 
toward wholeness. Thus we set broken bones, stem the flow of blood from 
wounds, undergo psychiatric therapy, take medicines, and employ prosthetics, 
transplants, and life support machines to allow our bodies to restore or maintain 
integral functioning for as long as we are alive. By contrast, enhancement uses 
the telos of the organism as a starting point, as a basis from which to create 
something new. Our capacities and faculties are not construed as definitive of 
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our being and the locus of medical attention, but rather limitations to be 
overcome.  
Jonas’ account of the difference between healthcare and other forms of 
technē is undermined, however, by the fact that the former already does go 
beyond our teleologically-defined capacities. This he even acknowledges (150). 
The classic example is an immunity to disease through vaccination, which 
arguably represents a novel capacity rather than the restoration of a prior state. 
Is the transhumanist then correct to say that enhancement is simply a logical 
extension of healthcare? Here Gadamer’s complementary insights in The 
Enigma of Health take us one step further. Like Jonas, he holds that healthcare 
is generically different from other forms of technē through its orientation toward 
the telos of the organism (1996: 32-33). But this, he says, is a legacy of our pre-
modern – more specifically, Greek – medical heritage. It is today intertwined 
with a competing tradition which has its origin in the modern scientific 
revolution. We recall from the very first chapter that Jonas identified 1543 as a 
symbolic turning point in Western history, as Copernicus’ On the Revolutions of 
the Celestial Orbs was posthumously published at the same time as Vesalius’ 
On the Fabric of the Human Body. This represented “the two sides of the 
scientific revolution as it eventually took shape: the macrocosmic and the 
microcosmic” (PE: 52). Jonas did not, however, fully sketch out the theoretical 
implications of this event for healthcare (although he was of course well aware 
of its practical consequences in science, medicine, and biotechnology). 
Gadamer fills in this gap, noting that modern medicine takes on the character of 
modern technology: “it understands itself precisely as a kind of knowledge that 
is guided by the idea of transforming nature into a human world, indeed almost 
of eliminating the natural dimension by means of rationally controlled projective 
‘construction’” (1996: 39). The consequence of this understanding of human 
beings – just as in modern science’s understanding of non-human beings – is 
that “this knowledge allows us to calculate and control natural processes to 
such an extent that it finally becomes capable of replacing the natural by the 
artificial” (ibid.). 
The intertwining of these two conceptions of healthcare, the ancient and 
the modern, rooted as they are in different understandings of nature, give 
contemporary healthcare its ambiguous character. It “can never be understood 
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entirely as a technology”, but instead “represents a peculiar kind of practical 
science for which modern thought no longer possesses an adequate concept” 
(ibid.). This has profound implications for our present concerns. While much 
medical practice is still consistent with the ancient conception of healthcare – 
even if it does not explicitly understand itself that way – enhancement can be 
understood as the logical extension of healthcare in the modern sense alone. In 
trying to overcome rather than aim at the telos of the organism, it belongs purely 
to medicine’s modern ‘productive’ dimension, along with vaccinated immunities, 
non-reconstructive cosmetic surgery, subdermal implants, and so on. If this tells 
us what the logical difference is between healthcare and enhancement, it still 
leaves us with the normative question of whether the latter is any less 
commendable than the former (assuming, of course, that we have already ruled 
out any form of enhancement which violates human dignity). Here there is no 
simple answer based on the different principles underlying ancient and modern 
medicine. To be sure, in working with the telos of the organism, ancient 
medicine respects our non-personal dignity, whereas a practice which can only 
be understood according to the logic of modern medicine violates it. This is, 
however, insufficient reason to reject the latter: after all, vaccinated immunities 
also exclusively belong to the modern ‘productive’ understanding of healthcare, 
and we are certainly unwilling to condemn these. 
Why, then, are we specifically troubled by the transhumanist vision? The 
answer, imprecise though it may be, is that enhancement disregards our 
organismic telos and non-personal dignity as such. The transhumanist isolates 
one aspect of the human condition – our cognitive freedom – and declares the 
rest superfluous, to be cast aside like obsolescent technology. True to its 
Baconian heritage, transhumanism is thereby the final manifestation of 
modernity’s Gnostic tendency: it conceives of our ‘real’ selves as a thinking 
substance to be liberated from nature’s corporeal prison. This is, indeed, the 
logical extreme of modern science, presupposing an entirely mathematically 
calculable, rather than teleological, conception of the organism which can be 
remade at will. But while we are thankful for (most of) the advances which the 
modern conception of healthcare has delivered – particularly when these are 
guided by the Greek conception – alone it is based on a deficient understanding 
of the human being. Our real selves are, in truth, embodied, vulnerable, and 
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dependent, all facets of the human condition. As Gadamer shows, the Greeks 
understood this well, reflected in their experience of health as a state of 
equilibrium, and disease as a disruption of it (36). By contrast, having 
erroneously abandoned the Greek conception of healthcare entirely, the 
transhumanist experiences their very organismic being as a disease. Every 
limitation is perceived as an imperfection, every vulnerability a cause for what 
Günther Anders once called modern humanity’s “Promethean shame” before 
our perfect machines (1956: 23). 
Perhaps the most egregious example of this, and the aspect of 
enhancement which Jonas wrote about most extensively, is the desire for 
immortality. Jonas does not doubt the value of immortality understood in the 
Classical sense: that which is made possible by our public life in the polis. On 
the contrary, he devoted the concluding essay of The Phenomenon of Life to 
that very topic, celebrating “the meteoric flash of deed and daring […] 
immortalized by worldly fame” (PL: 271). Immortality understood in this sense is 
congruent with the finitude characterising the human condition: “not what lasts 
longest in our experience, but what lasts shortest and is intrinsically most 
adverse to lastingness, may turn out to be that which binds the mortal to the 
immortal” (ibid.). Humans, unlike other species, have a profound understanding 
of their condition, and act against this shared backdrop regardless of 
geographic, cultural, or social circumstances: we know we are born rather than 
made, that we will one day die, and that every life – human or otherwise – 
shares this givenness. But the duration of time between the twin poles of 
natality and mortality represents a horizon of freedom, within which we are 
capable of deeds which can far outlast our mortal remains and grant us 
immortality (MM: 96). 
Transhumanists argue for immortality in a very different sense: as the 
permanent extension of the individual’s life. Just like our machines, which can 
endure indefinitely, the transhumanist seeks to become an eternally enduring 
corporeal being or a mind uploaded to an inorganic body. It is, therefore, 
fundamentally at odds with the human condition. Advocates of this form of 
immortality tend to follow a simple utilitarian logic: if a long, healthy life is a good 
by virtue of the opportunities and experiences it can offer, it stands to reason 
that an indefinite continuation of this state must be even better. Nick Bostrom 
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makes this very argument, claiming that infinite happiness can be found by 
biotechnologically eradicating death: “[a]ny death prior to the heat death of the 
universe is premature if your life is good. Oh, it is not well to live in a self-
combusting paper-hut! Keep the flames at bay and be prepared with liquid 
nitrogen, while you construct yourself a better habitation” (2008: 4). Bostrom 
may, in fact, dissuade us from seeking immortality, as the prospect of listening 
to such excruciating prose for all eternity strikes us as a living hell. 
Nevertheless, the basic transhumanist justification for immortality is that our 
pleasurable experiences would remain qualitatively the same (or even improve 
if we are cognitively enhanced), yet increase quantitatively. But this overlooks 
the value of natality and mortality for human existence and a meaningful life, 
which reveal themselves to us anew when we contemplate their abolition. 
 We can take firstly the fact that we are born, and ask what significance 
our natality, that “perennial spring”, has for us (IR: 19). Jonas suspects that “if 
we abolish death, we must abolish procreation as well, for the latter is life’s 
answer to the former” (ibid.). This is not just an ecological concern, to do with 
the mere fact of insufficient resources and living space on an already 
overcrowded planet (MM: 96). Although a pertinent objection, the transhumanist 
can always invoke a utopian solution in response: that if we have mastered 
death we would surely be able to solve such logistical issues, probably by 
uploading ourselves to cyberspace. Jonas’ worry is also that the desire to 
procreate – beyond the sexual impulse – is motivated, in part, by a concern for 
immortality in the Classical sense: to leave a mark on the world through one’s 
descendants. The realisation of transhumanist immortality may well diminish the 
desire for Classical immortality through procreation, and thereby result in a 
drastic reduction of births.  
Now, the transhumanist may well see no problem with this, and argue 
that if human lives continue permanently then it does not matter whether it is old 
or new. But Jonas reminds us that it does matter, in terms of the constitution of 
society and the effects it would have on our culture: “we would have a world of 




[Natality] grants us the eternally renewed promise of the freshness, 
immediacy, and eagerness of youth, together with the supply of 
otherness as such. There is no substitute for this in the greater 
accumulation of prolonged experience: it can never recapture the unique 
privilege of seeing the world for the first time and with new eyes; never 
relive the wonder which, according to Plato, is the beginning of 
philosophy. (Ibid.) 
Conversely, were a wellspring of youth and immortal beings to exist 
concurrently, the result could be an ever-greater estrangement of the old from 
the young, the former “stranded in a world we no longer understand” (MM: 98). 
Neither is desirable or wise. 
At the opposite end of our temporal existence is the pole of mortality, the 
fact that we will die. What would the eradication of this mean for us? In addition 
to the considerable consequences which biological immortality would doubtless 
have for society, Jonas’ existential perspective shines a light on the effects it 
could have for our self-understanding. In a Heideggerian vein, and in line with 
the memento mori tradition, Jonas argues that knowledge of our eventual 
deaths plays a fundamental role in giving meaning and weight to our lives (IR: 
19). The reason is that our finitude is in fact a presupposition to our making 
meaningful decisions – and, as existentialism taught us, our choices inform who 
we are. To be sure, I cannot choose to have been an ancient Briton or a 
contemporary Amazonian, but to the extent that our lives are undetermined we 
have before us a range of possibilities: if I am lucky I can choose where to live, 
which job to take, who to pursue romantically, whether to have children, and so 
on. On a more everyday level I can make choices ranging from how I treat 
others to which hobbies to pursue. I might choose to spend my time learning to 
play the piano rather than to speak Russian, or get a black belt in karate. The 
fact that this choice is delimited by the duration of my lifespan is precisely what 
gives my decision weight, because I have chosen to allocate the cherished time 
I have thus.110 If I am immortal, however, I could eventually do anything and 
everything. Rather than this being liberating, as the transhumanists naïvely 
suppose, it could in fact sap actions of their meaning: if I cannot die, an infinity 
                                                          
110 A polymath is of course capable of mastery in multiple domains, but this is remarkable only 
because they do so within the constraints of the human condition. 
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of options are open to me and thus no longer have the weight I presently 
experience in them as choices. What was gained quantitatively would be 
diminished qualitatively, and the abolition of mortality would simply amount to a 
form of existential denigration. In this context, the wisdom of Psalm 90 shines 
through: “[p]erhaps a nonnegotiable limit to our expected time is necessary for 
each of us as the incentive to number our days and make them count” (ibid.). 
Taken together, the foregoing critique of genetic engineering as a means 
and human enhancement as an end gives us ample reasons to reject the 
transhumanist project. If the goal is as dubious as I suggest, and genetic 
engineering fraught with risks to freedom, then we would be wise to rule it out in 
principle. However, the threats to existential and republican freedom are less 
compelling when divorced from the frivolous and arbitrary purpose of 
enhancement. That is to say: although the freedom-based concerns apply 
simpliciter, they derive additional persuasive force from being considered in 
tandem with enhancement as the purpose of the intervention. But if genetic 
engineering were undertaken not to enhance, but rather to cure or prevent 
diseases, then the intervention might perhaps be perceived by the engineered 
as a tolerable restriction on freedom.111 This ‘therapeutic’ kind of genetic 
engineering might be less an enhancement in the sense that we have 
discussed – motivated by a desire to transcend the human condition – and 
perhaps closer to a ‘modest’ enhancement such as acquiring an immunity 
through vaccination. Although vaccinations still conform to the logic of 
enhancement, their preventative rationale represents a less severe break with 
the human condition. It is possible, at least, that therapeutic enhancement 
would be seen in the same light.  
If, therefore, a form of genetic engineering could partially evade the 
above concerns, it would be the therapeutic sort. As Jonas says, it is certainly 
less objectionable in terms of its goal (EBA: 503), and the utilitarian promise 
might be sufficient to override our lingering principled concerns about freedom. 
But there remain worries to do with possible consequences which could yet lead 
to a staying of our hand. Complexity and unpredictability appear to define the 
genotype and its relation to the phenotype. As such, even therapeutic genetic 
                                                          
111 On this I suspect intuitions will diverge: some may find the threats to freedom compelling, 
whilst others might feel that these are overridden by the impulse to cure and prevent diseases. 
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engineering with the most precise tools would risk errors which cannot be 
undone – the defective human being can hardly be scrapped like a faulty 
machine – or which do not become apparent until long after standard practice 
had been established. This would be utterly unforgivable if such mistakes were 
committed to the germ-line and thus hereditary, transmitted through the 
generations. It would, perhaps, be less foolish if only made at the somatic and 
therefore nonheritable level, under conditions of informed consent. At this point I 
can only appeal, rather weakly, to a slippery slope argument. What might well 
begin as an understandable attempt to cure and restore at the somatic level 
could open Pandora’s box, “leaving behind the conservative spirit of genetic 
repairs and embarking on the path of creative arrogance. […] It would probably 
be wiser to resist even the charitable temptation for once, in this instance” (503-
504). Once more we find ourselves in agreement with Jonas. 
V. A Richer Bioethics 
Where does this leave our idea of Man, the ultimate object of responsibility? In 
considering various threats to human dignity, what did we discover about the 
fullness of our image? Human dignity categorically rules out the 
instrumentalisation of human life without prior consent (which alone could 
redeem it) in medical research. For the same reason, it also prohibits genetic 
engineering for eugenic purposes. Moving from this solid ground, we argued – 
with major caveats – that the echo or trace of human dignity discernible in the 
permanently non-conscious patient prohibited the harvesting of their organs. 
Similarly, but less compellingly, the weaker echo of human dignity possessed 
by the recently deceased generally prohibits us from making free use of their 
tissues without prior consent. However, extending this notion to abortion poses 
a particular problem, in that an embryo has no trace of human dignity, but 
instead a foreshadowing of it. Nevertheless, we argued that the foreshadowing 
gave us a reason to not instrumentalise embryonic human life as a matter of 
routine. The idea of Man is essentially, therefore, equivalent to personal human 
dignity insofar as it entails that we never treat others only as means, but also 
always as ends. This logic extended, in part, to the permanently comatose and 
brain dead, the truly deceased, and those yet to be born. Even if the latter 




We also, however, made a supplementary case on the grounds of non-
personal dignity for abiding by the human condition. This was not, to repeat, a 
categorical argument, but one which had intuitive appeal. Thus we could 
account for our objections to genetic engineering of non-human life, and it 
emerged most forcefully with regards to our final topic, human enhancement. 
Assuming it was for non-eugenic purposes, we found persuasive reasons to 
object to genetic engineering which perverted the relations between the 
generations or even one’s past and future selves (relations which are, or should 
be, characterised by republican freedom), and our existential freedom to 
discover oneself. We also argued that our finitude, so constitutive of the human 
condition, gave us good reason to protect natality and mortality against their 
abolition by transhumanists. The idea of Man and the human condition, 
however vague, therefore represent two significant guides for action in the 
bioethical domain, guides which will likely become only more necessary in the 
coming decades. 

















Conclusion: Humanity, the Shepherd of Beings 
I. Criticisms of Jonas’ Philosophical System 
How successful is Jonas’ project? We recall that he sought to tackle three 
profound crises – nihilism, ecological ruin, and the biotechnological revolution – 
which all have their roots in the anti-Aristotelian turn taken in the modern period, 
philosophically represented by Bacon and Descartes. Jonas’ foremost means 
for overcoming this development were existential phenomenology and practical 
reason, leading to a recovery of a neo-Aristotelian philosophy of nature and a 
broadly Kantian ethic. Taking stock of his attempt, Jonas’ philosophy of life, 
critique of technology, and his imperative of responsibility for the ‘idea of Man’ 
are enduring and significant achievements. Not only do these lead to a sound 
environmental ethic, but all three also feed into his rich bioethical reflections, 
which offer a much-needed corrective to the dominant approach to that 
discipline in the English-speaking world. To this extent Jonas’ philosophical 
project achieves its aims.  
(α) Baconianism and Crypto-Christianity 
The weakest aspects of his system, by contrast, are undoubtedly its 
metaethical foundations and the political philosophy advanced in The 
Imperative. Before turning to these, however, I would like to consider two 
criticisms of his philosophy made by other commentators. Firstly there is the 
claim made by Stephan Kampowski (2013: 112-113) and Gerald McKenny that 
Jonas’ philosophical system fails to truly escape the influence of Baconianism. 
In Jonas’ ethic of responsibility, and the political philosophy built on it, McKenny 
identifies a Baconian will-to-mastery: “the responsible subject, […] defined by its 
care for what has come under the guilt of its power, is still essentially a modern 
subject who must gain control over technology” (1997: 74). This is problematic 
since “it determines Jonas’ conception of politics. Political theory for him 
reduces to the question of which system, Marxism or capitalism, is more likely 
to gain control over the dynamics of technology” (ibid). In place of this, 
McKenny suggests that “the task is not to gain control over technology but to be 
guided by a process of moral formation that is capable of both resisting its 
diffuse power and assimilating it into a moral project” (74-75). According to 
McKenny, then, Jonas only counters Baconianism with Baconianism in a 
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different guise, when he ought instead to have explained how the technological 
drive might in some cases be resisted and in others co-opted to good ends. 
McKenny is not wrong to say that Jonas seeks, through a politics guided 
by responsibility, a power over the technological power over nature. I have tried 
to show how positive freedom is insufficient for a comprehensive account of 
freedom, as living beings can also be negatively free, and to the extent that this 
one-sided focus leads Jonas to formulate his authoritarian theory of the state in 
The Imperative I agree that it is also politically problematic. These concerns 
aside, however, I do not think that McKenny’s claim really amounts to a 
criticism. On the contrary, democratic political control of technological 
development is precisely what the present moment demands. Perhaps this 
does entail a conception of the modern subject exerting control over its world, 
but that is not a problem for Jonas since he never claimed to escape 
instrumental rationality in each and every instance. His critique of Baconianism 
– and modernity in general – was always restricted to specific domains: namely, 
a reductive conception of humanity and non-human nature and the fact that our 
desire to master these has led us to the brink of biotechnological revolution and 
ecological catastrophe. He never claims that the solution would not involve self-
mastery, and nor should he, since morality often demands exactly that.112 
 The second criticism, made by Gilbert Hottois in particular, is that Jonas’ 
philosophy of responsibility ultimately relies on Judeo-Christian foundations 
rather than comprising a fully secular ethics. Hottois rightly observes that “a 
careful reading of The Imperative of Responsibility shows that […] religious 
stylistic overtones are not uncommon” (1993: 14), which is most obviously the 
case in Jonas’ use of the imago Dei as a synonym for the idea of Man. More 
damningly, Hottois criticises Jonas for holding that “nature – here meaning living 
species – is sacred and inviolable, which is to say that it must not be 
manipulated by humans, who would be ‘playing God’ in doing so” (1996: 136). 
Let us begin with the second charge. Jonas does hold life to be of intrinsic value 
and the bearer of a non-personal kind of dignity, but he certainly does not 
                                                          
112 Furthermore, contrary to McKenny’s objection, Jonas does occasionally recommend that we 
try to bring emerging technologies in line with moral objectives. He thought, for example, that 
the development of nuclear fusion was easily the lesser of two evils when faced with rocketing 
carbon emissions from fossil fuels (IR: 190-191). Jonas does not consider renewable energy, 
which today is the most promising solution. The rest of the section cited, however, is an 
astonishingly – and depressingly – accurate forecast of our current energy predicament. 
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regard it as sacred and inviolable. As discussed at length in the previous 
chapter, the non-personal dignity of living beings gives us a reason to consider 
their good in any relevant moral situation, but this will not necessarily be a 
reason which overrides other concerns. Here there is no fear of playing God 
with a sacrosanct nature, but rather a legitimate concern with doing 
unnecessary or excessive harm to non-human life. It is in this sense that Jonas 
is an heir of Schweitzer, whose teaching of reverence for life did not 
categorically preclude taking non-human life for our own ends. The fact that we 
must do so, at least for sustenance and in self-defense, simply means that a 
degree of guilt is the moral price of our continued existence.  
Hottois’ broader charge – that Jonas’ nominally secular philosophy draws 
on Judeo-Christian notions – is undoubtedly correct to the extent that Jonas is 
influenced by religious sensibilities, both rhetorically and intellectually: a charge 
no one who has read his work could deny. But it is another point entirely to 
claim that this actually matters for the sake of evaluating his arguments, which 
stand or fall on their own merit. Irrespective of religious sanction one can offer, 
as I have suggested Jonas does, a convincing account of the intrinsic value, 
dignity, and integrity of human and non-human life which provides adequate 
grounds for their being objects of moral responsibility. The fact that his 
arguments so closely track the Judeo-Christian tradition is not a problem for 
Jonas, or at least not for the interpretation I have offered of him. This is because 
ethics by its very nature belongs to tradition (in the grand sense) and cannot be 
coherently abstracted from this context. In our case this is the Greco-Roman-
Judeo-Christian West, and therefore it is no surprise that Jonas’ ethics are so 
obviously indebted to this history. What matters philosophically is that the ideas 
are well-argued for, and, as I say, for the most part they are. 
(β) Jonas’ Metaethics and Politics 
My chief criticisms of Jonas concern his attempted proof of moral 
objectivism and his politics. The latter, as I have shown, contains key 
argumentative errors which lead to his acquiescence to authoritarianism. 
Perhaps most egregiously, in The Imperative Jonas seeks to justify paternalistic 
statesmanship with reference to responsibility for the infant. But political 
responsibility aligns not with this total and private form of the phenomenon, but 
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rather the public responsibility each moral agent has for one another by virtue of 
belonging to a group with power over the individual. Here Jonas perhaps would 
have benefitted from recalling that Kant’s categorical imperative had not only a 
moral, but also a political formulation. Regardless, he began to replace his 
earlier authoritarian theory of the state with an intriguing environmental 
republicanism (albeit too late to fully develop the theory). This alternative, as I 
have sought to show, aligns with an account of public responsibility and 
represents a credible political ethic. For this reason Jonas is perhaps not to be 
judged too harshly as a political theorist.  
As indicated, my foremost criticism of Jonas’ philosophical system is his 
attempt to provide an objective foundation to his ethical theory. It is admirable, 
no doubt, but necessarily falls short. The is-ought gap may well be dogmatically 
held as unquestionable by some contemporary philosophers, and advanced 
simplistically by others, but it endures because Hume’s insight ultimately holds 
true. As our reading of MacIntyre in Chapter Three showed, the attempts made 
by various modern philosophers to find an objective foundation for morality were 
doomed to fail because of a category error: morality does not have its 
foundations in reason, nor in a universal human ‘moral sense’, but rather 
sentiment and custom. In his failure to account for objective goodness Jonas’ 
name can therefore be added to a very long list of thinkers stretching back to 
Plato who have sought the same in vain. More pertinently, it means that Jonas 
does not succeed in his grand ambition of overcoming modern nihilism, and nor, 
therefore, is his philosophical project a complete success. 
Nevertheless, even if we can only accept Jonas’ most fundamental 
metaethical claim – that the existence of value is objectively valuable – on 
intuitive grounds this does not, I think, fatally undermine his project. After all, 
given our moral heritage the rational demonstration of intrinsic value in all life 
makes of us a strong appeal as something objectively valuable. It can always 
be denied, of course, but it is persuasive according to the tradition which 
constitutes our moral understanding (and many others besides). Moreover, 
given this same heritage and the understanding it entails of the kinds of beings 
that we are – embodied, social, born of other mortals – responsibility for the 
vulnerable newborn does strike us as an incontrovertible instance of the 
phenomenon. Once more, it can still be questioned, but this time only by 
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contravening our most fundamental beliefs about what we owe to whom: those 
who really doubt that we have a duty of care for the infant stand outside of the 
realm of legitimate disagreement. We are not, then, left with moral subjectivism 
but rather moral relativism – more specifically, a deep historical-cultural and 
‘form of life’ relativism. This provides an adequate metaethical basis for an ethic 
of responsibility, albeit one which falls short of Jonas’ lofty ambitions. 
II. Finitude and Transcendence 
Jonas’ philosophy does not, then, fully escape the finitude which Heidegger’s 
existentialism had prescribed as our lot; there are, alas, no timeless moral 
norms to be found. However, Jonas’ philosophy of life and philosophical 
anthropology nevertheless provide us with the resources to transcend the limits 
of Heidegger’s thinking. Heidegger had taken us to be thrown into being with 
only our projected meanings and the possibility of an authentic grasping of our 
being-toward-death. Jonas, by contrast, stresses that human existence is not 
only shared, to a great extent, by non-human life, but also that what we do not 
share with other living beings is itself the final achievement of a tendency in 
Being. That is to say: human existence, as an embodied psycho-physical unity, 
shares the same existential structures as other lifeforms (sociality, spatiality, 
temporality, and so on). But these structures vary in richness throughout the 
domain of life: a variation which presents itself as an ascent toward greater 
world-openness. This, we follow Jonas in supposing, is the result of a tendency 
in Being toward life and freedom. Hence the development of a symbolic 
existence, reaching a unique prominence and intensity in human life, and 
ultimately giving rise to morality, is itself the nisus of Being at work. Even though 
the content of morality belongs to our historicity, our moral being itself is 
therefore the result of something greater than any one form of life.  
The value of our moral being was then revealed in the case of 
responsibility for the newborn. This instance of responsibility is not only the 
most fundamental ethical injunction prescribed by our moral tradition, but also 
closely follows from our organismic being. But this is not the only reason for its 
exceptional status. The incontrovertible nature of the phenomenon also 
indicates the supreme value of its true object: humanity as a moral being. For in 
each instance of responsibility we are not only committed to this child before us 
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right now, but this child in its becoming a moral agent. Only with the realisation 
of the latter does our responsibility cease to be of the vertical kind, and become 
instead the horizontal kind that I have argued underpins a republican politics. 
Responsibility is therefore future-oriented, pointing toward the moral being 
which humanity alone can fulfil. This was no mere species-relative good, but 
rather – as the outcome of its nisus – a good of Being itself. The ‘idea of Man’, 
as Jonas called the capacity for morality, is thus the transcendent facet of each 
case of responsibility for the newborn.  
Finally, we were able to account for the worth of non-human life and the 
human condition without resorting to Aristotelian species essences. Each 
individual organism, in being oriented toward its continued existence, has a 
good-of-its own. Such goods have become for us a matter of responsibility now 
that their existence is imperilled by global technological civilisation. And these 
subjective goods coalesce around what we called ‘modes of being’ or ‘forms of 
life’, the most important of which – for our analysis, at least – is the human 
condition. Our natality, mortality, the life self-consciously lived between these 
extremes, and the connection between our symbolic existence and certain 
physiological traits – the opposable thumb, upright posture, and increase in 
brain size – allow us to sketch out what it is to be human. The human condition 
does not possess the normative significance of the idea of Man, responsibility 
for which was unequivocal, but it nevertheless has a value for us which is newly 
revealed in the possibility of its biotechnological transformation. 
 What is the connection between transcendence and our responsibilities – 
not just for the idea of Man, but also for the human condition and non-human 
life? It is that humanity is not the shepherd of being, as Heidegger had it, but 
rather that being which is uniquely capable of moral responsibility: the shepherd 
of beings. In this task of guardianship, which now encompasses life on Earth 








(α) Works by Jonas 
 
[AKT] Jonas, H. (1977) ‘Acting, Knowing, Thinking: Gleanings from Hannah 
Arendt’s Philosophical Work’, Social Research, 44(1), pp.25-43. 
 
[APF] Jonas, H. (1965) Augustin und das paulinische Freiheitsproblem: Eine 
philosophische Studie zum pelagianischen Streit, Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 
 
[CBE] Jonas, H. (2001) ‘Closer to the Bitter End’, Graduate Faculty Philosophy 
Journal, 23(1), pp.21-30. 
 
[CG] Jonas, H. (1951) ‘Comment on General System Theory’, Human Biology, 
23(4), pp.328-335. 
 
[CR] Jonas, H. (1992) ‘The Consumer’s Responsibility: A Commentary to Lenk’, 
in Øfsti, A. (ed.) Ecology and Ethics: A Report From the Melbu 
Conference, 18-23 July 1990, Trondheim: Nordland Akademi for Kunst 
og Vitenskap, pp.215-218. 
 
[CRG] Jonas, H. (1980) ‘Commentary: Response to James M. Gustafson’, in 
Engelhardt, H. T., and Callahan, D. (eds), Knowing and Valuing: The 
Search for Common Roots, Vol. IV. The Foundations of Ethics and Its 
Relationship to Science, New York: The Hastings Center, pp.203-217. 
 





[EDM] Jonas, H. ‘Essay on Dualism and Monism’, Philosophisches Archiv der 
Universität Konstanz, HJ 2-7a-3. 
 
[EH] Jonas, H. (2001) ‘Edmund Husserl and the Ontological Question’, Etudes 
Phénoménologiques, 17(33/34), pp.5-20. 
 
[FOS] Jonas, H. ‘The Female of the Species’, Philosophisches Archiv der 
Universität Konstanz, HJ 4-9-5.  
 
[FRR] Jonas, H. (1981) On Faith, Reason, and Responsibility, Claremont, CA: 
The Institute for Antiquity and Christianity. 
 
[FSE] Jonas, H. (1976) ‘Freedom of Scientific Enquiry and the Public Interest’, 
Hastings Center Report, 6(4), pp.15-17. 
 
[FWT] Jonas, H. (2005) Fatalismus wäre Todsünde: Gespräche über Ethik und 
Mitverantwortung im dritten Jahrtausend, ed. by Böhler, D., Münster: LIT. 
 
[GDT] Jonas, H., and Culianu, I. P. (1985) ‘From Gnosticism to the Dangers of 
Technology: An Interview with Hans Jonas’, in Culianu, I. P. (ed.) 
Gnostcismo e pensiero moderno: Hans Jonas, Rome: L'Erma di 
Bretschneider, pp.133-153. 
 
[GR] Jonas, H. (2001) The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien God and 




[HA] Jonas, H. (1976) ‘Hannah Arendt: 1906-1975’, Social Research, 43(1), 
pp.3-5. 
 
[HRR] Jonas, H. (1990) ‘Heidegger’s Resoluteness and Resolve’, in Neske, G., 
and Kettering, E. (ed.), Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: 
Questions and Answers, trans. by Harries, L., New York: Paragon 
House, pp.197-203. 
 
[IHJ] Jonas, H., and Scodel, H. (2003) ‘An Interview with Professor Hans 
Jonas’, Social Research, 70(2), pp.339-368. 
 
[IR] Jonas, H. (1984) The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics 
for the Technological Age, trans. by Jonas, H. and Herr, D., Chicago: 
Chicago University Press. 
  
[KG] Jonas, H. (1959) ‘Kurt Goldstein and Philosophy’, The American Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, 19(2): 161-164.  
 
[KM] Jonas, H. (1929) ‘Karl Mannheims Soziologie des Geistes’, Schriften der 
Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie, 6(1), pp.111-114. 
 
[M] Jonas, H. (2008) Memoirs, ed. by Wiese, C., trans. by Winston, K., 
Lebanon, NH: Brandeis University Press. 
 
[MM] Jonas, H. (1996) Mortality and Morality: A Search for the Good After 




[NCA] Jonas, H., Dönhoff, M., and Merkel, R. (1995) ‘Not Compassion Alone: 
On Euthanasia and Ethics’, Hastings Center Report, 25(7), pp.44-50. 
 
[NVN] Jonas, H., and Gebhardt, E. (1994) ‘Naturwissenschaft versus Natur-
Verantwortung?’, in Böhler, D., and Hoppe, I. (eds), Ethik für die Zukunft: 
Im Diskurs mit Hans Jonas, Munich: C. H. Beck. 
 
[OF] Jonas, H. Organism and Freedom: An Essay in Philosophical Biology, ed. 
by Beckers, J. O., and Preußger, F., available at: http://hans-jonas-
edition.de/?p=142 [accessed: 24/11/2016].  
Note: each reference to Organism and Freedom includes a Latin numeral 
referring to the chapter (e.g. OF IV), as these have not been synthesised 
into a single manuscript. 
 
[OFA] Jonas, H. (1973) Organismus und Freiheit: Ansätze zu einer 
philosophischen Biologie, trans. by Jonas, H., and Dockhorn, K., 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.  
 
[OFL] Jonas, H. (1943) ‘On the Firing Line’, The Hebrew Union College 
Monthly, January, pp.13-14. 
 
[OG] Jonas, H. (1984) ‘Ontological Grounding of a Political Ethics: On the 
Metaphysics of Commitment to the Future of Man’, Graduate Faculty 
Philosophy Journal, 10(1), pp.47-61. 
 
[OPW] Jonas, H. (2007) ‘Our Part in this War: A Word to Jewish Men’, in Wiese, 
C., The Life and Thought of Hans Jonas: Jewish Dimensions, trans. by 





[OR] Jonas, H. ‘Oral Remarks at Bicentennial Conference’, Philosophisches 
Archiv der Universität Konstanz, HJ 17-12-2. 
 
[OS] Jonas, H. (2012) ‘On Suffering’, La Rassegna Mensile di Israel, 78(1/2), 
pp.22-30. 
 
[PE] Jonas, H. (2010) Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to 
Technological Man, New York: Atropos Press.  
 
[PF] Jonas, H. (2010) Problemi di libertà [Problems of Freedom], ed. by Spinelli, 
E., and Michelis, A., Turin: Nino Aragno Editore. 
 
[PL] Jonas, H. (2001) The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophy of 
Biology, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.  
 
[PU] Jonas, H. (1992) Philosophische Untersuchungen und metaphysische 
Vermutungen, Frankfurt am Main: Insel. 
 
[PV] Jonas, H. (1979) Das Prinzip Verantwortung: Versuch einer Ethik für die 
technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
 
[RD] Jonas, H. (1978) ‘The Right to Die’, Hastings Center Report, 8(4), pp.31-
36. 
 
[SB] Jonas, H. (1978) ‘Straddling the Boundaries of Theory and Practice: 
Recombinant DNA Research as a Case of Action in the Process of 
[270] 
 
Inquiry’, in Richards, J. (ed.), Recombinant DNA: Science, Ethics, and 
Politics, New York: Academic Press, pp.253-271. 
 
[SE] Jonas, H. ‘Science and Ethics’, Philosophisches Archiv der Universität 
Konstanz, HJ 1-10-5e. 
 
[TH] Jonas, H. (1972) ‘Testimony Before Subcommittee on Health, United 
States Senate’, 73-191-0, Library of Congress. 
 
[THSR] Jonas, H. ‘Testimony Before Subcommittee on Health and Scientific 
Research, United States Senate’, Philosophisches Archiv der Universität 
Konstanz, HJ 7-1-1. 
 
[TME] Jonas, H. (1985) Technik, Medizin und Ethik: Zur Praxis des Prinzips 
Verantwortung, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
 
[TPT] Jonas, H. (1979) ‘Toward a Philosophy of Technology’, Hastings Center 
Report, 9(1), pp.34-43. 
 
[TSE] Jonas, H. (1982) ‘Technology as a Subject for Ethics’, Social Research, 
49(4), pp.891-898. 
 
[WGM] Jonas, H. ‘What Does “Good” Mean in “Good Physician”?’, 
Philosophisches Archiv der Universität Konstanz, HJ 1-2-12. 
 
[WPE] Jonas, H. (2002) ‘Wissenschaft as Personal Experience’, Hastings 
Center Report, 32(4): 27-35.  
[271] 
 
(β) Other Cited Works 
 
Achterhuis, H. (ed.) (2001) American Philosophy of Technology: The Empirical 
Turn, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. 
 
Aho, K. A. (2009) Heidegger’s Neglect of the Body, Albany, NY: State University 
of New York Press. 
 
Akbari, O. S. (2015) ‘Safeguarding Gene Drive Experiments in the Laboratory’, 
Science, 349(6251), pp.927-929. 
 
Anders, G. (1956) Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen: Über die Seele im Zeitalter 
der zweiten industriellen Revolution, Vol. 1, Munich: C. H. Beck. 
 
Anders, G., and Eatherly, C. (1989) Burning Conscience: The Guilt of 
Hiroshima, 2nd edn, New York: Paragon House. 
 
Apel, K.-O. (1996) Selected Essays, Vol. 2: Ethics and the Theory of 
Rationality, ed. by Mendieta, E., trans. by Brown, W., New Jersey: 
Humanities Press. 
 
Arendt, H. (1958) The Human Condition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Arendt, H. (1979) ‘On Hannah Arendt’, in Hill, M. A. (ed.) Hannah Arendt and 




Aristotle (1984a) ‘De Anima’, trans. by Smith, J. A., in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 
ed. by Barnes, J., Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp.641-692. 
 
Aristotle (1984b) ‘Generation of Animals’, trans. by Platt, A., in Complete Works, 
Vol. 1, ed. by Barnes, J., Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp.1111-
1218. 
 
Aristotle (1984c) ‘Movement of Animals’, trans. by Farquharson, A. S. L., in 
Complete Works, Vol. 1, ed. by Barnes, J., Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, pp.1087-1096. 
 
Aristotle (1984d) ‘Nicomachean Ethics’, trans. by Jowett, B., in Complete 
Works, Vol. 2, ed. by Barnes, J., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
pp.1729-1867. 
 
Aristotle (1984e) ‘Physics’, trans. by Hardie, R. P., and Gaye, R. K., in 
Complete Works, Vol. 1, ed. by Barnes, J., Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, pp.315-446. 
 
Aristotle (1984f) ‘Politics’, trans. by Ross, W. D., and Urmson, J. O., in 
Complete Works, Vol. 2, ed. by Barnes, J., Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, pp.1986-2129. 
 
Attfield, R. (1991) The Ethics of Environmental Concern, 2nd edn, Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press. 
 
Attfield, R. (2014) Environmental Ethics: An Overview for the Twenty-First 




Bacon, F. (1984) Valerius Terminus: Von der Interpretation der Natur, trans. by 
Träger, F., Würzburg: Könighausen and Neumann. 
 
Bacon, F. (2000) The New Organum, ed. by Jardine, L., and Silverthorne, M., 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Barbaras, R. (2008) ‘Life, Movement, and Desire’, Research in Phenomenology, 
38(1), pp.3-17. 
 
Barker, G. (2015) Beyond Biofatalism: Human Nature for an Evolving World, 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Beck, U. (1986) Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne, 
Berlin: Verlag. 
 
Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, trans. by Ritter, M., 
London: Sage Publications. 
 
Bergson, H. (1922) Creative Evolution, trans. by Mitchell, A., London: Macmillan 
& Co.  
 
Berlin, I. (2002) Liberty, ed. by Hardy, H., Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 





Blande, J. D., and Glinwood, R. (eds) (2016) Deciphering Chemical Language 
of Plant Communication, Cham: Springer. 
 
Bloch, E. (1986) The Principle of Hope, 3 vols, trans. by Plaice, N., Plaice, S., 
and Knight, P., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Bookchin, M. (1982) The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution 
of Hierarchy, Palo Alto: Cheshire Books. 
 
Borgmann, A. (1984) Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life: A 
Philosophical Inquiry, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Bostrom, N. (2008) ‘Letter From Utopia’, Studies in Ethics, Law, and 
Technology, 2(1), pp.1-7. 
 
Bostrom, N. (2014) Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Buchanan, B. (2008) Onto-Ethologies: The Animal Environments of Uexküll, 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze, Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press. 
 
Calarco, M. (2008) Zoographies: The Question of the Animal From Heidegger to 
Derrida, New York: Columbia University Press. 
 





Callicott, J. B. (1984) ‘Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental 
Ethics’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 21(4), pp.299-309. 
 
Callicott, J. B. (1989) In Defence of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental 
Philosophy, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
 
Cassirer, E. (1944) An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of 
Human Culture, New Haven: Yale University Press.  
 
Collingwood, R. G. (1945) The Idea of Nature, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Crocker, G. (2012) A Managerial Philosophy of Technology: Technology and 
Humanity in Symbiosis, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Danto, A. C. (1981) The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of 
Art, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Dahlstrom, D. O. (2011) ‘Being at the Beginning: Heidegger’s Interpretation of 
Heraclitus’, in Dahlstrom, D. O. (ed.) Interpreting Heidegger: Critical 
Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Descartes, R. (1968) Discourse on Method and the Meditations, trans. by 




Descartes, R. (1998) Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings, trans. by 
Clark, D. M., London: Penguin. 
 
Dinneen, N. (2014) ‘Hans Jonas’s Noble “Heuristics of Fear”: Neither the Good 
Lie Nor the Terrible Truth’, Cosmos and History, 10(1), pp.1-21. 
 
Dinneen, N. (2017) ‘Ecological Scenario Planning and the Question of the Best 
Regime in the Political Theory of Hans Jonas’, Environmental Politics, 
26(5), pp.938-955. 
  
di Paolo, E. A. (2006) ‘Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency’, 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4(4), pp.429-452. 
 
Donnelley, S. (1989) ‘Hans Jonas, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Ethics of 
Responsibility’, Social Research, 56(3), pp.635-657. 
 
Donnelley, S. (2008) ‘Hans Jonas and Ernst Mayr: On Organic Life and Human 
Responsibility’, in Tirosh-Samuelson, H., and Wiese, C. (eds), The 
Legacy of Hans Jonas: Judaism and the Phenomenon of Life, Leiden: 
Brill, pp.261-285. 
 
Dostoevsky, (1990) The Brothers Karamazov, trans. by Pevear, R., and 
Volokhonsky, L., London: Vintage. 
 
Dupré, J. (2001) ‘In Defence of Classification’, Studies in History and 




Dupuy, J.-P. (2012) ‘The Precautionary Principle and Enlightened Doomsaying’, 
Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 14(4), pp.577-592. 
 
Düwell, M. (2013) Bioethics: Methods, Theories, Domains, Abingdon: 
Routledge. 
 
Elden, S. (2006) ‘Heidegger’s Animals’, Continental Philosophy Review, 39(3), 
pp.273-291. 
 
Ellul, J. (1964) The Technological Society, trans. by Wilkinson, J., New York: 
Vintage. 
 
Farrell, J. M. (2015) ‘The Baby and the Bathwater: Hans Jonas’s Recovery of 
Aristotelian Biological Concepts’, Journal of the British Society for 
Phenomenology, 45(3), pp.187-202. 
 
Ferry, L. (1995) The New Ecological Order, trans. by Volk, C., Chicago: 
Chicago University Press. 
 
File, A. L., Klironomos, J., Maherali, H., and Dudley, S. A. (2012) ‘Plant Kin 
Recognition Enhances Abundance of Symbiotic Microbial Partner’, PLoS 
One, 7(9), pp.1-10. 
 
Foot, P. (2001) Natural Goodness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Frogneux, N. (2014) ‘Some Paradoxes Linked to Risk Moderation’, trans. by 
Cronin, J., in Gordon, J.-S., and Burckhart, H. (eds), Global Ethics and 
[278] 
 
Moral Responsibility: Hans Jonas and his Critics, Farnham: Ashgate, 
pp.73-91. 
 
Fukuyama, F. (2002) Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the 
Biotechnology Revolution, New York: Farrar Strauss & Giroux. 
 
Furnari, M. G. (2006) ‘From the Ontology of Temporality to the Ethics of the 
Future: Care and Responsibility in Hans Jonas’, in Siegal, L. V. (ed.) 
Philosophy and Ethics: New Research, New York: Nova Science 
Publishers, pp.133-157. 
 
Gadamer, H.-G. (1976) Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. by Linge, D. E., 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Gadamer, H.-G. (1994) Heidegger’s Ways, trans. by Stanley, J. W., New York: 
State University of New York Press. 
 
Gadamer, H.-G. (1996) The Enigma of Health: The Art of Healing in a Scientific 
Age, trans. by Gaiger, J., and Walker, N., Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Gadamer, H.-G. (2004) Truth and Method, 2nd edn, trans. by Weinsheimer, J., 
and Marshall, D. G., London: Continuum. 
 
Galileo (2008) The Essential Galileo, ed. and trans. by Finocchiaro, M. A., 
Indianapolis: Hackett. 
 
Gardiner, S. M. (2011) A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate 
[279] 
 
Change, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Gehlen, A. (1988) Man: His Nature and Place in the World, trans. by McMillan, 
C., and Pillemer, K., New York: Columbia University Press.  
 
Genesis 1-4:26, Holy Bible: King James Version. 
 
Giddens, A. (1984) The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of 
Structuration, Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Giddens, A. (1993) New Rules in Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of 
Interpretive Sociologies, 2nd edn, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Giubilini, A., and Minerva, F. (2013) ‘After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby 
Live?’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 39(5), pp.261-263. 
 
Glock, H.-J. (2012) ‘The Anthropological Difference: What Can Philosophers Do 
To Identify the Differences Between Human and Non-human Animals?’, 
in Sandis, C., and Cain, M. J. (eds), Human Nature, Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplements, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pp.105-131. 
 
Goldstein, K. (1995) The Organism: A Holistic Approach to Biology Derived 
from Pathological Data in Man, New York: Zone Books. 
 
Goodpaster, K. E. (1976) ‘On Being Morally Considerable’, The Journal of 




Gorz, A. (1980) Ecology as Politics, trans. by Vigderman, P., and Cloud, J., 
Montréal: Black Rose Press. 
 
Gramsci, A. (1992) Prison Notebooks, Vol. 1, ed. by Buttigieg, J. A., New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
 
Habermas, J. (1988) On the Logic of the Social Sciences, trans. by Nicholsen, 
S. W., and Stark, J. A., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Habermas, J. (2003) The Future of Human Nature, trans. by Rehg, W., Pensky, 
M., and Beister, H., Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Harris, J. (2007) Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better 
People, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Hauskeller, M. (2007) Biotechnology and the Integrity of Life: Taking Public 
Fears Seriously, Farnham: Ashgate. 
 
Hauskeller, M. (2015) ‘The Ontological Ethics of Hans Jonas’, in Meacham, D. 
(ed.), Medicine and Society: New Perspectives in Continental 
Philosophy, Dordrecht: Springer, pp.39-55. 
 
Hauskeller, M. (2017) ‘Is It Desirable to Be Able to Do the Undesirable? Moral 
Bioenhancement and the Little Alex Problem’, Cambridge Quarterly of 




Hegel, G. W. F. (1975) Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Vol. 1, trans. by Knox, 
T. M., Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Heidegger, M. (1966) Discourse on Thinking, trans. by Anderson, J. M., and 
Freund, E. H., New York: Harper & Row. 
 
Heidegger, M. (1977) Basic Writings, ed. by D. F. Krell, London: Routledge.  
 
Heidegger, M. (1981) ‘Why Do I Stay in the Provinces?’, trans. by Sheehan, T., 
in Sheehan, T. (ed.), Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, Chicago: 
Precedent Publishing, pp.27-29. 
 
Heidegger, M. (1985) History of the Concept of Time: Prologomena, trans. by 
Kisiel, T., Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
 
Heidegger, M. (1990) ‘Der Spiegel Interview with Martin Heidegger’, in Neske, 
G., and Kettering, E. (eds), Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: 
Questions and Answers, trans. by Harries, L., New York: Paragon 
House, pp.41-66. 
 
Heidegger, M. (1992) Parmenides, trans. by Schuwer, A., and Rojcewicz, R., 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
 
Heidegger, M. (1995) The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, 
Finitude, Solitude, trans. by McNeill, W., and Walker, N., Bloomington: 




Heidegger, M. (1997) Plato’s Sophist, trans. by Rojcewicz, R., and Schuwer, A., 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
 
Heidegger, M. (2000) Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. by Fried, G., and Polt, 
R., New Haven: Yale University Press.  
 
Heidegger, M. (2001a) Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation 
into Phenomenological Research, trans. by Rojcewicz, R., Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press.  
 
Heidegger, M. (2001b) Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. by Hofstadter, A., 
New York: Perennial. 
 
Heidegger, M. (2001c) Zollikon Seminars: Protocols, Conversations, Letters, ed. 
by Boss, M., trans. by Mayr, F., and Askay, R., Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press. 
 
Heidegger, M. (2002a) Off the Beaten Track, trans. by Young, J., and Haynes, 
K., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Heidegger, M. (2002b) Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and 
Time and Beyond, trans. by Buren, J. v., New York: State University of 
New York Press.  
 
Heidegger, M. (2008) Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy, trans. by 




Heidegger, M. (2009) Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, trans. by 
Metcalf, R. D., and Tanzer, M. B., Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press.  
 
Heidegger, M. (2010a) Being and Time, trans. by Stambaugh, J., and Schmidt, 
D. J., Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.  
 
Heidegger, M. (2010b) Country Path Conversations, trans. by Davis, B. W., 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
 
Heidegger, M. (2010c) Logic: The Question of Truth, trans. by Sheehan, T., 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
 
Heidegger, M. and Fink, E. (1993) Heraclitus Seminar, trans. by Seibert, C. H., 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press.  
 
Hobbes, T. (1914) Leviathan, London: J. M. Dent & Sons. 
 
Hösle, V. (2001) ‘Ontology and Ethics in Hans Jonas’, Graduate Faculty 
Philosophy Journal, 23(1), pp.31-50. 
 
Hösle, V. (2008) ‘Hans Jonas’s Position in the History of German Philosophy’, in 
Tirosh-Samuelson, H., and Wiese, C. (eds), The Legacy of Hans Jonas: 
Judaism and the Phenomenon of Life, Leiden: Brill, pp.19-37. 
 
Hottois, G. (1993) ‘Introduction’, in Hottois, G. (ed.) Aux Fondements D’une 
Éthique Contemporaine: H. Jonas et H.T. Engelhardt, Paris: Librarie 
[284] 
 
Philosophique J. Vrin, pp.11-31. 
 
Hottois, G. (1996) Entre Symboles & Technosciences: Un Itinéraire 
Philosophique, Seyssel: Editions Champ Vallon. 
 
Hume, D. (1969) A Treatise of Human Nature, London: Penguin. 
 
Hume, D. (1975) Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning 
the Principles of Morals, 3rd edn, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Hursthouse, R. (1991) ‘Virtue Theory and Abortion’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 
20(3), pp.223-246. 
 
Hursthouse, R. (1999) On Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Husserl, E. (1970) The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. 
by Carr, D., Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
 
Ihde, D. (1979) Technics and Praxis, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D. Reidel 
Publishing. 
 
Ihde, D. (1983) Existential Technics, Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press. 
 
Ihde, D. (1999) ‘Phil-Tech Meets Eco-Phil: The Environment’, in Mitcham, C. 
[285] 
 
(ed.) Research in Philosophy and Technology: Philosophies of the 
Environment and Technologies, Greenwich, Connecticut: Jai Press, 
pp.27-38. 
 
Ihde, D. (2010) Heidegger's Technologies: Postphenomenological 
Perspectives, New York: Fordham University Press. 
 
IPCC (2013) ‘Summary for Policymakers’, in Climate Change 2013: The 
Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
Cambridge: IPCC. 
 
IPCC (2014) ‘Summary for Policymakers’, in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. 
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge: IPCC. 
 
James, S. P., and Cooper, D. E. (2005) Buddhism, Virtue, and Environment, 
Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. 
 
James, S. P. (2009) The Presence of Nature: A Study in Phenomenology and 
Environmental Philosophy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Johnson, A. R. (2012) ‘Avoiding Environmental Catastrophes: Varieties of 
Principled Precaution’, Ecology and Society, 17(3). 
 
Johnson, A. T. (2014) ‘Is Organic Life “Existential”? Reflections on the 
Biophenomenologies of Hans Jonas and Early Heidegger’, 
[286] 
 
Environmental Philosophy, 11(2), pp.253-277.  
 
Jonsen, A. R. (1998) The Birth of Bioethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Kampowski, S. (2013) A Greater Freedom: Biotechnology, Love, and Human 
Destiny (in Dialogue with Hans Jonas and Jürgen Habermas), Eugene, 
Oregon: Pickwick Publications. 
 
Kant, I. (1993) Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 3rd edn, trans. by 
Ellington, J. W., Indianapolis: Hackett. 
 
Kant, I. (1996) Metaphysics of Morals, trans. by Gregor, M., Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kant, I. (2015) Critique of Practical Reason, trans. by Gregor, M., Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Karban, R., Shiojiri, K., Ishizaki, S., Wetzel, W. C., and Evans, R. Y. (2013) ‘Kin 
Recognition Affects Plant Communication and Defence’, Proceedings of 
the Royal Society: Biological Sciences, 280(1756), pp.1-5. 
 
Karban, R. (2015) Plant Sensing and Communication, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.  
 
Kass, L. R. (1995) ‘Appreciating The Phenomenon of Life’, Hastings Center 




Kass, L. (1997) ‘The Wisdom of Repugnance’, The New Republic, 2nd June, 
pp.17-26. 
 
Kass, L. R. (2002) Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for 
Bioethics, San Francisco: Encounter Books. 
 
Kisiel, T. J. (1993) The Genesis of Heidegger’s “Being and Time”, Berkeley: 
University of California Press.  
 
Klages, L. (2013) The Biocentric Worldview: Selected Essays and Poems of 
Ludwig Klages, trans. by Pryce, J. D., London: Arktos.  
 
Klostermann, V. (ed.) (1970) Durchblicke: Martin Heidegger zum 80. 
Geburtstag, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 
 
Korsgaard, C. M. (1986) ‘The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing With Evil’, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 15(4), pp.325-349. 
 
Krebs, A. (1999) Ethics of Nature: A Map, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
 
Krell, D. F. (1992) Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
 
Kuhlmann, W. (1994) ‘“Prinzip Verantwortung” versus Diskursethik’, in Böhler, 
D. (ed.) Ethik für die Zukunft: Im Diskurs mit Hans Jonas, Frankfurt am 




Kurasawa, F. (2007) The Work of Global Justice: Human Rights as Practices, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lapidot, E. (2017) ‘Hans Jonas’ Work on Gnosicism as Counterhistory’, 
Philosophical Readings, 9(1), pp.61-68. 
 
Larsen, Ø. (2009) The Right to Dissent: The Critical Principle in Discourse 
Ethics and Deliberative Democracy, Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum 
Press. 
 
Lenk, H. (2007) Global Technoscience and Responsibility: Schemes Applied to 
Human Values, Technology, Creativity and Globalisation, Münster: LIT 
Verlag. 
 
Leopold, A. (2001) A Sand County Almanac: With Essays on Conservation, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Lévinas, E. (1969) Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. by Lingis, 
A., Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. 
 
Levy, D. J. (1987) Political Order: Philosophical Anthropology, Modernity, and 
the Challenge of Ideology, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press. 
 
Levy, D. J. (2002) Hans Jonas: The Integrity of Thinking, Columbia, MO: 




Liang, P., Xu, Y., Zhang, X., Ding, C., Huang, R., Zhang, Z., Lv, J., Xie, X., 
Chen, Y., Li, Y., Sun, Y., Bai, Y., Songyang, Z., Ma, W., Zhou, C., and 
Huang, J. (2015) ‘CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Gene Editing in Human 
Tripronuclear Zygotes’, Protein Cell, 6(5), pp.363-372. 
 
Lindberg, S. (2005) ‘Hans Jonas’ Theory of Life in the Face of Responsibility’, in 
Lembeck, K.-H., Mertens, K., and Orth, E. W. (eds), 
Phänomenologischen Forschungen, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 
pp.175-191.  
 
Lee, P., and George, R. P. (2005) ‘The Wrong of Abortion’, in Cohen, A. I., and 
Wellman, C. H. (eds), Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, Oxford: 
Blackwell, pp.13-26. 
 
Lovejoy, A. O. (1936) The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an 
Idea, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Lovelock, J. (2006) Revenge of Gaia: Why the Earth is Fighting Back and How 
We Can Still Save Humanity, London: Penguin. 
 
MacIntyre, A. (1976) ‘Contexts of Interpretation’, Boston University Journal, 
24(1), pp.41-46. 
 
MacIntyre, A. (1999) Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need 
the Virtues, London: Duckworth. 
 
MacIntyre, A. (2002) ‘On Not Having the Last Word: Thoughts on Our Debts to 
Gadamer’, in Malpas, J., Arnswald, U., and Kertscher, J. (eds), 
[290] 
 
Gadamer’s Century: Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp.157-172. 
 
MacIntyre, A. (2007) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd edn, Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. 
 
Mannheim, K. (1991) Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of 
Knowledge, London: Routledge. 
 
Marquis, D. (1989) ‘Why Abortion is Immoral’, The Journal of Philosophy, 86(4), 
pp.183-202. 
 
Marx, K., and Engels, F. (1970) The German Ideology: Introduction to a Critique 
of Political Economy, London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
 
Mayr, E. (1982) The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and 
Inheritance, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Mayr, E. (1988) Toward a New Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an 
Evolutionist, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Mayr, E. (2004) What Makes Biology Unique? Considerations on the Autonomy 
of a Scientific Discipline, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 




McGrew, T., Alspector-Kelly, M., and Allhoff, F. (2009) Philosophy of Science: 
An Historical Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
McKenny, G. P. (1997) To Relieve the Human Condition: Bioethics, 
Technology, and the Body, Albany: State University of New York Press. 
 
McNeill, W. (2006) The Time of Life: Heidegger and Ēthos, Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press. 
 
Melle, U. (1998) ‘Responsibility and the Crisis of Technological Civilisation: A 
Husserlian Meditation on Hans Jonas’, Human Studies, 21(4), pp.329-
345. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962) Phenomenology of Perception, trans. by Smith, C., 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2003) Nature: Course Notes from the Collège de France, 
ed. by Séglard, D., trans. by Vallier, R., Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern 
University Press. 
 
Mitchell, A. J. (2011) ‘Heidegger’s Later Thinking of Animality: The End of World 
Poverty’, Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual, 1(1), pp.74-85. 
 
Morris, T. (2013) Hans Jonas’s Ethic of Responsibility: From Ontology to 
Ecology, Albany: State University of New York Press. 
 
Moss, C. (2000) Elephant Memories: Thirteen Years in the Life of an Elephant 
[292] 
 
Family, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Moss, L. (2003) What Genes Can’t Do, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Muraca, B. (2011) ‘The Map of Moral Significance: A New Axiological Matrix for 
Environmental Ethics’, Environmental Values, 20(3), pp.375-396. 
 
Musson, A. E., and Robinson, E. (1969) Science and Technology in the 
Industrial Revolution, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
 
Næss, A. (1989) Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy, 
ed. and trans. by Rothenberg, D., Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Nietzsche, F. (1974) The Gay Science, trans. by Kaufmann, W., New York: 
Random House. 
 
Nietzsche, F. (2003) Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ, trans. by 
Hollingdale, R. J., London: Penguin. 
 
Nietzsche, F. (2017) The Will to Power: Selections from the Notebooks of the 
1880s, trans. by Hill, R. K., and Scarpitti, M. A., London: Penguin. 
 
Nikulin, D. (2001) ‘Reconsidering Responsibility: Hans Jonas’ Imperative for a 




Nussbaum, M. C. (2004) ‘Beyond “Compassion and Humanity”: Justice for 
Nonhuman Animals’, in Sunstein, C. R., and Nussbaum, M. C. (eds), 
Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp.299-320. 
 
O’Neill, J. (1992) ‘The Varieties of Intrinsic Value’, The Monist, 75(2), pp.119-
137. 
 
Ott, K. (2016) ‘On the Meaning of Eudemonic Arguments for a Deep 
Anthropocentric Environmental Ethics’, New German Critique, 43(2), 
pp.105-126. 
 
Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Passmore, J. (1980) Man’s Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and 
Western Traditions, 2nd edn, London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. 
 
Penner, S. S., Seiser, R., and Schultz, K. R. (2008) ‘Steps Toward Passively 
Safe, Proliferation-Resistant Nuclear Power’, Progress in Energy and 
Combustion Science, 34(3), pp.275-287. 
 
Persson, I., and Savulescu, J. (2008) ‘The Perils of Cognitive Enhancement and 
the Urgent Imperative to Enhance the Moral Character of Humanity’, 
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 25(3), pp.162-177. 
 
Persson, I., and Savulescu, J. (2012) Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral 




Persson, I., and Savulescu, J. (2015) ‘The Art of Misunderstanding Moral 
Bioenhancement: Two Cases’, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare 
Ethics, 24(1), pp.48-57.  
 
Pettit, P. (1997) Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Pettit, P. (2012) On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of 
Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Plato (1997) ‘Critias’, trans. by Clay, D., in Complete Works, ed. by Cooper, J. 
M., Indianapolis: Hackett, pp.1292-1306. 
 
Plessner, H. (1970) Laughing and Crying: A Study of the Limits of Human 
Behavior, 3rd edn, trans. by Churchill, J. S., and Grene, M., Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press. 
 
Plessner, H. (1975) Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch: Einleitung in 
die philosophische Anthropologie, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.  
 
Portmann, A. (1956) ‘Letter’, Philosophisches Archiv der Universität Konstanz, 
HJ 16-4-25. 
 
Portmann, A. (1961) Animals as Social Beings, trans. by Coburn, O., London: 
Hutchinson.  
 
Pritchard, S. B. (2012) ‘An Envirotechnical Disaster: Nature, Technology, and 
[295] 
 
Politics at Fukushima’, Environmental History, 17(2), pp.219-243. 
 
Ramana, M. V. (2006) ‘Twenty Years After Chernobyl: Debates and Lessons’, 
Economic and Political Weekly, 41(18), pp.1743-1747. 
 
Regan, T. (2004) The Case for Animal Rights, 2nd edn, Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
 
Rolston III, H. (1988) Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural 
World, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
 
Rolston III, H. (1989) Philosophy Gone Wild, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. 
 
Rolston III, H. (1994) ‘Value in Nature and the Nature of Value’, in Attfield, R., 
and Belsey, A. (eds), Philosophy and the Natural Environment, Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Supplements, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp.13-30. 
 
Rosen, S. (2005) ‘Remarks on Heidegger’s Plato’, in Partenie, C., and 
Rockmore, T. (eds), Heidegger and Plato: Toward Dialogue, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, pp.178-191. 
 
Rowlands, M. (2012) Can Animals Be Moral?, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Sandel, M. J. (1996) Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public 




Sandel, M. J. (2007) The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic 
Engineering, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Sandler, R. L. (2007) Character and Environment: A Virtue-Oriented Approach 
to Environmental Ethics, New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Sartre, J.-P. (1948) Existentialism and Humanism, trans. by Mairet, P., London: 
Methuen. 
 
Savage-Rumbaugh, S., Shanker, S. G., and Taylor, T. J. (1998) Apes, 
Language, and the Human Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Scheler, M. (1961) Man’s Place in Nature, trans. by Meyerhoff, H., New York: 
Noonday Press.  
 
Schelling, F. W. J. (2006) Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of 
Human Freedom, trans. by Love, J., and Schmidt, J., Albany: State 
University of New York Press. 
 
Schmidt, J. C. (2013) ‘Defending Hans Jonas’ Environmental Ethics: On the 
Relation Between Philosophy of Nature and Ethics’, Environmental 
Ethics, 35(4), pp.461-479.  
 
Schmidt, J. C. (2014) ‘Ethics for the Technoscientific Age: On Hans Jonas’ 
Argumentation and his Public Philosophy Beyond Disciplinary 
Boundaries’, in Gordon, J.-S., and Burckhart, H. (eds), Global Ethics and 





Schütze, C. (1995) ‘The Political and Intellectual Influence of Hans Jonas’, 
Hastings Center Report, 25(7), pp.40-43.  
 
Schweitzer, A. (1965) The Teaching of Reverence for Life, trans. by Winston, 
R., and Winston, C., London: Peter Owen. 
 
Sharon, T. (2014) Human Nature in an Age of Biotechnology: The Case for 
Mediated Posthumanism, Dordrecht: Springer. 
 
Singer, P. (1993) Practical Ethics, 2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Singer, P. (1995) Animal Liberation, 2nd edn, London: Pimlico. 
 
Skidelsky, E. (forthcoming) ‘Moral Enhancement and the Human Condition’, in 
Hauskeller, M., and Coyne, L. (eds), Moral Enhancement: Critical 
Perspectives, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
 
Skinner, B. F. (1974) About Behaviorism, London: Jonathan Cape. 
 
Spengler, O. (2015) Man and Technics: A Contribution to a Philosophy of Life, 
trans. by Atkinson, C. F, and Putman, M., London: Arktos.  
 




Sugiyama, Y. (1985) ‘The Brush-Stick of Chimpanzees Found in South-West 
Cameroon and Their Cultural Characteristics’, Primates, 26(4), pp.361-
374. 
 
Sullivan, R. J. (1989) Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory, Cambridge: Cambrige 
University Press. 
 
Taylor, C. (1991) The Ethics of Authenticity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Taylor, P. W. (1986) Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Thompson, E. (2004) ‘Life and Mind: From Autopoiesis to 
Neurophenomenology. A Tribute to Francisco Varela’, Phenomenology 
and the Cognitive Sciences, 3(4), pp.381-398. 
 
Thompson, E. (2007) Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences 
of Mind, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
 
Thomson, J. J. (1971) ‘A Defense of Abortion’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1(1), 
pp.47-66. 
 





Trnka, J. (2008). ‘Hans Jonas on Teleology in Biology: The Relevance of 
Existential Philosophy for Biological Thinking’, available at: 
https://www.academia.edu/2915001/Hans_Jonas_on_Teleology_in_Biolo
gy [accessed 20/08/2015]. 
 
United Nations (1982) General Assembly Resolution 37/7, ‘World Charter for 
Nature’, 28th October 1982. 
 
United Nations (1992) ‘Report of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development’, 12th August 1992. 
 
Varela, F. G., Maturana, H. R., and Uribe, R. (1981) ‘Autopoiesis: The 
Organization of Living Systems, Its Characterization and a Model’, 
Cybernetics Forum, 10(2/3), pp.7-13. 
 
Voegelin, E. (1952) The New Science of Politics: An Introduction, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Vogel, L. (1995) ‘Does Environmental Ethics Need a Metaphysical Grounding?’, 
Hastings Center Report, 25(7), pp.30-39. 
 
Vogel, L. (1996) ‘“The Outcry of Mute Things”: Hans Jonas’s Imperative of 
Responsibility’, in Macauley, D. (ed.), Minding Nature: The Philosophers 
of Ecology, New York: Guildford Press, pp.167-185. 
 
Vogel, L. (2008) ‘Natural-Law Judaism?: The Genesis of Bioethics in Hans 
Jonas, Leo Strauss, and Leon Kass’, in Tirosh-Samuelson, H., and 
Wiese, C. (eds), The Legacy of Hans Jonas: Judaism and the 
[300] 
 
Phenomenon of Life, Leiden: Brill, pp.287-314. 
 
von Uexküll, J. (2010) A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, trans. 
by O’Neil, J. D., Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Vorstenbosch, J. (1993) ‘The Concept of Integrity: Its Significance for the 
Discussion on Biotechnology and Animals’, Livestock Science, 36(1), 
pp.109-112. 
 
Weber, A. (2002) ‘Feeling the Signs: The Origins of Meaning in the Biological 
Philosophy of Suzanne K. Langer and Hans Jonas’, Sign System 
Studies, 30(1), pp.183-199. 
 
Weber, A. and Varela, F. J. (2002) ‘Life After Kant: Natural Purposes and the 
Autopoietic Foundations of Biological Individuality’, Phenomenology and 
the Cognitive Sciences, 1(2), pp.97-125.  
 
Weisskopf, W. A. (2014) ‘Moral Responsibility for the Preservation of 
Humankind’, in Gordon, J.-S., and Burckhart, H. (eds), Global Ethics and 
Moral Responsibilty: Hans Jonas and his Critics, Farnham: Ashgate, 
pp.23-40. 
 
White, L. (1967) ‘The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis’, Science, 
155(3767), pp.1203-1207. 
 
Whitehead, A. N. (1920) The Concept of Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge 




Whitehead, A. N. (1978) Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, ed. by 
Griffin, D. R., and Sherburne, D. W., New York: The Free Press. 
 
Whiteside, K. H. (2006) Precautionary Politics: Principle and Practice in 
Confronting Environmental Risk, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Winner, L. (1977) Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a 
Theme in Political Thought, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Wennemann, D. J. (2013) Posthuman Personhood, Lanham: University Press 
of America. 
 
Wolin, R. (2015) Heidegger’s Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans 











Word Count: 109,182 
